Table of Contents








Semiannual Report

iMGP Global Select Fund

iMGP International Fund

iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund

iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund

iMGP High Income Fund (FKA iMGP High Income Alternatives Fund)

iMGP Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund

iMGP DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF

iMGP DBi Hedge Strategy ETF

iMGP RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF

iMGP Berkshire Dividend Growth ETF

June 30, 2023


Table of Contents


ii       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents






Our Commitment to Shareholders


iMGP Global Select Fund


Global Select Fund Review


Global Select Fund Schedule of Investments


iMGP International Fund


International Fund Review


International Fund Schedule of Investments


iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund


Oldfield International Value Fund Review


Oldfield International Value Fund Schedule of Investments


iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund


SBH Focused Small Value Fund Review


SBH Focused Small Value Fund Schedule of Investments


iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund


Alternative Strategies Fund Review


Alternative Strategies Fund Consolidated Schedule of Investments


iMGP High Income Fund


High Income Fund Review


High Income Fund Schedule of Investments


iMGP Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund


Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund Review


Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund Schedule of Investments


iMGP DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF


DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF Review


DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF Consolidated Schedule of Investments


iMGP DBi Hedge Strategy ETF


DBi Hedge Strategy ETF Review


DBi Hedge Strategy ETF Schedule of Investments


iMGP RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF


RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF Review


RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF Schedule of Investments


iMGP Berkshire Dividend Growth ETF


Berkshire Dividend Growth ETF Schedule of Investments


Expense Examples


Statements of Assets and Liabilities


Statements of Operations


Statements of Changes in Net Assets


Global Select Fund


International Fund


Oldfied International Value Fund


SBH Focused Small Value Fund


Alternative Strategies Fund (Consolidated)


High Income Fund


Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund


DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF (Consolidated)


DBi Hedge Strategy ETF


RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF


Berkshire Dividend Growth ETF



Financial Highlights


Global Select Fund


International Fund


Oldfied International Value Fund


SBH Focused Small Value Fund


Alternative Strategies Fund (Consolidated)


Alternative Strategies Fund Investor Class (Consolidated)


High Income Fund


Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund


DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF (Consolidated)


DBi Hedge Strategy ETF


RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF


Berkshire Dividend Growth ETF


Notes to Financial Statements


Other Information


Index Definitions



Industry Terms and Definitions



Trustee and Officer Information


Privacy Notice


This report is intended for shareholders of the funds and may not be used as sales literature unless preceded or accompanied by a current prospectus for the iMGP Funds. Statements and other information in this report are dated and are subject to change.

iM Global Partner Fund Management, LLC has ultimate responsibility for the funds’ performance due to its responsibility to oversee its investment managers and recommend their hiring, termination and replacement.


Table of Contents         1

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iM Global Partner Fund Management

Commitment to Shareholders




We are deeply committed to making each iMGP Fund a highly satisfying long-term investment for shareholders. In following through on this commitment we are guided by our core values, which influence four specific areas of service:

First, we are committed to the IMGP concept.



We will only hire managers who we strongly believe will deliver exceptional long-term returns relative to their benchmarks. We base this belief on extremely thorough due diligence research. This not only requires us to assess their stock-picking skills, but also to evaluate their ability to add incremental performance by investing in a concentrated portfolio of their highest conviction ideas.



We will monitor each of the managers so that we can maintain our confidence in their ability to deliver the long-term performance we expect. In addition, our monitoring will seek to assess whether they are staying true to their IMGP Funds mandate. Consistent with this mandate, we focus on long-term performance evaluation so that the IMGP managers will not be distracted by short-term performance pressure.

Second, we will do all we can to ensure that the framework within which our stock pickers do their work further increases the odds of success.



Investments from new shareholders in each fund are expected to be limited so that each fund’s asset base remains small enough to retain flexibility to add value.



The framework also includes either a single-manager or a multi-manager structure; the former allowing each fund an individual, highly disciplined investment process, and the latter making it possible for each manager to invest, when appropriate, in an opportunistic manner knowing that the potential volatility within his or her portfolio will be diluted at the fund level by the performance of the other managers. In this way, the multi-manager structure seeks to provide fund-level diversification.



We will work hard to discourage short-term speculators so that cash flows into the funds are not volatile. Lower volatility helps prevent our managers from being forced to sell stocks at inopportune times or to hold excessive cash for non-investment purposes.

Third, is our commitment to do all we can from an operational standpoint to maximize shareholder returns.



We will remain attentive to fund overhead, and whenever we achieve savings we will pass them through to shareholders. For example, we have had several manager changes that resulted in lower sub-advisory fees to our funds. In every case we have passed through the full savings to shareholders in the form of fee waivers.



We will provide investors with a low minimum, no-load, no 12b-1 Institutional share class for all iMGP Funds, and a low minimum, no-load Investor share class for the Alternative Strategies Fund.



We also will work closely with our managers to make sure they are aware of tax-loss selling opportunities (only to be taken if there are equally attractive stocks to swap into). We account for partial sales on a specific tax lot basis so that shareholders will benefit from the most favorable tax treatment. The goal is not to favor taxable shareholders over tax-exempt shareholders but to make sure that the managers are taking advantage of tax savings opportunities when doing so is not expected to reduce pre-tax returns.

Fourth, is our commitment to communicate honestly about all relevant developments and expectations.



We will continue to do this by providing thorough and educational shareholder reports.



We will continue to provide what we believe are realistic assessments of the investment environment.

Our commitment to iMGP Funds is also evidenced by our own investment. Our retired founders and current employees have, collectively, substantial investments in the funds, as does our company retirement plan. In addition, we use the funds extensively in the client accounts of our investment advisor practice (through our affiliate Litman Gregory Wealth Management, LLC). We have no financial incentive to do so because the fees we receive from iMGP Funds held in client accounts are fully offset against the advisory fees paid by our clients. In fact, we have a disincentive to use the funds in our client accounts because each iMGP Fund is capacity constrained (they may be closed as mentioned above), and by using them in client accounts we are using up capacity for which we may not be paid. But we believe these funds offer value that we can’t get elsewhere and this is why we enthusiastically invest in them ourselves and on behalf of clients.

While we believe highly in the ability of the Funds’ sub-advisors, our commitments are not intended as guarantees of future results.

While the funds are no-load, there are management fees and operating expenses that do apply, as well as a 12b-1 fee that applies to Investor class shares. Please refer to the prospectus for further details.

Diversification does not assure a profit or protect against loss in a declining market.

Must be preceded or accompanied by a prospectus.


2       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

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General Disclosures

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Index performance is not illustrative of fund performance. An investment cannot be made directly in an index. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the fund may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. To obtain the performance of the funds as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit Investment performance reflects fee waivers in effect. In the absence of such waivers, total return would be reduced.

Diversification does not assure a profit or protect against loss in a declining market.

Must be preceded or accompanied by a prospectus

Multi-investment management styles may lead to higher transaction expenses compared to single investment management styles. Outcomes depend on the skill of the sub-advisors and advisor and the allocation of assets amongst them.

Some of the comments are based on current management expectation and are considered “forward-looking statements”. Actual future results, however, may prove to be different from our expectations. You can identify forward-looking statement by words such as “estimate”, “may”, “expect”, “should”, “could”, “believe”, “plan”, and similar terms. We cannot promise future returns and our opinions are a reflection of our best judgment at the time this report is compiled.

Opinions expressed are subject to change, are not guaranteed and should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security.

iM Global Partner Fund Management has ultimate responsibility for the performance of the funds due to its responsibility to oversee the sub-advisors and recommend their hiring, termination and replacement.

Each of the funds may invest in foreign securities. Investing in foreign securities exposes investors to economic, political, and market risks and fluctuations in foreign currencies. Each of the funds may invest in the securities of small companies. Small-company investing subjects investors to additional risks, including security price volatility and less liquidity than investing in larger companies. Debt obligations of distressed companies typically are unrated, lower rated, in default or close to default and may become worthless. The International Fund will invest in emerging markets. Investments in emerging market countries involve additional risks such as government dependence on a few industries or resources, government-imposed taxes on foreign investment or limits on the removal of capital from a country, unstable government, and volatile markets. Investments in debt securities typically decrease when interest rates rise. This risk is usually greater for longer-term debt securities. Investments in mortgage-backed securities include additional risks that investor should be aware of including credit risk, prepayment risk, possible illiquidity, and default, as well as increased susceptibility to adverse economic developments. Investments in lower-rated and non-rated securities present a greater risk of loss to principal and interest than higher-rated securities. The funds may invest in master limited partnership units. Investing in MLP units may expose investors to additional liability and tax risks. Derivatives may involve certain costs and risks such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management, and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. Investing in derivatives could lose more than the amount invested. The funds may make short sales of securities, which involves the risk that losses may exceed the original amount invested.

A commission may apply when buying or selling an ETF.

© 2021 Morningstar, Inc. All Rights Reserved. The information contained herein: (1) is proprietary to Morningstar; (2) may not be copied or distributed; and (3) is not warranted to be accurate, complete or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.


Fund Summary         3

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iMGP Global Select Fund 2023 Semi-Annual Report




The iMGP Global Select Fund returned 11.97% in the first half of 2023, trailing its MSCI World Index gain of 15.09% but ahead of the Morningstar Global Large Blend category’s return of 11.46%.

Since the fund’s mandate was broadened to global equities at the end of July 2022, the Fund is trailing the MSCI World Index and Morningstar Global Large Blend category. The Fund has gained 6.15% compared to 9.79% for the Index and 7.51% for the category over the short 11-month period.


Performance as of June 30, 2023

     Year to







iMGP Global Select Fund

    11.97%        14.44%        8.27%        5.59%        9.34%        7.84%  

MSCI World Index

    15.09%        18.51%        12.18%        9.07%        9.50%        6.84%  


    13.93%        16.53%        10.99%        8.10%        8.75%        6.67%  

Russell 3000 Index

    16.17%        18.95%        13.89%        11.39%        12.34%        8.97%  

Moningstar Global Large-Stock Blend Category

    11.46%        13.81%        9.87%        6.81%        7.96%        7.32%  

The fund changed its primary benchmark in August 2022 to more appropriately match the global equity mandate of the fund and the managers.


Gross Expense Ratio 1.50% Net Expense Ratio 1.01% Adjusted Expense Ratio 0.98%


Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the funds may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. To obtain standardized performance of the funds, and performance as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit The advisor has agreed to waive fees and limit the expenses of the fund through at least April 30, 2024.




Portfolio Commentary


Nuance Investments

During the first half of 2023, we made several changes to the portfolio, but our overweight and underweight positions were relatively stable as was our geographic exposure. Our largest overweight remains the consumer staples sector where we are continuing to see input cost inflation-related underearning in a number of leaders across the household & personal products industry group. Henkel AG & Co, Kimberly-Clark Corp, and Beiersdorf AG continue to make up a meaningful part of our exposure within the sector. Our view is that earnings in this industry group have been negatively impacted by rising raw material costs. We believe these costs can ultimately be mostly offset by price increases which generally lag the raw material price increases.

While the health care sector remains one of our largest overweight positions, we did lower our exposure within the sector after a period of outperformance during the first half of the year. Despite the outperformance, we continue to own names like Smith & Nephew, Medtronic, and Dentsply Sirona. We believe these companies are manufacturing critical, advanced medical products and display the traits we look for in competitively advantaged businesses. They sell into end markets that have been severely disrupted for more than two years as patient visits and procedures of all kinds have run well below normal due to the impacts of COVID-19, including high cancellation rates, procedure delays, and insufficient care provider staffing to meet demand. We believe the magnitude and duration of this disruption has created a large backlog of procedures that will need to be made up over the next one to two years. More recently, we believe raw material availability and input cost inflation in items including resins and metals have also squeezed margins at these companies. Offsetting price actions can take one to two years to implement in this industry, which is prolonging the period of underearning, in our opinion. Nevertheless, this remains a high conviction, underearning group of excellent businesses, in our view.

We added to our exposure within the Utilities sector, specifically water utilities, during the first half of the year as the prolonged period of historically low interest rates over the last decade has resulted in low allowed returns on equity which we believe can potentially reset higher as utility regulators incorporate a more normal cost of capital environment.

From an exposure standpoint, we remain underweight the U.S. and we would highlight overweight exposure in the United Kingdom and Germany. The primary overweight within the U.K. is in the water utilities industry, and the primary overweight in Germany is due to positions in Knorr-Bremse AG and Henkel AG & Co.

Polen Capital

Global equity markets have been strong year to date, particularly in the large-cap space. A pause in rate hikes, an anticipated recession that has not materialized, and the hype around artificial intelligence (AI) have helped to boost returns. Quality fundamentals have also been rewarded, which has supported our positive relative performance.

We have continued to take advantage of what we believe are attractive opportunities in the market, building positions in businesses with attractive long-term earnings growth potential and/or where we think there have been dislocations in share prices and business performance, and reducing holdings where either valuations and/or fundamentals have changed our risk/rewards projections.


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We continue to stay focused on the long-term value propositions, competitive advantages, growth opportunities, and potential earnings power of our Portfolio companies. We are also still mindful that rising rates could lead to slower economic growth or even a recession but remain confident that our portfolios are well positioned to deliver strong earnings per share growth this year and beyond.

Scharf Investments

Throughout the year, equity market investors have crowded into risky growth, mega cap Information Technology (IT), especially semiconductors, to shrug off rising interest rates, still deteriorating leading economic indicators, an earnings recession, persistent elevated core inflation and the first money supply contraction in seven decades.

We believe investors are too bullish on a long duration trade based on an expected dovish pivot by the Fed in the second half 2023. Core inflation remains elevated as does labor strength. Multiples have risen smartly off fall 2022 bottoms and present downside risk. As value managers based in Silicon Valley, we have seen this AI movie before. In every technology revolution there is a changing of the guard. Investors would be wise to remember that of the six technology and communication companies on the list of the ten largest market caps in 2000, only Microsoft remains.

Price/Equity (P/E) dispersion presents a compelling investment opportunity for value stocks. Meanwhile, quality value (low EPS volatility) should mitigate the risk of traditional value stocks’ (e.g., energy, financials, materials) high operating leverage in a slowing 2023 global economy. The P/E spread between the market-cap and equal-weighted S&P 500 indexes, is now 4x (20x vs. 16x), its highest since the tech bubble in early 2000. The Russell 1000 Growth index has returned 29.0% vs. 5.1% for the Russell 1000 Value year-to-date. The forward P/E spread between the Russell 1000 Growth and Value indexes is now 12.5x turns (27.0x vs. 14.5x, respectively) vs. its long-term average of 6.7x turns (20.8x vs. 14.1x, respectively). Meanwhile, the P/E spread between the S&P 500 and the MSCI ACWI ex-U.S. is currently 6.2x turns, also roughly twice its 20-year average.

Key Performance Drivers


The Fund’s underweight to the largest stocks in the MSCI World Index hurt relative returns over the last six months. The large mega-cap growth names at the top of the index (Apple, Microsoft,, NVIDIA, Tesla, Alphabet, and Meta Platforms) account for 18% of the Index. The Fund has meaningfully less exposure to these names—owning positions in Alphabet,, and Microsoft that account for approximately 6% of fund assets at the end of June.

The fund benefited from stock picking in the health care, financials, and consumer staples sectors during the first half of 2023. Within health care, Align Technology had a strong six months after a difficult 2022 as it lapped extremely high prior year comparables. The position is held by the Polen Global Growth team. The company has delivered over consecutive quarters and as expected. On a three-year basis, Align has grown case shipments by over 15% and net revenues at 16%. The pandemic has given the company a chance to highlight its benefits relative to wires and brackets braces, and doctors seem to be responding. Earlier in the year, Align disclosed that the Invisalign treatment allows patients to go through the orthodontia process five months faster than braces, with roughly 35% fewer visits to a doctor. While Align continues to stay ahead of clear aligner competition through sales, marketing, and R&D, research indicates that the real fight is against braces, and Polen believes it is well positioned to win market share.

The financial sector contributed nicely to relative gains due, in part, to Goosehead Insurance. The position is held in the Polen Global SMID portfolio. The company, a personal line property and casualty insurance brokerage primarily focused on home and auto markets, has risen over 80% so far this year. Goosehead has continued to execute on its plan to clean up the corporate organization, return the company to its pre-COVID productivity metrics and deliver strong results despite weakness in the housing market. In the second quarter the company reported 40% year-on-year growth in total revenues, but also, importantly, core revenue grew 42% and premiums, the best leading indicator of potential future revenue growth, increased 41%. The company continues to show Polen that they are among the top operators in a difficult macro environment, leaning into their value propositions around great customer service and a better agent experience, and executing on thoughtful, value-add strategic growth programs.

