Fund |
Ticker |
Stock
Exchange |
FlexShares®
US
Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
QLV |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Developed
Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
QLVD |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
QLVE |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
TILT |
Cboe BZX
Exchange, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Morningstar
Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index Fund |
TLTD |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Morningstar
Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
TLTE |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
US
Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
QLC |
Cboe
BZX Exchange, Inc. |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
ESG |
Cboe
BZX Exchange, Inc. |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
ESGG |
Cboe
BZX Exchange, Inc. |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
FEUS |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
FEDM |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund |
FEEM |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
GUNR |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
NFRA |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Global
Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
GQRE |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Real
Assets Allocation Index Fund |
ASET |
The
Nasdaq Stock Market LLC |
FlexShares®
Quality
Dividend Index Fund |
QDF |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Quality
Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
QDEF |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
International
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
IQDF |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
International
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
IQDE |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
International
Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
IQDY |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
TDTT |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
TDTF |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
MBSD |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
SKOR |
The
Nasdaq Stock Market LLC |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
LKOR |
Cboe
BZX Exchange, Inc. |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
HYGV |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
FEIG |
NYSE
Arca, Inc. |
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A-1 |
NAME
OF FUND |
NUMBER
OF
SHARES
PER
CREATION
UNIT |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
25,000 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
100,000 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
100,000 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
200,000 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
100,000 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
25,000 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
25,000 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
25,000 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
25,000 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund |
50,000 |
NAME
OF FUND |
NUMBER
OF
SHARES
PER
CREATION
UNIT |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
25,000 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
25,000 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
25,000 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
100,000 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
100,000 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
100,000 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
50,000 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
50,000 |
NAME,
ADDRESS,(1)
AGE,
POSITIONS HELD
WITH
TRUST AND
LENGTH
OF
SERVICE
AS TRUSTEE(2)
|
PRINCIPAL
OCCUPATIONS DURING PAST
FIVE
YEARS |
NUMBER
OF
FUNDS
IN FUND
COMPLEX(3)
OVERSEEN
BY
TRUSTEE |
OTHER
DIRECTORSHIPS
HELD
BY
TRUSTEE
DURING
THE
PAST
FIVE
YEARS(4)
|
NON-INTERESTED
TRUSTEES | |||
Sarah
N. Garvey
Year
of Birth: 1952
Trustee
since July 2011 |
• Chairman
of the Board of Navy Pier
from
2011 to 2013 and Member of the
Board
from 2011 to 2020;
•Member
of the Board of Directors of
The
Civic Federation since 2004;
•Member
of the Executive Committee
and
Chairman of the Audit and Risk
Committee
since 2017 and Trustee of
the
Art Institute of Chicago since
2011;
•Director
and Member of Audit
Committee
of the Lyric Opera of
Chicago
since 2023;
•Member
of the Board of Directors and
Chair
of Audit Committee of the Arts
Club
of Chicago since 2023. |
30 |
NONE |
Philip
G. Hubbard
Year
of Birth: 1951
Trustee
since July 2011 |
• Managing
Partner of Solidian Fund,
LP
and Solidian Management, LLC (a
fund
of hedge funds platform for
family
and friends investments) since
2001;
•President
of Hubbard Management
Group,
LLC (a personal investment
vehicle)
since 2001;
•Chairman
of the Board of Trustees of
the
Wheaton College Trust Company,
N.A.
from 2004 to 2022;
•Member
of the Board of Trustees of
Wheaton
College from 1998 to 2022;
•Chairman
of the Board of Directors of
the
English Language Institute/China
(a
nonprofit educational organization)
since
1993;
•Member
of the Board of First Cup,
LLC
(restaurant franchising) since
2014. |
30 |
NONE |
NAME,
ADDRESS,(1)
AGE,
POSITIONS HELD
WITH
TRUST AND
LENGTH
OF
SERVICE
AS TRUSTEE(2) |
PRINCIPAL
OCCUPATIONS DURING PAST
FIVE
YEARS |
NUMBER
OF
FUNDS
IN FUND
COMPLEX(3)
OVERSEEN
BY
TRUSTEE |
OTHER
DIRECTORSHIPS
HELD
BY
TRUSTEE
DURING
THE
PAST
FIVE
YEARS(4) |
Eric
T. McKissack
Year
of Birth: 1953
Trustee
and Chairman since July 2011 |
• CEO
Emeritus and Founder; CEO and
Founder
from 2004 to 2020 of
Channing
Capital Management, LLC
(an
SEC registered investment
adviser);
•Member
of the Board of Trustees, the
Investment
Committee, and the
Finance
Committee of the Art Institute
of
Chicago since 2002;
•Member
of the Board of Grand
Victoria
Foundation since 2011;
•Member
of the Board of the Graham
Foundation
since 2014;
•Member
of the Board of the Terra
Foundation
since 2021. |
30 |
Morgan
Stanley
Pathway
Funds
(formerly,
Consulting
Group
Capital
Markets
Funds)
(11
Portfolios)
since
April 2013
Farmer
Mac
(NYSE:
AGM)
since
February 2021 |
INTERESTED
TRUSTEE | |||
Darek
Wojnar(5)
Year
of Birth: 1965
Trustee
since December 2018 |
• Director
and Executive Vice President,
Head
of Funds and Managed
Accounts,
Northern Trust Investments,
Inc.
