N-CSRS

This report is intended for shareholders of the funds and may not be used as sales literature unless preceded or accompanied by a current prospectus for the iMGP Funds. Statements and other information in this report are dated and are subject to change.

iM Global Partner Fund Management, LLC has ultimate responsibility for the funds’ performance due to its responsibility to oversee its investment managers and recommend their hiring, termination and replacement.

We are deeply committed to making each iMGP Fund a highly satisfying long-term investment for shareholders. In following through on this commitment we are guided by our core values, which influence four specific areas of service:

Second, we will do all we can to ensure that the framework within which our stock pickers do their work further increases the odds of success.

Third, is our commitment to do all we can from an operational standpoint to maximize shareholder returns.

Fourth, is our commitment to communicate honestly about all relevant developments and expectations.

Our commitment to iMGP Funds is also evidenced by our own investment. Our retired founders and current employees have, collectively, substantial investments in the funds, as does our company retirement plan. In addition, we use the funds extensively in the client accounts of our investment advisor practice (through our affiliate Litman Gregory Wealth Management, LLC). We have no financial incentive to do so because the fees we receive from iMGPFunds held in client accounts are fully offset against the advisory fees paid by our clients. In fact, we have a disincentive to use the funds in our client accounts because each iMGP Fund is capacity constrained (they may be closed as mentioned above), and by using them in client accounts we are using up capacity for which we may not be paid. But we believe these funds offer value that we can’t get elsewhere and this is why we enthusiastically invest in them ourselves and on behalf of clients.

While we believe highly in the ability of the Funds’ sub-advisors, our commitments are not intended as guarantees of future results.

While the funds are no-load, there are management fees and operating expenses that do apply, as well as a 12b-1 fee that applies to Investor class shares. Please refer to the prospectus for further details.

Diversification does not assure a profit or protect against loss in a declining market.

Effective December 16, 2021 the name of the PartnerSelect Funds was changed to iMGP Funds.

Effective October 1, 2021 the name of the Advisor to the Funds was changed from Litman Gregory Fund Advisors LLC to iM Global Partner Fund Management LLC.

On September 20, 2021 the iM Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund, iM DBI Managed Future Strategy ETF and iM DBI Hedge Strategy EFT were acquired by the Litman Gregory Funds Trust by merger. Performance reported for each of these funds for periods prior to the merger date represents the performance of the Predecessor Funds.

Each of the funds may invest in foreign securities. Investing in foreign securities exposes investors to economic, political, and market risks and fluctuations in foreign currencies. Each of the funds may invest in the securities of small companies. Small-company investing subjects investors to additional risks, including security price volatility and less liquidity than investing in larger companies. Debt obligations of distressed companies typically are unrated, lower rated, in default or close to default and may become worthless. The International Fund will invest in emerging markets. Investments in emerging market countries involve additional risks such as government dependence on a few industries or resources, government-imposed taxes on foreign investment or limits on the removal of capital from a country, unstable government, and volatile markets. Investments in debt securities typically decrease when interest rates rise. This risk is usually greater for longer-term debt securities. Investments in mortgage-backed securities include additional risks that investor should be aware of including credit risk, prepayment risk, possible illiquidity, and default, as well as increased susceptibility to adverse economic developments. Investments in lower-rated and non-rated securities present a greater risk of loss to principal and interest than higher-rated securities. The funds may invest in master limited partnership units. Investing in MLP units may expose investors to additional liability and tax risks. Derivatives may involve certain costs and risks such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management, and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. Investing in derivatives could lose more than the amount invested. The funds may make short sales of securities, which involves the risk that losses may exceed the original amount invested.

© 2021 Morningstar, Inc. All Rights Reserved. The information contained herein: (1) is proprietary to Morningstar; (2) may not be copied or distributed; and (3) is not warranted to be accurate, complete or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

The iMGP International Fund uses the iShares MSCI AWCI ex U.S. ETF for weightings comparisons because of its readily available information. We believe this particular ETF is the most relevant to our fund and is widely recognized by investors. The iShares MSCI ACWI ex U.S. ETF seeks to track the investment results of an index composed of large- and mid-capitalization non-U.S. equities Its expenses are 0.34% gross and 0.32% net. It may invest up to an aggregate amount of 15% of its assets in illiquid investments. An investment in the ETF is not a bank deposit and it is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency, BFA or any of its affiliates. As with any investment, you could lose all or part of your investment in the ETF and the ETF’s performance could trail that of other investments. The ETF intends to make distributions that may be taxable to you as ordinary income or capital gains, unless you are investing through a tax-deferred arrangement such as a 401(k) plan or an IRA, in which case, your distributions generally will be taxed when withdrawn.

Merger arbitrage investments risk loss if a proposed reorganization in which the fund invests is renegotiated or terminated.

Investments in absolute return strategies are not untended to outperform stocks and bonds during strong market rallies.

Multi-investment management styles may lead to higher transaction expenses compared to single investment management styles. Outcomes depend on the skill of the sub-advisors and advisor and the allocation of assets amongst them.

Performance discussion for the Alternative Strategies and Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Funds is specifically related to the Institutional share class.

Some of the comments are based on current management expectation and are considered “forward-looking statements”. Actual future results, however, may prove to be different from our expectations. You can identify forward-looking statement by words such as “estimate”, “may”, “expect”, “should”, “could”, “believe”, “plan”, and similar terms. We cannot promise future returns and our opinions are a reflection of our best judgment at the time this report is compiled.

Opinions expressed are subject to change, are not guaranteed and should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security.

See pages 10, 18, 23, and 29 for each equity fund’s top contributors. See pages 14, 22, 26, and 31 for each equity fund’s portfolio composition. See pages 34 for the Alternative Strategies Fund’s individual strategy portfolio allocations. See pages 91 for the High Income Alternative Fund’s individual strategy portfolio allocations. Fund holdings and/or sector allocations are subject to change at any time and are not recommendations to buy or sell any security.

Diversification does not assure a profit or protect against a loss in a declining market.

Leverage may cause the effect of an increase or decrease in the value of the portfolio securities to be magnified and the fund to be more volatile than if leverage was not used.

References to other mutual funds should not be interpreted as an offer of these securities.

iM Global Partner Fund Management LLC has ultimate responsibility for the performance of the iMGPFunds due to its responsibility to oversee the investment managers and recommend their hiring, termination and replacement.

Any tax or legal information provided is merely a summary of our understanding and interpretation of some of the current income tax regulations and it is not exhaustive. Investors must consult their tax advisor or legal counsel for advice and information concerning their particular situation. Neither the Funds nor any of their representatives may give legal or tax advice.

Please see page 187 for index definitions. You cannot invest directly in an index.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Index performance is not illustrative of fund performance. An investment cannot be made directly in an index. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the fund may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. To obtain the performance of the funds as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit www.imgpfunds.com. Investment performance reflects fee waivers in effect. In the absence of such waivers, total return would be reduced.

The Equity, International and Alternative Strategies Funds all have contractual fee waivers in effect through April 30, 2023. The Advisor has agreed to limit the expenses of the High Income Alternatives, SBH Focused Small Value, Oldfield International Value and Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Funds through April 30, 2023. See the Prospectus for more information.

Performance does not reflect taxes a shareholder might incur on the sale of shares. Performance does not reflect fees or commissions a shareholder may pay on the purchase or sale of shares.

MSCI index returns source: MSCI. Neither MSCI nor any other party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the MSCI data makes any express or implied warranties or representations with respect to such data (or the results to be obtained by the use thereof), and all such parties hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of such data. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall MSCI, any of its affiliates, or any third party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the data have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential, or any other damages (including lost profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages. No further distribution or dissemination of the MSCI data is permitted without MSCI’s express written consent. Source note: Returns prior to 1999 are the MSCI ACWI ex-US GR index. Returns from 1999 onwards are MSCI ACWI ex-US NR index.

It’s been a rough year, with equity markets down more than 20% and “low-risk” bond markets registering low double-digit losses. The S&P 500 dropped 16.1% for the second quarter and is down 20% for the year, after being down as much as 24% through mid-June. Foreign stocks fared slightly better with Developed international markets (MSCI EAFE Index) down 14.5% for the quarter and 19.6% YTD. Emerging Market stocks (MSCI Emerging Markets Index) held up a bit better, dropping 11.4% for the quarter, and down 17.6% YTD.

Core investment-grade bonds were pummeled again in the second quarter, with the benchmark Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index (the “Agg”) dropping 4.7%. This puts the “safe-haven” Agg down an incredible 10.3% for the year to date — its worst first-half ever. In other segments of the fixed-income market, high-yield bonds (ICE BofA Merrill Lynch U.S. High Yield Cash Pay Index) fell 9.9% and floating rate loans (S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan index) dropped 4.5% for the quarter. For the year to date through the end of June, these indexes are down 14.0% and 4.6%, respectively.

As we have long pointed out, core bonds are not low-risk or defensive assets in an inflationary (rising interest rate) environment. Taken together with the equity bear market, this is by far the worst first-half performance for a traditional “60/40” balanced portfolio (60% S&P 500/40% Aggregate Bond Index) since at least 1950, down 16.1%. The previous worst first half was in 1962, down 12%.

Portfolio diversification into “non-traditional” asset classes, non-core and flexible fixed-income strategies, and alternative strategies can be particularly valuable in an inflationary or stagflationary environment. We saw this in the first half of the year. Trend-following managed futures strategies led the way posting 20%-plus returns, benefiting from short positions in bond and stock markets, and long exposures to commodities and the US dollar. It’s worth noting the benchmark SG Trend Index has now outperformed both global stocks (MSCI ACWI) and core bonds (the Agg) by wide margins over the past three and five years through the end of June.

Given this macro backdrop, the iMGP Funds family offers several strong options that we believe can improve the risk-adjusted performance of a traditional stock/bond balanced portfolio: namely, our DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF, DBi Hedge Strategy ETF, Alternative Strategies Fund, High Income Alternatives Fund, RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF and Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund.

For more risk-tolerant investors, our high-conviction, concentrated equity funds seek to generate long-term capital growth exceeding passive indexes. They can serve as core equity holdings, or as satellite positions around core equity-market index allocations.

We believe the iMGP Funds can fill a valuable role within diversified investment portfolios. Each Fund is sub-advised by highly disciplined, deeply experienced, and skilled investors who we believe can outperform their respective benchmarks and peer groups over full market cycles.

We strongly encourage shareholders to read the enclosed individual fund and ETF semi-annual reports for portfolio manager commentary and performance details.

As always, we thank you for your continued trust and confidence. Our commitment and confidence are reflected in the collective personal investments in the funds by iMGP management, employees, and the Funds’ trustees and portfolio managers of over $15 million, as of June 30, 2022.

The iMGP Equity Fund lost 27.13% in the first half of 2022, lagging the 21.1% decline for the fund’s Russell 3000 Index benchmark and the 19.26% loss for the Morningstar Large Blend category. Since the fund’s inception on December 31, 1996, the fund’s 7.58% annualized return is slightly behind the benchmark return of 8.59% but ahead of its peer group’s 7.13% return.

Of the fund’s six sub-advisors, only one (Nuance Investments) outperformed their respective benchmark in the first half of 2022. Of the remaining managers, one manager (Fiduciary Management) performed in line, while the others underperformed. The fund’s sole growth manager, Sands Capital, suffered one of their worst absolute and relative performances in the six-month period, losing 50.11% and lagging the Russell 1000 Growth benchmark by 22.04% in the period. (Returns are net of sub-advisor management fees.)

In the first half of 2022, both sector allocation and stock selection had negative impacts on performance. It is important to understand that the portfolio is built stock by stock and that sector weightings are a residual of the bottom-up, fundamental stock-picking process employed by each sub-advisor. That said, we do report on the short-term relative performance of both sector weights and stock selection to help shareholders understand the drivers of recent performance. It is also important to remember that the performance of a stock over a relatively short period tells us nothing about whether it will be a successful position; that is only known at the point when the stock is sold.

At the overall sector level, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, and Real Estate were the three contributors. The portfolio’s consumer discretionary exposure benefitted from better relative stock performance, but this was partially offset by an overweight (17.08% vs. 11.45%) to an underperforming sector relative to the benchmark. Within the sector, Amazon.com was a meaningful detractor (down 36.3%) in the period. The stock is owned by both Sands Capital and Davis Advisors. Davis says the stock’s performance reflects the near-term uncertainty in e-commerce growth following accelerated adoption of e-commerce during the pandemic. In addition, excess capacity along with wage and fuel inflation are negatively impacting Amazon’s current e-commerce margins, leading some investors to question whether the e-commerce business is structurally less profitable than previously thought. While Amazon’s cloud business continues to perform very well on both the top and bottom-lines, growth could slow over the next few quarters if concerns about the economy materialize.

Sectors that detracted most from performance in the period were communication services, health care, and energy. The negative impact from communication services was primarily due to stock selection. Sea Limited was a leading detractor, falling 70.11%. Sea is an internet business in Southeast Asia that operates leading platforms for video games (Garena), ecommerce (Shopee), and digital financial services (SeaMonkey). Sands Capital says Sea’s core geographic market benefits from several secular trends—including above-average economic growth, young demographics, and low digital adoption levels—that the team believes will underpin strong growth for its core businesses. Sands says Sea’s shares have contended with several headwinds over the past several quarters, including the sell-off in high-growth, high-valuation stocks and company-specific headwinds (e.g., Tencent’s stock sale and voting restructuring, India’s gaming ban and ecommerce exit, and slowing gaming growth). The market’s elevated focus on near-term profitability has also weighed on Sea, but the company’s first-quarter results strengthened Sands’ conviction in the profit potential of what they view as its biggest growth driver: Shopee, its ecommerce segment.

Shopee grew gross merchandise volume and revenue by 39% and 64%year-over-year, respectively, well ahead of consensus expectations. Loss per order improved in both Southeast Asia & Taiwan, and the company committed to the segment breaking even in 2023. Loss per order also improved in Brazil. Shopee remains the crux of the investment case. Sands believes that Shopee can ultimately account for nearly a fifth of total retail sales in Taiwan and Southeast Asia, with profitability driven by take-rate expansion and cost dilution.

Outside of ecommerce, Sea’s digital financial services business grew revenue 360% year-over-year and losses narrowed to $125 million from $150 million in the prior quarter. Gaming, which Sands doesn’t view as a core growth driver but still attracts investor focus due to its historical importance to the overall business, met expectations. Today, Sands views Sea’s long-term risk/reward profile as among the most attractive in their portfolio. They continue to view the company as the best-positioned business to capture the growth opportunity in Southeast Asia over the next decade as it caters to the population’s underserved retail, financial services, and digital entertainment needs.

Another detractor in communication services was Meta Platforms, which was owned by two managers, Bill Nygren of Harris Associates and Fiduciary Management. FMI’s view is that Meta is the #1 social media company globally, with incredible scale (2.7bn users), network effects, and best-in-class advertising ROI. The company’s ability to evolve its engagement models in a shifting social media landscape highlights its durability. As a result of its leading reach and high engagement, the company has built a dominant position in the secularly growing digital advertising market. There’s opportunity to improve monetization on multiple fronts including the messaging platforms and outside the United States. Meta’s e-commerce and augmented reality/virtual reality efforts also provide optionality. Pricing headwinds from Apple’s iOS changes, a shift of engagement towards Reels which monetizes at a lower rate than Feed and Stories, competition (TikTok), investment spend in the Metaverse, and recession fears have weighed on the stock. The stock has a great balance sheet, better than average long-term growth prospects, and trades at a discount to the market (~12x depressed earnings, before accounting for $44bn of net cash). FMI wants to give management some time to see how they navigate the current fundamental challenges before taking any further action.

While energy exposure was an overall detractor, EOG Resources, owned by Bill Nygren of Harris Associates was a top contributor in the period, gaining 28.83%. In the team’s view, EOG Resources is one of the best positioned U.S. energy companies as its focus on capital productivity made it a true low-cost producer. At a broad level, Nygren believes EOG Resources is a rare exploration and production company that generates unusually high returns on its acreage position while sustaining those returns by reloading the inventory base with additional unusually high-return acres. In his estimation, EOG Resource’s new CEO Ezra Yacob is off to a favorable start, adding on to a management team that strives to optimize operations for value creation and capitalize on positive developments in the external environment.