The Fund benefited from its exposure to materials stocks, and, more specifically, to Akzo Nobel. The company is owned by Nuance Investments. Akzo Nobel is a global manufacturer of paints and coatings with leading market share positions for paint in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The company is also a global leader in several functional coating categories such as industrial, coil, wood, aerospace, and marine coatings. Nuance’s research suggests that the company is currently underearning its long-term potential for two transitory reasons. First, Akzo Nobel has faced raw material cost inflation, particularly in resins (40% of raw materials costs), which has depressed margins below normal levels, in Nuance’s opinion. Inflationary pressures have begun to abate over the past few quarters and as raw material prices decline further from still elevated levels, they believe the company will see margin improvement. Second, the company has faced cyclically lower demand for its products due to rising interest rates and slower growth across its geographies. Depressed demand has led to inventory destocking across the channel in Europe and slower growth in China has caused overall volumes to decline mid-single digits over the past year, according to Nuance’s research. They believe that Akzo Nobel’s stable market share position and structurally stable demand for paints and coatings, will position it to potentially benefit from a cyclical demand improvement across both these markets. In Nuance’s opinion, both these factors caused AKZOY to post 2.20 in earnings per share (EPS) relative to their internal estimates of normal EPS closer to 4.50, creating what an attractive risk reward relative to other opportunities.


Fund Summary         5

Table of Contents

Stock selection within the industrials and information technology sectors were a headwind to performance in the first half of the year. Within industrials, 3M Company (Nuance Investments) and MillerKnoll (Scharf Investments) were laggards. 3M Company is a diversified industrial conglomerate with leading market share positions across a variety of businesses including industrial materials and adhesives, healthcare consumables, safety equipment, and consumer products. The company has historically enjoyed stable market share positions across its portfolio and its businesses benefit from structural demand drivers including the shift from traditional fasteners to adhesives, aging populations, and rising safety standards globally. These characteristics have contributed to the company exhibiting high and stable returns on capital over time. Nuance’s view of 3M’s normalized earnings power is near $9.00 per share, and they believe the company is currently underearning relative to Wall Street consensus estimates for 2023. The first source of underearning is related to cyclical weakness in the company’s consumer-facing businesses. Discretionary consumer spending has weakened as inflation has impacted consumer budgets and consumers have worked down pandemic-related savings. According to Nuance’s research, this has led to a cyclical decline in discretionary consumer electronics purchases including smartphones, TVs, tablets, and their related semiconductor content. These are all categories that utilize 3M’s products. On top of this headwind to sales driven by the end consumer, general inventory destocking by retailers has compounded this decrease in sales, in Nuance’s opinion. The second source of underearning is related to cost inflation for 3M’s key inputs including resins, petrochemicals, wood pulp, labor, and transportation. Nuance estimates that 3M’s EBITDAR (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and restructuring or rent) margins are currently more than 200 basis points below levels they would consider normal. Nuance believes additional pricing actions and/or moderating input cost inflation should result in margin normalization over the next few years. 3M is currently facing two legal battles which they believe have led to negative sentiment and helped create a compelling valuation opportunity in the stock. The Nuance Investment Team has thoroughly studied both situations, has examined past analogous corporate litigation, and has stress tested 3M’s earnings power and balance sheet for a variety of scenarios. Importantly, Nuance does not expect these legal issues to impact the competitive position of 3M’s broad line of businesses and have incorporated their own expected litigation and settlement costs into the balance sheet and normalized earnings estimates. It is Nuance’s belief that the company’s strong balance sheet and its normalized annual free cash flow in excess of $5.5 billion should provide an ample cushion from which to service any costs related to these matters. To emphasize, these issues and Nuance’s own internal estimate of their long-term impact to the company are included in their view of normalized earnings, cash flows, and balance sheet strength. In legal matters, there is always uncertainty, but based on their study of these issues, it appears to be a situation where the uncertainty is providing a solid risk reward opportunity.

Scharf continues to believe MillerKnoll’s position as the premium high-quality leader in a fragmented market will allow it to gain share over time. Furthermore, the office furniture market is insulated from technological obsolescence and, despite work from home trends, should continue to grow. In fact, the company believes that a need for a reimagined work environment combined with increased demand for quality home office furniture could expand the market (as opposed to fears that work from home will lead to a contracting market) over the long-term. In addition, post the merger with Knoll, MillerKnoll is now the largest office furnishing company worldwide with what Scharf believes to be strong brand recognition and an established global distribution network. They believe the acquisition of Knoll will help the company fill out product and geography gaps in its portfolio, increasing scale and increase additional wallet share with existing customers. Scharf believes s MillerKnoll has the potential to realize $140 million in cost synergies by 2025. High-level, what’s incremental from their recent management call is improvement in order trends indicating a bottoming in 1Q24 (the current quarter) vs. their expectation for an elongated bottom throughout 2024.

The technology sector was the main detractor during the first half—from both security selection as well as not owning the aforementioned mega-cap tech names. The biggest detractor was Keyword Studios (owned in the Polen Global SMID portfolio). Keyword Studios, an outsourced video game production services company, has seen significant selling pressure due to concerns that AI could disrupt their business model. Many of the outsourced services it offers, such as language translation and video game artwork, could potentially be done in-house using generative AI (artificial intelligence). Management have addressed these concerns, and while there is still some uncertainty, they are embracing AI and believe it could become more of an opportunity than a threat. Ultimately, while there are still some unknowns, Polen has conviction in the management team and risk is skewed to the upside given the large correction in the share price.


6       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

By Sector




Consumer Discretionary


Information Technology


Communication Services


Health Care 




Consumer Staples


Real Estate








Summary Statistics


Market Cap Median (bn)

  $ 31.07  

Weighted Average Market Cap

  $ 210.24  

# of Holdings


By Region




North America


Asia ex-Japan




Latin America




Australia/New Zealand


Middle East


Other Countries


* Cash is excluded from calculation.



By Region

  By Market Cap

Small Cap < $2.028 b

Mid Cap >$2.028 B, <$42.290 b

Large Cap > $42.290 b



Fund Summary         7

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iMGP Global Select Fund Value of Hypothetical $10,000


The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP Global Select Fund from December 31, 1996 to June 30, 2023 compared with the Russell 3000 Index, Morningstar Global Large-Stock Blend Category and MSCI World Index.



The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


8       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP Global Select Fund



Shares           Value  


  Communication Services: 9.5%  
  25,000     Activision Blizzard, Inc.*    $ 2,107,500  
  19,947     Alphabet, Inc. - Class A*      2,387,656  
  14,665     Baidu, Inc. - ADR*      2,007,785  
  58,200     Comcast Corp. - Class A      2,418,210  
  21,370     CTS Eventim AG & Co. KGaA      1,349,804  
  22,000     Tencent Holdings Ltd.      930,938  
  15,350     Tencent Holdings Ltd. - ADR      652,221  






  Consumer Discretionary: 9.1%  
  20,265, Inc.*      2,641,745  
  9,358     Five Below, Inc.*      1,839,221  
  12,550     Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc. - Class A*      1,304,698  
  1,430     LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE      1,347,441  
  48,120     Revolve Group, Inc.*      789,168  
  70,150     Valvoline, Inc.      2,631,327  
  21,720     YETI Holdings, Inc.*      843,605  






  Consumer Staples: 7.8%  
  42,522     Beiersdorf AG - ADR      1,125,132  
  4,859     Clorox Co.      772,775  
  4,283     Diageo PLC - ADR      743,015  
  20,400     Heineken NV      2,097,732  
  113,245     Henkel AG & Co. KGaA - ADR      1,995,377  
  9,342     Kimberly-Clark Corp.      1,289,756  
  2,440     L’Oreal SA      1,137,843  
  10,536     Unilever PLC - ADR      549,242  






  Financials: 15.8%  
  179,900     AIA Group Ltd.      1,815,896  
  5,002     Aon PLC - Class A      1,726,690  
  2     Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. - Class A*      1,035,620  
  4,275     Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. - Class B*      1,457,775  
  58,650     Brookfield Corp. - Class A      1,973,573  
  5,772     Charles Schwab Corp.      327,157  
  2,568     Chubb Ltd.      494,494  
  29,720     Goosehead Insurance, Inc. - Class A*      1,869,091  
  1,525     Markel Group, Inc.*      2,109,350  
  18,712     Northern Trust Corp.      1,387,308  
  3,561     Reinsurance Group of America, Inc.      493,875  
  63,600     TMX Group Ltd.      1,432,231  
  6,326     Travelers Cos., Inc.      1,098,573  
  11,104     Visa, Inc. - Class A      2,636,978  






  Health Care: 23.2%  
  16,508     Abbott Laboratories      1,799,702  
  6,597     Align Technology, Inc.*      2,332,963  
  29,565     Centene Corp.*      1,994,159  
  29,885     CVS Health Corp.      2,065,950  
  31,705     DENTSPLY SIRONA, Inc.      1,268,834  
  28,880     Eurofins Scientific SE      1,833,937  
  8,959     ICON PLC - ADR*      2,241,542  
  5,525     McKesson Corp.      2,360,888  
  14,942     Medtronic PLC      1,316,390  
  25,285     Novartis AG - ADR      2,551,509  
  31,210     Siemens Healthineers AG(a)      1,767,214  
  130,270     Smith & Nephew PLC - ADR      4,201,208  
Shares           Value  
  Health Care (continued)  
  3,520     Tecan Group AG    $ 1,350,169  
  8,081     Universal Health Services, Inc. - Class B      1,274,940  
  541     Waters Corp.*      144,198  
  4,011     Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc.      584,002  






  Industrials: 7.2%  
  19,836     3M Co.      1,985,385  
  187,400     Alight, Inc. - Class A*      1,731,576  
  74,677     Knorr-Bremse AG - ADR      1,421,850  
  24,982     Legrand SA - ADR      494,644  
  72,275     MillerKnoll, Inc.      1,068,224  
  4,520     Paycom Software, Inc.      1,452,005  
  2,286     Schneider Electric SE - ADR      83,119  
  52,500     TOMRA Systems ASA      845,679  






  Information Technology: 16.8%  
  3,307     Accenture PLC - Class A      1,020,474  
  4,892     Adobe, Inc.*      2,392,139  
  7,423     Amphenol Corp. - Class A      630,584  
  17,070     Dynatrace, Inc.*      878,593  
  18,639     Endava PLC - ADR*      965,314  
  6,920     Globant SA*      1,243,662  
  67,101     Keywords Studios PLC      1,543,361  
  7,410     Microsoft Corp.      2,523,401  
  55,024     Murata Manufacturing Co. Ltd. - ADR      789,044  
  24,160     Oracle Corp.      2,877,215  
  14,440     SAP SE      1,972,996  
  7,000     SHIFT, Inc.*      1,269,050  
  4,350     Tyler Technologies, Inc.*      1,811,645  
  5,172     Workday, Inc. - Class A*      1,168,303  






  Materials: 0.3%  
  5,663     Akzo Nobel NV - ADR      154,600  
  2,238     DuPont de Nemours, Inc.      159,883  






  Real Estate: 2.0%  
  41,266     Altus Group Ltd.      1,369,454  
  54,149     Healthcare Realty Trust, Inc. - Class A, REIT      1,021,250  
  5,895     Healthpeak Properties, Inc. - REIT      118,490  






  Utilities: 1.9%  
  488     American Water Works Co., Inc.      69,662  
  29,002     Severn Trent PLC - ADR      979,609  
  53,358     United Utilities Group PLC - ADR      1,332,883  







(Cost $104,175,124)






  Information Technology: 2.1%  
  57,915     Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. - (Preference Shares)      2,615,218  




(Cost $2,436,388)






The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


Schedule of Investments         9

Table of Contents

iMGP Global Select Fund

SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES at June 30, 2023 (Unaudited) (Continued)






  $6,046,041     Fixed Income Clearing Corp. 1.520%, 6/30/2023, due 07/03/2023 [collateral: par value $1,158,500, U.S. Treasury Note, 3.875%, due 12/31/2029; par value $3,119,600, U.S. Treasury Inflation Indexed Bonds, 0.125%, due 01/15/2030; par value $1,004,600, U.S. Treasury Note, 4.000%, due 02/28/2030; par value $730,300, U.S.Treasury Note, 3.500%, due 04/30/2030; total collateral value $6,168,129] (proceeds $6,046,807)    $ 6,046,041  




(Cost $6,046,041)





(Cost: $112,657,553): 100.5%




  Liabilities in Excess of Other Assets: (0.5)%      (628,025




NET ASSETS: 100.0%

   $ 125,315,735  




Percentages are stated as a percent of net assets.



American Depositary Receipt


Real Estate Investment Trust


Non-Income Producing Security.


Security was purchased pursuant to Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933 and may be sold in transactions exempt from registration only to qualified institutional buyers or in a public offering registered under Securities Act of 1933.


The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


10       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP International Fund 2023 Semi-Annual Report




The iMGP International Fund returned 15.83% in the first half of 2023, ahead of the 11.67% gain for the MSCI EAFE Index and the 10.88% return for the Morningstar Foreign Large Blend category.

Since inception, the Fund has gained 6.34% annualized, which compares favorably to annualized returns of 4.88% and 4.08% for MSCI EAFE Index and Morningstar Foreign Large Blend category, respectively.



Performance as of June 30, 2023

     Year to







iMGP International Fund

    15.83%        17.15%        11.38%        2.26%        3.30%        6.34%  


    9.47%        12.72%        7.22%        3.52%        4.75%        5.01%  


    11.67%        18.77%        8.93%        4.39%        5.41%        4.88%  

Morningstar Foreign Large Blend Category

    10.88%        15.66%        7.87%        3.64%        4.76%        4.08%  

Gross Expense Ratio 1.47%, Net Expense Ratio 1.24%


Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the funds may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. To obtain standardized performance of the funds, and performance as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit There are contractual fee waivers in effect through 4/30/2024.


MSCI index returns source: MSCI. Neither MSCI nor any other party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the MSCI data makes any express or implied warranties or representations with respect to such data (or the results to be obtained by the use thereof), and all such parties hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of such data. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall MSCI, any of its affiliates, or any third party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the data have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential, or any other damages (including lost profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages. No further distribution or dissemination of the MSCI data is permitted without MSCIs express written consent. Source note: Returns prior to 1999 are the MSCI ACWI ex-US GR index. Returns from 1999 onwards are MSCI ACWI ex-US NR index.





Portfolio Commentary


Harris Associates

Major global markets generally finished higher for the year-to-date period following a challenging 2022. U.S. and Europe equity markets showed strength on the back of better-than-expected economic data, while Asian markets were mixed with China equities pressured and Japanese equities reaching 30-year highs. While a resilient labor market, cooling housing market and hopes for less-hawkish central banks have given investors reasons for optimism, the ramifications of recent banking stress, elevated inflation and geopolitical uncertainty continue to offer cause for concern.

Markets were shaken in March as worry about the health of the banking system spread, ignited by the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, and furthered by UBS’s purchase of Credit Suisse at a discounted valuation. Major banking institutions and government agencies around the globe stepped in to help assure depositors their money was safe, which helped avoid contagion across the system.

In March, the U.S. Federal Reserve and Bank of England increased their respective benchmark interest rates by 25 basis points, while the European Central Bank opted for 50 basis points. The Federal Reserve then increased its benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points in May before pausing at its June meeting. Comments from members of the Federal Open Market Committee pointed to further hikes in the future and interest rates remaining elevated for some time. The European Central Bank and Bank of England both increased their respective interest rates in May and June, reaching 4.00% and 5.00%, respectively, while Japan and China opted for more accommodative monetary policies. In the face of tightening financial conditions, inflation fell during the period throughout most of the world.

Regardless of the economic backdrop and central bank activity, our disciplined investment process continues to revolve around bottom-up, fundamental research. As long-term investors, we value our companies through the economic cycle and focus portfolio construction on optimizing what we believe are our best investment opportunities. We attempt to identify growing businesses that are managed to benefit their shareholders and invest in those businesses only when priced substantially below our estimate of intrinsic value, then patiently wait for the gap between share price and our estimate of intrinsic value to converge. We believe this approach best serves our goal of growing our client’s capital over the long term.

Lazard Asset Management

Overall corporate profits have remained resilient, but under the surface we have seen pressure in areas of discretionary spending—such as marketing or apparel. After 18 months of significant price increases, we see more examples of material impact on consumer demand, and a series of rate rises are putting pressure on the financial system and real estate. There appears to be a fading confidence that companies can maintain prices as raw material prices roll over in a softer demand environment. This dynamic should separate well-run companies with true pricing power and those reliant on benign economic conditions.


Fund Summary         11

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Our experiences with COVID and geopolitical tensions will have lasting implications for us all. The sharp rise in energy prices has made clear the energy transition is not only for the climate, but a geopolitical imperative. A re-evaluation of economics versus certainty of supply is resulting in a shift to more regional supply chains – most notably for the semiconductor industry.

How the relationship between China and the West develops remains as critical as ever now that Xi Jinping has cemented his position of power. Navigating this geopolitical frontier will remain a focus for businesses and investors in the years ahead. The shift in the cost of capital has exposed the fragile foundation for high growth companies with yet to be proven financials and a reliance on cheap funding. Meanwhile, the demand destruction observed in countries with a rapid rise in energy cost illustrates that commodity booms are hard to sustain.