since 2018;
•Head
of Exchange-Traded Funds at
Hartford
Funds from 2016 to 2017 and
Managing
Director of Lattice
Strategies
LLC from 2014 to 2016;
•Managing
Director and Head of US
iShares
Product at BlackRock
(including
Barclays Global Investors
acquired
by BlackRock) from 2005 to
2013
and the Equity Long/Short
Opportunities
Fund (formerly, NT
Equity
Long/Short Strategies Fund)
from
2011 to 2019. |
30 |
Northern
Funds
(41
Portfolios)
since
January 1,
2019
and
Northern
Institutional
Funds
(6
Portfolios)
since
January 1,
2019 |
NAME,
ADDRESS, AGE,
POSITIONS
HELD WITH
TRUST
AND LENGTH OF
SERVICE(1)
|
PRINCIPAL
OCCUPATIONS DURING PAST FIVE YEARS |
Peter
K. Ewing
Year
of Birth: 1958
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
President
since March 2017 |
•President
of Northern Funds, Northern Institutional Funds and the Trust since
March
2017; Vice President of the Trust from July 2011 to February 2017;
Director
of Product Management, ETFs & Mutual Funds, and Director of
Northern
Trust Investments, Inc. since March 2017; Senior Vice President, The
Northern
Trust Company and Northern Trust Investments, Inc., since
September
2010; Director of ETF Product Management, Northern Trust
Investments,
Inc. from September 2010 to February 2017. |
Randal
E. Rein
Year
of Birth: 1970
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
Treasurer
and Principal Financial Officer since
July
2011 |
•Senior
Vice President of Northern Trust Investments, Inc. since 2010;
Treasurer
of Northern Funds and Northern Institutional Funds since 2008;
Treasurer
of Alpha Core Strategies Fund from 2008 to 2018; Treasurer of
Equity
Long/Short Opportunities Fund from 2011 to 2018. |
Maya
Teufel
Year
of Birth: 1972
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
Chief
Compliance Officer since July 2019 |
•Chief
Compliance Officer of FlexShares Trust since July 2019; Chief
Compliance
Officer of Northern Trust Investments, Inc. since July 2019;
Co-
Head
of U.S. Regulatory Compliance Group of Goldman Sachs Asset
Management,
LP from September 2016 to June 2019. |
Craig
R. Carberry, Esq.
Year
of Birth: 1960
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
Chief
Legal Officer since June 2019 |
•Chief
Legal Officer and Secretary of Northern Trust Investments, Inc. since
May
2000; Chief Compliance Officer of Northern Trust Investments, Inc. from
October
2015 to June 2017; Chief Legal Officer and Secretary of 50 South
Capital
Advisors, LLC since 2015; Chief Legal Officer and Secretary of
Belvedere
Advisors LLC since September 2019; Deputy General Counsel and
Senior
Vice President of The Northern Trust Company since August 2020;
Associate
General Counsel and Senior Vice President at The Northern Trust
Company
from June 2015 to 2021; Secretary of Alpha Core Strategies Fund
since
2004; Secretary of Equity Long/Short Opportunities Fund (formerly NT
Equity
Long/Short Strategies Fund) from 2011-2019; Secretary of Northern
Institutional
Funds and Northern Funds from 2010-2018; Secretary of
FlexShares
Trust from 2011-2018. |
Jose
J. Del Real
Year
of Birth: 1977
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
Secretary
since December 2018 |
•Assistant
General Counsel and Senior Vice President of The Northern Trust
Company
since August 2020; Senior Legal Counsel and Senior Vice President
of
The Northern Trust Company from March 2017 to July 2020; Assistant
Secretary
of Northern Trust Investments, Inc. since 2016; Secretary of
Northern
Funds and Northern Institutional Funds since November 2018;
Assistant
Secretary of Northern Funds and Northern Institutional Funds from
2011
to 2014, and from May 2015 to November 2018; Assistant Secretary of
FlexShares®
Trust from June 2015 to December 2018. |
Himanshu
S. Surti
Year
of Birth: 1974
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
Vice
President since December 2020 |
•Director,
ETF Product Management, Northern Trust Investments, Inc. since
November
2020; Senior Vice President, The Northern Trust Company since
November
2020; Portfolio Manager and Chief Operating Officer, Cambria
Investment
Management from June 2014 to November 2020; Vice President,
Cambria
ETF Trust from March 2018 to November
2020. |
NAME,
ADDRESS, AGE,
POSITIONS
HELD WITH
TRUST
AND LENGTH OF
SERVICE(1) |
PRINCIPAL
OCCUPATIONS DURING PAST FIVE YEARS |
Christopher
P. Fair
Year
of Birth: 1982
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
Vice
President since June 2019 |
•Vice
President, The Northern Trust Company since March 2020; ETF Services
Manager,
Northern Trust Investments, Inc. since June 2019; Second Vice
President,
The Northern Trust Company from November 2015 to March 2020;
ETF
Product Manager, Northern Trust Investments, Inc. from November 2015
to
June 2019. |
Darlene
Chappell
Year
of Birth: 1963
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
Anti-Money
Laundering Officer since July
2011 |
•Anti-Money
Laundering Compliance Officer for Northern Trust Investments,
Inc.,
Northern Trust Securities, Inc., Northern Funds, Northern Institutional
Funds
and Alpha Core Strategies Fund (formerly NT Alpha Strategies Fund)
since
2009 and 50 South Capital Advisors, LLC since 2015; Vice President and
Compliance
Consultant for The Northern Trust Company since 2006; Anti-
Money
Laundering Compliance Officer for The Northern Trust Company of
Connecticut
from 2009 to 2013 and the Equity Long/Short Opportunities Fund
(formerly,
NT Equity Long/Short Strategies Fund) from 2011 to 2019 and
Belvedere
Advisors LLC from 2019 to 2023. |
Tim
Handell
Year
of Birth: 1989
50
South LaSalle Street
Chicago,
IL 60603
Assistant
Secretary since December 2022 |
•Senior
Counsel and Senior Vice-President of The Northern Trust Company
since
November 2021; Assistant Secretary of FlexShares® Trust since
December
2022; Assistant General Counsel of Legal & General Investment
Management
America, Inc. from March 2021 to November 2021; Associate
Counsel
of Legal & General Investment Management America, Inc. from
March
2017 to March 2021. |