Specific to the stock’s recent performance, EOG Resources’ share price benefitted from the surge in energy prices in the first quarter due to the crisis in Ukraine. In addition, the company released its fourth-quarter earnings report revealing a 100 basis point increase in oil production year-over-year with capital expenditures flat sequentially and below consensus estimates. Guidance for 2022 remained in-line with estimates, and management plans to increase oil production by 4% year-over-year due to their belief that drilling is the best use of capital with 20 years of premium inventory. Management also believes the company will be able to offset inflation fully with drilling efficiencies. A $1 per share special dividend was awarded to shareholders for the second straight quarter while maintaining the regular $0.75 per share dividend. Despite its strong balance sheet relative to peers, management also said the company intends to build cash in 2022. Later, EOG Resources delivered good first-quarter earnings results, as production grew 2% quarter-over-quarter and finished above consensus expectations. Importantly, Nygren and his team find that the company’s absolute results are solid, and appreciated management’s commitment to returning 60% of its free cash flow to shareholders. They met with EOG’s new CEO Ezra Yacob in the second quarter, who reiterated the company’s goal to reduce finding and development costs every year and organically replenish drilling inventory. EOG also remains ready and willing to buy back stock in a downturn opportunistically.

Within industrials, CK Hutchison Holdings was leading performance contributor in the period. The FMI team says the company is a blue-chip holding conglomerate that owns relatively defensive, quality businesses (telecom, infrastructure, retail, etc.). The company has taken steps to create value over the past couple years (sale-and-leaseback of European tower assets, deconsolidation of Husky Energy, etc.), yet the stock price has barely budged. Despite a strong balance sheet, based on FMI’s estimates the stock trades at around a 50% discount to net asset value. Based on 2022 estimated earnings, the stock trades, at only ~5 times earnings and pays a healthy dividend (5% yield). FMI believes the current stock price undervalues the business. However, sentiment has been weak as the company has been less aggressive with shareholder returns (buying back stock, increasing the dividend) than investors had expected following the tower sale. FMI had written a letter to management and the board to encourage additional activity on this front, but was disappointed with their subsequent conversation with management, and have concerns they may pursue M&A. FMI sold their position in April, and rolled the proceeds into Sodexo, an investment where they have higher conviction: a simple, defensive compounder, which is cheap and out of favor, but one where they have greater confidence in management creating shareholder value.

The Equity Fund portfolio is the result of six bottom-up stock pickers with diverse investment approaches building concentrated portfolios. Therefore, the portfolio often looks quite different from its benchmark. For example, it is common for the fund to have meaningful sector over- or underweights. As of mid-year, the fund was 9.7% overweight to the consumer discretionary sector (20.3% vs. 10.6%) and underweight to the information technology sectors by an equal amount (15.7% vs. 25.5%). The fund is also overweight to the finance and communication services sectors—8.7% and 4.3% overweight relative to Russell 3000 Index, respectively.

The fund’s position in foreign equities increased slightly from the start of the year (up from 15% to 16.2% through mid-year). The fund’s weighted-average market cap stands at close to $240 billion at the end of June, while its median market cap is $39.4 billion (both figures are lower than where they stood at the start of the year).

We believe the fund comprises an eclectic mix of highly skilled, disciplined, and opportunistic stock pickers who have the potential to add significant additional value through concentrating in only their highest-conviction names.

Portfolio Breakdown as of 06/30/2022


By Sector	Fund		Russell 3000		+/-
Finance		20.3%		11.6%		8.7%
Consumer Discretionary		20.3%		10.6%		9.7%
Information Technology		15.7%		25.5%		-9.8%
Communication Services		12.4%		8.1%		4.3%
Health Care & Pharmaceuticals		13.4%		14.9%		-1.5%
Industrials		7.6%		8.9%		-1.2%
Consumer Staples		4.5%		6.4%		-1.9%
Real Estate		2.7%		3.7%		-1.0%
Utilities		0.3%		3.0%		-2.8%
Energy		1.2%		4.4%		-3.2%
Materials		0.0%		2.9%		-2.9%
Cash		1.6%		0.0%		1.6%

iM Global Partner Fund Management, the Investment Advisor for iMGP Equity Fund, is making significant changes to the fund’s line up of Subadvisors that includes the addition of a dedicated small/mid-cap manager as well as expanding each manager’s ability to own their highest-conviction ideas globally (the fund has always had the flexibility to invest globally but it is now a formal part of its investment objective). These changes were made with an effective date of August 1, 2022.

While these changes are material in scope, we believe them to be consistent with the fund’s original premise when it was launched back in 1996. It is with enthusiasm and confidence that we share details and rationale behind these changes.

Current managers Sands Capital, Fiduciary Management Inc., Harris Associates, and Davis [<<clean up names]—all long-time Subadvisors on the fund—were removed effective close of business on July 29, 2022. Polen Capital and Scharf Investments were being added and will manage sleeves alongside Nuance Investments, who will remain on the fund.

In total the new manager line-up includes four separate strategies as outlined below:

The changes are the result of an in-depth analysis focused on configuring a combination of managers we believe to be skilled in a way that can deliver the alpha we expected when we originally launched the fund. It reflects what we’ve learned after decades of research on active managers both in terms of the skills and discipline that give a manager an edge and how to craft and oversee mandates that individually and in combination maximize the odds of success—defined as materially beating a passive benchmark after fees.

We continue to believe, as we did when the fund was launched in 1996, that allowing skilled managers to own only their highest-conviction ideas is better than owning more-diversified portfolios because owning a large number of names leads to more index-like performance. We don’t believe in paying fees that are higher than those charged by index funds to get index-like performance. An additional benefit to these changes is a reduction in the operating expense ratio as IM Global Partner Fund Management has contractually agreed to limit the expenses of the fund to 0.98% through at least April 30, 2023.

We also continue to believe that giving managers latitude in the types of stocks they can own can confer an advantage over managers who are more tightly constrained to a “style box.” Those beliefs underlay the original premise of the fund to seek skilled managers, give them broad flexibility, limit them to their highest-conviction ideas, and create diversification by choosing managers with complementary styles to reduce risk. We believe that the revised configuration of fund preserves, if not enhances, those foundational concepts.

The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP Equity Fund from December 31, 1996 to June 30, 2022 compared with the Russell 3000 Index and Morningstar Large Blend Category

The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


Shares			Value

	COMMON STOCKS: 98.4%

	Communication Services: 12.4%
	3,990	Alphabet, Inc. - Class A*	$	8,695,247
	886	Alphabet, Inc. - Class C*		1,938,081
	2,610	Charter Communications, Inc. - Class A*		1,222,863
	5,600	Liberty Broadband Corp. - Class C*		647,584
	23,850	Meta Platforms, Inc. - Class A*		3,845,813
	10,790	Netflix, Inc.*		1,886,847
	22,898	Sea Ltd. - ADR*		1,530,960
	25,800	Tencent Holdings Ltd. - ADR		1,171,062

				20,938,457


	Consumer Discretionary: 20.3%
	17,010	Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. - ADR*		1,933,697
	50,580	Amazon.com, Inc.*		5,372,102
	2,450	Booking Holdings, Inc.*		4,285,025
	16,150	Dollar General Corp.		3,963,856
	77,280	General Motors Co.*		2,454,413
	25,810	Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc.		2,876,266
	22,860	JD.com, Inc. - ADR		1,468,069
	23,190	Lear Corp.		2,919,389
	6,600	Lithia Motors, Inc.		1,813,746
	42,440	Prosus N.V. - ADR		555,540
	36,000	Sodexo S.A.*		2,527,263
	25,900	Sony Group Corp.		2,117,772
	28,355	Thor Industries, Inc.		2,118,969

				34,406,107


	Consumer Staples: 4.5%
	76,290	Beiersdorf AG - ADR		1,556,316
	14,097	Cal-Maine Foods, Inc.		696,533
	8,744	Clorox Co. (The)		1,232,729
	164,319	Henkel AG & Co. KGaA - ADR		2,507,508
	12,181	Kimberly-Clark Corp.		1,646,262

				7,639,348


	Energy: 1.2%
	18,400	EOG Resources, Inc.		2,032,096


	Financials: 20.3%
	77,300	Ally Financial, Inc.		2,590,323
	44,300	Bank of America Corp.		1,379,059
	41,015	Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (The)		1,710,736
	14	Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. - Class A*		5,725,300
	11,400	Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. - Class B*		3,112,428
	56,360	Capital One Financial Corp.		5,872,149
	44,050	Charles Schwab Corp. (The)		2,783,079
	44,600	Citigroup, Inc.		2,051,154
	759,900	GoHealth, Inc. - Class A*		454,344
	17,000	Reinsurance Group of America, Inc.		1,993,930
	4,779	Travelers Cos., Inc. (The)		808,272
	40,320	US Bancorp		1,855,526
	104,640	Wells Fargo & Co.		4,098,749

				34,435,049


	Health Care: 13.4%
	22,049	Baxter International, Inc.		1,416,207
	9,730	Cigna Corp.		2,564,050
	40,359	Dentsply Sirona, Inc.		1,442,027
	27,772	DexCom, Inc.*		2,069,847
	19,517	Edwards Lifesciences Corp.*		1,855,872
	5,923	ICU Medical, Inc.*		973,682


Shares			Value

	Health Care (continued)
	85,400	Koninklijke Philips N.V.	$	1,837,637
	51,665	LivaNova Plc*		3,227,513
	90,583	Smith & Nephew Plc - ADR		2,529,077
	6,600	UnitedHealth Group, Inc.		3,389,958
	8,852	Universal Health Services, Inc. - Class B		891,485
	4,624	Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc.		485,797

				22,683,152


	Industrials: 7.6%
	17,475	Carlisle Cos., Inc.		4,169,710
	24,325	Ferguson Plc		2,718,518
	24,575	General Electric Co.		1,564,690
	95,900	KAR Auction Services, Inc.*		1,416,443
	33,229	Knorr-Bremse AG - ADR		472,849
	31,350	PACCAR, Inc.		2,581,359

				12,923,569


	Information Technology: 15.7%
	1,019	Adyen N.V.*^(a)		1,480,635
	9,454	Atlassian Corp. Plc - Class A*		1,771,680
	24,127	Block, Inc.*		1,482,845
	15,040	Cloudflare, Inc. - Class A*		658,000
	34,190	Intel Corp.		1,279,048
	4,994	Intuit, Inc.		1,924,887
	36,000	Micron Technology, Inc.		1,990,080
	6,774	ServiceNow, Inc.*		3,221,172
	27,500	Shopify, Inc. - Class A*		859,100
	8,898	Snowflake, Inc. - Class A*		1,237,356
	29,270	TE Connectivity Ltd.		3,311,901
	9,512	Twilio, Inc. - Class A*		797,201
	33,636	Visa, Inc. - Class A		6,622,592

				26,636,497


	Real Estate: 2.7%
	22,300	CBRE Group, Inc. - Class A*		1,641,503
	99,500	Cushman & Wakefield Plc*		1,516,380
	49,303	Equity Commonwealth - REIT*		1,357,311

				4,515,194


	Utilities: 0.3%
	19,065	United Utilities Group Plc - ADR		482,726


	TOTAL COMMON STOCKS (Cost $145,045,995)			166,692,195


Principal Amount

	SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS: 1.6%

	REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS: 1.6%
	$2,682,037	Fixed Income Clearing Corp. 0.240%, 6/30/2022, due 07/01/2022 [collateral: par value $1,313,900, U.S. Treasury Inflation Index Bond, 3.625%, due 04/15/2028 value $2,736,138] (proceeds $2,682,055)		2,682,037


	TOTAL SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS (Cost $2,682,037)			2,682,037


	TOTAL INVESTMENTS (Cost: $147,728,032): 100.0%			169,374,232


	Other Assets in Excess of Liabilities: 0.0%			7,369


	NET ASSETS: 100.0%		$	169,381,601

SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES at June 30, 2022 (Unaudited) (Continued)

The iMGP International Fund lost 22.46% in the first half of 2022, lagging the 19.57% decline for the fund’s MSCI EAFE benchmark and the 19.25% loss for the Morningstar Foreign Large Blend category. Since the fund’s inception on December 1, 1997, the fund’s 5.93% annualized return is ahead of both the benchmark return of 4.35% and its peer group’s 3.63% return. Note that effective October 1, 2021 the fund changed its primary benchmark from the MSCI ACWI Index to the MSCI EAFE Index to reflect the current managers’ emphasis on investing in developed markets.

Of the fund’s three sub-advisors, only one (Mark Little, Lazard Asset Management) outperformed their respective benchmark in the first half of 2022. David Herro (Harris Associates) underperformed his value benchmark, while the Polen Capital team trailed their growth benchmark.

Selection within three sectors—industrials, information technology, and materials—contributed to returns in the first half of 2022. The portfolio’s industrial exposure benefited from CAE, a Canadian provider of pilot training services primarily for the civil aviation and defense markets. This holding is owned by Mark Little, who believes the company has exposure to the structural increase in demand for pilots, given the growth in air travel, aging demographics of certified pilots, and the ongoing regulatory requirement to maintain pilot skills. As the pandemic ensued, management has taken costs out of the business and has made accretive acquisitions, positioning the company to be larger and more profitable in the recovery. Now, pilots laid off during the pandemic are starting to work again and have urgent training requirements, leading to significant order intake for CAE’s civil business. On the defense side, the company has won a record number of orders from their pipeline before defense budget increases were announced—putting its book-to-bill ratio above 1x for the first time in four years. Additionally, CAE is the training provider for the German Air Force so should benefit from material defense spending increases in coming years.

Glencore, owned by David Herro, had a strong first half and was a leading contributor within the materials sector.

Herro notes that his team likes that Glencore is run by smart, hyper-competitive and value-focused managers with a focus on improving asset returns. In his estimation, Glencore differentiates itself from other miners with its trading business that provides high returns and cash flow with low cyclicality and significant barriers to entry. They appreciate the company’s leading market positions in attractive commodities and believe existing mining operations will benefit from normalized prices, higher volumes, lower costs, and the move towards a low carbon economy.

In Herro’s view, Glencore delivered a solid fiscal year 2021 earnings report as financial metrics improved materially year-over-year. In the marketing segment, earnings handily bested expectations ($3.7 billion vs. $3.5 billion). In metals, earnings increased to $2.5 billion from $1.7 billion for the year-ago period due to strong demand, supply constraints and inventory drawdowns. Herro’s team met with CEO Gary Nagle and CFO Steve Kalmin and discussed the massive impact the crisis in Ukraine is having on Glencore’s markets. As customers bypass Russian oil, natural gas and coal, the tightened supply translated to large price increases. In particular, European nations are now buying coal at elevated prices as a replacement for Russian natural gas, leading to stronger than expected free cash flow. Management also noted that the company now has 27 assets either in sale processes or under consideration on top of the nine assets already sold as part of the

portfolio simplification. In April, the company’s first-quarter production report showed strong performance from coal, which Herro found important given the high prices in the first quarter. Later, Glencore reached settlements for the U.S., U.K. and Brazil investigations with figures that look to align with the $1.5 billion provision from fiscal year 2021. Herro appreciates that Glencore is in strong financial shape in terms of its balance sheet and current cash flow generation and believe the company is well positioned to move forward with dividends and share repurchase programs. In June, Glencore provided a positive trading update, as marketing earnings for the first-half are expected to exceeded $3.2 billion, which is the at the top end of the company’s long-term earnings range for a fiscal year.

Despite overall stock selection being negative in the health care sector, the fund’s top contributor in the first half of 2022 was Bayer (owned by Herro). In his determination, Bayer’s merger with Monsanto creates the best agriculture business in the world within its vertical markets in terms of size and quality. Despite some recent glyphosate-related litigation issues, he believes Bayer’s collaboration with Monsanto should deliver benefits to its crop sciences business from increased channel access in the U.S. thanks to Monsanto’s direct dealings with farmers and expanded application of its seed growth solutions on additional quantities of Monsanto seed, which would afford a pathway to near-term revenue synergies. Bayer’s pharmaceutical business developed blood thinning drug XARELTO^®, which is in wide use and has an excellent outlook over the medium-term, in Herro’s view, given that its patent is held until at least 2023 (or beyond depending on the country). In addition to its crop sciences and pharmaceutical businesses, Bayer is a leading global provider of over-the-counter consumer health products and possesses a robust portfolio of brands (including Aleve^™, Alka Seltzer^™, Claritin^™, Afrin^™ and MiraLAX^™, among others), which supports a healthy level of continuing cash flow.