The determination of central banks to reign in inflationary pressures combined with pressure on disposable incomes, and a downward draft in asset prices, continues to create a challenging backdrop for markets. The ability to balance economic growth with efforts to bring inflation back to target levels will determine the direction of markets in the period ahead. While the near-term outlook is uncertain, market volatility provides opportunities for stock pickers to invest in great businesses at more attractive prices. The team is optimistic about the investment opportunity set presented in today’s market.

Stock selection, not sector or regional allocation, has driven the long-term track record of the strategy. At the company level, we seek a balance between financial productivity (i.e., returns on capital), valuation, and sustainability of income generation. At the same time, we look for market inefficiencies—Mispriced Assets, Improvers, and Compounders – that are empirically-validated sources of alpha.

Polen Capital

As we closed the first half of 2023, the portfolio continued to show overweight exposures to European based companies. Significant exposures to information technology, business and information services, health care and consumer facing companies cover the bulk of our positioning.

China provides an interesting counter to many trends seen elsewhere. Markets eagerly anticipated strong post-COVID reopening growth last fall, but China’s reopening has been a dud. Note how COVID responses in China ran counter to supporting consumer spending—a sharp departure from the combined monetary and fiscal largesse many Western countries used during the pandemic. Of course, Western policies played significant roles in stoking inflation. Now, more than six months after reopening, China’s inflation statistics are grinding towards outright deflation each month. A battery of other issues matter in China, so we can’t pin poor growth and inflation solely on COVID responses. However, juxtaposing China’s weak inflation with the West’s persistent inflation does prompt questions about the government’s stance towards consumer spending as an economic driver.

We continue to have limited exposure to China as we felt the reopening from COVID failed to materialize in a significant way. We cover a handful of Chinese businesses and are open to considering investments there, but at present concerns around indebtedness and economic stagnation have us on the sidelines.

Key Performance Drivers


The fund benefited the most relative to its benchmarks in the first half from positioning in consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, and information technology sectors. Within the consumer discretionary sector, shares of Spanish company Amadeus—owned by Polen Capital—contributed to portfolio returns throughout 2023 as the continued pandemic recovery in air travel brings more passengers back to the airline industry. Amadeus emerged from the COVID crisis as a leader in the three markets it serves. In its core global distribution systems (GDS), Amadeus enables travel bookings to pair multiple airline carriers together into single tickets for a given passenger. In airline IT and now hospitality IT, Amadeus provides mission critical software to airlines and hotels which makes these businesses run more efficiently. Passengers boarded and air bookings ended 2022 approximately 15% below 2019 levels and continue to steadily recover. While many companies cut to the bone to weather the pandemic, Amadeus prioritized long term growth drivers like a New Distribution Capability for the GDS platform, and upgrades to its hospitality solutions for hoteliers. These moves strengthened legacy air travel business lines while expanding the reach of its hotel software solutions. Competitively, Polen believe Amadeus emerged from the pandemic far stronger than peers. If pandemic travel patterns continue reversing, they see Amadeus growing at elevated rates through 2025. Given these business drivers and strong growth prospects Polen feel shares are attractive at 22x 2024 earnings per share.

Within consumer staples, Coca-Cola Europacific Partners shares performed well in the first half of the year. This position is held by Lazard Asset Management. The company’s management team had upgraded medium term targets at their capital markets day late 2022, which were followed by good FY23 results update in February. In Lazard’s view, the strong performance illustrates the inherent pricing power in the category and continues to validate the strategic shift within the Coca-Cola system away from volume-led growth. Reassuringly, the management team continues to execute well in their markets and are gaining market share.

The shares of Coca-Cola Europacific Partners remain attractively valued considering the good defensive growth profile of the business in their established markets and opportunity to significantly grow the business in Indonesia, which was acquired along with Amatil back in 2021. Lazard believes that the focus on value in the Coca-Cola system should continue to support margins and further improvement in financial productivity.


12       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

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ICON, an Ireland-based contract research organization which helps pharmaceutical and biotech companies design and complete trials for new products, was a top contributor during the first half of 2023. Both Lazard Asset Management and Polen Capital own shares in the health care name, making it the fund’s largest position. Polen Capital noted that ICON has consistently taken market share, but the industry remains highly fragmented, providing a good opportunity for it to win even more share as vendor consolidation remains an ongoing trend. Recent results have reinforced their conviction in the business; it continues to produce industry beating revenue growth and margin expansion.

Lazard Asset Management says shares in ICON outperformed on the back of solid first quarter results. The results showed a combination of resilient order intake, and healthy growth in revenues and margins. Concerns around weak biotech funding conditions have been a significant headwind to sentiment around the shares. The +6% growth in gross booking during the quarter and reports of continued healthy levels of RFP activity helped to ease concerns of an imminent deterioration in the market.

The fund’s positioning within financials, industrials, and materials were among the main detractors in the first half of the year. Within financials, Sampo Ojy, which is owned by Lazard Asset Management, underperformed in the first half of 2023. This was perhaps partly explained by a “high water mark” for the company, which had a very strong run in 2022. The defensive growth characteristics of the company were less in favor, as investors grew more confident in the economic outlook towards the end of 2022. The lack of gearing to higher interest rates made it a less attractive financials holding at a time when European banks were experiencing strong net interest margin (NIM) expansion.

The relative attraction of Sampo became further challenged when the company reported weak results in February. The core P&C insurance business delivered results ahead of expectations, but the recently acquired UK business and the Life insurance segments, soon to be demerged, both fell short of expectations. Investors were also disappointed by lower levels of cash returns than expected. Management have since provided clarity on the demerger of Mandatum (life insurance), which should free up capital in the group and support future cash returns to shareholders.

Teleperformance, the world’s leading outsourced customer service provider, was among the main detractors to performance during the first half of 2023. The position is owned by Polen Capital. The company’s stock price has been under pressure the past few months—a weaker IT services backdrop combined with concerns about generative AI disrupting Teleperformance’s business model have negatively impacted short-term returns. Amidst an AI hype cycle markets reflexively assume generative AI will bring about the end of many human capital-intensive businesses. Teleperformance management believes generative AI is another evolutionary development causing changes for the industry as have other technologies in the past. Management projects certain workflows will be negatively impacted by AI, but the business should continue to grow revenue at a high single digit rate over the long-term net of AI headwinds. Further, Teleperformance has long been using AI enhanced workflows to better serve call center customers. Generative AI may well offer useful efficiency gains to the business moving forward. Despite near-term weakness, Polen continues to have conviction in Teleperformance, and views the concerns around generative AI to be overblown. The stock’s current NTM P/E of ~10x is compellingly undervalued.

Glencore, owned by Harris Associates, detracted from fund returns during the first half. According to Harris Associates, Glencore’s full-year 2022 results were strong in an absolute sense with an 84% increase in earnings year-over-year, though they fell short of expectations. This shortfall was driven entirely by the industrial business as marketing significantly exceeded Harris’ expectations. Adjusted earnings of $6.38 billion were nearly double the high end of Glencore’s long-term guidance for the marketing segment due to exceptional profitability from the energy segment. The industrial division fell short of their expectations due to a mix of production issues in coal and at two copper assets, Katanga and Mt. Isa, as well as cost inflation related to labor, diesel and explosives. Glencore also announced an incremental $7.1 billion of distributions to shareholders. While a very high number and implied yield, this was actually somewhat lower than had been expected under Glencore’s capital allocation policy due to weaker free cash generation during 2022 driven by working capital constraints.

First-quarter results were released in April, which is typically a seasonally weak time for production. Copper and zinc production suffered from adverse weather conditions at Antamina and production fell in zinc following the disposal of several smaller assets. Coal production fell due to the community blockade in Cerrejon as well as some temporary geological challenges in South Africa. During a call with management, CEO Gary Nagle revealed Glencore sees significant latent potential to double its copper business organically over the next decade via brownfield expansions and an attractive greenfield project in Argentina. While the company is waiting until the market demands the tons, Glencore is acquiring land, conducting sample testing, and doing permitting work to help ensure these projects can be completed within a timely manner once sanctioned. Further, Nagle remains committed to the rundown of Glencore’s coal assets over time in accordance with the company’s strategy, but Nagle reiterated the belief that it should be very strong profit and cash flow contributors for the company due to an attractive cost position and favorable supply and demand dynamics. Harris Associates continues to believe that Glencore remains an attractive holding and that management is committed to delivering value for shareholders.


Fund Summary         13

Table of Contents

Portfolio Allocations as of June 30, 3023


By Sector




Consumer Discretionary


Information Technology


Communication Services


Health Care & Pharmaceuticals




Consumer Staples


Real Estate










By Region




North America


Asia ex-Japan




Latin America




Australia/New Zealand


Middle East


Other Countries


*   Cash is excluded from calculation.



Summary Statistics


Market Cap Median (bn)

  $ 29.54  

Weighted Average Market Cap

  $ 63.65  

# of Holdings



By Region

  By Market Cap

Small Cap < $2.028 b

Mid Cap >$2.028 B, <$42.290 b

Large Cap > $42.290 b



14       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP International Fund Value of Hypothetical $10,000


The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP International Fund from November 30, 1997 to June 30, 2023 compared with the MSCI EAFE Index, Morningstar Foreign Large Blend Category and MSCI ACWI Ex USA Index.



The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


Fund Summary         15

Table of Contents

iMGP International Fund



Shares           Value  


  Argentina: 1.2%  
  2,352     MercadoLibre, Inc.*    $ 2,786,179  



  Australia: 1.3%  
  511,700     Glencore PLC      2,904,352  



  Canada: 2.8%  
  169,686     CAE, Inc.*      3,800,710  
  40,730     Shopify, Inc. - Class A*      2,631,158  






  China: 1.6%  
  50,794     Prosus NV*      3,719,216  



  Denmark: 3.3%  
  28,235     Carlsberg AS - Class B      4,517,479  
  114,685     Vestas Wind Systems AS*      3,049,035  






  Finland: 2.6%  
  132,455     Sampo Oyj - Class A      5,943,995  



  France: 8.4%  
  87,600     BNP Paribas SA      5,536,931  
  7,140     Kering SA      3,956,755  
  2,240     LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE      2,115,204  
  15,300     Teleperformance      2,570,026  
  142,110     Worldline SA*(a)      5,204,304  






  Germany: 22.5%  
  14,375     Adidas AG      2,789,762  
  15,035     Allianz SE      3,499,358  
  84,800     Bayer AG      4,691,041  
  69,749     Continental AG      5,259,714  
  54,292     CTS Eventim AG & Co. KGaA      3,430,741  
  98,318     Daimler Truck Holding AG      3,542,004  
  192,065     Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA      5,319,531  
  132,689     Hensoldt AG      4,357,683  
  58,695     Mercedes-Benz Group AG      4,726,677  
  61,640     SAP SE      8,421,576  
  102,830     Siemens Healthineers AG(a)      5,823,356  






  Ireland: 9.4%  
  51,266     ICON PLC - ADR*      12,826,753  
  80,185     Ryanair Holdings PLC - ADR*      8,868,461  






  Israel: 3.9%  
  1,344,819     Israel Discount Bank Ltd. - Class A      6,673,251  
  440,085     Tel Aviv Stock Exchange Ltd.*      2,267,703  






  Japan: 1.9%  
  234,200     Renesas Electronics Corp.*      4,426,203  



  Netherlands: 5.2%  
  6,720     ASML Holding NV      4,867,308  
  32,238     EXOR NV      2,882,278  
  195,760     Universal Music Group NV      4,351,902  






  Portugal: 1.9%  
  894,096     EDP - Energias de Portugal SA      4,379,061  



Shares           Value  
  South Korea: 1.6%  
  26,185     NAVER Corp.    $ 3,666,237  



  Spain: 2.7%  
  80,955     Amadeus IT Group SA*      6,175,783  



  Sweden: 3.0%  
  55,546     Evolution AB(a)      7,040,275  



  Switzerland: 1.5%  
  56,800     Julius Baer Group Ltd.      3,582,605  



  Taiwan: 2.0%  
  249,000     Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd.      4,640,197  



  United Kingdom: 12.9%  
  359,743     CNH Industrial NV      5,202,694  
  104,661     Coca-Cola Europacific Partners PLC      6,742,386  
  10,460,750     Lloyds Banking Group PLC      5,802,565  
  655,980     Sage Group PLC      7,710,456  
  83,885     Unilever PLC      4,376,559  






  United States: 5.3%  
  21,696     Aon PLC - Class A      7,489,459  
  53,814     Medtronic PLC      4,741,015  







(Cost $195,120,636)






  Repurchase Agreements: 4.0%  
  $9,170,774     Fixed Income Clearing Corp. 1.520%, 6/30/2023, due 07/03/2023 [collateral: par value $112,500, U.S. Treasury Note, 3.875%, due 12/31/2029; par value $3,755,800, U.S. Treasury Inflation Indexed Bonds, 0.125%, due 01/15/2030; par value $749,300, U.S. Treasury Note, 4.000%, due 02/28/2030; par value $4,635,000, U.S.Treasury Note, 3.500%, due 04/30/2030; total collateral value $9,356,077] (proceeds $9,171,936)      9,170,774  




(Cost $9,170,774)





(Cost: $204,291,410): 99.0%




  Other Assets in Excess of Liabilities: 1.0%      2,295,512  




NET ASSETS: 100.0%

   $ 230,776,224  




Percentages are stated as a percent of net assets.



American Depositary Receipt


Non-Income Producing Security.


Security was purchased pursuant to Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933 and may be sold in transactions exempt from registration only to qualified institutional buyers or in a public offering registered under Securities Act of 1933.


The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


16       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund 2023 Semi-Annual Report




The iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund returned 10.75% in the first half of 2023, finishing the period ahead of the 9.28% return for the MSCI EAFE Value Index and the 10.30% return for the Morningstar Foreign Large Value category. The broader MSCI EAFE Index gained 11.67% over the last six months.

Since inception, the Fund has gained 4.88% annualized, trailing the annualized returns of 7.14% and 6.58% for MSCI EAFE Value Index and Morningstar Foreign Large Value category, respectively. The Fund has outpaced the 4.21% annualized return for the MSCI EAFE Index since inception.



Performance as of June 30, 2023

     Year to

iMGP Oldfield Internatl Value Fund

    10.75%        13.19%        4.88%  

MSCI EAFE Value Index

    9.28%        17.40%        7.14%  


    11.67%        18.77%        4.21%  

Morningstar Foreign Large Value Category

    10.30%        15.59%        6.58%  

Gross Expense Ratio: 2.11% Net Expense Ratio 0.94%


Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the funds may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. Short term performance is not a good indication of the fund’s future performance and should not be the sole basis for investing in the fund. To obtain standardized performance of the funds, and performance as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit There are contractual fee waivers in effect through 4/30/2024.


MSCI index returns source: MSCI. Neither MSCI nor any other party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the MSCI data makes any express or implied warranties or representations with respect to such data (or the results to be obtained by the use thereof), and all such parties hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of such data. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall MSCI, any of its affiliates, or any third party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the data have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential, or any other damages (including lost profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages. No further distribution or dissemination of the MSCI data is permitted without MSCI’s express written consent. Source note:





Portfolio Commentary


While the Artificial Intelligence-inspired excitement in May in the U.S. was driven by just the seven largest stocks, the U.S. market breadth improved in June and the U.S. led global markets higher. A ‘Goldilocks’ view on inflation in full retreat and interest rates topping out at current levels is now pervasive despite the commentary from the U.S. Federal Reserve’s June meeting that they were likely to raise rates further in the months ahead. The Fed says they are worried about the tightness of the labor market and resilience of consumer spending.

The U.S. core consumer price index (CPI), that excludes food and energy prices, was 5.3% year-on-year in May, down from its peak in September 2022 at 6.6%. The U.S. unemployment rate of 3.7% is in-line with levels seen at the end of 2019 and lower only in the early 1950’s and briefly in 1969.

That said, the U.S. producer price index (PPI) is surely the leading indicator that is giving U.S. equity investors the confidence to ignore the comments from the Fed. The annual PPI rate is now just 1.1%, below the 1.7% average between 2010 and the end of 2019, and down from its 11.7% peak in March 2022.

The U.S. economy is finely poised. While the equity market is focused on PPI, the U.S. bond market is less certain with the 10-year bond yield back up to 3.8% (from 3.3% in April), against its October 2022 peak of 4.2%. The spread between the three-month treasury note rate and the 10-year bond rate stands at negative 148 basis points, almost its most negative reading ever. The indicator is infamous because when it turns negative it has a 100% record of predicting a U.S. recession within the next eighteen months. The indicator turned negative in late October 2022.