Information
as of December 31, 2023 | |||
Name
of Non-Interested Trustee |
Fund |
Dollar
Range of
Equity
Securities in
the
Fund |
Aggregate
Dollar
Range
of Equity
Securities
in All
Registered
Investment
Companies
Overseen
by
Trustee in
Family
of Investment
Companies1
|
Sarah
N. Garvey |
FlexShares® Morningstar
Emerging Markets Factor Tilt
Index
Fund |
$10,001-$50,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
|
FlexShares® STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
Over
$100,000 |
|
Philip
G. Hubbard |
None |
None |
None |
Eric
T. McKissack |
None |
None |
None |
Information
as of December 31, 2023 | |||
Name
of Interested Trustee |
Fund |
Dollar
Range of
Equity
Securities in
each
Fund |
Aggregate
Dollar
Range
of Equity
Securities
in All
Registered
Investment
Companies
Overseen
by
Trustee in
Family
of Investment
Companies1
|
Darek
Wojnar |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$50,001-$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 |
|
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$50,001-$100,000 |
|
|
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$50,001-$100,000 |
|
|
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low
Volatility
Index Fund |
$10,001-$50,000 |
|
Name
of Trustee |
Aggregate
Compensation from
Trust(1) |
FlexShares®
US
Quality
Low
Volatility
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Developed
Markets
ex-
US
Quality
Low
Volatility
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Emerging
Markets
Quality
Low
Volatility
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Morningstar
US
Market
Factor
Tilt
Index
Fund |
Non-Interested
Trustees: |
|
|
|
|
|
Sarah
N. Garvey |
$237,750 |
$2,040 |
$845 |
$171 |
$16,326 |
Philip
G. Hubbard |
$237,750 |
$2,040 |
$845 |
$171 |
$16,326 |
Eric
T. McKissack |
$262,750 |
$2,255 |
$933 |
$189 |
$18,042 |
Interested
Trustee: |
|
|
|
|
|
Name
of Trustee |
Aggregate
Compensation from
Trust(1) |
FlexShares®
US
Quality
Low
Volatility
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Developed
Markets
ex-
US
Quality
Low
Volatility
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Emerging
Markets
Quality
Low
Volatility
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Morningstar
US
Market
Factor
Tilt
Index
Fund |
Darek
Wojnar |
None |
None |
None |
None |
None |
Name
of Trustee |
FlexShares®
Morningstar
Developed
Markets
ex-US
Factor
Tilt
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Morningstar
Emerging
Markets
Factor
Tilt
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
US
Quality
Large
Cap
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US
ESG
Select
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global
ESG
Select
Index
Fund |
Non-Interested
Trustees: |
|
|
|
|
|
Sarah
N. Garvey |
$5,900 |
$2,684 |
$1,497 |
$1,974 |
$1,790 |
Philip
G. Hubbard |
$5,900 |
$2,684 |
$1,497 |
$1,974 |
$1,790 |
Eric
T. McKissack |
$6,521 |
$2,966 |
$1,655 |
$2,182 |
$1,978 |
Interested
Trustee: |
|
|
|
|
|
Darek
Wojnar |
None |
None |
None |
None |
None |
Name
of Trustee |
FlexShares®
ESG
&
Climate
US
Large
Cap
Core
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
ESG
&
Climate
Developed
Markets
ex-
US
Core
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
ESG
&
Climate
Emerging
Markets
Core
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Morningstar
Global
Upstream
Natural
Resources
Index
Fund |
FlexShares® STOXX®
Global
Broad
Infrastructure
Index
Fund |
Non-Interested
Trustees: |
|
|
|
|
|
Sarah
N. Garvey |
$336 |
$368 |
$53 |
$83,299 |
$27,431 |
Philip
G. Hubbard |
$336 |
$368 |
$53 |
$83,299 |
$27,431 |
Eric
T. McKissack |
$371 |
$406 |
$59 |
$92,058 |
$30,316 |
Interested
Trustee: |
|
|
|
|
|
Darek
Wojnar |
None |
None |
None |
None |
None |
Name
of Trustee |
FlexShares®
Global
Quality
Real
Estate
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Real
Assets
Allocation
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Quality
Dividend
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Quality
Dividend
Defensive
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
International
Quality
Dividend
Index
Fund |
Non-Interested
Trustees: |
|
|
|
|
|
Sarah
N. Garvey |
$3,752 |
$261 |
$17,779 |
$3,889 |
$5,936 |
Philip
G. Hubbard |
$3,752 |
$261 |
$17,779 |
$3,889 |
$5,936 |
Eric
T. McKissack |
$4,147 |
$288 |
$19,649 |
$4,298 |
$6,560 |
Interested
Trustee: |
|
|
|
|
|
Darek
Wojnar |
None |
None |
None |
None |
None |
Name
of Trustee |
FlexShares®
International
Quality
Dividend
Defensive
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
International
Quality
Dividend
Dynamic
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
iBoxx
3-Year
Target
Duration
TIPS
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
iBoxx
5-Year
Target
Duration
TIPS
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Disciplined
Duration
MBS
Index
Fund |
Non-Interested
Trustees: |
|
|
|
|
|
Sarah
N. Garvey |
$400 |
$1,050 |
$22,965 |
$7,931 |
$992 |
Philip
G. Hubbard |
$400 |
$1,050 |
$22,965 |
$7,931 |
$992 |
Eric
T. McKissack |
$442 |
$1,160 |
$25,379 |
$8,765 |
$1,097 |
Interested
Trustee: |
|
|
|
|
|
Darek
Wojnar |
None |
None |
None |
None |
None |
Name
of Trustee |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored
US
Corporate
Bond
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored
US
Long
Corporate
Bond
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
High
Yield
Value-Scored
Bond
Index
Fund |
FlexShares®
ESG
&
Climate
Investment
Grade
Corporate
Core
Index
Fund |
Non-Interested
Trustees: |
|
|
|
|
Sarah
N. Garvey |
$2,781 |
$405 |
$11,765 |
$394 |
Philip
G. Hubbard |
$2,781 |
$405 |
$11,765 |
$394 |
Eric
T. McKissack |
$3,073 |
$447 |
$13,002 |
$436 |
Interested
Trustee: |
|
|
|
|
Darek
Wojnar |
None |
None |
None |
None |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Wilmington
Trust
626
Commerce Drive, 3rd Floor
Amherst,
NY 14228 |
5.70% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
10.19% |
Merrill
Lynch
P.O.