Bayer reported strong earnings results for 2021, in Herro’s view, with growth exceeding expectations across divisions. Notably, the crop science division delivered 11% growth, staging a robust recovery following two years of an agriculture downcycle and competitive challenges. Management’s increased guidance for crop sciences in 2022 calls for 7% organic growth and a 25-26% margin, which Herro believes is a key positive for the segment as it signals a long-awaited favorable transition toward profitable growth. In the pharmaceuticals division, revenue growth of more than 7% also bested expectations, supported by a strong recovery of Eylea, continued growth of Xarelto and the ramp of new products. Moreover, Bayer’s pipeline enjoyed notable successes in the period, including a favorable read-out for cancer drug Nubeqa. The Harris Associate’s team spoke with Bayer CFO Wolfgang Nickl who noted that tailwinds are robust in the business today. Notably, he expressed confidence in both the pricing and competitive backdrop in the crop sciences business as rate increases are layering into sales growth and cost cuts begin to come through. Bayer’s first quarter earnings report showed strength, in Herro’s view, surpassing consensus estimates across the board. In the crop business, growth accelerated 60% from herbicides as industry-wide capacity shortages led to windfall pricing and volume share gains for the company. However, supply and demand for glyphosate is expected to normalize in the second half of 2022. Without the tailwind from herbicides, the crop business still grew over 10% and margins improved ahead of forecasts as well. Strong consumer growth persisted and is now 27% above pre-Covid-19 levels. The pharma segment was the weakest as sales were pressured by volume-based pricing impacts on Xarelto, this is consistent with expectations and management still expects roughly flat product revenue for the year.

Turning to portfolio detractors for the period, ICON was a material drag on performance within the health care sector. The co-portfolio manager team at Polen Capital contends that ICON remains one of the world’s largest contract research organizations, structuring, administering, and delivering successful drug trial outcomes for the global biopharma industry. ICON completed a transformational acquisition in July 2021 when it acquired PRA Health Sciences, a deal that roughly doubled the company’s breadth and reach. The integration is going well with minimal employee and customer attrition. The team believes the company is well positioned to grow sales and profits at a steady clip in the coming five years. Deal synergies are being realized, including the tax benefits accruing from ICON’s Ireland domicile being applied to PRA’s US operations. Shares have underperformed this year as ICON’s valuation multiple compressed. Though some investors harbor cyclical concerns about early-stage funding drying up for venture backed biotech companies, such businesses account for less than 15% of ICON’s revenues. Further, management does not believe this cohort is at risk for funding shortfalls. Polen is looking through investor concerns and believes ICON’s business has superior scale and process management capabilities enabling it to win share within a steadily growing market. These views support Polen’s conviction that ICON can continue growing its earnings at a mid-teens rate for the next five years. Shares trade at ~17x forward 12 months earnings.

Although overall stock selection within the information technology sector was positive for the fund in the first half of 2022, Worldline, owned by Herro, was a large detractor. Herro appreciates Worldline’s position as a leader in European payments, and believes it has a long growth runway ahead due to Europe’s lower cashless penetration and higher levels of bank payment in-sourcing when compared to the U.S. He believes the payments industry is structurally attractive with high recurring revenues, low customer churn and strong free cash flow generation. In Herro’s view, Worldline’s revenue acceleration, which is driven by e-commerce business, travel recovery and synergy opportunities, is underappreciated by the market.

Early in the first quarter, Worldline completed its acquisition of Axepta Italy, a strategic partnership with BNL. It now owns 80% of Axepta Italy, which is a significant bank acquirer in the country. The partnership with BNL is in merchant services and is part of Worldine’s strategy to increase its presence across Europe. Worldline later posted strong fiscal year earnings results as revenue (EUR 3.69 billion vs. EUR 3.66 billion) and free cash flow (EUR 407 million vs. EUR 390 million) exceeded analysts’ estimates. Herro appreciated that fourth-quarter organic growth reached 12% versus the year-ago period and improved about 7% on a two-year basis, driven by merchant services’ 15.1% organic growth year-over-year. Moreover, Worldline’s organic revenues continued to progressively improve each quarter in 2021, leading to 6.8% organic growth for the full year, and margins improved 220 basis points in 2021 to reach 25.3%. The company also entered into an

agreement with Apollo Funds for the sale of its terminals, solutions & services business for a total consideration of EUR 2.3 billion in February. Management also struck a bullish tone on deal prospects in the coming year and highlighted that its pipeline is as full as it has ever been. Worldline also released an update on its exposure to the situation in Ukraine. It is enforcing all applicable sanctions and confirmed its exposure to business related to Russia was limited, accounting for just 1.5% of estimated 2021 pro forma revenue. Later, the company delivered a strong set of first-quarter earnings results, as exhibited by its 15.3% growth, of which 11.6% was organic growth. The merchant acquiring business drove much of this growth given: (1) the continued double-digit growth of the merchant count, (2) strong recovery in offline retail and travel, (3) ongoing cash to cashless transitions and (4) recent mergers and acquisitions. In addition, Worldline announced that CFO Eric Heurtaux would step down and be replaced by Gregory Lambertie who currently runs strategy, mergers and acquisitions and public/regulatory affairs at Worldline. In Herro’s estimation, the replacement could prove to be a good upgrade. The Harris Associates team met with CEO Gilles Grapinet in June, who expressed that the business is doing well, supported by a healthy European consumer in the second quarter. Overall, the investment thesis for the company remains intact.

Stock selection within the consumer discretionary sector was negative over the first six months. Evolution Gaming, owned by the team at Polen Capital, was a headwind to performance. They own Evolution Gaming because it is the world’s premier digital back-end solutions provider to the gaming industry. The business is poised to enjoy secular growth for a generation as gaming transforms from a destination-based experience to one enjoyed at home. Over the next 10-20 years, they believe gaming will increasingly shift out of the casino and into consumers’ homes via digital connectivity over the internet, cellular devices and connected TVs. This transition is just beginning in some important markets like the US and should largely flow through Evolution Gaming’s solutions. The company white labels live gaming so that casino operators can engage with consumers by offering a full suite of games from slots to game shows, to table games. The front-end experience bears the casino operator’s branding and management, but the games are administered by Evolution. Over the last quarter Evolution shares underperformed as investor sentiment soured on consumer discretionary businesses. This is linked to macro-oriented fears that consumer spending could wane from here. At roughly 20x forward 12-month earnings the team feels the stock is compellingly valued now given a long-term view that the company can compound earnings at greater than 20% per annum.

The International Fund portfolio is the result of three bottom-up stock pickers with diverse investment approaches building concentrated portfolios. Therefore, the portfolio often looks quite different from its benchmark. For example, it is common for the fund to have meaningful sector over- or underweights. As of mid-year, the fund was 8.3% overweight to the technology sector (16.1% vs. 7.8%) and underweight to the consumer staples and materials sectors by 6.0% and 6.3%, respectively. There were no significant changes in sector weightings over the first half of the year.

The fund’s position across different countries and regions did not materially change since the start of 2022. A significant overweight to Europe (84.4% versus 63.1% in the index) remains in place. The fund also remains without exposure to Japan—which is a 22.3% weighting with the index.


By Sector	Fund		iShares EAFE ETF		+/-
Finance		20.3%		17.6%		2.7%
Consumer Discretionary		14.2%		11.3%		2.9%
Information Technology		16.1%		7.8%		8.3%
Communication Services		9.0%		5.0%		4.0%
Health Care & Pharmaceuticals		9.9%		13.8%		-3.9%
Industrials		14.4%		14.9%		-0.5%
Consumer Staples		4.8%		10.9%		-6.0%
Real Estate		0.0%		2.9%		-2.9%
Utilities		5.5%		3.5%		1.9%
Energy		0.0%		4.7%		-4.7%
Materials		1.2%		7.5%		-6.3%
Cash		4.6%		0.0%		4.6%


By Region	Fund		iShares EAFE ETF		+/-
Europe		84.4%		63.1%		21.3%
North America		5.4%		1.0%		4.3%
Asia ex-Japan		5.4%		4.8%		0.7%
Japan		0.0%		22.3%		-22.3%
Latin America		1.4%		0.1%		1.3%
Africa		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Australia/New Zealand		0.0%		8.0%		-8.0%
Middle East		3.4%		0.7%		2.7%
Other Countries		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%

* Cash is excluded from calculation.

The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP International Fund from December 1, 1997 to June 30, 2022 compared with the MSCI EAFE Index and Morningstar Foreign Large Blend Category.

The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does no imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


Shares			Value

	COMMON STOCKS: 94.9%

	Argentina: 0.6%
	2,300	MercadoLibre, Inc.*	$	1,464,801


	Australia: 1.2%
	566,700	Glencore Plc*		3,068,475


	Canada: 2.7%
	272,913	CAE, Inc.*		6,725,296


	China: 5.9%
	3,562,000	China Longyuan Power Group Corp. Ltd. - Class H		6,947,418
	73,314	Prosus N.V.*		4,840,111
	66,300	Tencent Holdings Ltd.		3,010,761

				14,798,290


	Denmark: 2.0%
	38,531	Carlsberg A/S - Class B		4,909,474


	Finland: 2.6%
	150,318	Sampo Oyj - Class A		6,539,083


	France: 10.7%
	120,000	BNP Paribas S.A.		5,707,554
	567,425	Engie S.A.		6,578,855
	6,290	Kering S.A.		3,264,592
	7,510	LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE		4,629,804
	173,600	Worldline S.A.*^(a)		6,415,218

				26,596,023


	Germany: 20.7%
	30,575	Adidas AG		5,401,855
	24,160	Allianz SE		4,607,158
	58,300	Bayer AG		3,460,171
	53,091	Continental AG		3,695,864
	91,291	CTS Eventim AG & Co. KGaA*		4,778,455
	94,115	Daimler AG		5,440,705
	157,718	Daimler Truck Holding AG*		4,111,940
	197,602	Hensoldt AG		4,985,760
	90,780	SAP SE		8,261,616
	132,520	Siemens Healthineers AG^(a)		6,729,374

				51,472,898


	Ireland: 6.8%
	41,110	ICON Plc*		8,908,537
	120,314	Ryanair Holdings Plc - ADR*		8,091,117

				16,999,654


	Israel: 3.2%
	1,526,215	Israel Discount Bank Ltd. - Class A		7,993,233


	Italy: 1.4%
	434,618	GVS SpA^(a)*		3,552,542


	Mexico: 1.4%
	410,270	Grupo Televisa SAB - ADR		3,356,009


	Netherlands: 5.3%
	8,660	ASML Holding N.V.		4,175,169
	73,728	EXOR N.V.		4,622,483
	222,163	Universal Music Group N.V.		4,483,910

				13,281,562


	South Korea: 1.2%
	15,610	NAVER Corp.		2,896,096


Shares			Value

	Spain: 4.1%
	110,740	Amadeus IT Group S.A.*	$	6,215,320
	215,590	Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy S.A.*		4,065,869

				10,281,189


	Sweden: 2.6%
	71,582	Evolution AB^(a)		6,511,239


	Switzerland: 4.3%
	1,099,738	Credit Suisse Group AG*		6,257,993
	51,650	Temenos AG		4,405,386

				10,663,379


	United Kingdom: 10.4%
	358,184	CNH Industrial N.V.		4,152,855
	138,595	Coca-Cola European Partners Plc		7,106,935
	604,211	Informa Plc*		3,890,796
	10,592,750	Lloyds Banking Group Plc		5,459,609
	699,870	Sage Group Plc (The)		5,408,685

				26,018,880


	United States: 7.8%
	17,743	Accenture Plc - Class A		4,926,344
	33,916	Aon Plc - Class A		9,146,467
	60,104	Medtronic Plc		5,394,334

				19,467,145


	TOTAL COMMON STOCKS (Cost $274,800,048)			236,595,268


Principal Amount

	SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS: 3.4%

	REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS: 3.4%
	$8,588,473	Fixed Income Clearing Corp. 0.240%, 6/30/2022, due 07/01/2022 [collateral: par value $4,207,100, U.S. Treasury Inflation Index Bond, 3.625%, due 04/15/2028 value $8,761,096] (proceeds $8,588,530)		8,588,473


	TOTAL SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS (Cost $8,588,473)			8,588,473


	TOTAL INVESTMENTS (Cost: $283,388,521): 98.3%			245,183,741


	Other Assets in Excess of Liabilities: 1.7%			4,254,600


	NET ASSETS: 100.0%		$	249,438,341

Percentages are stated as a percent of net assets.

ADR	American Depositary Receipt

L.P.	Limited Partnership

*	Non-Income Producing Security.

(a)	Security was purchased pursuant to Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933 and may be sold in transactions exempt from registration only to qualified institutional buyers or in a public offering registered under Securities Act of 1933.

The iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund declined 16.72% in the six-month period, compared to losses of 12.12% for the MSCI EAFE Value Index and a 13.30% decline for the Morningstar Foreign Large Value Category.

In the first six months of 2022, the iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund and its MSCI EAFE Value benchmark fell by less than the broader MSCI EAFE Index. Value is doing better, as one might expect, given its propensity to have lower starting valuations and is helping protect capital in the current environment. At the end of June, the Financial Times reported that equity markets had suffered their worst first half performance in more than 50 years after the declines seen so far in 2022, triggered by the Federal Reserve curtailing Quantitative Easing. Risks remain around further de-rating and earnings expectations. At the stock level, companies are facing severe margin pressures across the board owing to rising interest rates, wages, input costs, pricing pressures and concerns around end demand.

The stocks with the biggest negative impact on relative performance during the period were, Embraer (-51%, total return in local currency), Siemens (-34%), easyJet (-34%), E.on (31%) and Samsung Electronics (-27%).

The share price of Embraer, the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer and leading global producer of regional jets, has been weak given the month-long shutdown in production announced earlier in the year. This is due to a final re-integration of the commercial aviation unit after the aborted bid by Boeing. In addition, the collapse of investor appetite for Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, or SPACS, has also impacted Embraer’s SPAC for its EVE unit. EVE is developing a short range electric vertical take-off and landing ‘flying taxi’ seating five people that will aim to replace helicopters and some taxi routes primarily in urban settings. Whilst we acknowledge that this remains a somewhat speculative endeavour it has more chance of success than most with Embraer’s excellent engineering track record, a €5bn order backlog and targeting commercial operations by 2026. We do not include this in our valuation and yet some analysts are valuing this well in excess of the entire market value of Embraer. Embraer continues to recover from its COVID induced collapse and we see its intrinsic value as significantly higher than today’s level.

Siemens, as a German industrial, has been impacted by the ongoing conflict in the Ukraine which threatens the supply of energy to Germany which is heavily reliant on Russian gas which accounted for some 55% of Germany’s gas consumption (40% for Europe as a whole) before the war. These concerns were heightened by Russia curtailing supplies through the existing Nord Stream 1 pipeline seemingly to prevent Germany building gas inventories over the summer months. We believe the impact on the fundamentals of Siemens has been more than priced into the shares. Earnings projections for Siemens remain flat over the last six months and we note that it is now a global business with only 28% of its workforce based in Germany. If we strip out the current market value of the Siemens Healthineers business which has a separate listing, the forward PE for the Siemens group is around 8x which is very low for the quality of this business. Concerns around energy supply have also impacted E.on, which as the main German energy networks business which should be a relatively defensive share in more normal times. Its valuation has now fallen to 9x price-to-earnings when a more normalised valuation level of 14x is deemed appropriate. It now offers an attractive dividend yield of 6.3% which is 1.8x covered.