The U.S. equity market is finely poised too. The U.S. market trades at 20.5x expected earnings and 22x historic earnings. If the equity market is right in its outlook on the economy, then the U.S. market looks fully valued. If the bond market is right, then the equity market is riding for a fall. Either way, the outlook for international markets, trading on just 13x earnings looks to have a larger margin of safety built into the valuation than the U.S. market.

Key Performance Drivers


The fund benefited the most from stock selection within the industrials sector. Both easyJet and Embraer have rebounded significantly so far in 2023 following a difficult 2022. EasyJet’s share price jumped in January and finished the first half with a gain of 57% (in U.S. dollar


Fund Summary         17

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terms). EasyJet reported excellent results for their first fiscal quarter ending December—the firm generated revenue of £1.5bn for the period, +83% on a COVID-affected period in 1QFY22 and +19% above market expectations. While profit margins were lower than the market had expected, the guidance for the year was strong with the new packaged holiday business ramping up nicely. Traditionally, January is the busiest month of the year for booking summer holidays, and this year was no exception, with easyJet noting they were selling out five full aircraft every minute during the busiest days of the month. Despite widespread gloom about the outlook for the UK and European economies, initial company guidance for the summer suggests it will be 9% better than 2022.

Within the financials sector, there was dispersion in the returns of names held in the fund. Japanese financial, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group gained over 11% (in U.S. dollar terms) and contributed to returns over the last six months. On the other side, Swedish bank, Svenska Handelsbanken fell over 9% in the first half of 2023 (in U.S. dollar terms).

Shares of Mitsubishi UFJ, the largest bank in Japan, enjoyed a strong recovery from the setback in March when bank shares around the world suffered in the wake of the failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank. After years of declining net interest income, increasing lending spreads are driving an expectation of a robust recovery in its net interest income particularly amongst domestic and international corporates. The valuation is now at 0.75x book value, and there is an expectation of returns on equity rising to 7.5% from 6.5% last year. The valuation is now approaching our view of fair value.

The largest decliner during the first half of 2023 was LG Household & Health Care. Relatively good performance in the company’s South Korea-focused businesses (which comprised more than half of LG H&H’s 2022 operating profit) continues to be overshadowed by weak performance in the China-focused skin care business. The company is not alone in delivering weak performance in skin care. Key peers, such as Amorepacific and Estee Lauder, are equally challenged by the disappointing recovery of Chinese tourism, challenges in the Korean duty-free channel and changing shopping habits. We continue to believe that the headwinds facing LG H&H are more temporary rather than structural—and therefore remain optimistic that LG H&H’s performance will improve. The shares have fallen to their lowest level since 2014 and now discount little in the way of recovery.

Portfolio Allocations as of June 30, 2023


By Sector




Consumer Discretionary


Information Technology


Communication Services


Health Care & Pharmaceuticals




Consumer Staples


Real Estate










By Region




North America


Asia ex-Japan




Latin America




Australia/New Zealand


Middle East


Other Countries


*   Cash is excluded from calculation.



Summary Statistics


Market Cap Median (bn)

  $ 3.02  

Weighted Average Market Cap

  $ 0.56  

# of Holdings



18       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

By Region

  By Market Cap

iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund Value of Hypothetical $10,000


The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund from November 30, 2020 to June 30, 2023 compared with the MSCI EAFE Value Index, Morningstar Foreign Large Value Category and MSCI EAFE Index.



The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


Fund Summary         19

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iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund



Shares           Value  


  Brazil: 4.8%  
  114,700     Embraer SA - ADR*    $ 1,773,262  



  China: 7.9%  
  131,900     Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.*      1,371,699  
  258,500     CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd.      1,582,177  






  France: 4.6%  
  16,172     Sanofi      1,734,719  



  Germany: 19.6%  
  34,500     Bayer AG      1,908,501  
  130,583     E.ON SE      1,665,446  
  53,859     Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA      1,491,707  
  13,440     Siemens AG      2,238,399  






  Italy: 4.5%  
  115,783     Eni SpA      1,670,525  



  Japan: 11.3%  
  17,400     East Japan Railway Co.      963,624  
  31,000     Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.      1,448,348  
  246,900     Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc.      1,819,999  






  Netherlands: 4.9%  
  20,531     EXOR NV      1,835,599  



  South Korea: 9.4%  
  16,897     KT&G Corp.      1,063,749  
  2,910     LG H&H Co. Ltd.      1,019,273  
  25,869     Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.      1,425,807  






  Sweden: 3.2%  
  141,745     Svenska Handelsbanken AB - Class A      1,189,171  



  United Kingdom: 18.5%  
  1,108,353     BT Group PLC      1,725,442  
  286,443     easyJet PLC*      1,764,481  
  3,651,205     Lloyds Banking Group PLC      2,025,319  
  443,579     Tesco PLC      1,402,552  







(Cost $29,578,130)






  Germany: 4.5%  
  21,056     Henkel AG & Co. KGaA (Preference Shares)      1,684,149  




(Cost $1,484,673)





(Cost: $31,062,803): 93.2%




  Other Assets in Excess of Liabilities: 6.8%      2,549,594  




NET ASSETS: 100.0%

   $ 37,353,542  




Percentages are stated as a percent of net assets.



American Depositary Receipt


Non-Income Producing Security.


The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


20       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund 2023 Semi-Annual Report




The iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund gained 10.80% in the first half of 2023, finishing the period well ahead of the 2.50% gain for the Russell 2000 Value Index benchmark, and the 5.47% gain for the Morningstar Small Value category. Since the fund’s inception in July 2020, the fund has gained 13.83% compared to the 15.11% gain for the benchmark.



Performance as of June 30, 2023

     Year to

iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund

    10.80%        19.63%        13.83%  

Russell 2000 Value

    2.50%        6.01%        15.11%  

MSCI USA Small Value Index

    2.99%        8.95%        16.34%  

Russell 2000 Index

    8.09%        12.31%        10.13%  

Morningstar Small Value Category

    5.47%        11.30%        18.38%  

Gross Expenses : 1.68%, Net Expenses: 1.15%


Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the funds may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. Short term performance is not a good indication of the fund’s future performance and should not be the sole basis for investing in the fund. To obtain standardized performance of the funds, and performance as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit Returns less than one year are not annualized. The Advisor has contractually agreed to limit the expenses of the fund through April 30, 2024. Without this limit the fund’s net expenses would be higher the return would be lower.



Portfolio Commentary from SBH

The second quarter was a bit less volatile than the first quarter as we moved further past the banking failures and investors shifted their focus towards the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) interest-rate decisions related to driving down inflation. Excitement around Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the potential applications and benefits of this technology over the coming years and decades emerged as a theme. This was the primary reason that Information Technology was the best-performing sector during the quarter followed by Industrials. We have maintained an underweight position in regional banks and the Financials sector in the portfolio and currently do not plan to increase those exposures. The portfolio is underweight the Energy sector post the reconstitution of the benchmark in late June. Energy now represents close to 9% of the index. This is an area we are keenly focused on in terms of unearthing solid capital allocators that could benefit the portfolio.

As we stated last quarter and based on historical precedent, we still believe the ingredients are in place for a recession to occur within the next several quarters; however, we believe that if one does occur, it might be quite shallow in terms of economic damage. We also believe the portfolio is in a position of strength due to the focus we have always had on return on invested capital (ROIC) relative to the cost of capital. We have always held the portfolio’s companies to a capital allocation standard where management is focused on ROIC well above recent historical weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) levels once assets are managed for optimal returns.

Key Performance Drivers

The sectors that contributed most to the portfolio’s performance relative to its benchmark in the first six months were Industrials (driven by selection and allocation), Consumer Discretionary (driven by selection), Consumer Staples (driven by selection), and Health Care (driven by selection). Within Industrials, CIRCOR International (CIR) was the top performer in the year-to-date period. The company, under a new leadership team, has taken an aggressive approach to driving margin improvement by capitalizing on its product portfolio pricing structure which was aided by deploying an 80/20 strategy across the organization. The board announced a process in which it was undertaking strategic alternatives to extract maximum value for shareholders. During the second quarter, the board received two offers to buy the company for a significant premium.

Within Consumer Discretionary, Modine Manufacturing (MOD) was the top performer. MOD has seen significant success in deploying an 80/20 culture which has allowed for a less complex, higher margin, and higher growth business, which we believe has significant potential in the next several years. We always seek to identify those stocks that have the leadership and culture in place to drive an inflection point in ROIC and, in our experience, those companies adopting an 80/20 focus throughout the organization can create a pathway for value creation.

In the Health Care sector, ICU Medical was a top performer. The company has positioned the business to regain market share in its core markets. Improved hospital surgery volume and lower inflation should allow the company to regain upward momentum on ROICs.

The three sectors that detracted most from the portfolio’s performance relative to its benchmark in the first half of the year were Financials (driven by selection), Energy (driven by selection), Materials (driven by selection) and Information Technology (driven by selection).


Fund Summary         21

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Information Technology holding, Lumentum Holdings (LITE) was the top detractor within the sector. We underestimated the inventory overhang the business would be facing from its major telecom customers and though LITE has a strong balance sheet and solid prospects going forward, we now realize it will take a couple of quarters for the business to get back on track.

Glacier Bancorp (GBCI) was the top detractor within Financials. After reporting its first quarter earnings, GBCI suffered as its net interest margin (NIM) contracted more than expected. GBCI has one of the most resilient deposit models; however, as a safety measure, it took on higher cost borrowing due to the bank failures and uncertainty on deposit pricing dynamics. Looking ahead, GBCI expects its NIM to bottom sometime in the third quarter as it pays down those higher cost borrowing and loan yields reprice at much higher levels. The area we are watching closely for all the portfolio’s bank exposure is credit issues that might become more prevalent as the year progresses. GBCI has a reputation as one of the most disciplined credit underwriters based on past loss rates. Therefore, in a period of broader credit stress, we believe GBCI will be a positive standout.

Within Health Care, Orthofix was sold during the period. The thesis for owning the stock was focused on the company’s self-help initiatives around sales force optimization and operating leverage developing from a broader distribution which did not fully play out. The board decided the best course of action was to merge with Sea Spine to gain greater scale. Given the merger and risk of integration, we exited the position.

Consumer Discretionary holding, American Eagle Outfitters was another detractor in the period. Originally, we owned the stock because of the company’s sizeable cost reduction strategy on top of it being in a much stronger inventory position than the industry, which we believed would help drive margin improvement. Ultimately, execution and the headwinds from a weaker consumer and additional pressure from the potential student loan repayment plans starting back up in the latter part of 2023, led us to sell the stock.

Market Outlook

What an exciting time to be an active investor! As we continue into the second half of 2023, there are a lot of moving parts including a monetary policy that is trying to slow the broad economy and quell wage inflation and fiscal stimuli (Highway Bill, Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS and Science Act, etc.) that are continuing to fuel growth in focused areas of our economy. In addition, we have the continued shift toward reshoring, renewed trade restrictions between China and the U.S., potential peace attempts starting with Russia and Ukraine, and an AI-driven productivity boon for machines.

Importantly, rising real interest rates are having an impact on the cost of capital—increasing it—for all companies. In turn, this demands a shift in thinking by company managements regarding how much debt to maintain longer term. In our opinion, we see a challenging market backdrop going forward primarily due to the significant increase in the cost of capital that is not likely to reverse anytime soon; however, the impact of this higher cost will likely be felt over months and years rather than in just a single quarter. Our investment approach has always used a high cost of capital hurdle (10%+), coupled with our work toward keeping our portfolio populated with ROIC change agents. ROIC change agents are management and incentive driven focus on how to optimize capital allocation via asset purchase and sales, facility rationalization, and continuous programs with improving returns as the goal. We remain comfortable with our philosophy and process over cycles regardless of the economic backdrop. We do see volatility increasing as real rates continue to rise, particularly for loss makers and zombie companies. In recent years, due to easy money policies, we have seen many companies misallocating capital (i.e., investing in too many low return businesses), while simultaneously not allowing for creative destruction. Hopefully, we can return to an appropriate balance of appropriate capitalism for the benefit of companies and citizens alike. While we cannot know exactly when a soft landing or hard landing will occur, we think we are nearing that juncture over the next two-three quarters. Our focus is on management teams that cannot just weather a broad variety of storms but can become stronger organizations, financially and culturally, via continuous improvement programs. We are excited to invest in a difficult investment backdrop that even Stanley Druckenmiller calls the most difficult of his career. Thank you for your continued interest and support.

Portfolio Allocations as of June 30, 2023


By Sector




Consumer Discretionary


Information Technology


Communication Services


Health Care 




Consumer Staples


Real Estate










Summary Statistics


Market Cap Median (bn)


Weighted Average Market Cap (bn)


# of Holdings


By Market Cap


Small Cap


Mid Cap


Large Cap



22       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund Value of Hypothetical $10,000


The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund from July 31, 2020 to June 30, 2023 compared with the Russell 2000 Value Index, Morningstar Small Value Category and Russell 2000 Index.



The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


Fund Summary         23

Table of Contents

iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund



Shares           Value  


  Consumer Discretionary: 11.6%  
  26,623     Gildan Activewear, Inc.    $ 858,326  
  73,583     Modine Manufacturing Co.*      2,429,711  
  11,386     Ollie’s Bargain Outlet Holdings, Inc.*      659,591  
  8,765     Papa John’s International, Inc.      647,120  
  8,020     PVH Corp.      681,459  
  21,235     Steven Madden Ltd.      694,172  






  Consumer Staples: 3.4%  
  88,825     Coty, Inc. - Class A*      1,091,659  
  52,944     Hain Celestial Group, Inc.*      662,330  






  Energy: 5.1%  
  31,794     Murphy Oil Corp.      1,217,710  
  20,045     PDC Energy, Inc.      1,426,001  






  Financials: 11.1%  
  27,503     Cadence Bank      540,159  
  31,982     Glacier Bancorp, Inc.      996,879  
  23,403     Hancock Whitney Corp.      898,207  
  36,796     National Bank Holdings Corp. - Class A      1,068,556  
  48,101     Seacoast Banking Corp. of Florida      1,063,032  
  17,596     SouthState Corp.      1,157,817  






  Health Care: 3.9%  
  46,797     AdaptHealth Corp.*      569,520  
  8,185     ICU Medical, Inc.*      1,458,485  






  Industrials: 37.4%  
  26,860     Apogee Enterprises, Inc.      1,275,044  
  7,106     ArcBest Corp.      702,073  
  30,475     AZZ, Inc.      1,324,444  
  48,194     CIRCOR International, Inc.*      2,720,551  
  24,762     Enerpac Tool Group Corp.      668,574  
  14,931     EnerSys      1,620,312  
  25,296     KBR, Inc.      1,645,758  
  15,362     Mercury Systems, Inc.*      531,372  
  35,772     Quanex Building Products Corp.      960,478  
  9,147     Regal Rexnord Corp.      1,407,723  
  87,713     REV Group, Inc.      1,163,074  
  55,246     SP Plus Corp.*      2,160,671  
  19,433     SPX Technologies, Inc.*      1,651,222  
  25,520     Sterling Infrastructure, Inc.*      1,424,016  






  Information Technology: 5.1%  
  20,789     Belden, Inc.      1,988,468  
  11,319     Lumentum Holdings, Inc.*      642,127  






  Materials: 11.0%  
  31,537     Compass Minerals International, Inc.      1,072,258  
  69,667     Element Solutions, Inc.      1,337,606  
  10,570     Sensient Technologies Corp.      751,844  
  22,330     Silgan Holdings, Inc.      1,047,054  
  38,466     Summit Materials, Inc. - Class A*      1,455,938  






Shares           Value  
  Real Estate: 7.0%  
  56,192     Equity Commonwealth - REIT    $ 1,138,450  
  39,614     STAG Industrial, Inc. - REIT      1,421,350  
  17,691     Terreno Realty Corp. - REIT      1,063,229  







(Cost $40,562,881)





(Cost: $40,562,881): 95.6%




  Other Assets in Excess of Liabilities: 4.4%      2,254,374  




NET ASSETS: 100.0%

   $ 51,548,744  




Percentages are stated as a percent of net assets.



Real Estate Investment Trust


Non-Income Producing Security.


The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


24       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

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iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund 2023 Semi-Annual Report




The iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund (Institutional Share Class) was up 2.02% in the first half of the year, compared to the Morningstar Multistrategy category’s 3.07% return, a gain of 2.09% for the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, and a 2.25% gain for the ICE BofA 3-Month Treasury Bill Index.

Since its inception on September 30, 2011, the fund’s annualized return is 3.48% with a volatility (standard deviation) of 4.76%, and a beta to the U.S. stock market (Russell 1000 Index) of 0.27. This compares to the 3-Month Treasury Bill Index return of 0.85%, the Morningstar Multistrategy category return of 2.85% and the U.S. Aggregate Bond Index return of 1.53%.