Box 2011
Lakewood,
NJ 08701 |
13.45% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
21.07% |
Principal
Bank
711
High Street
Des
Moines, IA 50392 |
27.25% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
5.39% |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC
P.O.
Box 3197
New
York, NY 10282 |
8.05% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
11.46% |
Wilmington
Trust
626
Commerce Drive, 3rd
Floor
Amherst,
NY 14228 |
12.74% |
Principal
Bank
711
High Street
Des
Moines, IA 50392 |
50.33% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
14.64% |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC
P.O.
Box 3197
New
York, NY 10282 |
27.54% |
Principal
Bank
711
High Street
Des
Moines, IA 50392 |
52.36% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
5.15% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Morgan
Stanley
1300
Thames Street, 7th Floor
Baltimore,
MD 21231 |
8.00% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
20.52% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
44.40% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
6.67% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
17.95% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
44.53% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
JPMorgan
Securities, LLC
P.O.
Box 183211
Columbus,
OH 43218 |
5.84% |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
6.51% |
SEI
Private Trust Co.
1
Freedom Valley Drive
Oaks,
PA 19456 |
7.57% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
21.82% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
29.34% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
LPL
Financial
P.O.
Box 629022
El
Dorado Hills, CA 95762 |
8.52% |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th
Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
10.16% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
10.93% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
40.12% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
5.13% |
Morgan
Stanley
1300
Thames Street, 7th Floor
Baltimore,
MD 21231 |
6.78% |
LPL
Financial
P.O.
Box 629022
El
Dorado Hills, CA 95762 |
7.40% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
18.67% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
34.59% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Ameriprise
Financial Services, LLC
70100
Ameriprise Financial Center
Minneapolis,
MN 55474 |
9.63% |
JPMorgan
Securities LLC
P.O.
Box 183211
Columbus,
OH 43218 |
11.63% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
26.28% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
32.12% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
BofA
Securities, Inc.
1600
Merrill Lynch Drive
Pennington,
NJ 08534 |
6.60% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
11.87% |
ABN
AMRO Clearing Chicago LLC
175
West Jackson Blvd
Chicago,
Il 60604 |
14.49% |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
15.39% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
49.78% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
BofA
Securities, Inc.
1600
Merrill Lynch Drive
Pennington,
NJ 08534 |
7.16% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
8.77% |
JPMorgan
Securities LLC
P.O.
Box 183211
Columbus,
OH 43218 |
11.14% |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC
P.O.
Box 3197
New
York, NY 10282 |
12.40% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
59.32% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
JPMorgan
Securities LLC
P.O.
Box 183211
Columbus,
OH 43218 |
97.41% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Morgan
Stanley
1300
Thames Street, 7th Floor
Baltimore,
MD 21231 |
7.79% |
Citibank,
NA
3800
Citibank Center
Tampa,
FL 33610 |
9.92% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
18.81% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
21.78% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
5.70% |
JPMorgan
500
Stanton Christiana Road
Newark,
DE 19713-2107 |
10.27% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
50.88% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
US
Bank
Securities
Control
1555
North Rivercenter Drive, Suite 302
Milwaukee,
WI 53212 |
5.39% |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
5.66% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Hills
Bank and Trust
590
West Forevergreen Road
North
Liberty, IA 52317 |
8.15% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
9.29% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
23.24% |
ESL
Federal Credit Union
100
Kings Highway South
Rochester,
NY 14617 |
26.05% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
5.92% |
Merrill
Lynch
P.O.
Box 2011
Lakewood,
NJ 08701 |
7.76% |
FNBC
Bank & Trust
620
West Burlington Avenue
La
Grange, IL 60525 |
8.50% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
27.95% |
TD
Waterhouse Canada Inc
3500
Steeles Avenue East
Tower
2, 2nd Floor
Markham
ON L3R 0X1 |
38.67% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
8.85% |
TIAA
Trust, N.A.
211
North Broadway Suite 1000
St.
Louis, MO 63102 |
11.44% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
17.34% |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th
Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
28.71% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
7.86% |
Morgan
Stanley
1300
Thames Street, 7th Floor
Baltimore,
MD 21231 |
7.91% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
LPL
Financial
P.O.
Box 629022
El
Dorado Hills, CA 95762 |
10.40% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
20.60% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
28.35% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Ameriprise
Financial Services, LLC
70100
Ameriprise Financial Center
Minneapolis,
MN 55474 |
7.04% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
10.04% |
UBS
Financial Services, Inc
1000
Harbor Boulevard
Weehawken,
NJ 07086 |
10.10% |
Morgan
Stanley
1300
Thames Street, 7th Floor
Baltimore,
MD 21231 |
10.27% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
801
S. Canal Street
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
17.30% |
RBC
Wealth Management
60
South 6th
Street
Minneapolis,
MN 55402 |
23.21% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Merrill
Lynch
P.O.
Box 2011
Lakewood,
NJ 08701 |
7.51% |
RBC
Wealth Management
60
South 6th Street
Minneapolis,
MN 55402 |
8.40% |
JPMorgan
Securities LLC
P.O.