The global airline sector has been up ended by COVID followed by the oil price increase. We are witnessing the pent-up demand for foreign holidays recover which paradoxically is shown by the chaos at European airports. The recovery in demand is greater than available airport capacity. These issues should be ironed out over the next few months. Delays in giving airport staff security clearance were one of the main reasons highlighted by the industry for continued travel disruption. The UK’s Department for Transport states that the time taken for security clearance is now 10 days, half the time it took in March. Leisure travel is seen as discretionary spend and hence vulnerable in any downturn. However, given the recovery, as we emerge from two years of COVID induced lockdowns, it is evident that consumers are starting to prioritize services over goods in their spending. We hold a leading low-cost airline in easyJet, who will not only out-compete their legacy rivals but also benefit from consumers trading down.

The stocks with the largest positive impact on the strategy’s relative performance were, in order of their impact, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) (+81%, total return in local currency), Bayer (+25%), BT Group (+10%), Sanofi (+13%) and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (+19%).

MHI, the Japanese industrial conglomerate covering sectors such as energy, aviation, and logistics, is the biggest contributor to fund performance year to date, providing a total return of +81% in local currency terms and, despite the weakness of the Yen, +54% in US dollar terms. In its Energy business it is one of the world’s largest suppliers of power installations from gas turbines to nuclear. Clearly in a world where energy security concerns will be elevated, it has numerous businesses which are highly relevant. It is also a leader in the growing areas of hydrogen and carbon capture technologies that will be needed to reach Net Zero targets. At the end of December last year, Seiji Izumisawa, the Chief Executive of MHI briefed reporters that the group could require a sweeping overhaul and restructuring to focus the group on businesses with the strongest opportunity set. We have been engaging on this issue with the company since we bought the shares in 2017. MHI’s shares were strong from the start of 2022 on the back of the CEO’s comments but since the war in Ukraine began investors have also noted that MHI is Japan’s largest defence contractor.

Over the period, we completed the sales of Nokia and Kansai Electric Power and the purchase of a new position in LG Household & Health Care (LG H&H). In March, we switched some of the Sanofi holding that had been defensive into Fresenius that had suffered a weak share price after its poorly handled results day announcement. LG H&H is a Korean consumer goods company with three core businesses: Home Care & Daily Beauty (HDB), Cosmetics, and Refreshments. Since IPO in 2001, Cosmetics comprise 70% of operating profit and has grown rapidly over the last decade at about 14% per annum, driven primarily by its luxury skin care brand “The History of Whoo” in China. A large part of Whoo sales are to Chinese consumers through resellers buying the products in duty free stores in Korea. This channel has been hit by COVID-related travel restrictions which has seen a 97% fall in Chinese tourist numbers visiting South Korea which has led resellers to seek price discounts. It continues to be impacted by the continued lockdowns in China. On any relaxation of the COVID-related travel restrictions between China and Korea, we expect the revenues to increase. LG H&H’s shares have more than halved in price since their January 2021 peak. We view fair value at 50% above the prevailing price on a two-year view. We have now also taken a third bite in easyJet and hence have reached our limits in adding to that position, with the second bite being the participation in the rights issue. The weighted average upside in the portfolio is now at 55% this this is one of the highest levels seen in recent years.


By Sector	Fund		iShares EAFE Value ETF		+/-
Finance		21.7%		25.1%		-3.4%
Consumer Discretionary		9.6%		8.5%		1.1%
Information Technology		4.3%		2.6%		1.7%
Communication Services		7.5%		6.4%		1.2%
Health Care & Pharmaceuticals		15.3%		10.4%		4.9%
Industrials		17.8%		10.2%		7.6%
Consumer Staples		12.1%		8.0%		4.0%
Real Estate		0.0%		4.6%		-4.6%
Utilities		3.1%		6.0%		-2.9%
Energy		4.4%		8.8%		-4.4%
Materials		0.0%		9.4%		-9.4%
Cash		4.2%		0.0%		4.2%


By Region	Fund		iShares EAFE Value ETF		+/-
Europe		60.4%		63.5%		-3.1%
North America		0.0%		0.8%		-0.8%
Asia ex-Japan		17.1%		4.4%		12.7%
Japan		19.4%		22.6%		-3.2%
Latin America		3.1%		0.2%		2.9%
Africa		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%
Australia/New Zealand		0.0%		7.9%		-7.9%
Middle East		0.0%		0.7%		-0.7%
Other Countries		0.0%		0.0%		0.0%

The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund from November 30, 2020 to June 30, 2022 compared with the MSCI EAFE Value Index and Morningstar Foreign Large Value Category.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


Shares			Value

	COMMON STOCKS: 93.3%

	Brazil: 3.0%
	72,300	Embraer S.A. - ADR*	$	634,794


	China: 3.9%
	58,700	Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.*		837,296


	France: 4.4%
	9,324	Sanofi		941,906


	Germany: 17.9%
	22,397	Bayer AG		1,329,287
	79,094	E.ON SE		662,899
	32,623	Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA		987,447
	8,244	Siemens AG		838,174

				3,817,807


	Italy: 4.4%
	78,302	Eni SpA		929,234


	Japan: 18.6%
	10,600	East Japan Railway Co.		542,314
	26,500	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.		927,481
	212,800	Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc.		1,138,501
	188,600	Nomura Holdings, Inc.		689,770
	42,700	Toyota Motor Corp.		657,562

				3,955,628


	Netherlands: 4.1%
	14,037	EXOR N.V.		880,070


	South Korea: 12.5%
	12,189	KT&G Corp.		771,569
	1,842	LG H&H Co. Ltd.		965,301
	847	Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. - GDR		924,077

				2,660,947


	Sweden: 3.4%
	85,855	Svenska Handelsbanken AB - Class A		733,641


	United Kingdom: 21.1%
	708,527	BT Group Plc		1,606,534
	191,899	easyJet Plc*		857,258
	2,313,079	Lloyds Banking Group Plc		1,192,184
	268,677	Tesco Plc		835,026

				4,491,002


	TOTAL COMMON STOCKS (Cost $23,199,453)			19,882,325


	PREFERRED STOCK: 2.6%

	Germany: 2.6%
	8,319	Porsche Automobil Holding SE - (Preference Shares)		549,706


	TOTAL PREFERRED STOCK (Cost $625,505)			549,706


	TOTAL INVESTMENTS (Cost: $23,824,958): 95.9%			20,432,031


	Other Assets in Excess of Liabilities: 4.1%			878,759


	NET ASSETS: 100.0%		$	21,310,790

The iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund fell 19.78% in the first half of 2022, finishing the period behind the 17.31% loss for the Russell 2000 Value Index benchmark, and the 15.10% decline for the Morningstar Small Value category. Since the fund’s inception in July 2020, the fund has gained 10.92% compared to the 20.17% gain for the benchmark.

When it comes to our outlook and positioning, there are two issues that currently frame our thinking. First, supply chain issues continue to plague corporate America. Many of the companies in the portfolio have struggled to show an effective turnaround. The economic slowdown should help this situation and lead to improved production runs, as well as demonstrate the improvements implemented by management teams in recent quarters. There were glimpses of the supply chain improvement and improving visibility of production efficiencies early this year until the Russia/Ukraine war occurred followed shortly by the zero-COVID lockdowns in China which wreaked havoc on normalcy. While we are disappointed by these circumstances, we believe the management teams are pragmatic and creative when identifying solutions that will service customers. Indeed, in meeting with management teams this quarter, we were taken aback to learn that many of them were hoping for a recession to help reset demand factors, in order to speed up the return to “normal” supply chains. The Federal Reserve (Fed) seems to be focused on facilitating this outcome given its recent tightening of interest rates and consequently the cost of capital and liquidity dynamics. While we do not wish for recessions, we believe the portfolio’s companies can manage downturns due to their focus on return improvement.

The other source of disappointment for us during the quarter was our downside capture. This was atypical for our portfolio and due almost exclusively to our significant underexposure to Energy. The sector was a significant headwind during the second quarter (and first half of the year), exacerbated by Energy being over 10% of the index weight (the June Russell index reconstitution cut Energy’s percentage in half). The Russia/Ukraine war materially benefited the sector’s outperformance which is highly dependent on the disruption continuing and global demand holding up. We focus on management teams that have self-help and significant improvement in rates of change on Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) through better decision making and an improved overall focus on culture, incentives, and governance. Companies in the Energy sector offer limited control on many of these factors with profit performance often predicated on the “spot” price of an underlying commodity as opposed to “good people doing the right thing.” For this reason, the portfolio has been historically underweight the sector. At times, this will hurt performance.

As we look to the second half of 2022, we are faced with the daunting task of trying to understand the macro environment and anticipate the effects of the many moving parts well outside the normal economic cycle factors. What we see is not encouraging from an overall economic perspective given the significant increase in interest rates and, accordingly, costs of capital. Additionally, margins broadly are being negatively impacted by the inflation backdrop while demand destruction has just begun. Historically, as companies’ margins degrade, employment starts to show weakening signs. The slew of companies which were able to raise capital over the last couple of years, companies that in our view should not have received a dime under normal capital outlay scenarios, will be facing a reckoning should policymakers be dedicated to getting things back into balance. Until the global central bankers stop the tightening of conditions on a rate of change basis, volatility will remain (inflation-driven bear markets historically are some of the most volatile).

If there is any bright spot in such a scenario, it is that companies executing on well-conceived plans to allocate capital will thrive while those who relied on perpetual easy money will fall by the wayside. Trying to determine whether the monetary authorities or Congress will have the political fortitude to stay the course and let inflationary pressures subside and allow interest rates to find their own level or not is close to being a fool’s errand. We think focusing on putting your capital with management teams that respect capital, proactively prepare

for negative shocks, and can withstand a period of less than robust economic conditions are of utmost importance, and a far better use of our time. We have raised our cash levels over the last few months to improve liquidity in order to redeploy capital into an increasing number of what we feel are attractive opportunities, some of which have already pulled back 80% to 90% over the last year with plenty of financial flexibility and should be positioned for secular tailwinds. We believe the coming months will prove to be some of the most critical in our investment career given the rates of change and systemic risks. We clearly are not perfect, but we are constantly seeking ways to improve our growing team. As always, we appreciate your interest and vote of confidence in our philosophy and process.

The three sectors that contributed most to the portfolio’s performance relative to its benchmark in the first half of year were Real Estate (driven by selection), Health Care (driven by allocation), and Communication Services (driven by allocation). Real Estate holding Equity Commonwealth was a top contributor on an individual stock basis. Company management team has remained extremely patient in deploying capital over the last couple of years as it was not seeing attractive risk-adjusted return opportunities. As interest rates have risen and overall economic activity is at risk of entering a recession, we see a solid backdrop for the company to be in an enviable position of deploying its significant cash holdings into mispriced opportunities in the market.

Another key stock contributor in the period was Modine Manufacturing, a maker of automotive components. The stock’s performance was driven by the company’s new CEO’s significant rejuvenation of the organization. The management team has adopted a simplification approach to all revenue streams which is eliminating complexity and driving both pricing, margins, and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) higher. We believe the stock is attractively valued based on the current run-rate of earnings and profitability being generated.

Mercury Systems, a technology company serving the aerospace and defense industry, was the second-largest individual contributor in the period. Our thesis for owning Mercury was driven by the company’s initiative to reduce internal costs, which should improve capital allocation and result in higher margins as defense spending across the globe provides a sizeable tailwind to the business. We believe the business should be attractive to strategic and/or financial organizations, as two activist investors now are represented on the board of directors. We believe the business remains undervalued.

The three sectors that detracted most from the portfolio’s performance relative to its benchmark in the quarter were Energy (driven by allocation), Materials (driven by selection) and Consumer Staples (driven by selection). Materials holding Compass Minerals was the top detractor during the quarter after having been a strong contributor in the first quarter. Compass has faced rapidly rising fuel costs this year, which they have not been able to pass along quickly to customers. We do expect that as their annual contracts renew over the next couple months, they will be able to recover most, if not all, of these higher expenses on a go-forward basis.

Within Consumer Staples, Hain Celestial was the largest detractor. HAIN faced facing significant inflationary and supply chain issues over the last year and the invasion of Ukraine has further accelerated some of these issues. Although HAIN has been very aggressively raising prices to offset these higher costs, the timing of a full recovery and the overall elasticity of their price increases are more in question as demand patterns become less clear going forward.

Six Flags Entertainment was at Consumer Discretionary company that declined in the period. Our thesis for owning Six Flags was driven by the new CEO’s strategy, which is to focus on premium pricing while upgrading the amusement parks to be more family friendly by providing higher quality food and drink offerings. The stock has underperformed as investors worry a recession will cause further pressure on park attendance. We believe the stock is attractively valued; however, the new premium pricing strategy is early in its rollout and therefore we will wait for further evidence it will add value.

Another Consumer Discretionary holding that detracted from relative performance was Gildan Activewear. The reason for adding Gildan to the portfolio centered around the company being the most vertically-scaled and integrated manufacturer of apparel in the U.S. The management team has implemented a “Back to Basics” strategy to focus on simplicity (e.g., reducing selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A), massively reducing stock-keeping units (SKUs), and exiting an unproductive private label) which has driven ROICs from a historical 14-15% range to ~20%+. We believe the current valuation of the stock is very compelling as the business is not receiving credit for the structural improvements that have been made to its business model and its attractive ROIC profile. The stock has underperformed year-to-date primarily due to concerns around the consumer slowing, cotton price volatility, and the potential for channel destocking. We believe the concerns are reasonable and may be impactful in the short term; however, longer term prospects are compelling as Gildan maintains structurally higher margins and an attractive ROIC profile as more retailers look to near-shore their apparel sourcing for which Gildan is well positioned.

Materials holding, Glafelter Corp. was a top detractor in the period. Our thesis for owning Glafelter was driven by the company’s dominant market share globally in its core engineered material markets which we believed would significantly improve returns and growth; however, the rapid rise of European energy costs has caused a large cost headwind. The management team is aggressively renegotiating contracts with customers and implementing a dynamic pricing model in order to recapture these costs. The largest driver of the company’s underperformance was the worsening situation in Europe which caused earnings to miss expectations. We believe the stock is attractively valued; however, until we see some resolution of the Russia/Ukraine war, which would cause energy prices to fall, the company has to focus on paying down debt.

While the Energy sector was a large detractor in the period, one the portfolio’s top contributors in the period was PDC Energy. Our thesis for owning PDC Energy was driven by the company’s transformation of refocusing capital towards its highest-return acreage in Colorado while committing to paying down a significant amount of debt. Overall profitability and returns have been buoyed by higher oil and natural gas prices. We view its valuation as attractive given the current level of oil and gas prices; however, prices could remain volatile and influence valuation.