Performance as of June 30, 2023


Year to












iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund Instl

    2.02%        0.93%        1.46%        1.66%        2.54%        3.48%  

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund Inv

    1.88%        0.74%        1.21%        1.41%        2.29%        3.24%  

ICE BofA US 3-Month Treasury Bill

    2.25%        3.59%        1.27%        1.55%        0.98%        0.85%  

Bloomberg Aggregate Bond Index

    2.09%        -0.94%        -3.96%        0.77%        1.52%        1.53%  

Morningstar Multistrategy Category

    3.07%        4.37%        4.40%        2.43%        2.51%        2.85%  

Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less that their original cost. Current performance of the fund may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. The Advisor has contractually agreed to waive a portion of the management fee through April 30, 2024. Performance data current to the most recent month end may be obtained by visiting Gross Expense Ratio: 1.67% Net Expense Ratio: 1.39%


The Risk/Return Statistics table below presents some of the key performance metrics that we track for the fund.





iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund Risk/Return Statistics                                   
Data as of June 30, 2023   MASFX      Bloomberg
Barclays Agg
     Russell 1000  

Annualized Return

    3.48        1.53        2.85        14.44  

Total Cumulative Return

    49.53        19.51        39.10        387.84  

Annualized Std. Deviation

    4.76        4.11        4.25        14.72  

Sharpe Ratio (Annualized)

    0.55        0.17        0.46        0.93  

Beta (to Russell 1000)

    0.27        0.07        0.26        1.00  

Correlation of MASFX to

    1.00        0.33        0.90        0.83  

Worst 12-Month Return

    -10.04        -15.68        -5.71        -19.13  

% Positive 12-Month Periods

    0.76        0.64        0.73        0.86  

Upside Capture (vs. Russell 1000)

    25.80        8.73        24.44        100.00  

Downside Capture (vs. Russell 1000)

    27.20        6.62        29.07        100.00  

Upside Capture (vs. AGG)

    74.86        100.00        62.83        233.20  

Downside Capture (vs. AGG)

    22.69        100.00        20.75        3.84  

Performance Review


The Alternative Strategies Fund’s roughly 2% increase is certainly better than a loss, but it isn’t cause for celebration. The fund is in the process of recovering from last year’s disappointing performance, but it has not happened as quickly as we would like. Despite this, we think we are still in the early stages of a performance recovery due to the “coiled spring” nature of several of the subadvisor portfolios. (The blended portfolio of DoubleLine and Loomis Sayles has a nearly 10% yield to maturity and duration of under five years.) We have previously detailed how attractive we believe the prospective returns for these managers have the potential to be over the coming quarters, while acknowledging that there are likely to be bumps along the way. We have recently seen an example of a “bump” that has hampered performance somewhat. After starting to recover earlier this year, Agency Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) have been challenged by the extreme interest rate volatility related to the regional bank crisis in March, the resumption of yields rising across the curve (following the sharp bank-panic-induced plunge) and the subsequent lack of demand/selling pressure from banks. Without demand from the biggest investors in the sector (banks and the Fed), asset managers and foreign buyers are forced to pick up the slack, but only at nominal spreads approaching levels seen in the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) . This naturally impacts other areas of securitized products to varying degrees, and while some sectors have fared better than others, the same headwinds, as well as fear of negative performance in commercial real estate, have helped to delay what we still expect to be attractive performance from the fixed income portfolios. Spreads in many areas of securitized are still very high relative to their historical averages and relative to similarly rated corporate debt. We don’t know when it will happen, but when Fed rate cuts begin to feel more imminent and investors begin to exit the money market funds and short-term Treasuries that have become so popular, these spread sectors with high yields (some with a bit of duration) certainly seem likely to be beneficiaries.


Fund Summary         25

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Similarly, Water Island’s merger arbitrage portfolio, although it has taken a few lumps due to regulatory challenges this year, offers a very compelling annualized deal spread well north of 20%. As usual, we add the caveat that some deals do extend or even break, but with spreads at the highest levels seen since the GFC, prospective returns appear attractive. Higher rates and the unfriendly regulatory climate have set the stage for what could be a lucrative period for the strategy, especially considering the relative lack of success the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) have had in their merger challenges (as Water Island mentions in their commentary).

We thus have a substantial portion of the fund’s portfolio where discussion of the attractiveness of their opportunity sets can reasonably include ‘not since the GFC’ references. We are fairly confident that we don’t face a similar risk of systemic financial collapse as we did back in 2008, so we believe this is an additional, strong indicator of the potential for (very) attractive returns going forward.

Our tactical overweight to the DoubleLine Opportunistic Income strategy seemed to largely be working as intended in Q1, but given the phenomena mentioned previously, Q2 performance has not been kind to the move, and DoubleLine is now only the third-best performer for the year. However, our decision was not based on a two-quarter outlook, and since we are still expecting strong absolute and relative performance from that sleeve, we are confident in maintaining the current weightings. Taking a glass-half-empty view of the situation, the two subadvisors who generated the strongest performance in the first half (FPA and Blackstone Credit) had the lowest allocations. With that said, we didn’t tactically reduce them much from their strategic allocations when we overweighted DoubleLine because we know timing changes is difficult and markets can easily confound even the most well-considered moves, especially in the short-term. More optimistically, the fund is up more than 2% with relatively little contribution from what we viewed (and still view) as the segments with the best combination of absolute return potential and catalysts to drive performance. It was also gratifying to see DBi’s portfolio rebound strongly from the Q1 losses that were largely driven by the regional bank failures. This powerful diversifying strategy should make the fund more resilient to different market conditions over time, despite recent challenges.

As shareholders and managers, we are very excited about the fund’s positioning, and look forward to reporting to you in coming quarters, hopefully detailing further (and larger) gains.

Quarterly Portfolio Commentary


Performance of Managers

For the first half of the year, the returns by sub-advisor are as follows: FPA up 10.86%; Blackstone Credit Systematic Group up 4.48%; DoubleLine up 3.07%; Loomis Sayles up 1.80%; Water Island up 0.53%; and DBi down 0.47%. (All returns are net of sub advisory fees.)

Key performance drivers and positioning by strategy

Blackstone Credit Systematic Group (DCI):


The Blackstone Credit strategy was notably positive even amidst the continued market cross currents, and gained 4.5% (net) in the first half of the year. The strategy has continued to build on a run of good performance from last year.

Alpha performance was strong for the first half, driven by the long side of the portfolio. Positive gains were led by long positions in consumer discretionary—especially travel related, including airlines and cruise lines—and also in durables including homebuilders. Short positioning in financials also provided a boost as the market digested the failure of three U.S. banks and the rescue of Credit Suisse. Long consumer names, long technology names, and long energy names provided positive performance contributions, amid the broad market updraft. Telecom, materials, and pharma were negative contributors, as well as longs in healthcare and an underweight in utilities.

The portfolio was well hedged over the period and so the macro footprint was limited. This was nice to see given the continued propensity for market gyrations and large moves in interest rates. Portfolio performance was steady and the net security selection gains in the portfolio were broad-based. With credit differentiation a market theme, the portfolio’s underweight to high-default-probability names and tilt into stronger credit quality has been particularly valuable and we’ve seen this play out positively in both the corporate bond and CDS sleeves. Both sleeves have made notable contributions to performance for the quarter and the hedging performed in line.

We expect this positive alpha environment to continue. We see the market environment as supportive of future convergence in credit selection, with an economic retrenchment and profit slowdown still looming, a sorting of credit into winners and losers is looking likely and should provide ample opportunity for continued credit selection gains this year.



Since last Fall, the markets have been like a drunk stumbling across a highway. You watch an eighteen-wheeler barrel down and clench your eyes shut—only to open them seconds later and find that he’s still standing. Then it happens again. And again. And, to your utter surprise, you soon find that he’s standing on the other side. Here we are in mid-2023 and we have been grazed, not flattened, by a long list of economic eighteen wheelers: most recently, no regional or global banking crisis, no US debt default, no profits collapse, no “recession by June.” We’re still standing.

Now place yourself back in early January. The market gods tip you off: inflation will prove sticky and the Fed will keep hiking. With a wink and a nod, they tell you that the Two-Year Treasury, then 4.4%, will hit nearly 5% by mid-year. Armed with this inside information, would


26       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

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you have bet that the Nasdaq, decimated by higher rates last year, would rise nearly 40% by mid-year, a record? Or that value would underperform growth by 25%, a tad more than its historic rebound last year? Or that equities would simply ignore the bond market which, with the most inverted yield curve in five decades, has breathlessly screamed recession for months?

We have two observations. Hedge funds have been cautiously positioned this year and are up single digits. While this might seem paltry relative to the 14% gain in the MSCI World Index, should they have predicted an overnight frenzy in AI that added $5 trillion to tech stocks? On the other hand, those numbers do look healthy relative to the 1% return on the Bloomberg Global Aggregate Bond Index—a disappointment given the unexpected headwind of higher rates. This clearly has been a year to manage risk and live to fight another day. Great investors sometimes put on a sensible trade and it doesn’t work out—statistical tails do happen, after all. Over time, sensible trades generate alpha. That’s our bet, at least.

Further, we would like to remind people about the math of drawdowns. Bold cap headlines on Meta and Tesla tout year-to-date returns of 140% and 113%, respectively—not that both, after 65% drawdowns last year, are down 17% and 27% over eighteen months. The current obsession with respectable yields on corporate credit—and a decent 3% total return this year—glosses over the 18% drawdown last year. Investing is a long game and our math should reflect it.

Performance and Positioning

The Enhanced Trend portfolio gained 6% during the second quarter after falling by almost the same amount in the first quarter, leading to a net loss of approximately 0.5% for the first half of the year. The sudden banking crisis in March caused significant uncertainty which led investors into safe haven investments, especially treasuries. Due to this, the short interest rate positions, as well as a short in the Japanese Yen versus the U.S. Dollar, detracted from performance in Q1. The Euro was also impacted by the Credit Suisse failure which led to a volatile first quarter. However, a well-timed increase in exposure towards the end of February led to gains for the quarter. Commodity swings whipsawed positioning in crude oil and gold due to market participants torn between a hard or soft landing from the rate hikes. Equity asset classes were highly correlated during Q1, and a large rally in January due to hints about the end of the hiking cycle was reversed in February then as contagion fears abated, the rally resumed in March. The volatility caused swings in positioning which further contributed to losses.

In Q2 the Japanese Yen declined significantly as a result of widening policy spreads; central banks globally continued to tighten while the Bank of Japan maintained its yield-curve control. An elevated short position in JPY contributed to performance. An enhanced short position in 2-year Treasuries further aided portfolio performance. Developed markets, ex U.S., declined sharply during May, hurting the portfolio’s quarterly performance, but were positive in April and June, somewhat muting May’s impact. A reversal in gold markets also detracted from performance.



For the six months ended June 30, the portfolio outperformed the Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index return of 2.09%.

Market Environment

Markets remained fairly volatile during this period, but the Federal Reserve’s pausing of its rate hiking campaign in June allowed most sectors to deliver positive performance. The FOMC’s actions and guidance during the period, coupled with softer inflation data, caused global investors to speculate that the Central Bank was nearing the end of its rate hiking cycle. There were several bouts of volatility, however, during which large bank failures tested the mettle of global credit markets. The diverse asset mix within the portfolio enabled it whether the storms and deliver positive performance.

Relative Performance Discussion

The top-performing sectors in the portfolio during this period were all out-of-index assets. Specifically: domestic High Yield bonds, Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs), Emerging Market debt, and residential credit exposures. All of these sectors generated strong interest income and benefitted from credit spread tightening as investor demand for risk improved. Quarterly earnings for High Yield issuers were satisfactory and much better than feared while the CLO allocation naturally benefitted from its floating rate coupons and tremendous levels of carry compared to Index assets. Emerging market debt and US residential credit were additional examples of assets that saw underlying credit fundamentals outperform base case expectations from the start of the year.

The largest detractors from performance were Asset Backed Securities (ABS), Bank Loans, and non-Agency Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS). The ABS allocation suffered from its consumer-centric nature as delinquencies for consumer loans rose and demand for this cyclical asset class waned. Bank Loans experienced some spread widening as debt service costs have caused some anxieties for credit investors. Lastly, the non-Agency CMBS positions experienced some spread widening due to consistently unfavorable headlines and secular shifts in the commercial office market. Despite the steady drumbeat of negative headlines, this asset class experienced only small negative returns due to the portfolio’s active management of collateral exposures.


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Forward Outlook

With the Federal Reserve taking strong measures to tighten financial conditions, we expect volatility in financial markets to remain elevated. Consequently, we will continue to manage the portfolio with a sizeable allocation to fully secured assets with low structural leverage such as residential and commercial mortgage loans. On the corporate side, we see some risks to corporate earnings in the coming quarters and will therefore continue to take a more targeted approach to investing in these assets. Exposures will be selected on a line-item basis and will often include out-of-index assets.



Performance Overview

The strategy gained approximately 10.9% for the first half of the year. The Fund captured 82.0% of the MSCI ACWI’s gain in the trailing twelve months, outperforming its 72.5% average net risk exposure.1

Portfolio discussion

There wasn’t a unifying theme that drove performance in the last year. In the previous twelve months, the Fund’s top five performers contributed 5.32% to its return, while its bottom five detracted 1.75%.

Trailing Twelve-Month Contributors and Detractors as of June 30, 20232


Contributors      Perf.
of Port.
           Detractors      Perf.
of Port.


       1.55%        2.9%       Int’l Flavors & Fragrances        -0.48%        1.7%  

Meta Platforms

       1.13%        1.7%       Charter Communications        -0.48%        1.5%  


       1.03%        1.8%       McDermott (multiple securities)        -0.46%        1.6%  

Analog Devices

       0.88%        2.7%       Open Text        -0.18%        0.2%  


       0.73%        0.7%       Alibaba & Altaba        -0.15%        0.6%  












       5.32%        9.8%              -1.75%        5.6%  

Of the contributors and detractors listed, we haven’t recently addressed Open Text and Broadcom. We have discussed most of the other positions in the last year.

Open Text was a relatively short-lived holding in comparison to our typical time frame. We were attracted to this Canadian-based provider of enterprise software due to its stable revenue stream. More than 80% of Open Text’s revenue was recurring, which helped deliver attractive mid-30s EBITDA margins. We considered the business to have a sticky customer base that included 97 of the 100 largest companies in the world. Purchased at a low double-digit multiple to after-tax free cash flow, we expected to own the company for years, with capital deployment going towards dividends, buybacks, and small bolt-on acquisitions, as it had in the past. Unfortunately, to our surprise, while we owned the stock, Open Text announced a relatively large acquisition in the form of UK-based Micro Focus. Familiar with the target, we were unenthused about both the asset and increased debt on the balance sheet from funding the purchase, so we chose to exit stage left rather than try to re-write our investment thesis.3

In contrast to our short-lived ownership of Open Text, Broadcom has been a holding for just short of five years. At the time of our original purchase, the company was primarily focused on driving organic growth in its existing semiconductor franchises and acquiring new ones when the opportunity presented itself. As potential acquisition candidates in the industry became scarce, management, led by highly regarded Hock Tan, pivoted to set their sights on the software industry, culminating in several acquisitions. Unlike Open Text, in this instance, after multiple discussions with senior management, we found ourselves comfortable with the company’s new strategy after re-examining the investment implications. We are glad we did, as it would be an understatement to say that Broadcom has gone from strength to strength over the past five years, improving operating margins, aggressively repurchasing shares, and increasing the dividend, all the while continuing to execute its M&A strategy flawlessly.



Risk assets are any assets that are not risk free and generally refers to any financial security or instrument, such as equities, commodities, high-yield bonds, and other financial products that are likely to fluctuate in price. Risk exposure refers to the Fund’s exposure to risk assets as a percent of total assets. The Fund’s net risk exposure as of June 30, 2023 was 73.7%.


Reflects the top five contributors and detractors to the Fund’s performance based on contribution to return for the trailing twelve months (“TTM”). Contribution is presented gross of investment management fees, transactions costs, and Fund operating expenses, which if included, would reduce the returns presented. The information provided does not reflect all positions purchased, sold or recommended by the portfolio management team during the quarter. It should not be assumed that recommendations made in the future will be profitable or will equal the performance of the securities listed.


Past performance is no guarantee, nor is it indicative, of future results.


Source:; OpenText to Acquire Micro Focus International plc; August 25, 2022.


Past performance is no guarantee, nor is it indicative, of future results.


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“Risk on” in 2023 has replaced the fear that drove markets lower in 2022. How much of this rebound will ultimately be supported by corporate earnings has yet to be seen. While there is always something to fear, we prefer to focus on the future prospects of the businesses we own. Focusing on the destination makes the big potholes in the road feel more like small speed bumps and prevents us from executing panicked driving maneuvers.

Looking back at the past 18 months, there was certainly no shortage of opportunities to take down risk exposure as macro concerns, from interest rates to war, seemed to grow by the day. But as in prior market declines, we attempted to lean into the market and add to either new or existing names where our estimates of the risk/reward improved with each leg down. While we will never get it perfectly right, using the MSCI ACWI as a proxy, in the downturn from January 5, 2022 through the market low of October 12, 2022, the Fund experienced a drop in value of 17.60%. While not ideal, this was more palatable than the ACWI’s 26.36% decline in the same period.