Box 183211
Columbus,
OH 43218 |
8.55% |
BofA
Securities, Inc.
1600
Merrill Lynch Drive
Pennington,
NJ 08534 |
9.40% |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC
P.O.
Box 3197
New
York, NY 10282 |
12.56% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
17.06% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
801
S. Canal Street
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
17.57% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
UBS
Financial Services, Inc
1000
Harbor Boulevard
Weehawken,
NJ 07086 |
5.03% |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
5.17% |
BofA
Securities, Inc.
1600
Merrill Lynch Drive
Pennington,
NJ 08534 |
5.98% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
8.35% |
LPL
Financial
P.O.
Box 629022
El
Dorado Hills, CA 95762 |
11.08% |
US
Bank
Securities
Control
1555
North Rivercenter Drive, Suite 302
Milwaukee,
WI 53212 |
14.25% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
30.68% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Morgan
Stanley
1300
Thames Street, 7th Floor
Baltimore,
MD 21231 |
5.89% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
12.17% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
40.53% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
12.02% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
22.24% |
UBS
Financial Services, Inc
1000
Harbor Boulevard
Weehawken,
NJ 07086 |
23.06% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
28.78% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
SEI
Private Trust Co.
1
Freedom Valley Drive
Oaks,
PA 19456 |
22.91% |
JPMorgan
500
Stanton Christiana Road
Newark,
DE 19713-2107 |
32.19% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
33.08% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Harbor
Trust & Investment Management
1024
N. Karwick
Michigan
City, IN 46360 |
5.27% |
JPMorgan
500
Stanton Christiana Road
Newark,
DE 19713-2107 |
8.51% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
9.38% |
SEI
Private Trust Co.
1
Freedom Valley Drive
Oaks,
PA 19456 |
9.76% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082-4930 |
52.96% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Raymond
James & Associates, Inc
880
Carillon Parkway
St.
Petersburg, FL 33716 |
5.59% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
7.80% |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC
P.O.
Box 3197
New
York, NY 10282 |
8.44% |
JPMorgan
Securities LLC
P.O.
Box 183211
Columbus,
OH 43218 |
12.70% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
15.63% |
SEI
Private Trust Co.
1
Freedom Valley Drive
Oaks,
PA 19456 |
31.54% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
Pershing
LLC
1
Pershing Plaza, 7th Floor
Jersey
City, NJ 07399 |
5.80% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
US
Bank
Securities
Control
1555
North Rivercenter Drive, Suite 302
Milwaukee,
WI 53212 |
8.29% |
Morgan
Stanley
1300
Thames Street, 7th Floor
Baltimore,
MD 21231 |
8.38% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
15.88% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
24.65% |
Nominee
Name/Address |
Percentage
Ownership |
JPMorgan
Securities LLC
P.O.
Box 183211
Columbus,
OH 43218 |
7.53% |
National
Financial Services LLC
P.O.
Box 673004
Dallas,
TX 75267-3004 |
29.99% |
Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc.
P.O.
Box 64930
Phoenix,
AZ 85082 |
52.55% |
NAME
OF FUND |
INVESTMENT
ADVISORY FEE |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund(1) |
0.17% |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
0.32% |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
0.40% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
0.25% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
0.39% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund(2) |
0.57% |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
0.25% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
0.32% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
0.42% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
0.09% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
0.12% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund |
0.18% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
0.46% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
0.47% |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
0.45% |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund(3) |
0.49% |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
0.37% |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
0.37% |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
0.47% |
NAME
OF FUND |
INVESTMENT
ADVISORY FEE |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
0.47% |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
0.47% |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
0.18% |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
0.18% |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
0.20% |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund(4) |
0.15% |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund(5) |
0.15% |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
0.37% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
0.12% |
NAME
OF FUND |
ADVISORY
FEES PAID |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$308,386 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$265,648 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$59,572 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$3,969,352 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$2,461,755 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$1,821,138 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$337,429 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$521,784 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$683,660 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund(1)
|
$257 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index Fund(1)
|
$679 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund(2)
|
$- |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$21,980,412 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$11,848,820 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$1,540,255 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$85,509 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$5,628,359 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$1,724,233 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$2,713,722 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$335,748 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$253,214 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$2,531,544 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$1,121,056 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
$212,604 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$630,609 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$119,227 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$1,060,642 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index Fund(1)
|
$6,638 |
NAME
OF FUND |
ADVISORY
FEES PAID |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$357,704 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$225,185 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$56,549 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$3,837,927 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$2,161,436 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$1,656,739 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$424,992 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$590,773 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$698,019 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
$9,585 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
$15,800 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund(1)
|
$4,309 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$33,544,536 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$12,080,810 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$1,804,239 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$209,506 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$5,972,446 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$1,484,915 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$2,582,906 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$287,883 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$354,718 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$3,426,960 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$1,350,627 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
$221,444 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$588,642 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$108,214 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$2,949,144 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
$50,966 |
NAME
OF FUND |
ADVISORY
FEES PAID |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$399,546 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$234,875 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$59,599 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$3,564,943 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$2,016,539 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$1,388,377 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$335,673 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$551,704 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$656,624 |
FlexShares®
ESG & Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
$28,256 |
FlexShares®
ESG & Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
$41,277 |
FlexShares®
ESG & Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund |
$8,066 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$33,743,024 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$10,896,769 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$1,435,405 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$118,048 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$5,758,194 |
NAME
OF FUND |
ADVISORY