By Sector	Fund		Russell 2000 Value		+/-
Finance		16.6%		28.4%		-11.8%
Consumer Discretionary		7.1%		9.6%		-2.5%
Information Technology		12.9%		6.1%		6.8%
Communication Services		0.0%		3.3%		-3.3%
Health Care & Pharmaceuticals		5.0%		11.0%		-6.0%
Industrials		34.4%		12.7%		21.6%
Consumer Staples		6.3%		2.9%		3.4%
Real Estate		3.2%		11.9%		-8.7%
Utilities		0.0%		5.3%		-5.3%
Energy		3.7%		5.0%		-1.3%
Materials		6.9%		3.9%		3.0%
Cash		4.1%		0.0%		4.1%

The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund from July 31, 2020 to June 30, 2022 compared with the Russell 2000 Value Index and Morningstar Small Value Fund Category.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


Shares			Value

	COMMON STOCKS: 95.9%

	Consumer Discretionary: 7.1%
	39,054	Gildan Activewear, Inc.	$	1,123,974
	24,234	Harley-Davidson, Inc.		767,248
	118,634	Modine Manufacturing Co.*		1,249,216
	18,718	Six Flags Entertainment Corp.*		406,181

				3,546,619


	Consumer Staples: 6.3%
	266,468	Coty, Inc. - Class A*		2,134,409
	41,534	Hain Celestial Group, Inc. (The)*		986,017

				3,120,426


	Energy: 3.7%
	14,123	Helmerich & Payne, Inc.		608,136
	19,608	PDC Energy, Inc.		1,208,049

				1,816,185


	Financials: 16.6%
	28,235	Glacier Bancorp, Inc.		1,338,904
	38,822	National Bank Holdings Corp. - Class A		1,485,718
	27,989	Pacific Premier Bancorp, Inc.		818,398
	47,570	Seacoast Banking Corp. of Florida		1,571,713
	7,005	SouthState Corp.		540,436
	64,688	Umpqua Holdings Corp.		1,084,818
	46,542	United Community Banks, Inc.		1,405,103

				8,245,090


	Health Care: 4.9%
	7,959	ICU Medical, Inc.*		1,308,380
	49,000	Orthofix Medical, Inc.*		1,153,460

				2,461,840


	Industrials: 34.3%
	36,075	Apogee Enterprises, Inc.		1,414,862
	16,455	Astec Industries, Inc.		671,035
	31,482	AZZ, Inc.		1,285,095
	18,707	Beacon Roofing Supply, Inc.*		960,792
	52,313	CIRCOR International, Inc.*		857,410
	13,466	EnerSys		793,955
	39,547	KBR, Inc.		1,913,679
	15,799	Mercury Systems, Inc.*		1,016,350
	45,016	Quanex Building Products Corp.		1,024,114
	11,604	Regal Beloit Corp.		1,317,286
	105,966	REV Group, Inc.		1,151,850
	57,295	SP Plus Corp.*		1,760,102
	31,446	SPX Corp.*		1,661,607
	56,411	Sterling Construction Co., Inc.*		1,236,529

				17,064,666


	Information Technology: 12.9%
	36,256	Belden, Inc.		1,931,357
	116,908	Conduent, Inc.*		505,043
	15,718	CSG Systems International, Inc.		938,050
	50,267	NCR Corp.*		1,563,806
	32,173	Progress Software Corp.		1,457,437

				6,395,693


	Materials: 6.9%
	41,452	Compass Minerals International, Inc.		1,466,986
	60,205	Element Solutions, Inc.		1,071,649


Shares			Value

	Materials (continued)
	127,809	Glatfelter Corp.	$	879,326

				3,417,961


	Real Estate: 3.2%
	57,269	Equity Commonwealth - REIT*		1,576,616


	TOTAL COMMON STOCKS (Cost $47,508,274)			47,645,096


	TOTAL INVESTMENTS (Cost: $47,508,274): 95.9%			47,645,096


	Other Assets in Excess of Liabilities: 4.1%			2,030,260


	NET ASSETS: 100.0%		$	49,675,356

Percentages are stated as a percent of net assets.

REIT	Real Estate Investment Trust

*	Non-Income Producing Security.

The iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund (Institutional Share Class) declined 8.51% for the first six months of 2022. During the same period, the ICE BofA 3-Month Treasury Bill Index returned 0.14%, the Morningstar Multistrategy category declined 4.18%, the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index lost 5.05%, and the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index dropped 10.35%.

Note: Given the phase-out of LIBOR indexes, the fund’s official benchmark has changed to the ICE BofA 3-Month Treasury Bill Index.

Since its inception on September 30, 2011, the fund’s annualized return is 3.72% with a volatility (standard deviation) of 4.72%, and a beta to the U.S. stock market (Russell 3000) of 0.28. This compares to the 3-Month Treasury Bill Index return of 0.60%, the Morningstar Multistrategy category return of 2.71%, the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index return of 1.86% and the U.S. Aggregate Bond Index return of 1.76%.

The Risk/Return Statistics table below presents some of the key performance metrics that we track for the fund.

The fund is down 8.5% for the first half of the year. Without mincing words, this is disappointing to us, both as stewards of your capital as well as fellow shareholders. Part of our goal is preserving capital while generating good absolute returns over a full market cycle. This recent absolute performance is short of what we would have hoped to deliver. But since the Fund’s inception, we have also been clear that shareholders could expect the fund to be down in the mid-single digits during an equity bear market. And we have seen that play out so far this year.

Although the fund trailed the Agg slightly in the second quarter, it is still outperforming by nearly 200 basis points through the first half of the year (and roughly 13 percentage points cumulatively over the last two years).

We all recognize the main drivers, clear in retrospect: stubbornly high and persistent inflation, exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine, which drove accelerated aggressive monetary tightening by the Fed. This in turn punished long-duration assets: bonds obviously, but also previous market leaders like dominant large cap growth stocks, which had been seen as relative safe havens compared to more cyclical assets, resulting in rich valuation multiples that have been crushed by higher discount rates and fear of slowing growth.

The virtuous cycle of QE is also reversing, draining liquidity from the system and tightening financial conditions when consumer confidence is already extremely low. Much of the financial market commentary and discussion now is of the other shoe dropping, whether it be a technical recession or “just” slowing growth accompanied by falling corporate profits, which would presumably result in further equity market losses. Losses in one or multiple areas of financial markets often drives selling in other parts, causing risk premia to widen even in areas not directly impacted, even including those with reasonably strong fundamentals, producing contagion. The chances of the Fed “threading the needle” and controlling inflation without significantly hurting the economy seem remote at this point. None of this is breaking news, of course, but negative headlines abound. However, without minimizing the challenges (and of course the related “real-world” pain), we think there is reason for cautious optimism.

A lot of bad news and negative sentiment are already priced into financial markets. Things can always be worse than consensus expectations, and we fully recognize the Fed seems committed to breaking inflation almost regardless of the cost to equity markets. However, we think the Alternative Strategies Fund is set up to produce quite attractive performance over the next multiple quarters or more going forward. (This is not to say that returns couldn’t decline further from here in the short or even medium term—they absolutely could.) In the past we have bristled at managers seemingly brushing off periods of weak performance and focusing only on the glorious outlook going forward, as if no one experienced the painful road traveled to arrive at the precipice of the promising future. That is not our intention, but having acknowledged the challenges both in the fund’s recent performance and the economy and markets, we think it is important to maintain a balanced perspective.

The fund’s portfolio has rarely been as attractive as it is currently, in our view. The credit strategies are yielding in the upper single digits on a blended basis (and have some dry powder in cash) with a blended duration under three years. The merger arbitrage portfolio offers an average annualized deal spread well into the teens after holding up relatively well during the difficult first half of the year. Deals can break, spreads can widen, and defaults can increase, but these spread levels have historically been very attractive entry points even if they don’t necessarily mark “the bottom” for merger arbitrage returns, which is of course impossible to time with any precision. The long-short credit strategy has protected capital well through market turmoil, and its fundamental drivers now appear to be at their most attractive since late 2018/early 2019 (which preceded the strategy’s strongest year of performance): credit spreads are wide, volatility is increasing, and there is wide dispersion in company fundamentals and default probabilities, which are still in the early stages of being fully reflected by the market. Lastly, FPA’s portfolio, the largest contributor to returns since inception but the most volatile and highly correlated with the equity market, has unsurprisingly been hit the hardest this year. Without going into detail here, we believe it is also attractive, with a mix of value and quality growth businesses at reasonable valuations, pockets of special situations, and the optionality of a healthy cash balance. The FPA sleeve is the most market-sensitive, but is the smallest allocation within the fund. It also has the highest short-term upside in the event of positive surprises relative to market expectations.

Finally, we will also note that we are in the later innings of research and discussions about adding a new strategy to the fund and will very likely be able to announce something later this year. The strategy would have been extremely beneficial over the last two to four quarters, but is not so geared to a particular macro or market environment that it would have detracted from the fund’s performance in other periods. It should improve the fund’s risk-adjusted returns across different environments and reduce drawdowns like the current one. We have always tried to avoid overreacting to recent events (for example, we evaluated but didn’t add tail-risk strategies following March 2020, to the benefit of returns the rest of the year and in 2021), so we wouldn’t say this is a reaction to performance this year. In fact, strategies of this type have been the subject of our interest and research for several years, and 2022 certainly did nothing to temper our enthusiasm. We are excited about the prospects for the fund going forward, and even more so as we envision it with this likely addition.

Thank you for your investment in the fund. We look forward to updating you at year-end, hopefully with significantly better results.

For the first half of 2022, the returns by manager/strategy are as follows: Blackstone Credit Systematic Group down 1.07%; Water Island down 2.73%; DoubleLine down 10.50%; Loomis Sayles down 12.07%; and FPA Contrarian Opportunity strategy down 13.73%. (All returns are net of the management fee charged to the fund.)

The fund’s capital is allocated according to its strategic target allocations: 25% to DoubleLine, 19% each to Blackstone Credit Systematic Group (DCI), Loomis Sayles, and Water Island, and 18% to FPA. We use the fund’s daily cash flows to bring the manager allocations toward their targets when differences in shorter-term relative performance cause divergences.

The Blackstone Long-Short Systematic Credit strategy returned -1.07% (net of fees) in H1, after returning -0.04% (net) in Q2, even as the S&P 500 declined 21%, credit indices dropped 14%, and the U.S. 10-year Treasury returned -11% for the first half. Risk-repricing dominated the market as valuations declined along with higher discount rates and on growing fears of a profits slowdown and potential recession. Rates moves have been very large as the Treasury yields rocketed higher on the torrid inflation data and the Fed’s move to jumbo-sized rate hikes; and interest rate volatility hit crisis levels as the MOVE index matched its Covid heights. High yield index spreads were nearly 300 bps wider over the 6 months and the VIX index jumped up to end the quarter at 29. Only oil bucked the trend as crude rallied further and WTI closed June at about $106.

The long-short systematic credit strategy continued to deliver mixed performance as both the bond sleeve and CDS overlay delivered only modest alpha gains for the first half and the contribution from residual betas was negative. The net contribution on credit beta, which is well matched in the portfolio, was a few bps negative. The rates contribution accounted for most of the strategy’s underperformance for H1. The portfolio is well-hedged out the rate curve but retains some residual exposure to front-end yields. This net duration has been close to ¹⁄₂ year, which accounts for about -0.80% to portfolio performance amidst the move higher in Fed funds this year. Given the aggressive Fed pricing already in the market, this exposure becomes a modest tailwind going forward and, indeed, was a small positive contributor in Q2.

The alpha environment has continued to be challenging amidst the beta-dominant market moves, and we are eagerly anticipating an opportunity to generate more consistent alpha as the market finally differentiates along fundamentals in the second half. The alpha potential has gotten large as spreads, volatilities, and dispersion of fundamentals and default probabilities are all elevated. The CDS strategy delivered small positive gains, led by gains from short retail and short autos positions and mostly offset by long transports and energy. Alpha in the bond sleeve was a small positive as our long positions, especially in energy held up well.

Our portfolio views have not changed much and we continue to see balanced positioning across recovery names in the portfolio, which remains comforting amidst the new reopening. Energy continues to be attractive to us, despite the market rally, because the sector recovery has gained traction and the longer-term prospects—particularly so given higher oil prices—look positive relative to spread levels. The portfolio risk spend is, as usual, concentrated in idiosyncratic names and the portfolio continues to be unusually neutral in most sectors. We are long in energy and newly long again in consumer goods (favoring some selective retail and consumer brands). We also are broadly neutral, running a bit underweight, in financials. We remain long in technology (especially consumer-facing and networking) and short in telecoms.

For the six months ended June 30, 2022, the DoubleLine Opportunistic Income portfolio performed approximately in-line with the Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index return of -10.35%.

This period in the markets was a rather unfavorable investment environment as inflation readings remained high and the Federal Reserve (Fed) consequently pursued hawkish monetary policy. Specifically, the Fed hiked its policy rate by 150 basis points during the period and also announced the official tapering of its asset purchasing (QE) program. US Treasury yields rose rapidly, with total increases of 222 basis points for 2-year notes and 150 basis points for 10-year notes. The response from financial assets was unfavorable across-the-board as both stocks and bonds experienced steep declines. In total for the period, the Bloomberg US Treasury Index fell 9.14%, the Bloomberg Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index fell 14.39%, the Bloomberg High Yield Bond Index fell 14.19%, and the S&P 500 Index fell 19.96%.

The Opportunistic Income portfolio maintained a large allocation to fixed income credit throughout this period, consistent with its opportunistic mandate. The portfolio’s benchmark, the Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index, perennially maintains a roughly 70% allocation to government-backed assets. Our portfolio was able to perform in-line with the Agg Index, despite its higher credit risk, due to active duration management and asset allocation. In terms of duration management, the portfolio consistently maintained a lower duration than the Index which bolstered relatively performance as rates rose sharply. As for asset allocation, most of the credit sectors in the portfolio outperformed the credit allocation in the Index, resulting in some additional boost to relative performance.

The top-performing sectors in the portfolio over this period were non-Agency CMBS and non-Agency RMBS. These sectors generated high levels of monthly interest income which helped offset price declines from rising rates and rising credit risk premiums. In addition, strong property valuations caused generally high levels of borrower equity and therefore reduced or created non-existent incentives for default. The worst-performing sectors were Agency MBS and emerging market debt. The emerging market holdings experienced credit spread widening during the latter portion of this performance period as recessionary fears gripped global markets. Agency MBS experienced duration-related price declines as well as some negative sentiment in the market stemming from the Federal Reserve’s tapering of monthly asset purchases.

With the Federal Reserve taking strong measures to tighten financial conditions, we expect volatility in financial markets to remain elevated. Consequently, we will continue to manage the Opportunistic Income portfolio with a sizeable allocation to fully secured assets with low structural leverage, such as residential and commercial mortgage loans. On the corporate side, we see some risks to corporate earnings in the coming quarters and will therefore continue to take a more targeted approach to investing in these assets. Exposures will be selected on a line item basis and will often include out-of-index assets.

The FPA Contrarian Opportunity strategy declined 10.88% (net of fees) in 2022’s second quarter and declined 12.69% for the trailing twelve months. The Fund generated 85.0% of the average of the S&P 500 and MSCI ACWI NR USD’s (“MSCI ACWI”) return in the trailing twelve months, underperforming its 74.6% average net risk exposure.¹

During the first half of 2022, from its peak on January 5th to the end of June, the MSCI ACWI declined more than 20%. As discussed in prior commentaries, we had been concerned about inflation and were running the portfolio more invested than the recent past in an effort to protect purchasing power. With an average net risk exposure of 73% during this same period, the Fund was not immune to the market selloff, capturing 67% of the average market decline (based on the average return of the S&P 500 and MSCI ACWI indices).²

The decline in global equity indexes was broad-based, leaving little unscathed, with energy as one of the few exceptions, as rising interest rates, high inflation, fears of a weakening economy, and greater caution around funding risky, money-losing companies. Market declines can be psychologically difficult, but are to be expected, and can be used to allocate capital towards re-priced and newly attractive opportunities. We are predisposed to lean into price weakness by adding to what we believe are quality businesses at increasingly attractive prices, acquiring debt at equity-like returns, building positions in long-admired franchises, and occasionally seeking out opportunities in distressed and deeply out-of-favor situations.

Exhibit B: Trailing Twelve-Month Contributors and Detractors as of June 30, 2022³

In the last twelve months, the Fund’s top five performers contributed 1.9% to its return, while its bottom five detracted 6.5%. We believe that some of these ups and downs might prove ephemeral, but we address where our thesis is being validated or where it might be broken.

Glencore is one of the largest globally diversified commodity businesses operating both industrial and marketing businesses. Importantly, we believe Glencore operates in a genuinely shareholder-oriented manner. We purchased Glencore off-and-on from 2018 through 2020 at what we believe is a single digit multiple of normal earnings power. The opportunity presented itself when investors were less willing to own commodity sensitive businesses due to a period of low inflation and general disregard for valuation. Net of distributions of above average cyclical profits likely to be earned in 2022, we believe the company still trades at an attractive valuation relative to its long-term earnings power, justifying its continued presence in the portfolio.

Our investment thesis on the names that have detracted from performance have not materially changed but we highlight the following two.

Prosus’ stock price has declined along with the values of their investment portfolio. Our thesis has somewhat improved as management recently announced a share repurchase program that will be funded, in part, by periodic and partial sales of its Tencent holding. Given that its stock price trades at a greater than 35% discount to its estimated net asset value (NAV), share repurchases should be accretive. The Company’s stock price has appreciated 26% since the announcement.⁴

Charter Communications, one of the portfolio’s investments in the US cable industry, is an example of us leaning into fear. This investment has underperformed in the last year but still trades above the Fund’s cost basis. The industry has been plagued by fears of video cord cutting, and competition from 5G and Fiber to the Home. This allowed us to buy and to continue to hold Charter Communications. This business trades at what we believe is a reasonable valuation and we think should have attractive growth in free cash flow over the next decade. We expect that it will allocate that free cash flow in the best interest of shareholders, given that it is controlled by owner-operators.