Looking forward, we do not offer a market forecast or make predictions about interest rates, the economy, or other significant macro issues because we don’t know anyone who can do so consistently (ourselves included). We submit the following to show the futility of forecasting. In the last eighteen years, the consensus view only expected the market to increase, yet it declined 22% of the time. Further, the Wall Street consensus estimate of how the S&P 500 will perform (ex-dividends) in the next twelve months, from 2005 to 2022, usually missed the mark, often by quite a lot -53.6% and 28.9% too high in 2008 and 2022; and 16.9% and 21.0% too low in 2013 and 2021. On average, the “experts” missed by 11.4%, quite a lot, particularly when compared to the S&P’s 6.6% annualized return (before dividends) over the same period. We, therefore, direct our efforts from the bottom up rather than the top down.

S&P 500 Actual vs Wall Street Analysts’ Forecasted Returns Ex-Dividends4





For those who prefer less up and down, especially when price moves precipitate an often-inappropriate action—buy or sell—our investment mandate is as relevant to investors today as when the Fund launched in 2011. Though we don’t know what the future holds, we strive to continue to offer a similar investor experience. The last decade plus has given us surprises and market excess; the recent pandemic and the millennia-low interest rates, to name a couple. We will be surprised, but probably not astonished, in the future. We promise to remain thoughtful and calm as we continue to steward your capital, traits that allow us to lean in when there’s the opportunity and tilt away when there is none, like when we increased risk exposure during Covid, but reduced it in the preceding periods.

We would like to think our investment team have pushed each other to evolve and stay relevant, and fingers crossed, our continuing education is far from over. However regardless of the times, we think sensible optimism mixed with a dash of prudence will never go out of fashion, even if our haircuts may.

Thank you for entrusting us with your capital since 2011, but as we say goodbye to the past, we look forward to what the future holds.

Loomis Sayles:



The global fixed-income markets delivered mixed returns in the second quarter, giving back some of the positive performance from the first three months of the year.



Source: Bloomberg; Chart shows actual S&P 500 price returns excluding dividends minus Wall Street analyst estimates. Chart period is 2005-2022.


Past performance is no guarantee, nor is it indicative, of future results.


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News flow was generally favorable at the headline level, as inflation moderated and the near-term interest rate outlook began to improve. Headline consumer price inflation came in at annual rates of 4.9% in April and 4.0% in May, ending a 23-month stretch in which it rose 5% or more. Cooling inflation allowed the US Federal Reserve (Fed) to slow its pace of interest-rate increases. After raising short-term rates by a total of 4.25 percentage points in 2022, the Fed enacted only three quarter-point hikes in the first half of 2023. Notably, the Fed elected not to raise rates at its meeting in June – the first time this was the case since January of 2022.

While the Fed raised rates less aggressively, better-than-expected economic growth prompted officials to reiterate their intention to continue tightening until inflation falls to the central bank’s stated target of 2%. At the end of June, the futures markets indicated that the Fed was likely to hike by 25 bps once, or possibly even twice, before the end of 2023. This represented a shift from earlier in the year, when investors were pricing in a Fed cutting cycle to begin before year-end. The change in market expectations for the Fed Funds Rate, together with the more aggressive approaches of other developed-market central banks, was a headwind for the bond market in the quarter.


With a semi-annual net return of 1.80%, the portfolio underperformed its benchmark, the ICE BofAML 3-Month US Treasury Bill Index, which returned 2.25%. The Fund’s positive absolute performance was diversified across many sectors, with the majority generated from investment grade corporate bonds, securitized assets, high yield corporate bonds, and dividend equities. Our allocations to emerging market and global rates assets detracted from performance during the period.

Investment grade corporate bond spreads widened during the period, but ended largely flat. The sector was able to outpace US Treasurys due to a yield advantage and increased investor risk appetite. Within the portfolio, investment grade corporates contributed to performance with financials names being primarily responsible.

During the first half of the year, securitized markets offered mixed results. Consumer asset-backed securities were buoyed by a healthy US consumer and CMBS issues benefitted from reduced concern about fallout from recent stresses in the banking sector during the second quarter. Within the portfolio, the allocation to ABS issues was primarily responsible for the sector’s positive impact on period performance, with non-Agency RMBS and CLO holdings also contributing. CMBS issues detracted during the same time frame.

High yield corporate bond spreads tightened over the period. The category broadly outperformed investment-grade corporate issues as a modest decline in yield spreads and contribution from income served to offset the effect of rising government yields. The sector was also aided by favorable investor risk sentiment that supported higher-risk segments of the fixed income market. Within the portfolio, our allocation to the sector positively impacted absolute performance. Consumer names were mostly responsible for the positive impact.

Emerging market assets navigated a challenging environment during the first half of the year. The sector experienced headwinds related to weaker commodity prices in Africa and Latin America recently, along with softer non-US economic data and tighter policy. Within the portfolio, emerging markets assets weighed on performance, with Chinese exposures being primarily responsible.


The global bond market has partially recovered from last year’s poor showing by posting positive returns in the first half of 2023. Inflation—while still high—has continued to decline from its mid-2022 peak, helping to create optimism early in the year that central banks would be able to conclude their long series of interest rate hikes. In the US, volatility in regional banks combined with an impending debt ceiling situation put significant stress on the financial system and investors began pricing in multiple Fed rate cuts before year-end. The Fed responded by providing liquidity to support regional banks and a relatively uneventful resolution to the US debt ceiling issue coupled with the Fed’s decision to take a break in its hiking cycle, albeit a hawkish one, led to tighter credit spreads and a subsequent re-pricing of Fed rate cuts to the 2nd half of 2024.

In our view, the credit cycle is firmly in the late cycle stage and the risk of downturn has increased. The ability of the Fed to manufacture a soft landing could become more difficult if inflation remains sticky, likely leading to monetary policy that remains in restrictive territory for an extended period. The Fed may be in a precarious position to fight inflation, as we believe it must balance future policy with its potential to create financial market instability. While inflation seems to have peaked and should roll down over time, we believe it will remain above the Fed’s target throughout the second half of 2023, primarily as result of wage pressure and owner’s equivalent rent (OER). In addition, we maintain longer-term structural concerns that could support higher levels of inflation, including the impact of de-globalization, de-carbonization, changing demographics and growing government deficits. Throughout the remainder of the year, we anticipate the Fed to be driven by the extent to which there is firm evidence that inflation continues to moderate. The potential for an extended Fed pause remains—in our view, policymakers will be slow to react to the onset of a downturn and will likely tolerate a rise in unemployment, particularly while inflation is above target.

Monetary policy has been restrictive and lending standards have tightened, however, the economic backdrop has remained resilient, in our opinion, and as a result, our base case is for below trend US growth. Based on a strong consumer and positive corporate fundamentals, we do not expect a technical recession of back-to-back quarters with negative GDP. The consumer appears on solid footing, maintaining strong levels of excess savings and continuing to spend at a healthy rate. Labor markets remain tight, as we’ve observed higher wages, an elevated number of job openings and employers who are reluctant to shed workers in industries where they may have trouble getting them back. We believe these factors should help support consumer confidence and spending. Corporate fundamentals also remain strong, highlighted by


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strong leverage and interest coverage ratios, and specific to the high yield market, a maturity wall that seems manageable through 2025. One area, in particular, that we are monitoring to determine if growth could slow more quickly is corporate earnings. Earnings have contracted over the past two quarters and we believe we are currently in the midst of a ‘profits recession.’ In the event that this trend continues or accelerates as pricing power fades and margins come under further pressure, companies may need to more aggressively cut costs (via job cuts), which could lead to an environment where the pace at which growth is declining increases materially and ultimately leads to recession. Under this scenario, we believe a healthy consumer combined with positive corporate fundamentals should serve to minimize the potential for a hard landing by helping to provide a floor to economic activity, resulting in a mild or shallow recession.

Water Island:


Broader markets have faced numerous obstacles in the past six months, including no less than Ukraine’s ongoing war against Russian invaders, the Federal Reserve’s (“Fed”) fight to subdue inflation with interest rate hikes, a US regional banking crisis that led to the failures of multiple large banks, and yet another battle over the US federal government’s debt ceiling in Congress. While returns for the broader credit market were generally unimpressive, equities nonetheless seemed to deliver strong year-to-date gains—though upon closer inspection, it appeared much of the performance was generated by a handful of mega-cap heavy hitters, and it was accompanied by a healthy dose of volatility along the way.

In this environment, the landscape for event-driven investing has also faced heightened volatility. The merger arbitrage strategy in particular has encountered significant regulatory challenges. Antitrust regulators around the globe have attempted to block several large mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions, in turn driving correlated volatility in deal spreads throughout the investment universe. At times, we have found the logic behind the regulators’ recent cases to be perplexing—especially in the US, where the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), in our opinion, have sought to block deals using novel legal theories with little basis in historical precedent—or what appears to be a foundation in a political agenda rather than antitrust law.

With their attempts to block deals in court, the FTC and DOJ have succeeded in causing some companies to abandon their planned tie-ups rather than take the fight to trial – to be certain, a costly endeavor. In addition, the regulators’ actions may also have had a chilling effect on M&A in certain sensitive industries or by large acquirers, as we will never know how many deals that companies may have wanted to pursue were never announced. At the same time, we are seeing signs that the regulatory pendulum may be starting to swing back to the other side.

At this point, of the cases that have gone to trial, the FTC and DOJ under the Biden administration have lost more than they have won. The most recent example is the FTC’s attempt to block Microsoft’s acquisition of Activision. At the end of June, based on our view of the trial’s proceedings and the skeptical tone of the presiding judge’s questions to the FTC, we believed it likely Microsoft would prevail. (Indeed, as of this writing in July, the courts have not only officially ruled against the FTC but also rejected its attempted appeal, and Microsoft could reportedly try to close the merger before the end of the month.) We believe these successes on the part of dealmakers may cause acquirers to increasingly take a bolder stance in fighting regulatory objections. Furthermore, within the ranks of agency staff, there has been considerable brain drain, which may be a result of skepticism regarding the current regime’s approach. In the past two years, for example, senior-level attorneys at the FTC have departed the agency at the fastest rate since 2000, which could make future enforcement actions more challenging.

The portfolio was modestly positive in the first half of the year. While merger arbitrage positions detracted from returns, this performance was offset by positive contributions from special situations positions as well as some incremental earnings on cash holdings. The top-performing position for the period was the aforementioned Microsoft/Activision deal. This deal was struck in January 2022, when Microsoft reached an agreement to acquire video game developer Activision Blizzard for $75.1 billion in cash. During its timeline, this deal has been met not just with objections from competitors, including Sony, but also wariness amongst antitrust regulators, which caused ongoing volatility in the deal spread. During Q1 2023, for example, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) signaled a favorable assessment of certain aspects of the transaction (namely the continued availability of certain top tier franchises, such as Call of Duty, on competing gaming platforms), only to block the transaction early in Q2 based on concerns about competition in the nascent cloud gaming market—a decision which Microsoft appealed. Moreover, as we have discussed, the FTC took Microsoft to court seeking to block the acquisition in the US. Now that the deal has been cleared in the US, the CMA has agreed to reopen negotiations with Microsoft about potential remedies that could satisfy its concerns. In all, we continue to expect this transaction will ultimately achieve a successful conclusion and we maintain our exposure.

Other top contributors included our positions in Momentive Global and Rogers Corp, both of which originated as target company holdings in transactions that ultimately failed. Momentive was originally the target of Zendesk, where an activist was successful in convincing shareholders to vote down the transaction and instead put Zendesk itself up for sale. While Zendesk eventually found its own suitor, we opted to maintain our exposure to Momentive post-break, as the company had its own activist agitating for change and there were multiple additional interested parties disclosed in the proxy background of the Zendesk merger. In March 2023, Momentive officially found another buyer, entering into a definitive agreement to be acquired by Symphony Technology Group. The deal closed successfully less than three months later, leading to gains for the fund. Rogers saw its acquisition by DuPont unexpectedly abandoned in November 2022, when DuPont opted to exercise a right to walk away rather than extend the deal timeline when the termination date was reached with regulatory approval in China still outstanding. Rogers shares were met with massive selling pressure upon the deal break, as there were fears (which proved unfounded) that DuPont had walked because it discovered fraud at the company. We opted to follow our deal break protocol and


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wait for more normalized trading levels, seeking to unwind our position in an orderly fashion, and we were rewarded when the company’s shares traded nearly 37% higher during Q1 2023.

Conversely, the top detractor in the portfolio was the fund’s investment in the failed acquisition of First Horizon Corp by Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD”). In February 2022, First Horizon—a regional bank based in Tennessee that operates throughout the Southeast US—agreed to be acquired by TD—a Canada-based multinational banking and financial services corporation—for $13.4 billion in cash. While First Horizon was not directly connected to Silicon Valley Bank, the company’s shares were a casualty of indiscriminate selling across the US regional banking industry following the news of Silicon Valley Bank’s failure. This, combined with an extended regulatory review in Canada as well as rumors of a potential price cut, pressured the deal’s spread. Through the volatility, we opted to maintain exposure to the transaction as mere weeks prior TD had publicly reaffirmed its commitment to the transaction—which, due to First Horizon’s relatively small size, would have been one of very few paths for TD to gain scale via acquisition—and our outlook on the deal fundamentals had not changed. As the regional banking crisis continued to unfold, leading to the additional failures of Signature Bank and First Republic, volatility in First Horizon shares escalated. Eventually, in May 2023, when no progress had been made on the antitrust review front, First Horizon and TD mutually agreed to terminate the merger due to “uncertainty” as to when the deal might gain the lagging regulatory approvals. As such, we are following our standard deal break protocols and seeking to unwind our position in an orderly fashion.

Other top detractors included the acquisition of Tegna by Standard General and the merger of VMware and Broadcom. Tegna is a US-based broadcast television and digital media company which agreed to be acquired by Standard General—a US-based investment company—for $5.3 billion in cash. The transaction was, for all intents and purposes, blocked by the US Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) when the agency designated it for a judicial review based on concerns it could raise prices for consumers. While this particular proceeding was not an outright block, such hearings are notoriously lengthy and have historically led deals to collapse. Standard General attempted to push a faster timeline in the courts because it feared that when the deal’s termination date arrived, should they attempt to extend the timeline, they would not be able to secure financing at rates comparable to when the deal was originally announced. After Standard General exhausted all appeals and was unsuccessful, the companies agreed to terminate the merger. The $61.4 billion acquisition of virtualization software maker VMware by semiconductor manufacturer Broadcom was announced in May 2022. This deal has already seen its timeline extended as there have been multiple delays in receiving required regulatory clearances in several jurisdictions, which has led to intermittent volatility in the deal spread. We continue to believe this deal will prove successful, as while regulators posture about “big tech” mergers, there is no actual product overlap between the two companies. We maintain our exposure and are monitoring the situation closely.

Looking ahead, while we are cognizant of the challenges that remain, we believe the return opportunities in merger arbitrage are compelling. Volatility and rising interest rates are bolstering wider deal spreads, which have reached average levels we haven’t seen since the Global Financial Crisis. According to Dealogic data, the average day-one gross spread (i.e., the non-annualized spread the day after deal announcement) of pending deals as of June 30, 2023, was 9%—nearly double the rate on January 1, 2022, just 18 months prior.

Additionally, although M&A deal flow has slowed from recent peaks, the level of activity continues to provide plentiful investment opportunities. Current deal flow still exceeds pre-pandemic 2019 levels, and we anticipate a pick-up in consolidation activity should the Fed succeed in tamping down inflation and interest rates begin to stabilize. In such a scenario, we expect business leaders will increasingly seek to drive growth through strategic M&A, while private equity firms—still flush with approximately $2.5 trillion in dry powder—will seek to put capital to work.

Beyond merger arbitrage, given ongoing volatility in the broader markets, we continue to remain focused on hard catalyst investments, which should benefit from more definitive timelines and outcomes. In that vein, we are seeing attractive opportunities in merger-related credit and certain hard catalyst credit special situations, such as refinancings, and we anticipate the portfolio’s allocation to credit may grow in the coming months. We may introduce select soft catalyst investments—which typically have greater sensitivity to broader market moves—but only when we believe the potential reward outweighs the potential risk and when we can construct appropriate risk mitigation strategies.

Strategy Allocations

The current allocations, reflecting the DoubleLine tactical overweight of 7% are 27% to DoubleLine, 17% each to DBi and Water Island, 15% to Loomis Sayles, 13% to Blackstone Credit Systematic Group, and 11% to FPA. (The fund’s strategic targets are: 20% each to DBi and DoubleLine, 18% to Water Island, 15% each to Blackstone Credit Systematic Group and Loomis Sayles, and 12% to FPA.) We use the fund’s daily cash flows to bring the manager allocations toward their targets when differences in shorter-term relative performance cause divergences.