FEES PAID |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$1,253,222 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$2,485,060 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$152,814 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$412,971 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$3,566,309 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$1,283,920 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
$163,535 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$547,702 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$73,984 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$4,010,051 |
FlexShares®
ESG & Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
$39,929 |
NAME
OF FUND |
ADVISORY
FEES
REIMBURSED |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$6,191 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$2,620 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$515 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$50,967 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$21,291 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$45,848 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$4,459 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$6,051 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$5,417 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
$927 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
$1,012 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund |
$173 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$322,945 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$90,757 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$14,271 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$98,833 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$55,150 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$12,200 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$62,037 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$1,348 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$3,318 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$74,099 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$24,059 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
$3,410 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$8,442 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$3,529 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$119,275 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
$1,263 |
NAME
OF FUND |
EXPENSE
REIMBURSEMENTS BY NTI |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$5,703 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$3,428 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$633 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$64,277 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$23,722 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$11,515 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$3,807 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$6,351 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$6,018 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund(1)
|
$2 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index Fund(1)
|
$5 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund(2)
|
$- |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$172,689 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$97,737 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$12,012 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$68,101 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$58,241 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$18,457 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$21,994 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$2,763 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$1,925 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$58,667 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$25,599 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
$4,646 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$12,828 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$2,326 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$9,242 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index Fund(1)
|
$57 |
NAME
OF FUND |
EXPENSE
REIMBURSEMENTS BY NTI |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$522 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$211 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$31 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$5,294 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$1,805 |
NAME
OF FUND |
EXPENSE
REIMBURSEMENTS BY NTI |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$1,044 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$1,790 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$569 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$494 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
$19 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
$38 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund(1)
|
$12 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$29,020 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$8,180 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$1,286 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$170,806 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$4,869 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$1,162 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$1,944 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$198 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$248 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$8,159 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$33,375 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
$382 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$828 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$144 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$3,238 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
$154 |
NAME
OF FUND |
EXPENSE
REIMBURSEMENTS BY NTI |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$6,191 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$2,620 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$515 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$50,967 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$21,291 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$45,848 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$4,459 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$6,051 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$5,417 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
$927 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
$1,012 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund |
$173 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$322,945 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$90,757 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$14,271 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$98,833 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$55,150 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$12,200 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$62,037 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$1,348 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$3,318 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$74,099 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$24,059 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
$3,410 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$8,442 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$3,529 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$119,275 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
$1,263 |
NAME
OF FUND |
BROKERAGE
COMMISSIONS |
AMOUNT
OF
TRANSACTIONS
INVOLVED |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$131.29 |
$8,416,958.72 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$4,404.94 |
$38,962,293.24 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$10,352.16 |
$21,946,725.20 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$2,904.59 |
$233,245,512.50 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$26,542.75 |
$284,742,022.34 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$110,316.08 |
$319,904,442.75 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$271.47 |
$12,826,770.17 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$220.37 |
$21,260,772.21 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$2,089.58 |
$43,717,160.93 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund(1)
|
$4.19 |
$87,816.94 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index Fund(1)
|
$129.29 |
$434,925.83 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund(2)
|
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$496,561.40 |
$2,328,504,391.11 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$50,778.30 |
$601,111,212.77 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$10,581.44 |
$137,433,586.64 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$3,006.65 |
$12,184,120.94 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$3,133.53 |
$207,078,584.00 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$558.37 |
$47,990,720.38 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$126,622.26 |
$619,147,884.04 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$14,637.22 |
$69,399,344.57 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$17,100.98 |
$68,927,275.99 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$24.78 |
$122,443.86 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index Fund(1)
|
- |
- |
NAME
OF FUND |
BROKERAGE
COMMISSIONS |
AMOUNT
OF
TRANSACTIONS
INVOLVED |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$970.75 |
$30,381,554.93 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$1,463.80 |
$20,123,751.63 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$7,341.64 |
$18,364,576.70 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$3,495.12 |
$205,672,422.71 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$8,552.53 |
$164,788,390.38 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$66,119.58 |
$229,521,112.94 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$341.92 |