The Contrarian Opportunity portfolio had net risk exposure at the end of the second quarter of 75.51%, marginally higher (just 1%) than its exposure at the end of the first quarter. We added eight new positions to the portfolio and exited four in the quarter. Some of the new positions in the portfolio include CarMax and investments in convertible bonds.

CarMax has three operating segments: used retail, used wholesale, and used auto lending. The general market decline and recession concerns have caused its stock price to decline by almost half since it peaked in Q4 2021. CarMax is the largest US company in the used car retail space. We think CarMax has the opportunity to gain share in the market due to its strong wholesale business, historically good returns on capital, and an excellent management team that invests for the future and allocates capital with an owner-oriented mindset.⁵ Recessionary concerns are valid as their lending business, in particular, will likely be hurt. We would not be surprised to see its stock price decline as a result and would consider the opportunity to increase the portfolio’s stake at that time.

Convertible Bonds—High-yield exposure in the portfolio fell to just 1.0% in Q4 of last year. We explained in Q4 2021 this low exposure was because of historically low yields and spreads to Treasuries. Since Q4, the U.S. high-yield bond index has declined 10% as both Treasury yields have increased, and credit spreads have widened. We have begun to see some compelling risk-adjusted opportunities in convertible bonds specifically for the first time since 2000. Many stocks have seen a tremendous decline in price, particularly those companies that are still in their earlier stages with business models that have yet to be optimized. Some of these companies had raised money to fund their growth via convertible bonds initially with yields of 1% and lower. With the conversion price now well out of the money due the decline in

their stock prices, the bonds have traded down and now offer what we believe are attractive yields to intermediate term maturities that leave some optionality should these businesses succeed. If this is the case, we would expect the market to reward them with a higher stock price that should translate to a higher bond price; and an outside chance that the convertible feature pays off prior to maturity. The average yield-to-maturity of these bonds is currently 11.5%, 310 basis points better than the 8.4% yield currently offered in the U.S. high-yield market.⁶ The allocation to these bonds is small for now, but we are hopeful a combination of a further increase in interest rates and continued stock market volatility may allow us to increase the allocation to this space.

We are often asked about our “outlook.” Which is kind of funny because we have never made a market forecast and, like everyone else, are regularly surprised by world events. While there is always plenty to worry about (insert list of worries), we agree with Jamie Dimon, who on JP Morgan’s second quarter 2022 call, in response to a question about pending economic hurricanes, observed “going through a storm,—that gives us opportunities, too. I always remind myself the economy will be a lot bigger in 10 years, we’re here to serve clients through thick or thin.” There will always be a place in the portfolio for good businesses at good prices, and you should expect to see the portfolio’s risk exposure increase should those prices become attractive. As always, we will be conservative in our underwriting, and let price be our guide.

Despite our no-market prediction philosophy, we do think it is useful to observe current conditions and pricing for financial assets, in order to avoid potholes, focus research attention and calibrate risk appetite.

In bonds, we mentioned the initial fruits of our labor in convertible bonds. Stepping back, we would observe that the U.S. high-yield market is approaching 2016 and 2020 yield levels, but credit spreads are still below the 800+ basis point spreads seen in both of those periods, despite there being no official recession in 2016.

Exhibit C: US High-Yield Effective Yield and Option-Adjusted Spread⁷

In equities, more traditional value stocks are no longer as inexpensive, unlike March 2020 when value spreads (the cheapest 20% of the market versus the market average) got to 2008 levels of cheapness. We have therefore spent more time considering (and adding to) faster growing, better quality businesses, many of which are both less expensive than the market today and where they have historically been valued, as supported in the following Exhibits D and E

Exhibit D: Valuation Spreads—The Cheapest Quintile Compared to the Market Average (1926 – June 30, 2022)⁸

We will remain flexible and seek to take advantage of opportunities that present a margin of safety, whether they are perceived as “value” or “growth.”¹⁰

Relatively speaking, international markets continue to trade at lower valuations than that of the US, as shown in Exhibit F below. That explains, in part, the portfolio’s increase in international exposure from 19.1% to 26.7% of the portfolio’s net equities over the last three and a half years. We continue to find attractive opportunities outside of the U.S.

Exhibit F: Twelve-Month Forward Price to Earnings Ratio Discount MSCI AC World Index ex-US vs S&P 500 Index¹¹

We are living through what is not our first volatile period. While we cannot tame volatility, we have learned to make friends with it. A decline in price can afford us the opportunity to buy as much as an increase can offer the chance to sell. We believe our hyper focus on price and business quality should allow us to successfully navigate this current turbulent moment in time.

With a semi-annual net return of -12.07%, the portfolio trailed its benchmark, the three-month Treasury Bill Index, which returned 0.14%

High yield corporate bond spreads significantly widened during the first half of the year; reflecting risk- off sentiment driven by challenging macroeconomic and technical dynamics. Lingering covid effects contributed to supply chain issues and knock-on inflationary pressure. Within the portfolio, high yield corporates detracted from performance. Consumer and communications issues were primarily responsible for the sector’s negative performance.

During the period, emerging market assets faced headwinds caused by a US dollar, global growth concerns, inflationary pressures, and broad aversion to risk. Within the portfolio, emerging markets assets weighed on performance, with Chinese and Mexican exposures being primarily responsible.

Despite generally supportive fundamentals, investment grade corporate bond spreads meaningfully widened over the period amid uncertainty around the persistency of inflation and the pace of central bank tightening in response. For the portfolio, investment grade corporates detracted from performance, with financial and communications names being particularly responsible.

Our global rates tools, primarily through the usage of sovereign bonds and interest rate futures, contributed to performance. The yields of the benchmark 10-year and 30-year US treasuries experienced volatility during the period as a result of persistent elevated inflation and Fed hawkishness. These key yields increased from 1.52% to 2.98% and 1.93% to 3.14% respectively. Within the portfolio, our short exposure to US treasury futures was primarily responsible for the allocation’s positive performance over the period.

Throughout the first half of 2022, the macroeconomic environment and outlook became more challenging. Increased geopolitical risk, led by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, added a strong supply chain shock to an already concerning inflationary environment just as continued Covid-19 shutdowns in China created further uncertainty. The US Federal Reserve, in an effort to get ahead of these shocks, announced the end of its quantitative easing program and delivered increasingly aggressive rate hikes of 25 basis points in March, 50 basis points in May and 75 basis points in June. As investors priced in a more hawkish Fed and growth expectations diminished, interest rates continued their move higher and risk assets came under pressure.

In our view, the credit cycle has shifted from the “expansion” phase to “late cycle” with a macroeconomic environment that consists of potentially slower growth and inflation that will likely moderate but remain above the Fed’s target. In our base case, growth will likely trend lower but stay resilient as a healthy consumer, positive corporate fundamentals and a strong banking system should help provide a backdrop for continued economic activity. Inflationary pressures will potentially remain sticky, with expectations for elevated commodity prices and persistent supply issues combined with a tight labor market. We believe this environment warrants an accelerated process of normalizing monetary policy, which would increase the potential for a policy mistake as the Fed, and other global central banks, embark on tighter monetary policy to combat inflation even as growth concerns have been increasing.

We are mindful of the risks inherent to our credit cycle and macroeconomic outlook, such as ongoing global supply chain disruptions, tighter financial conditions resulting from global central bank rate hikes and quantitative tightening, slowing Chinese growth and increased geopolitical risk. All of the turmoil around the world leaves us with a wide range of potential outcomes, but the probability of a downturn in 2023 has risen. As a result, we have modestly reduced portfolio risk and increased the level of cash reserve-like, higher quality instruments that can offer flexibility. With increased uncertainty surrounding economic activity, the path of inflation and subsequent Fed policy, we expect volatility to remain elevated in the second half of 2022, which could help drive future opportunities for investors.

Given the upward movement of yields seen so far in 2022, fixed income markets currently offer higher levels of income that can help dampen downside risk for investors and have the potential to provide attractive total returns. As a result, we believe that future pockets of short-term market volatility can offer opportunities to reduce holdings of higher quality, liquid investments in favor of adding credit exposure; however, we will be patient and selective in doing so. We continue to favor issuers with strong carry potential, solid corporate profits and relatively low interest rate sensitivity and believe that increased volatility will help drive wider performance dispersion across sectors, industries and issuers.

In this environment, we believe that individual issuer selection will be key in seeking to deliver favorable performance for the remainder of 2022. We remain comfortable with corporate fundamentals, and while we expect the rate of defaults and losses to rise in the intermediate term we believe they should stay below their long-term averages.

With respect to interest rate risk, we expect an active Fed at each meeting for the rest of 2022 and have more modest expectations for rising nominal US Treasury rates following the significant increase seen in the first half of the year. We remain positioned shorter than broad market benchmarks from the perspective of duration and corresponding interest rate sensitivity to help minimize any negative performance impact from a further rise in interest rates. With the yield curve flattening experienced in 2022, short-dated maturity bonds currently offer favorable levels of income with potentially less volatility, without materially sacrificing yield relative to longer maturities.

While we remain cautious on our outlook, we continue to focus on seeking to deliver higher levels of income and total return potential over time. As economic and central bank developments continue to unfold, we remain focused on our investing framework, philosophy and strategy to guide us.

As we reach the halfway point of 2022, we reflect on a difficult period not just for broader capital markets but also for event-driven strategies. After reaching all-time highs at the start of 2022, the S&P 500 index—a popular proxy for the stock market—embarked on a downturn that officially entered bear market territory. The Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond index, which is reflective of the broad investment grade bond market, was down more than 10% year-to-date through June 30, extending a drawdown that began in 2020 and is now the largest bond market drawdown in more than 40 years. There has been no shortage of pressures driving the volatility: a pandemic that has now entered its third year; malfunctioning supply chains; runaway inflation; rapidly rising interest rates; recession fears; domestic discord and imminent midterm elections in the US; and geopolitical tensions and the Russia/Ukraine conflict have all played a part.

More pertinent to our event-driven strategies, volatility began to spike about a year ago, in June 2021, when the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued to block the merger of insurance brokers Willis Towers Watson and Aon—a large, widely held deal that had already acquired necessary regulatory approvals in all jurisdictions but the US. Since then, competition regulation has remained at the forefront of merger arbitrage investors’ minds, as the Biden administration takes an increasingly strict view of antitrust. The DOJ, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) are just a handful of a stable of global regulators—including the pro-consumer European Commission and the unpredictable State Administration for Market Regulation in China—whose views often must be properly assessed to predict deal success, and with US regulators now straying from historical precedent more frequently, deal spreads have been experiencing atypical spikes in volatility.

When the volatility within our strategy was met with broader capital market drawdowns, the impact was dramatic. Forced and panicked selling can often cause correlations to converge, and in late Q2 we saw spreads in our universe of announced mergers and acquisitions (M&A) gap wider, as arbitrageurs exited positions en masse—even in deals where there had been no change to the underlying fundamentals of the transaction. We have seen similar behavior before—for example, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and more recently at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the first quarter of 2020. That said, we view these movements as mere mark-to-market losses. We continue to have conviction that the vast majority of pending deals will reach a successful conclusion (as over 90% of announced M&A has done, historically, according to Dealogic data), at which point their spreads will narrow to zero and losses will reverse.

For the first six months of the year, our sleeve of the fund incurred losses in both its merger arbitrage investments and hard and soft catalyst special situations investments. The top detractor for the period was our position in the failed merger of Momentive Global and Zendesk. In October 2021, Zendesk—a US-based developer of software for customer support and customer communications—agreed to acquire Momentive Global—a US-based developer of software for conducting web-based surveys—for $4.1 billion in stock, after an activist investor in Momentive pushed for a sale process. In January, however, yet another activist investor—this time at Zendesk—began to push Zendesk’s board of directors and management to reject the acquisition, believing the company should instead be put up for sale itself. The very next month, Zendesk management rejected an offer from a private equity consortium that would have valued the company at $17 billion—yet Zendesk shareholders appear to have agreed with the activist, as they overwhelmingly rejected the Momentive deal mere days later. Subsequent share price volatility led to mark-to-market losses for the fund; however, we have maintained our Momentive exposure as not only has its activist reemerged, but the proxy background of the Zendesk merger indicated there were at least two other interested parties who put forth bids for the company before Zendesk won the initial sale process. We believe there is more left to this story.

Conversely, the top contributor in the portfolio was the fund’s investment in the merger of Xilinx and Advanced Micro Devices. In October 2020, Xilinx—a US-based semiconductor manufacturer—agreed to be acquired by local peer Advanced Micro Devices for $35.7 billion in stock. This transaction experienced ongoing volatility in the deal spread, in large part due to its lengthy timeline stemming from continued delays in receiving regulatory approval from China (a required condition to complete the deal, where antitrust reviews are a notoriously opaque process). The companies ultimately received approval from China in February 2022 and the merger subsequently closed successfully, leading to gains for the fund.

As we look ahead, with volatility extending throughout the credit and equity markets, we continue to believe merger arbitrage and other hard catalyst merger-related investments remain the appropriate area toward which to direct our focus. We anticipate M&A will remain an important avenue for corporations to drive growth, and we have no doubt dealmakers will adapt to model rising interest rates and high inflation into their valuations, fueling deal flow even if we enter a broader economic downturn. We also believe acquirers will continue to engage in M&A as a path to shore up weakened supply chains, diminished workforces, and inadequate technology infrastructure—common themes of the past year. Strategic acquirers in a position of strength can often find their best opportunities to deliver strong return on investment when valuations are dislocated, and deals with a strong strategic rationale can create long term value for shareholders. Lest we forget financial buyers, private equity (PE) acquisition activity—which now comprises nearly half of global deal value—should continue, as PE shops still have more than $2 trillion in dry powder on the books, waiting to be deployed. We intend to introduce select soft catalyst opportunities—which tend to be more sensitive to broader market moves—to the portfolio only with appropriate risk mitigation strategies in place.

As event-driven investors, our objective remains to generate returns sourced from the outcomes of idiosyncratic corporate events, rather than from the overall direction of broader credit or equity markets. We believe market volatility will remain heightened in the year ahead, but we are optimistic about the prospects for our strategies. Volatility can present opportunities to trade around positions and find attractive entry points. Furthermore, the risk-free interest rate is a fundamental building block of a deal spread, and rising interest rates have historically provided a tailwind to merger arbitrage returns. In this favorable environment, our goal, as always, remains to implement strong risk mitigation strategies as we seek to deliver non-correlated return streams with as little volatility as possible.