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Sub-Advisor Portfolio Composition as of June 30, 2023


Blackstone Credit Systematic Group (DCI) Long-Short Credit Strategy


Bond Portfolio Top Five Sector Exposures


Consumer Discretionary




High Tech


Investment Vehicles/REITs




CDS Portfolio Statistics


    Long     Short  

Number of Issuers

    70       71  

Average Credit Duration

    4.3       4.3  


    173 bps     164  bps  

DBi Enhanced Trend Strategy

Asset Class Exposures (Notional)










DoubleLine Opportunistic Income Strategy

Sector Exposures






Agency IO/Inverse IO


Agency CMO


Agency PO


Non-Agency Residential MBS


Commercial MBS


Collateralized Loan Obligations




Bank Loan


Emerging Markets












FPA Contrarian Opportunity Strategy

Asset Class Exposures


U.S. Stocks


Foreign Stocks




Limited Partnerships


Other Asset-Backed












Loomis Sayles Absolute Return Strategy

Strategy Exposures


    Long Total     Short Total     Net Exposure  


    27.9%       0.0%       27.9%  

High-Yield Corporate

    26.8%       -4.6%       22.2%  

Investment-Grade Corp.

    21.3%       0.0%       21.3%  


    5.5%       0.0%       5.5%  

Dividend Equity

    4.4%       -0.2%       4.2%  

Emerging Market

    3.9%       0.0%       3.9%  

Bank Loans

    2.5%       0.0%       2.5%  

Global Rates

    0.8%       -0.3%       0.5%  

Global Credit

    0.6%       -0.6%       0.0%  


    0.0%       -1.7%       -1.7%  


    93.6%       -7.4%       86.2%  

Cash & Equivalents

    6.4%       0.0%       6.4%  

Water Island Arbitrage and Event-Driven Strategy

Sub-Strategy Exposures


    Long     Short     Net  

Merger Arbitrage – Equity

    87.9     -10.5     77.4

Merger Arbitrage – Credit

    3.2     0.0     3.2

Total Merger-Related

    91.2     -2.0     80.7

Special Situations – Equity

    1.2     0.0     1.2

Special Situations – Credit

    2.2     0.0     2.2

Total Special Situations

    1.9     0.0     3.4











    94.5     -10.5     84.0












Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding.


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iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund Value of Hypothetical $100,000


The value of a hypothetical $100,000 investment in the iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund from September 30, 2011 to June 30, 2023 compared with the ICE BofA US 3-Month Treasury Bill, Morningstar Multistrategy Category and Bloomberg US Agg Bond Index.



The hypothetical $100,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.


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Table of Contents

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund



Shares           Value  


  Communication Services: 4.3%   
  128,989     Activision Blizzard, Inc.*    $ 10,873,773  
  24,976     Alphabet, Inc. - Class A*      2,989,627  
  17,125     Alphabet, Inc. - Class C*      2,071,611  
  114,390     Altegrity, Inc.*(a)      266,529  
  48,999     Altice USA, Inc. - Class A*      147,977  
  120,875     Bollore SE      753,591  
  4,324     Charter Communications, Inc. - Class A*      1,588,508  
  48,890     Cineplex, Inc.*      327,595  
  79,795     Comcast Corp. - Class A      3,315,482  
  24,160     iHeartMedia, Inc. - Class A*      87,942  
  7,971     Intelsat SA*      183,333  
  10,315     Meta Platforms, Inc. - Class A*      2,960,199  
  1,851     Netflix, Inc.*      815,347  
  21,663     Nexon Co. Ltd.      411,850  
  16,998     Nintendo Co. Ltd.      769,610  
  183,126     Radius Global Infrastructure, Inc. - Class A*      2,728,577  
  104,847     Rovio Entertainment Oyj(b)      1,045,177  
  365,376     TEGNA, Inc.      5,933,706  
  85,348     Telenet Group Holding NV      1,921,520  






  Consumer Discretionary: 1.0%  
  19,957     Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.*      206,792  
  15,444, Inc.*      2,013,280  
  16,720     CarMax, Inc.*      1,399,464  
  6,239     Cie Financiere Richemont SA - Class A      1,057,440  
  6,060     Delivery Hero SE*(b)      267,344  
  16,860     Entain PLC      272,524  
  184     Home Depot, Inc.      57,158  
  26,721     Just Eat NV*(b)      409,505  
  4,950     Marriott International, Inc. - Class A      909,265  
  6,243     Naspers Ltd. - Class N      1,126,549  
  675     Starbucks Corp.      66,866  
  45,246     Uni-Select, Inc.*      1,608,177  






  Consumer Staples: 0.5%  
  78,142     Albertsons Cos., Inc. - Class A      1,705,059  
  1,088     Coca-Cola Co.      65,519  
  59     Costco Wholesale Corp.      31,764  
  16,254     Heineken Holding NV      1,413,543  
  9,600     Herbalife Ltd.*      127,104  
  44,430     JDE Peet’s NV      1,322,407  
  458     Procter & Gamble Co.      69,497  
  334     Walmart, Inc.      52,498  






  Energy: 1.0%  
  18,829     Battalion Oil Corp.*      107,514  
  65,994     Baytex Energy Corp.*      215,140  
  139,576     Baytex Energy Corp.*      455,500  
  6,016     Canadian Natural Resources Ltd.      338,460  
  169     Devon Energy Corp.      8,169  
  6,210     Diamondback Energy, Inc.      815,746  
  2,161     EOG Resources, Inc.      247,305  
  47,534     Exmar NV      555,330  
  3,100     Gulfport Energy Corp.*      325,717  
  57,860     Kinder Morgan, Inc.      996,349  
  20,716     Magellan Midstream Partners LP(c)      1,291,021  
Shares           Value  
  Energy (continued)  
  42,106     PDC Energy, Inc.(c)    $ 2,995,421  
  917     Pioneer Natural Resources Co.      189,984  
  747     Vitesse Energy, Inc.      16,733  
  1,337     Williams Cos., Inc.      43,626  






  Financials: 2.2%  
  560     Alpha Partners Technology Merger Corp.*      6,112  
  46,720     American International Group, Inc.      2,688,269  
  5,862     Aon PLC - Class A      2,023,562  
  50     BlackRock, Inc.      34,557  
  39,270     Citigroup, Inc.      1,807,991  
  60,800     Fast Sponsor Capital*(a)      121,600  
  325,630     First Horizon Corp.      3,669,850  
  68,672     Focus Financial Partners, Inc. - Class A*      3,605,967  
  21,230     Groupe Bruxelles Lambert NV      1,672,667  
  11,317     Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.      815,050  
  27,680     Jefferies Financial Group, Inc.      918,146  
  224     JPMorgan Chase & Co.      32,579  
  2,510     LPL Financial Holdings, Inc.      545,749  
  81     MasterCard, Inc. - Class A      31,857  
  10,672     Moneylion, Inc.*      128,171  
  561     Morgan Stanley      47,909  
  776     PowerUp Acquisition Corp.*      8,206  
  450     Signature Bank      95  
  43,550     Wells Fargo & Co.      1,858,714  






  Health Care: 2.8%  
  490     Abbott Laboratories      53,420  
  585     AbbVie, Inc.      78,817  
  47,716     Albireo Pharma, Inc.*      105,844  
  10,187     Amedisys, Inc.*(c)      931,499  
  13,335     Bayer AG      737,746  
  5     Biote Corp. - Class A*      34  
  868     Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.      55,509  
  54,961     CinCor Pharma, Inc.*      173,930  
  213,778     Concert Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*      81,556  
  41,206     Dechra Pharmaceuticals PLC      1,930,082  
  48,702     DICE Therapeutics, Inc.*      2,262,695  
  134     Elevance Health, Inc.      59,535  
  33,414     EMIS Group PLC      581,713  
  12,047     Globus Medical, Inc. - Class A*(c)      717,278  
  73,277     Horizon Therapeutics PLC*(c)      7,536,540  
  2,572     ICON PLC - ADR*      643,514  
  51,898     IVERIC bio, Inc.*      2,041,667  
  373     Johnson & Johnson      61,739  
  79     Merck & Co., Inc.      9,116  
  16,009     Seagen, Inc.*(c)      3,081,092  
  42,947     Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB*      837,986  
  77,973     Syneos Health, Inc.*(c)      3,285,782  
  82     Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc.      42,784  
  125     UnitedHealth Group, Inc.      60,080  






  Industrials: 3.8%  
  117,580     Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc.*      6,451,615  
  45,661     Applus Services SA      491,819  
  3,695     Carlson Travel, Inc.      38,798  
  207,470     Caverion Oyj      1,932,267  
  96,159     CIRCOR International, Inc.*      5,428,176  
  127     Cummins, Inc.      31,135  


The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


Schedule of Investments         35

Table of Contents

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund



Shares           Value  


  Industrials (continued)  
  144     Deere & Co.    $ 58,347  
  321     Emerson Electric Co.      29,015  
  567     Fastenal Co.      33,447  
  7,690     Ferguson PLC      1,209,714  
  1     Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc.      42  
  18,710     Howmet Aerospace, Inc.      927,268  
  45,151     Kloeckner & Co. SE      477,206  
  15,730     LG Corp.      1,050,537  
  142     Lockheed Martin Corp.      65,374  
  538,442     McDermott International Ltd.*      96,919  
  590,897     McDermott International, Inc.*      106,361  
  5,847     RB Global, Inc.      350,820  
  124,401     Resolute Forest Products, Inc.*      182,310  
  29,273     Rush Enterprises, Inc. - Class A      1,778,042  
  10,320     Safran SA      1,616,491  
  7,630     Samsung C&T Corp.      612,068  
  17,500     Sound Holding FP*(a)      1,209,160  
  34,724     Triton International Ltd.(c)      2,891,120  
  17,366     Uber Technologies, Inc.*      749,690  
  218     Union Pacific Corp.      44,607  
  451     United Parcel Service, Inc. - Class B      80,842  
  157,682     Univar Solutions, Inc.*      5,651,323  
  7,880     Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp.      864,200  






  Information Technology: 4.3%  
  172,829     Absolute Software Corp.      1,980,620  
  156     Accenture PLC - Class A      48,139  
  288,179     Alfa Financial Software Holdings PLC(b)      714,097  
  16,750     Analog Devices, Inc.      3,263,068  
  1,356     Apple, Inc.      263,023  
  7,048     Black Knight, Inc.*      420,977  
  1,929     Broadcom, Inc.      1,673,272  
  445     Cisco Systems, Inc.      23,024  
  22,138     Contra Abiomed, Inc.*      38,742  
  115,113     ForgeRock, Inc. - Class A*      2,364,421  
  78,290     Magnachip Semiconductor Corp.*      875,282  
  807     Microchip Technology, Inc.      72,299  
  287     Microsoft Corp.      97,735  
  103,091     National Instruments Corp.(c)      5,917,423  
  4,151     NCR Corp.*      104,605  
  5,740     NXP Semiconductors NV      1,174,863  
  194,369     Ordina NV      1,203,297  
  2,593     QUALCOMM, Inc.      308,671  
  10,043     Rogers Corp.*      1,626,263  
  36,646     Silicon Motion Technology Corp. - ADR(c)      2,633,382  
  21,900     SimCorp AS      2,321,963  
  37,330     Software AG      1,296,128  
  20,560     TE Connectivity Ltd.      2,881,690  
  54,174     VMware, Inc. - Class A*(c)      7,784,262  






  Materials: 1.0%  
  34,197     Arconic Corp.*      1,011,547  
  122,275     Cemex SAB de CV - ADR*      865,707  
  274,950     Glencore PLC      1,553,050  
  7,830     Heidelberg Materials AG      642,899  
  46,964     Holcim AG*      3,159,802  
  23,737     International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.      1,889,228  
Shares           Value  
  Materials (continued)  
  84     Linde PLC    $ 32,011  
  1,281     Newmont Corp.      54,647  
  169     Packaging Corp. of America      22,335  






  Real Estate: 0.5%  
  286     American Tower Corp. - REIT      55,467  
  23,730     Douglas Emmett, Inc. - REIT      298,286  
  20,495     Life Storage, Inc. - REIT(c)      2,725,015  
  43,655     Swire Pacific Ltd. - Class A      334,526  
  50,498     Urstadt Biddle Properties, Inc. - Class A(c)      1,073,588  
  9,830     Vornado Realty Trust - REIT      178,316  






  Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: 0.0%  
  3,818     Bright Bidco BV      2,291  
  6,266     Pershing Square Tontine Holdings Ltd.*      0  






  Utilities: 0.8%  
  415     Duke Energy Corp.      37,242  
  25,740     FirstEnergy Corp.      1,000,771  
  144     NextEra Energy, Inc.      10,685  
  12,520     PG&E Corp.*      216,346  
  140,776     PNM Resources, Inc.      6,348,997  







(Cost $186,858,976)







African Gold Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 03/13/28)*


Apollo Strategic Growth Capital II - Class A

(Expiration date 12/31/27)*


Ares Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 12/31/27)*


Atlantic Coastal Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 12/31/27)*


Atlantic Coastal Acquisition Corp. II

(Expiration date 06/02/23)*

  3,595 Holdings, Inc.

(Expiration date 12/31/28)*


BurTech Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 08/19/23)*


C5 Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 05/19/28)*


Churchill Capital Corp. VII

(Expiration date 02/29/28)*


Cie Financiere Richemont SA

(Expiration date 11/22/23)*


DHC Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 12/31/27)*


Digital Transformation Opportunities Corp.

(Expiration date 03/31/28)*


Disruptive Acquisition Corp. I

(Expiration date 03/06/26)*


ECARX Holdings, Inc.

(Expiration date 12/21/27)*


Flame Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 12/31/28)*


Forest Road Acquisition Corp. II

(Expiration date 01/15/26)*



The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


36       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund



Shares           Value  



Fusion Acquisition Corp. II

(Expiration date 12/31/27)*

   $ 4  

Global Partner Acquisition Corp. II

(Expiration date 12/31/27)*


Golden Arrow Merger Corp.

(Expiration date 07/31/26)*


GSR II Meteora Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 07/22/23)*


Heliogen, Inc.

(Expiration date 12/30/26)*


Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc.

(Expiration date 04/09/30)*


Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc.

(Expiration date 04/09/30)*


Intelsat Jackson Holdings SA

(Expiration date 12/05/25)*


Intelsat Jackson Holdings SA

(Expiration date 12/05/25)*


Landcadia Holdings IV, Inc.

(Expiration date 12/31/28)*



(Expiration date 12/16/27)*


Metals Acquisition Ltd.

(Expiration date 06/16/28)*


NioCorp Developments Ltd.

(Expiration date 03/17/28)*


Northern Star Investment Corp. III

(Expiration date 02/25/28)*


Northern Star Investment Corp. IV

(Expiration date 12/31/27)*


Plum Acquisition Corp. I

(Expiration date 12/31/28)*


Prenetics Global Ltd.

(Expiration date 05/17/27)*


Ross Acquisition Corp. II

(Expiration date 02/12/26)*


Slam Corp.

(Expiration date 12/31/27)*


Stratim Cloud Acquisition Corp.

(Expiration date 03/05/26)*


Swvl Holdings Corp.

(Expiration date 03/31/27)*


TLG Acquisition One Corp.

(Expiration date 01/25/28)*


Twelve Seas Investment Co. II

(Expiration date 03/02/28)*


Virgin Orbit Holdings, Inc.

(Expiration date 12/29/26)*





(Cost $198,971)






  Energy: 0.0%  
  El Paso Energy Capital Trust I



4.750%, 03/31/2028

  Gulfport Energy Corp.



10.000%, 07/31/2023*(a)(d)(e)







Shares           Value  
  Industrials: 0.0%  
  Clarivate PLC - Series A



5.250%, 06/01/2024

  Element Commercial Aviation




  McDermott International, Inc. -
(Preference Shares)










  Information Technology: 0.0%  
  Riverbed Technology, Inc.








(Cost $2,397,187)






  510 Asset-Backed Trust   

Series 2021-NPL1-A1
2.240%, 06/25/2061(b)(f)

  Aaset Trust   

Series 2021-1A-A
2.950%, 11/16/2041(b)

  Accelerated Assets LLC   

Series 2018-1-B
4.510%, 12/02/2033(b)

  Affirm Asset Securitization Trust   

Series 2023-A-D
9.090%, 01/18/2028(b)

  AGL CLO 3 Ltd.   

Series 2020-3A-D
8.560%, 01/15/2033(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 3.300%

  AIM Aviation Finance Ltd.   