$24,488,387.36 |
NAME
OF FUND |
BROKERAGE
COMMISSIONS |
AMOUNT
OF
TRANSACTIONS
INVOLVED |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$286.48 |
$18,103,417.05 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$3,541.29 |
$53,460,074.41 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
$102.34 |
$1,567,586.04 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
$383.91 |
$3,438,566.97 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund(1)
|
$2,879.95 |
$5,328,689.72 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$631,501.29 |
$2,769,097,102.15 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$55,222.78 |
$650,305,125.86 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$6,889.66 |
$145,911,663.06 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$836.81 |
$4,883,176.12 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$4,575.44 |
$247,341,981.02 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$1,978.02 |
$86,094,848.01 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$66,396.68 |
$418,430,081.54 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$9,950.53 |
$52,323,243.55 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$9,043.31 |
$54,708,197.30 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
- |
- |
NAME
OF FUND |
BROKERAGE
COMMISSIONS |
AMOUNT
OF
TRANSACTIONS
INVOLVED |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$1,506.81 |
$33,542,772.44 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$688.92 |
$19,842,818.26 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$14,350.82 |
$26,632,166.11 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$6,257.24 |
$198,074,014.23 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$6,159.62 |
$162,573,233.36 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$48,240.40 |
$191,893,117.48 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$644.67 |
$20,382,600.21 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$312.91 |
$21,765,547.14 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$930.32 |
$28,981,138.42 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
$239.25 |
$3,997,537.33 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
$419.69 |
$8,309,813.59 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund |
$566.25 |
$2,569,074.20 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
$2,332,016.85 |
$2,683,236,537.12 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
$35,693.09 |
$454,602,953.35 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$4,860.21 |
$97,922,458.90 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$1,215.31 |
$4,744,795.59 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$4,002.64 |
$210,726,411.31 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$975.47 |
$57,835,471.26 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$47,647.50 |
$348,066,168.68 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$10,488.43 |
$33,838,884.74 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
$19,445.31 |
$84,482,559.51 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
- |
- |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
- |
- |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
$60,074 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Barclays
Capital, Inc. |
E |
$2,000,186 |
BofA
Securities, Inc. |
E |
$6,000,000 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$12,429,365 |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$3,045,208 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$267,784 |
J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
$2,470,540 |
Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC |
E |
$749,559 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$885,182 |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$1,045,936 |
Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC |
E |
$635,255 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$502,778 |
J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
$3,927,611 |
Macquarie
Group Limited |
E |
$262,558 |
Societe
Generale |
E |
$92,530 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
BofA
Securities, Inc. |
E |
$369,893 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$276,667 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$141,179 |
J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
$521,614 |
Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC |
E |
$265,646 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Macquarie
Capital (USA) Inc. |
E |
$119,252 |
Societe
Generale |
E |
$102,990 |
UBS
Securities LLC |
E |
$335,351 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
BofA
Securities, Inc. |
E |
$8,000,000 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$63,795,983 |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$12,000,000 |
Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC |
E |
$12,000,000 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
BofA
Securities, Inc. |
E |
$2,000,000 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$21,144,363 |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$3,000,000 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
BofA
Securities, Inc. |
E |
$8,000,000 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$9,465,697 |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$3,000,000 |
Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC |
E |
$4,000,000 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
BofA
Securities, Inc. |
E |
$1,000,000 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$7,783,683 |
J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
$1,666,634 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$125,891 |
HSBC
Securities (USA) Inc. |
E |
$38,639 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
BNP
Paribas Securities Corp. |
E |
$466,364 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$695,880 |
UBS
Securities LLC |
E |
$567,872 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Barclays
Capital, Inc. |
E |
$1,754,111 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$7,965,458 |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$916,373 |
J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
$7,867,411 |
Truist
Securities, Inc. |
E |
$233,325 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$295,129 |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$133,818 |
J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
$129,701 |
Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC |
E |
$81,217 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Jane
Street Capital, LLC |
E |
$426,070 |
Jefferies
LLC |
E |
$2,913,014 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Barclays
Capital, Inc. |
E |
$314,592 |
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
E |
$650,219 |
Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC |
E |
$433,835 |
J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC |
E |
$527,450 |
Regular
Broker-Dealer |
Debt
(D)/Equity (E) |
Aggregate
Holdings
(000’s) |
Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC |
E |
$111,557 |
NAME
OF FUND |
PORTFOLIO
MANAGERS |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Volter Bagriy |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Volter Bagriy |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Yair Walny |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Alan Aung |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Volter Bagriy |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Volter Bagriy |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Yair Walny |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Steven Santiccoli |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Yair Walny |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Steven Santiccioli and Brendan Sullivan |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core Index
Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Alan Aung and Steven Santiccioli |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine and Alan Aung |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources Index
Fund |
Robert
Anstine and Brendan Sullivan |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine and Brendan Sullivan |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Volter Bagriy |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine and Brendan Sullivan |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Steven Santiccoli |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Yair Walny |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Alan Aung |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Steven Santiccoli |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund |
Robert
Anstine, Brendan Sullivan and Steven Santiccoli |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
David
M. Alongi and Michael R. Chico |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
David
M. Alongi and Michael R. Chico |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
David
M. Alongi, Michael R. Chico and
Kevin O’Shaughnessy |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
Benjamin
Gord and Chaitanya Mandavakuriti |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index Fund |
Benjamin
Gord and Chaitanya Mandavakuriti |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
Eric
R. Williams, Benjamin Gord and Chaitanya
Mandavakuriti |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate Core Index
Fund |
Mousumi
Chinara and Michael R.
Chico |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
3 |
$2,810,562,372 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
3 |
$136,053,367 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
19 |
$48,714,671,424 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
32 |
$19,152,612,611 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
21 |
$14,436,230,986 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
2 |
$2,075,044,536 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
3 |
$3,069,522,994 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