Blackstone Credit Systematic Group (DCI) Long-Short Credit Strategy

Bond Portfolio Top Five Sector Exposures


Energy			14.7%
Consumer Non-Discretionary			11.7%
Consumer Discretionary			11.0%
Materials			9.1%
Investment Vehicles/REITs			8.2%

CDS Portfolio Statistics


	Long		Short
Number of Issuers		73		73
Average Credit Duration		4.5		4.5
Spread		255 bps		244 bps

DoubleLine Opportunistic Income Strategy

Sector Exposures


Cash			10.9%
Government			3.5%
Agency Inverse Interest-Only			6.9%
Agency CMO			0.3%
Agency PO			0.3%
Non-Agency Residential MBS			33.2%
Commercial MBS			14.4%
Collateralized Loan Obligations			10.8%
ABS			5.6%
Bank Loan			5.8%
Emerging Markets			5.4%
Other			2.9%

TOTAL			100.0%

FPA Contrarian Opportunity Strategy

Asset Class Exposures


U.S. Stocks			47.0%
Foreign Stocks			24.7%
Bonds			1.8%
Limited Partnerships			1.6%
Cash			24.9%

TOTAL			100.0%

Loomis Sayles Absolute Return Strategy

Strategy Exposures


	Long Total		Short Total		Net Exposure
Securitized		29.4%		0.0%		29.4%
High-Yield Corporate		26.2%		-0.7%		25.6%
Investment-Grade Corp.		17.4%		0.0%		17.4%
Dividend Equity		10.0%		-0.7%		9.4%
Emerging Market		5.7%		-2.2%		3.5%
Convertibles		5.7%		0.0%		5.7%
Global Rates		1.5%		0.0%		1.5%
Bank Loans		0.4%		-0.2%		0.2%
Global Credit		0.3%		-0.3%		0.0%
Subtotal		96.7%		-4.1%		92.6%
Cash & Equivalents		6.3%		0.0%		6.3%

Water Island Arbitrage and Event-Driven Strategy

Sub-Strategy Exposures


	Long		Short		Net
Merger Arbitrage – Equity		91.7%		-2.0%		89.7%
Merger Arbitrage – Credit		2.9%		0.0%		2.9%
Total Merger-Related		94.6%		-2.0%		92.6%
Special Situations – Equity		0.5%		0.0%		0.5%
Special Situations – Credit		1.5%		0.0%		1.4%
Total Special Situations		1.9%		0.0%		1.9%

Total		96.5%		-2.0%		94.5%

The value of a hypothetical $100,000 investment in the iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund from September 30, 2011, 1996 to June 30, 2022 compared with the ICE BofA 3 Month Treasury Index and Morningstar Multistrategy Category

The hypothetical $100,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


Shares			Value

	COMMON STOCKS: 30.5%

	Communication Services: 4.8%
	131,856	Activision Blizzard, Inc.	$	10,266,308
	3,896	Alphabet, Inc. - Class A*		8,490,397
	2,733	Alphabet, Inc. - Class C*		5,978,301
	84,001	Altice USA, Inc. - Class A*		777,009
	33,347	Baidu, Inc. - Class A*		631,057
	202,054	Bollore SE		934,919
	11,701	Charter Communications, Inc. - Class A*		5,482,270
	54,867	Cineplex, Inc.*		460,777
	224,150	Comcast Corp. - Class A		8,795,646
	114,390	Escrow Altegrity, Inc.*^(a)		583,389
	24,160	iHeartMedia, Inc. - Class A*		190,622
	7,971	Intelsat Emergence S.A.*		215,217
	31,687	Meta Platforms, Inc. - Class A*		5,109,529
	8,836	Netflix, Inc.*		1,545,151
	58,363	Nexon Co. Ltd.		1,194,874
	2,898	Nintendo Co. Ltd.		1,253,259
	19,071	T-Mobile US, Inc.*		2,565,812
	331,213	TEGNA, Inc.^(b)		6,945,537
	95,329	Twitter, Inc.*		3,564,351
	423,581	Uniti Group Ltd.*		1,439,015

				66,423,440


	Consumer Discretionary: 2.5%
	2,951	Airbnb, Inc. - Class A*		262,875
	123,962	Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.*		1,767,681
	48,160	Amazon.com, Inc.*		5,115,074
	187	Booking Holdings, Inc.*		327,061
	27,257	CarMax, Inc.*		2,466,213
	4,305	Carnival Corp.*		37,238
	19,900	Cie Financiere Richemont S.A. - Class A		2,117,598
	16,544	Delivery Hero SE*^(c)		619,504
	94,760	Entain Plc*		1,435,003
	11,361	Flutter Entertainment Plc*		1,139,234
	776	Home Depot, Inc. (The)		212,834
	46,340	Just Eat Takeaway.com N.V.*^(c)		730,867
	530	LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE		322,745
	15,226	Marriott International, Inc. - Class A*		2,070,888
	1,788	McDonald’s Corp.		441,422
	329	MercadoLibre, Inc.*		209,530
	2,525	NIKE, Inc. - Class B		258,055
	4,011	Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd.*		44,602
	70,869	Prosus N.V.		4,635,341
	2,729	Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.*		95,269
	7,656	Starbucks Corp.		584,842
	228,170	Tenneco, Inc. - Class A*		3,915,397
	54,491	Terminix Global Holdings, Inc.*		2,215,059
	1,559,745	Vivo Energy Plc^(c)		2,769,905
	1,845	Wynn Resorts Ltd.*		105,128

				33,899,365


	Consumer Staples: 1.0%
	15,012	Coca-Cola Co. (The)		944,405
	1,243	Estee Lauder Cos., Inc. (The) - Class A		316,555
	28,086	Herbalife Nutrition Ltd.*		574,359
	119,500	JDE Peet’s N.V.		3,397,676
	6,874	Procter & Gamble Co. (The)		988,412
	22,397	Sanderson Farms, Inc.		4,827,225
	132,577	Swedish Match AB		1,349,134


Shares			Value

	Consumer Staples (continued)
	5,176	Walmart, Inc.	$	629,298

				13,027,064


	Energy: 0.3%
	18,829	Battalion Oil Corp.*		160,611
	17,596	California Resources Corp.		677,446
	8,225	Gulfport Energy Corp.*		653,970
	155,610	Kinder Morgan, Inc.		2,608,023
	1,258	Pioneer Natural Resources Co.		280,635
	7,419	Williams Cos., Inc. (The)		231,547

				4,612,232


	Financials: 4.2%
	12,475	Alleghany Corp.*		10,392,922
	560	Alpha Partners Technology Merger Corp.*		5,482
	128,235	American International Group, Inc.		6,556,656
	12,743	Angel Pond Holdings Corp. - Class A*		125,327
	19,191	Aon Plc - Class A		5,175,429
	2,792	Apollo Strategic Growth Capital II*		27,515
	5,085	Atlantic Coastal Acquisition Corp. II*		50,748
	68,106	Avanti Acquisition Corp.*		678,676
	568	BlackRock, Inc.		345,935
	280,770	Brewin Dolphin Holdings Plc		1,748,554
	14,913	BurTech Acquisition Corp.*		149,950
	3,884	C5 Acquisition Corp.*		38,801
	105,610	Citigroup, Inc.		4,857,004
	67,864	Contra Zogenix, Inc.		47,566
	4,507	COVA Acquisition Corp. - Class A*		44,304
	60,800	Fast Sponsor Capital*^(a)		60,800
	292,982	First Horizon Corp.^(b)		6,404,587
	58,037	Groupe Bruxelles Lambert S.A.		4,841,039
	7	GSR II Meteora Acquisition Corp.*		71
	12,520	Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (The)		819,184
	77,470	Jefferies Financial Group, Inc.		2,139,721
	8,893	LPL Financial Holdings, Inc.		1,640,581
	14,054	Macondray Capital Acquisition Corp. I*		139,275
	7,468	Metals Acquisition Corp. - Class A*		73,112
	320,179	Moneylion, Inc.*		422,636
	3,350	Morgan Stanley		254,801
	6,266	Pershing Square Tontine Holdings Ltd. - Class A*		125,132
	776	PowerUp Acquisition Corp.*		7,830
	85,548	Sanne Group Plc*		942,750
	1,174	Signature Bank		210,393
	1,763	Silver Spike Acquisition Corp. II - Class A*		17,269
	117,140	Wells Fargo & Co.		4,588,374
	19,850	Willis Towers Watson Plc		3,918,191

				56,850,615


	Health Care: 2.9%
	2,082	Abbott Laboratories		226,209
	2,926	AbbVie, Inc.		448,146
	22,209	Biohaven Pharmaceutical Holding Co. Ltd.*^(b)		3,236,073
	3,869	Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.		297,913
	531,651	Change Healthcare, Inc.*		12,259,872
	155,642	Covetrus, Inc.*		3,229,572
	462	Elevance Health, Inc.		222,952
	85,639	Inovalon Holdings, Inc. - Class A*		3,618,248
	6,413	Johnson & Johnson		1,138,372

SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES at June 30, 2022 (Unaudited) (Continued)


Shares			Value

	COMMON STOCKS (CONTINUED)

	Health Care (continued)
	35,075	LHC Group, Inc.*	$	5,462,580
	5,619	Merck & Co., Inc.		512,284
	50,092	Natus Medical, Inc.*		1,641,515
	97,766	Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB*		2,111,991
	270	Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc.		146,686
	41,342	Turning Point Therapeutics, Inc.*		3,110,986
	339	UnitedHealth Group, Inc.		174,121
	20,451	UpHealth, Inc.*		12,117
	12,855	Vifor Pharma AG*		2,227,168

				40,076,805


	Industrials: 4.2%
	108,170	Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc.*		4,391,702
	77,763	Atlantia SpA		1,821,870
	207,910	Cornerstone Building Brands, Inc.*		5,091,716
	1,105	Cummins, Inc.		213,851
	3,695	CWT Travel Group, Inc.		73,900
	722	Deere & Co.		216,217
	3,415	Expeditors International of Washington, Inc.		332,826
	13,540	Ferguson Plc		1,499,013
	75,543	HomeServe Plc		1,076,912
	1	Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc.		10
	105,955	Howmet Aerospace, Inc.		3,332,285
	130,915	Intertrust N.V.*^(c)		2,623,105
	217	L3Harris Technologies, Inc.		52,449
	45,628	LG Corp.		2,737,539
	896	Lockheed Martin Corp.		385,244
	25,696	ManTech International Corp. - Class A		2,452,683
	565,707	McDermott International Ltd.*		321,850
	590,897	McDermott International Ltd.*		336,811
	341,452	Nielsen Holdings Plc		7,928,515
	42,919	Rush Enterprises, Inc. - Class A		2,068,696
	27,722	Safran S.A.		2,734,046
	20,938	Samsung C&T Corp.		1,983,498
	51,080	Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy S.A.*		957,703
	17,500	Sound Holding FP Luxemburg*^(a)		1,859,991
	52,416	Uber Technologies, Inc.*		1,072,431
	1,416	Union Pacific Corp.		302,005
	1,633	United Parcel Service, Inc. - Class B		298,088
	57,500	Univar Solutions, Inc.*		1,430,025
	319,101	Welbilt, Inc.*		7,597,795
	31,520	Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp.		2,587,162

				57,779,938


	Information Technology: 6.8%
	965	Accenture Plc - Class A		267,932
	48,690	Analog Devices, Inc.		7,113,122
	5,579	Apple, Inc.		762,761
	2,262	Applied Materials, Inc.		205,797
	832	Autodesk, Inc.*		143,071
	204,898	Avast Plc^(c)		1,288,507
	14,183	Black Knight, Inc.*^(b)		927,426
	12,702	Broadcom, Inc.		6,170,759
	28,844	CDK Global, Inc.		1,579,786
	6,461	Cisco Systems, Inc.		275,497
	68,273	Citrix Systems, Inc.		6,634,087


Shares			Value

	Information Technology (continued)
	454,075	Ideagen Plc	$	1,927,576
	321	KLA Corp.		102,425
	91,341	Magnachip Semiconductor Corp.*		1,327,185
	417,761	Mandiant, Inc.*^(b)		9,115,545
	1,300	MasterCard, Inc. - Class A		410,124
	3,636	Microchip Technology, Inc.		211,179
	1,363	Microsoft Corp.		350,059
	336,781	Momentive Global, Inc.*		2,963,673
	1,376	NVIDIA Corp.		208,588
	14,376	NXP Semiconductors N.V.		2,128,079
	70,530	Open Text Corp.		2,668,855
	934	PayPal Holdings, Inc.*		65,231
	172,800	Plantronics, Inc.*		6,856,704
	4,094	Qualcomm, Inc.		522,968
	24,822	Rogers Corp.*		6,505,598
	87,230	Sailpoint Technologies Holdings, Inc.*		5,467,576
	1,100	salesforce.com, Inc.*		181,544
	15,047	Silicon Motion Technology Corp. - ADR^(b)		1,259,434
	124,433	Switch, Inc. - Class A		4,168,505
	55,961	TE Connectivity Ltd.		6,331,987
	2,151	Visa, Inc. - Class A		423,510
	23,050	VMware, Inc. - Class A*		2,627,239
	344,512	Vonage Holdings Corp.*		6,490,606
	68,228	Zendesk, Inc.*		5,053,648

				92,736,583


	Materials: 1.3%
	225,306	Cemex SAB de C.V. - ADR*		883,200
	946,357	Glencore Plc		5,123,551
	29,950	HeidelbergCement AG		1,437,228
	164,687	Holcim AG		7,042,621
	30,262	International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.		3,604,809
	4,442	Newmont Corp.		265,054

				18,356,463


	Real Estate: 0.7%
	72,130	American Campus Communities, Inc. - REIT		4,650,221
	1,366	American Tower Corp. - REIT		349,136
	61,924	Deutsche EuroShop AG		1,439,118
	31,812	Duke Realty Corp. - REIT		1,748,069
	297,322	Swire Pacific Ltd. - Class A		1,771,308

				9,957,852


	Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: 0.3%
	25	Accelerate Acquisition Corp.*		245
	2,368	African Gold Acquisition Corp.*		23,372
	13,096	Agile Growth Corp.*		128,799
	6,668	Ares Acquisition Corp.*		65,747
	16,681	Atlantic Coastal Acquisition Corp. - Class A*		163,140
	11,288	Broadscale Acquisition Corp. - Class A*		110,848
	8,316	Churchill Capital Corp. VII*		81,913
	13,902	Colonnade Acquisition Corp. II*		136,240
	7,012	DHC Acquisition Corp.*		68,648
	972	Digital Transformation Opportunities Corp.*		9,487
	13,902	Disruptive Acquisition Corp. I*		136,935
	2	ESM Acquisition Corp.*		20
	13,902	Flame Acquisition Corp.*		137,074
	16,730	Forest Road Acquisition Corp. II*		163,954
	6,664	Fortress Value Acquisition Corp. IV*		65,041

SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES at June 30, 2022 (Unaudited) (Continued)


Shares			Value

	COMMON STOCKS (CONTINUED)

	Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (continued)
	1,678	FTAC Hera Acquisition Corp.*	$	16,587
	2,338	Fusion Acquisition Corp. II*		22,901
	13,945	Glenfarne Merger Corp.*		139,868
	5,221	Global Partner Acquisition Corp. II*		51,557
	13,902	Golden Arrow Merger Corp.*		135,823
	65	Gores Holdings VII, Inc.*		638
	3,177	Gores Holdings VIII, Inc. - Class A*		31,293
	88	Gores Technology Partners II, Inc.*		867
	8,746	GX Acquisition Corp. II - Class A*		85,623
	16,773	Hudson Executive Investment Corp. III*		164,375
	11,615	InterPrivate IV InfraTech Partners, Inc.*		114,292
	13,902	Kismet Acquisition Three Corp.*		135,962
	16,705	Landcadia Holdings IV, Inc.*		164,294
	506	Lazard Growth Acquisition Corp. I*		4,979
	1,510	Lead Edge Growth Opportunities Ltd.*		14,881
	10,143	Mason Industrial Technology, Inc.*		99,452
	8,259	Mission Advancement Corp.*		80,690
	940	Monument Circle Acquisition Corp.*		9,240
	7,430	Northern Star Investment Corp. III*		73,297
	5,739	Northern Star Investment Corp. IV*		56,443
	3,367	Orion Acquisition Corp.*		33,030
	7,873	Peridot Acquisition Corp. II*		77,155
	13,031	Pine Technology Acquisition Corp. - Class A*		127,313
	13,079	Plum Acquisition Corp. I*		128,305
	3,118	Ross Acquisition Corp. II*		30,743
	133	RXR Acquisition Corp.*		1,310
	9,637	Slam Corp.*		95,117
	9,063	Stratim Cloud Acquisition Corp.*		88,591
	1,601	TCW Special Purpose Acquisition Corp.*		15,738
	3,992	Tio Tech A*		39,261
	16,730	TLG Acquisition One Corp.*		164,121
	13,335	Twelve Seas Investment Co. II*		130,950

				3,626,159


	Utilities: 1.5%
	28,145	Albioma S.A.		1,469,644
	8,935	Duke Energy Corp.		957,921
	73,324	FirstEnergy Corp.		2,814,908
	4,694	NextEra Energy, Inc.		363,597
	200,775	PG&E Corp.*		2,003,735
	136,935	PNM Resources, Inc.^(b)		6,542,754
	178,658	South Jersey Industries, Inc.^(b)		6,099,384