Series 2015-1A-B1
7.072%, 02/15/2040(b)(f)

  AMSR Trust   

Series 2020-SFR5-G
4.112%, 11/17/2037(b)


Series 2021-SFR1-G
4.612%, 06/17/2038(b)(h)

  Apidos CLO XX   

Series 2015-20A-BRR
7.210%, 07/16/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 1.950%

  Apidos CLO XXIV   

Series 2016-24A-DR
11.050%, 10/20/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.800%

  Applebee’s Funding LLC/IHOP Funding LLC   

Series 2023-1A-A2
7.824%, 03/05/2053(b)

  Arbor Realty Commercial Real Estate Notes CLO Ltd.   

Series 2021-FL1-C
7.219%, 12/15/2035(b)(g)
1 mo. USD LIBOR + 2.000%



The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


Schedule of Investments         37

Table of Contents

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund





  ARES LX CLO Ltd.   
  $ 500,000    

Series 2021-60A-D
8.212%, 07/18/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 2.950%

   $ 463,740  
  Atrium CLO XIII   

Series 13A-E
11.323%, 11/21/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.050%

  Atrium CLO XIV LLC   

Series 14A-E
10.910%, 08/23/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.650%

  Avid Automobile Receivables Trust   

Series 2019-1-C
3.140%, 07/15/2026(b)

  Avis Budget Rental Car Funding AESOP LLC   

Series 2020-2A-C
4.250%, 02/20/2027(b)

  Bain Capital Credit CLO Ltd.   

Series 2021-2A-D
8.410%, 07/16/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 3.150%

  Barings CLO Ltd.   

Series 2018-4A-E
11.080%, 10/15/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.820%

  BHG Securitization Trust   

Series 2022-A-B
2.700%, 02/20/2035(b)

  Blackbird Capital Aircraft Lease Securitization Ltd.   

Series 2016-1A-A
4.213%, 12/16/2041(b)(f)

  Blue Stream Issuer LLC   

Series 2023-1A-C
8.898%, 05/20/2053(b)

  Bristol Park CLO Ltd.   

Series 2016-1A-CR
7.210%, 04/15/2029(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 1.950%

  Buttermilk Park CLO Ltd.   

Series 2018-1A-E
11.010%, 10/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%

  Canyon Capital CLO Ltd.   

Series 2016-1A-ER
11.010%, 07/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%


Series 2018-1A-E
11.010%, 07/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%


Series 2021-4A-E
11.560%, 10/15/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.300%

  Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO Ltd.   

Series 2014-2RA-D
10.671%, 05/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.350%

  Carlyle US CLO Ltd.   
  $ 500,000    

Series 2021-1A-D
11.260%, 04/15/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.000%

   $ 453,443  
  Carvana Auto Receivables Trust   

Series 2021-N1-R
0.010%, 01/10/2028(b)(i)


Series 2021-N4-D
2.300%, 09/11/2028

  Castlelake Aircraft Securitization Trust   

Series 2018-1-C
6.625%, 06/15/2043(b)

  Castlelake Aircraft Structured Trust   

Series 2019-1A-E
0.010%, 04/15/2039(b)(i)

  Catskill Park CLO Ltd.   

Series 2017-1A-D
11.250%, 04/20/2029(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.000%

  Chenango Park CLO Ltd.   

Series 2018-1A-D
11.060%, 04/15/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.800%

  CIFC Funding CLO Ltd.   

Series 2013-2A-A3LR
7.212%, 10/18/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 1.950%


Series 2017-4A-D
11.373%, 10/24/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.100%


Series 2019-3A-DR
12.060%, 10/16/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.800%

  College Ave Student Loans LLC   

Series 2021-A-D
4.120%, 07/25/2051(b)

  Cologix Data Centers U.S. Issuer LLC   

Series 2021-1A-C
5.990%, 12/26/2051(b)

  Cook Park CLO Ltd.   

Series 2018-1A-E
10.660%, 04/17/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.400%

  CoreVest American Finance Ltd.   

Series 2020-4-C
2.250%, 12/15/2052(b)

  CSAB Mortgage-Backed Trust   

Series 2006-2-A6B
6.200%, 09/25/2036(f)

  Diamond Resorts Owner Trust   

Series 2019-1A-B
3.530%, 02/20/2032(b)

  Dryden 40 Senior Loan Fund CLO   

Series 2015-40A-ER
11.071%, 08/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%

  Dryden 45 Senior Loan Fund CLO   

Series 2016-45A-ER
11.110%, 10/15/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.850%



The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


38       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund





  Dryden 55 CLO Ltd.   
  $ 500,000    

Series 2018-55A-F
12.460%, 04/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 7.200%

   $ 374,792  
  DT Auto Owner Trust   

Series 2020-3A-D
1.840%, 06/15/2026(b)


Series 2022-2A-D
5.460%, 03/15/2028(b)

  Education Funding Trust   

Series 2020-A-A
2.790%, 07/25/2041(b)

  Elevation CLO Ltd.   

Series 2021-14A-C
7.550%, 10/20/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 2.300%

  Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust   

Series 2023-2A-D
6.320%, 08/15/2029

  Fillmore Park CLO Ltd.   

Series 2018-1A-E
10.660%, 07/15/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.400%

  FirstKey Homes Trust   

Series 2020-SFR2-F1
3.017%, 10/19/2037(b)

  Flagship Credit Auto Trust   

Series 2022-1-D
3.640%, 03/15/2028(b)

  FMC GMSR Issuer Trust   

Series 2021-GT1-B
4.360%, 07/25/2026(b)(h)


Series 2021-GT2-B
4.440%, 10/25/2026(b)(h)

  Galaxy XIX CLO Ltd.   

Series 2015-19A-D1R
11.803%, 07/24/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.530%

  Gilbert Park CLO Ltd.   

Series 2017-1A-E
11.660%, 10/15/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.400%

  GITSIT Mortgage Loan Trust   

Series 2023-NPL1-A1
8.353%, 05/25/2053(b)(h)

  GLS Auto Receivables Issuer Trust   

Series 2021-4A-E
4.430%, 10/16/2028(b)


Series 2023-2A-D
6.310%, 03/15/2029(b)

  Greystone CRE Notes Ltd.



Series 2021-HC2-A
7.062%, 12/15/2039(b)(g)
1 mo. USD Term SOFR + 1.914%

  GSAA Home Equity Trust   

Series 2006-10-AF5
6.948%, 06/25/2036(f)

  Hayfin US CLO XII Ltd.   
  $ 300,000    

Series 2020-12A-D
9.410%, 01/20/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 4.160%

   $ 293,939  
  Hertz Vehicle Financing III LLC   

Series 2022-1A-D
4.850%, 06/25/2026(b)


Series 2022-3A-D
6.310%, 03/25/2025(b)

  Hertz Vehicle Financing LLC   

Series 2022-4A-D
6.560%, 09/25/2026(b)

  Highbridge Loan Management CLO Ltd.   

Series 2013-2A-DR
11.850%, 10/20/2029(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.600%

  Hilton Grand Vacations Trust   

Series 2018-AA-C
4.000%, 02/25/2032(b)

  Kestrel Aircraft Funding Ltd.   

Series 2018-1A-A
4.250%, 12/15/2038(b)

  LCM CLO 26 Ltd.   

Series 26A-E
10.550%, 01/20/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.300%


Series 17A-ER
11.260%, 10/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.000%

  LCM CLO XX L.P.   

Series 20A-ER
10.700%, 10/20/2027(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.450%

  LCM Loan Income Fund I Income Note Issuer CLO Ltd.   

Series 27A-E
10.860%, 07/16/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.600%

  Lehman XS Trust   

Series 2005-6-3A3A
6.260%, 11/25/2035(f)

  Madison Park Funding CLO XLV Ltd.



Series 2020-45A-ER
11.610%, 07/15/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.350%

  Madison Park Funding CLO XXVI Ltd.



Series 2017-26A-DR
8.299%, 07/29/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 3.000%

  Madison Park Funding CLO XXXVIII Ltd.



Series 2021-38A-E
11.260%, 07/17/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.000%

  MAPS Ltd.



Series 2018-1A-A
4.212%, 05/15/2043(b)


Series 2019-1A-A
4.458%, 03/15/2044(b)



The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


Schedule of Investments         39

Table of Contents

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund





  Marble Point CLO XII Ltd.


  $ 500,000    

Series 2018-1A-D
8.260%, 07/16/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 3.000%

   $ 427,986  
  Marlette Funding Trust



Series 2022-1A-D
3.390%, 04/15/2032(b)

  MetroNet Infrastructure Issuer LLC



Series 2023-B
8.010%, 04/20/2053(b)

  Milos CLO Ltd.



Series 2017-1A-ER
11.400%, 10/20/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.150%

  Mosaic Solar Loans LLC



Series 2017-2A-B
4.770%, 06/22/2043(b)




Series 2013-1A-CR
7.250%, 10/20/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 2.000%




Series 2020-1A-C
4.210%, 10/20/2037(b)


Series 2021-1WA-D
3.170%, 01/22/2041(b)

  MVW Owner Trust



Series 2019-1A-C
3.330%, 11/20/2036(b)

  Myers Park CLO Ltd.



Series 2018-1A-E
10.750%, 10/20/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.500%

  Navient Private Education Refi Loan Trust



Series 2018-A-B
3.680%, 02/18/2042(b)


Series 2019-FA-B
3.120%, 08/15/2068(b)


Series 2019-GA-B
3.080%, 10/15/2068(b)


Series 2020-FA-B
2.690%, 07/15/2069(b)

  Neuberger Berman CLO XVI-S Ltd.



Series 2017-16SA-ER
11.510%, 04/15/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.250%

  Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 24 Ltd.



Series 2017-24A-E
11.285%, 04/19/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.020%

  Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 26 Ltd.



Series 2017-26A-INC
0.000%, 10/18/2030(b)(h)

  Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 37 Ltd.



Series 2020-37A-ER
11.000%, 07/20/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%

  Ocean Trails CLO V


  $ 700,000    

Series 2014-5A-DRR
8.692%, 10/13/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 3.450%

   $ 597,057  
  Octagon Investment Partners CLO 26 Ltd.



Series 2016-1A-FR
13.350%, 07/15/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 8.090%

  Octagon Investment Partners CLO 29 Ltd.



Series 2016-1A-DR
8.373%, 01/24/2033(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 3.100%


Series 2016-1A-ER
12.523%, 01/24/2033(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 7.250%

  Octagon Investment Partners CLO 39 Ltd.



Series 2018-3A-E
11.000%, 10/20/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%

  Octagon Investment Partners CLO 40 Ltd.



Series 2019-1A-ER
12.250%, 01/20/2035(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 7.000%

  Octagon Investment Partners CLO XVI Ltd.



Series 2013-1A-ER
11.010%, 07/17/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%


Series 2013-1A-SUB
0.000%, 07/17/2030(b)(h)

  Octagon Investment Partners CLO XXI Ltd.



Series 2014-1A-DRR
12.321%, 02/14/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 7.000%

  OHA Credit Funding CLO 5 Ltd.



Series 2020-5A-C
7.262%, 04/18/2033(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 2.000%

  OHA Credit Partners CLO XVI



Series 2021-16A-A
6.412%, 10/18/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 1.150%

  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust



Series 2020-1A-B
4.830%, 05/14/2032(b)


Series 2020-2A-C
2.760%, 09/14/2035(b)

  Pagaya AI Debt Selection Trust



Series 2021-5-CERT
0.000%, 08/15/2029(b)(i)

  Pagaya AI Debt Trust



Series 2022-2-AB
5.306%, 01/15/2030(b)(h)

  PFP CLO Ltd.



Series 2021-8-C
6.958%, 08/09/2037(b)(g)
1 mo. USD LIBOR + 1.800%

  Planet Fitness Master Issuer LLC



Series 2019-1A-A2
3.858%, 12/05/2049(b)

  Post CLO Ltd.



Series 2023-1A-A
6.829%, 04/20/2036(b)(g)
3 mo. USD Term SOFR + 1.950%



The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


40       Litman Gregory Funds Trust

Table of Contents

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund





  Progress Residential Trust


  $ 255,000    

Series 2020-SFR3-F
2.796%, 10/17/2027(b)

   $ 229,022  

Series 2021-SFR1-F
2.757%, 04/17/2038(b)


Series 2021-SFR10-F
4.608%, 12/17/2040(b)


Series 2021-SFR2-D
2.197%, 04/19/2038(b)


Series 2021-SFR2-E2
2.647%, 04/19/2038(b)


Series 2021-SFR2-G
4.254%, 04/19/2038(b)


Series 2021-SFR3-F
3.436%, 05/17/2026(b)


Series 2021-SFR5-F
3.158%, 07/17/2038(b)


Series 2021-SFR6-E2
2.525%, 07/17/2038(b)


Series 2021-SFR7-F
3.834%, 08/17/2040(b)

  Rockford Tower CLO Ltd.



Series 2017-2A-CR
7.160%, 10/15/2029(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 1.900%

  RR CLO 2 Ltd.



Series 2017-2A-DR
11.060%, 04/15/2036(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.800%

  RR CLO 6 Ltd.



Series 2019-6A-DR
11.110%, 04/15/2036(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.850%

  SCF Equipment Leasing LLC



Series 2021-1A-E
3.560%, 08/20/2032(b)

  Sierra Timeshare Receivables Funding LLC



Series 2020-2A-C
3.510%, 07/20/2037(b)

  Slam Ltd.



Series 2021-1A-B
3.422%, 06/15/2046(b)

  SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust



Series 2003-A-A3
8.658%, 06/15/2032(g)


Series 2003-B-A3
8.648%, 03/15/2033(g)


Series 2003-B-A4
8.693%, 03/15/2033(g)

  SoFi Professional Loan Program LLC



Series 2020-A-BFX
3.120%, 05/15/2046(b)

  SoFi Professional Loan Program LLC



Series 2017-F-R1
0.010%, 01/25/2041(b)(i)

  Sound Point CLO XXXII Ltd.



Series 2021-4A-E
11.955%, 10/25/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.700%

  SpringCastle America Funding LLC


  $ 382,002    

Series 2020-AA-A
1.970%, 09/25/2037(b)

   $ 341,828  
  Stewart Park CLO Ltd.



Series 2015-1A-ER
10.540%, 01/15/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.280%

  Sunnova Helios XI Issuer LLC



Series 2023-A-B
5.600%, 05/20/2050(b)

  Textainer Marine Containers VII Ltd.



Series 2020-1A-A
2.730%, 08/21/2045(b)


Series 2021-1A-B
2.520%, 02/20/2046(b)

  THL Credit Wind River CLO Ltd.



Series 2014-2A-INC
0.010%, 01/15/2031(b)(i)


Series 2017-3A-ER
12.310%, 04/15/2035(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 7.050%


Series 2018-2A-E
11.010%, 07/15/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%




Series 2017-7A-CR
7.410%, 04/15/2033(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 2.150%




Series 2020-15A-C
7.400%, 04/20/2033(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 2.150%

  Towd Point Mortgage Trust



Series 2019-2-M1
3.750%, 12/25/2058(b)(h)

  Trestles CLO II Ltd.



Series 2018-2A-D
11.005%, 07/25/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.750%

  Tricon American Homes Trust



Series 2020-SFR2-E1
2.730%, 11/17/2039(b)

  Upstart Pass-Through Trust



Series 2021-ST8-CERT
0.010%, 10/20/2029(b)(i)(j)


Series 2021-ST9-CERT
0.010%, 11/20/2029(b)(i)

  Upstart Securitization Trust



Series 2021-2-CERT
0.010%, 06/20/2031(i)




Series 2021-NPL5-A1
1.868%, 08/25/2051(b)(f)




Series 2021-NPL3-A1
2.240%, 02/27/2051(b)(f)


Series 2021-NPL3-A2
4.949%, 02/27/2051(b)(f)

  Voya CLO Ltd.



Series 2018-2A-E
10.510%, 07/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.250%



The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.


Schedule of Investments         41

Table of Contents

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund





  Voya CLO Ltd. (Continued)   
  $ 500,000    

Series 2019-1A-ER
11.380%, 04/15/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.120%

   $ 419,154  
  WAVE Trust



Series 2017-1A-A
3.844%, 11/15/2042(b)

  Webster Park CLO Ltd.



Series 2015-1A-DR
10.750%, 07/20/2030(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 5.500%

  Wellfleet CLO Ltd.



Series 2017-3A-C
8.010%, 01/17/2031(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 2.750%

  Wendy’s Funding LLC



Series 2019-1A-A2II
4.080%, 06/15/2049(b)

  Willis Engine Structured Trust V



Series 2020-A-A
3.228%, 03/15/2045(b)

  Willis Engine Structured Trust VI



Series 2021-A-C
7.385%, 05/15/2046(b)

  Wind River CLO Ltd.



Series 2021-2A-E
11.680%, 07/20/2034(b)(g)
3 mo. USD LIBOR + 6.430%





(Cost $120,062,604)






  Air Methods Corp.



9.231%, 04/22/2024(g)
3 mo. LIBOR + 3.500%

  AmWINS Group, Inc.



7.834%, 02/19/2028(g)
1 mo. SOFR + 2.750%

  Applied Systems, Inc.