				20,251,943


	TOTAL COMMON STOCKS (Cost $414,685,260)			417,598,459


	RIGHTS/WARRANTS: 0.0%
	4,247	Angel Pond Holdings Corp. (Expiration date 12/31/27)*		1,805
	5,560	Atlantic Coastal Acquisition Corp. (Expiration date 12/31/27)*		445
	3,595	BigBear.ai Holdings, Inc. (Expiration date 12/31/28)*		1,438
	24	Biote Corp. (Expiration date 02/12/27)*		9
	2,822	Broadscale Acquisition Corp. (Expiration date 02/02/26)*		668


Shares			Value
	64,680	Cie Financiere Richemont S.A. (Expiration date 11/22/23)*	$	35,209
	2,253	COVA Acquisition Corp. (Expiration date 12/31/27)*		226
	397	Gores Holdings VIII, Inc. (Expiration date 12/31/27)*		241
	2,915	GX Acquisition Corp. II (Expiration date 12/31/28)*		495
	1,333	Heliogen, Inc. (Expiration date 03/31/28)*		351
	389	Hornbeck Offshore SRVC, Inc. (Expiration date 04/09/30)*		0
	11	Hornbeck Offshore SRVC, Inc. (Expiration date 04/09/30)*		106
	834	Intelsat Jackson Holdings S. A. (Expiration date 12/05/25)*		3,128
	834	Intelsat Jackson Holdings S. A. (Expiration date 12/05/25)*		3,336
	2,489	Metals Acquisition Corp. (Expiration date 07/12/26)*		1,258
	4,343	Pine Technology Acquisition Corp. (Expiration date 03/31/28)*		353
	145	Prenetics Global Ltd. (Expiration date 12/31/26)*		43
	440	Silver Spike Acquisition Corp. II (Expiration date 02/26/26)*		26
	367	Swvl Holdings Corp. (Expiration date 03/31/27)*		201
	2,045	UpHealth, Inc. (Expiration date 07/01/24)*		143
	1,275	Virgin Orbit Holdings, Inc. (Expiration date 12/29/26)*		737



iMGP Funds Performance as of June 30, 2022
	Average Annual Total Returns
	Year to Date Return		One-Year		Three-Year		Five-Year		Ten-Year		Since Inception
iMGP Equity Fund (Inception 12/31/1996)		-27.13%		-26.41%		3.17%		5.76%		9.91%		7.58%
Russell 3000 Index		-21.10%		-13.87%		9.77%		10.60%		12.57%		8.59%
Morningstar US Large Blend Category		-19.26%		-11.87%		8.42%		9.21%		10.99%		7.13%
Gross Expenses 1.29%, Net Expenses 1.16%

iMGP International Fund (Inception 12/1/1997)		-22.46%		-20.26%		0.18%		0.24%		3.88%		5.93%
MSCI EAFE Index NET		-19.57%		-17.77%		1.07%		2.20%		5.40%		4.35%
Morningstar Foreign Large Blend Category		-19.25%		-18.72%		1.14%		1.89%		4.82%		3.63%
Gross Expenses 1.38%, Net Expenses 1.15%

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund Instl (Inception 9/30/2011)		-8.51%		-8.78%		1.16%		1.82%		3.27%		3.72%
iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund Inv		-8.62%		-9.09%		0.90%		1.56%		3.02%		3.47%
ICE BofA US 3-Month Treasury Bill		0.14%		0.17%		0.63%		1.11%		0.64%		0.60%
Bloomberg Aggregate Bond Index		-10.35%		-10.29%		-0.93%		0.88%		1.54%		1.76%
Morningstar Multistrategy Category		-4.18%		-3.08%		1.90%		1.99%		2.57%		2.71%
Inst Class Gross Expenses 1.72%, Net Expenses 1.44%, Adjusted Expeneses 1.30%

iMGP High Income Alternatives Fund (inception 9/28/2018)		-7.85%		-6.02%		2.02%						2.27%
Bloomberg Aggregate Bond Index		-10.35%		-10.29%		-0.93%						1.27%
ICE BofAML U.S. High Yield TR USD Index		-14.04%		-12.66%		-0.04%						1.29%
Morningstar US Fund Nontraditional Bond Category		-6.68%		-6.96%		-0.07%						0.62%
Gross Expenses 1.44%, Net Expenses 0.98%

iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund (Inception 7/31/2020)		-19.78%		-17.51%								10.92%
Russell 2000 Value		-17.31%		-16.28%								20.17%
Morningstar Small Value Category		-15.10%		-12.02%								22.25%
Gross Expenses 1.48%, Net Expenses 1.15%

iMGP Oldfield Internatl Value Fund (Inception 11/30/2020)		-16.72%		-18.95%								-0.04%
MSCI EAFE Value NR USD		-12.12%		-11.95%								1.77%
Morningstar Fund Foreign Large Value		-13.30%		-13.12%								1.96%
Gross Expenses 1.52%, Net Expenses 0.94%

iMGP DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF (NAV) (Inception 5/7/2019)		26.24%		25.04%		15.03%						15.25%
iMGP DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF (Price)		25.60%		25.49%		15.37%						15.58%
SG CTA		21.14%		20.74%		10.40%						10.34%
Morningstar US Fund Systematic Trend		15.94%		14.34%		7.73%						7.78%
Gross Expenses 0.95%, Adjusted Expenses 0.85%

iMGP DBi Hedge Strategy ETF (NAV) (inception 12/17/2019)		-6.02%		-6.42%								8.16%
iMGP DBi Hedge Strategy ETF (Price)		-6.07%		-6.42%								8.08%
Morningstar US Fund Long-Short Equity Category		-9.65%		-6.58%								2.90%
Gross Expenses 0.85%

iMGP Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Instl (inception 9/28/2018)		-9.06%		-9.75%		-0.59%						1.31%
iMGP Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Inv (inception 5/17/2019)		-9.14%		-9.92%		-0.91%						-0.31%
Bloomberg US Intermediate Credit Index		-8.52%		-8.96%		-0.14%						1.82%
Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond TR USD		-10.35%		-10.29%		-0.93%						1.27%
US Fund Corporate Bond Category		-13.86%		-13.92%		-1.04%						1.35%
Inst Class Gross Expenses 096%, Net Expenses 0.70%

iMGP RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF (NAV) Inception 2.1.2022)		-11.61%										-11.61%
iMGP RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF (Price)		-11.72%										-11.72%
65/35 Blend of MSCI ACWI Index & Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index		-13.35%										-13.35%
Morningstar US Fund World Allocation Category		-11.32%										-11.32%
Gross Expenses 0.75%, Net Expenses 0.69%



Performance as of 6/30/2022
	Average Annual Total Returns
	Year to Date Return		One- Year		Three- Year		Five- Year		Ten- Year		Since Inception (12/31/1996)
iMGP Equity Fund		-27.13%		-26.41%		3.17%		5.76%		9.91%		7.58%
Russell 3000 Index		-21.10%		-13.87%		9.77%		10.60%		12.57%		8.59%
S&P 500 Index		-19.96%		-10.62%		10.60%		11.31%		12.96%		8.61%
Morningstar Large Blend Category		-19.26%		-11.87%		8.42%		9.21%		10.99%		7.13%

Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the funds may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. To obtain standardized performance of the funds, and performance as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit www.imgpfunds.com. The Advisor has contractually agreed to waive fees or limit the expenses of the fund through April 30, 2023.


Top Contributors for the Six Months Ended June 30, 2022
Holding	Weight %		Return %		Contribution %		Benchmark Weight %		Sector
EOG Resources Inc		1.25		28.83		0.31		0.16	Endergy
CalMaine Foods		0.51		33.58		0.20		—	Consumer Staples
Cigna Corp		1.14		15.81		0.14		0.19	HealthCare
CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd		0.64		11.71		0.12		—	Industrials
Reinsurance Group of America		1.24		8.48		0.10		0.02	Financials
The Travelers Companies Inc		0.62		9.26		0.10		0.10	Financials
Dollar General Corp		1.76		4.51		0.07		0.12	Consumer Discretionary
American International Group Inc		0.18		7.26		0.07		0.11	Financials
Equity Commonwealth REIT		1.00		6.29		0.06		—	Real Estate
Clorox Co		0.34		11.34		0.05		0.04	Consumer Staples


Top Detractors for the Six Months Ended June 30, 2022
Holding	Weight %		Return %			Contribution %			Benchmark Weight %		Sector
Netflix Inc		1.82		(70.97	)		(1.99	)		0.32	Communication Services
Sea Ltd ADR		1.20		(70.11	)		(1.42	)		—	Communication Services
Dexcom Inc		1.24		(86.12	)		(1.29	)		0.09	HealthCare
Amazon.com Inc		3.36		(36.29	)		(1.29	)		2.84	Consumer Discretionary
Meta Platforms Inc Class A		1.96		(52.06	)		(1.14	)		1.21	Communication Services
Alphabet Inc Class A		4.62		(24.78	)		(1.11	)		1.79	Communication Services
Block Inc Class A		1.13		(61.95	)		(0.97	)		0.12	Information Technology
GoHealth Inc Ordinary Shares - Class A		0.49		(84.22	)		(0.96	)		—	HealthCare
Shopify Inc		0.64		(77.32	)		(0.92	)		—	Information Technology
Capital One Financial Corp		3.73		(27.54	)		(0.89	)		0.13	Financials
General Motors Co		1.65		(45.83	)		(0.88	)		0.14	Consumer Discretionary


INVESTMENT MANAGER	FIRM	TARGET MANAGER ALLOCATION	MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF COMPANIES IN PORTFOLIO	STOCK-PICKING STYLE	BENCHMARK
Christopher Davis Danton Goei	Davis Selected Advisers, L.P.	15%	Mostly large companies	Blend	S&P 500 Index
Pat English Jonathan Bloom	Fiduciary Management, Inc.	15%	All sizes	Blend	S&P 500 Index
Bill Nygren	Harris Associates L.P.	15%	Mostly large- and mid-sized companies	Value	Russell 3000 Value Index
Clyde McGregor	Harris Associates L.P.	15%	All sizes, but mostly large- and mid-sized companies	Value	Russell 3000 Value Index
Scott Moore Chad Baumler	Nuance Investments, LLC	15%	All sizes	Value	Russell 3000 Value Index
A. Michael Sramek	Sands Capital Management, LLC	25%	All sizes, but mostly large- and mid-sized companies	Growth	Russell 1000 Growth Index


Our Commitment to Shareholders		2
Funds’ Performance		5
Letter to Shareholders		6
iMGP Equity Fund
Equity Fund Review		8
Equity Fund Managers		13
Equity Fund Schedule of Investments		14
iMGP International Fund
International Fund Review		16
International Fund Managers		21
International Fund Schedule of Investments		22
iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund
Oldfield International Value Fund Review		23
Oldfield International Value Fund Schedule of Investments		26
iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund
SBH Focused Small Value Fund Review		27
SBH Focused Small Value Fund Schedule of Investments		31
iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund
Alternative Strategies Fund Review		32
Alternative Strategies Fund Managers		44
Alternative Strategies Fund Schedule of Investments		45
iMGP High Income Alternatives Fund
High Income Alternatives Fund Review		87
High Income Alternatives Fund Managers		92
High Income Alternatives Fund Schedule of Investments		93
iMGP Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund
Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund Review		109
Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund Schedule of Investments		112
iMGP DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF
DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF Review		114
DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF Consolidated Schedule of Investments		116
iMGP DBi Hedge Strategy ETF
DBi Hedge Strategy ETF Review		118
DBi Hedge Strategy ETF Schedule of Investments		120
iMGP RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF
RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF Review		122
RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF Schedule of Investments		126
Expense Examples		127
Statements of Assets and Liabilities		129
Statements of Operations		133
Statements of Changes in Net Assets
Equity Fund		136
International Fund		136
Oldfied International Value Fund		137
SBH Focused Small Value Fund		137
Alternative Strategies Fund		138
High Income Alternatives Fund		138
Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund		139
DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF (Consolidated)		140
DBi Hedge Strategy ETF		140
RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF		141
Financial Highlights
Equity Fund		142
International Fund		143
Oldfied International Value Fund		144
SBH Focused Small Value Fund		145
Alternative Strategies Fund		146
Alternative Strategies Fund Investor Class		147
High Income Alternatives Fund		148
Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund		149
Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund Investor Class		150
DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF (Consolidated)		151
DBi Hedge Strategy ETF		152
RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF		153
Notes to Financial Statements		154
Other Information		186
Index Definitions		187
Industry Terms and Definitions		190
Trustee and Officer Information		195
Privacy Notice		197


By Market Cap		By Region


Small Cap < $6.1 billion Mid Cap >$6.1 Billion<$33.9 billion Large Cap >$33.9 billion


Summary Statistics

Market Cap Median (bn)			2.4
Weighted Average Market Cap (bn)			2.9
# of Holdings			40



Performance as of 6/30/2022
	Average Annual Performance
	Year to Date		One Year		Three Year		Five Year		Ten Year		Since Inception (9/30/11)
iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund Instl		-8.51%		-8.78%		1.16%		1.82%		3.27%		3.72%
iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund Inv		-8.62%		-9.09%		0.90%		1.56%		3.02%		3.47%
ICE BofA US 3-Month Treasury Bill		0.14%		0.17%		0.63%		1.11%		0.64%		0.60%
Bloomberg Aggregate Bond Index		-10.35%		-10.29%		-0.93%		0.88%		1.54%		1.76%
Morningstar Multistrategy Category		-4.18%		-3.08%		1.90%		1.99%		2.57%		2.71%

Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the fund may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. Other share classes may impose other fees. To obtain standardized performance of the funds, and performance as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit wwwpartnerselectfunds.com. The Advisor has contractually agreed to waive a portion of its management fee through April 30, 2023.



iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund, Risk/Return Statistics, 6/30/22
	MASFX		Bloomberg Barclays Agg		Morningstar Multistrategy Category		HFRX Global Hedge Fund
Annualized Return		3.72		1.76		2.71		1.86
Total Cumulative Return		48.15		20.64		33.27		21.88
Annualized Std. Deviation		4.72		3.41		4.25		4.24
Sharpe Ratio (Annualized)		0.67		0.35		0.50		0.31
Beta (to Russell 1000)		0.28		0.03		0.27		0.25
Correlation of MASFX to...		1.00		0.26		0.91		0.87
Worst 12-Month Return		-8.78		-10.29		-5.71		-8.19
% Positive 12-Month Periods		0.83		0.70		0.78		0.71
Upside Capture (vs. Russell 1000)		27.34		6.65		25.38		22.12
Downside Capture (vs. Russell 1000)		27.74		0.04		31.45		31.27
Upside Capture (vs. AGG)		83.64		100.00		69.24		46.45
Downside Capture (vs. AGG)		22.07		100.00		28.36		17.70
Source: Morningstar Inc.
Since inception (9/30/11)


Contributors	Perf. Cont.		Avg.% of Port.		Detractors	Perf. Cont.		Avg.% of Port.
Glencore		0.56%		2.2%	LG Corp		-2.63%		1.1%
Meggitt		0.51%		0.2%	Meta Platforms		-1.51%		2.5%
LPL Financial		0.28%		1.0%	Charter Communications		-0.83%		2.4%
Aon		0.28%		2.2%	Naspers & Prosus		-0.77%		2.2%
American International Group		0.25%		2.8%	Citigroup		-0.73%		2.2%

		1.86%		8.4%			-6.48%		10.4%


INVESTMENT MANAGER	FIRM	TARGET MANAGER ALLOCATION	Strategy
Stephen Kealhofer Paul Harrison Adam Dwinells	Blackstone Credit/DCI, LLC	19%	Long-Short Credit
Jeffrey Gundlach Jeffrey Sherman	DoubleLine Capital LP	25%	Opportunistic Income
Steven Romick Brian Selmo Mark Landecker	First Pacific Advisors, LLC	18%	Contrarian Opportunity
Matt Eagan Brian Kennedy Elaine Stokes Todd Vandam	Loomis Sayles & Company, LP	19%	Absolute-Return
John Orrico Todd Munn Roger Foltynowicz Gregg Loprete	Water Island Capital, LLP	19%	Arbitrage



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