5 |
$70,271,885 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
4 |
$2,000,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
3 |
$2,100,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
8 |
$7,800,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
5 |
$1,311,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
3 |
$2,553,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
13 |
$30,531,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
6 |
$2,195,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
4 |
$2,832,579,741 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
10 |
$4,307,350,691 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
1 |
$211,075,909 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
27 |
$9,858,188,578 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
1 |
$24,675,495 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
5 |
$3,079,746,488 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
16 |
$25,604,746,450 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Other
Accounts: |
24 |
$14,671,553,162 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
3 |
$1,525,588,127 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
4 |
$1,673,310,282 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
1 |
$1,108,250,806 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
1 |
$73,269,742 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
1 |
$2,161,224,597 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
23 |
$58,902,684,175 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
33 |
$19,403,858,383 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
3 |
$240,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
3 |
$27,940,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
7 |
$947,800,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
5 |
$2,700,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
1 |
$4,000,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
3 |
$9,200,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
8 |
$1,530,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
3 |
$612,115,497 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
0 |
$0 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
3 |
$2,839,649,383 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
4 |
$1,667,375,375 |
0 |
$0 |
Type
of Accounts |
Total
# of
Accounts
Managed |
Total
Assets |
#
of Accounts
Managed
that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
Total
Assets that
Advisory
Fee
is
Based on
Performance |
FlexShares®
Trust: |
1 |
$1,200,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Registered Investment Companies: |
2 |
$2,400,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles: |
1 |
$214,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Other
Accounts: |
2 |
$474,000,000 |
0 |
$0 |
Shares
Beneficially Owned by |
|
Dollar
($) Range of
Shares
Beneficially
Owned
by Portfolio
Manager
Because of
Direct
or Indirect
Pecuniary
Interest |
David
M. Alongi |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$10,001-$50,000 |
Eric
R. Williams |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$50,001-$100,000 |
Fund |
Administration,
Custodian,
Transfer
Agency Expenses
Paid
During Fiscal Year
Ended
October 31, 2023 |
Administration,
Custodian,
Transfer
Agency
Expenses
Paid
During Fiscal Year
Ended
October 31, 2022 |
Administration,
Custodian,
Transfer
Agency
Expenses
Paid
During Fiscal Year
Ended
October 31, 2021 |
FlexShares®
US
Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$54,333 |
$73,481 |
$70,386 |
FlexShares®
Developed
Markets ex-US Quality Low
Volatility
Index Fund |
$46,478 |
$65,945 |
$77,066 |
FlexShares®
Emerging
Markets Quality Low Volatility
Index
Fund |
$41,791 |
$52,214 |
$53,705 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$480,678 |
$635,576 |
$703,959 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US
Factor
Tilt Index Fund |
$305,979 |
$413,057 |
$449,907 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt
Index
Fund |
$418,720 |
$499,376 |
$569,104 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$40,279 |
$60,701 |
$54,280 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$56,289 |
$88,272 |
$91,726 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$95,703 |
$122,029 |
$98,739 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index
Fund(1) |
$11,044 |
$19,310 |
$2,704 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US
Core
Index Fund(1) |
$28,465 |
$37,719 |
$9,083 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core
Index
Fund(2) |
$37,173 |
$36,075 |
- |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural
Resources
Index Fund |
$3,675,999 |
$4,677,024 |
$3,065,689 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index
Fund |
$903,965 |
$1,261,019 |
$1,333,613 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$106,914 |
$191,323 |
$176,067 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$6,171 |
$24,515 |
$18,728 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$442,026 |
$606,108 |
$622,158 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$95,563 |
$159,527 |
$201,311 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$337,060 |
$469,619 |
$488,543 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive
Index
Fund |
$52,566 |
$90,359 |
$101,822 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic
Index
Fund |
$77,966 |
$97,924 |
$81,926 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index
Fund |
$578,957 |
$721,032 |
$588,528 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index
Fund |
$218,668 |
$302,598 |
$273,320 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund |
$26,414 |
$58,221 |
$64,259 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index
Fund |
$78,188 |
$106,115 |
$125,997 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond
Index
Fund |
$16,910 |
$33,829 |
$36,931 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$271,051 |
$292,263 |
$116,363 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate
Core
Index Fund(1) |
$15,290 |
$32,294 |
$5,608 |
Fund |
Gross
income
from
securities
lending
activities |
Securities
lending
revenue
paid
to
securities
lending
agent
(“Revenue
Split”) |
Rebate
(paid to
borrower) |
Aggregate
fees/compensation
for
securities
lending
activities |
Net
income
from
securities
lending
activities |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$43,435 |
$3,942 |
$23,147 |
$0 |
$20,287 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low
Volatility
Index Fund |
$40,663 |
$2,232 |
$24,755 |
$0 |
$15,909 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low
Volatility
Index Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt
Index
Fund |
$9,965,584 |
$132,845 |
$9,085,362 |
$0 |
$880,222 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US
Factor
Tilt Index Fund |
$777,229 |
$62,480 |
$271,809 |
$0 |
$505,419 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor
Tilt
Index Fund |
$170,351 |
$15,235 |
$30,943 |
$0 |
$139,408 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$17,614 |
$2,065 |
$7,310 |
$0 |
$10,305 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$14,338 |
$1,759 |
$5,270 |
$0 |
$9,067 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$38,585 |
$2,996 |
$17,749 |
$0 |
$20,836 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core
Index
Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-
US
Core Index Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core
Index
Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural
Resources
Index Fund |
$11,962,632 |
$352,698 |
$9,189,493 |
$0 |
$2,772,139 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure
Index
Fund |
$2,532,004 |
$131,279 |
$1,503,457 |
$0 |
$1,028,547 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$189,707 |
$12,645 |
$118,852 |
$0 |
$70,855 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
Fund |
Gross
income
from
securities
lending
activities |
Securities
lending
revenue
paid
to
securities
lending
agent
(“Revenue
Split”) |
Rebate
(paid to
borrower) |
Aggregate
fees/compensation
for
securities
lending
activities |
Net
income
from
securities
lending
activities |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$6,479,426 |
$155,326 |
$5,198,496 |
$0 |
$1,280,929 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$864,646 |
$28,533 |
$618,008 |
$0 |
$246,638 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index
Fund |
$370,795 |
$33,786 |
$92,310 |
$0 |
$274,485 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive
Index
Fund |
$25,421 |
$1,978 |
$10,038 |
$0 |
$15,383 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic
Index
Fund |
$85,342 |
$5,541 |
$41,585 |
$0 |
$43,757 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS
Index
Fund |
$46,074 |
$4,636 |
$21,207 |
$0 |
$24,867 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration TIPS
Index
Fund |
$61,647 |
$6,935 |
$18,241 |
$0 |
$43,406 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index
Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond
Index
Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index
Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade
Corporate
Core Index Fund(1)
|
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
$0 |
Fund |
Closing
Time |
All
Funds (except as noted below) |
No
later than the closing time of the regular trading
session
of the Listing Exchange (normally
4:00
p.m., Eastern time) |
FlexShares® Disciplined
Duration MBS Index Fund |
No
later than 1:00 p.m., Eastern
time |
Fund |
Closing
Time |
FlexShares® Credit-Scored
US Corporate Bond Index
Fund
FlexShares® Credit-Scored
US Long Corporate Bond
Index
Fund
FlexShares® High
Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund
FlexShares® ESG &
Climate Investment Grade Corporate
Core
Index Fund |
No
later than 3:00 p.m., Eastern
time |
NAME
OF FUND |
Fee
for In-Kind and
Cash
Purchases |
Maximum
Additional
Variable
Charge for
Cash
Purchase* |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$350 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality
Low
Volatility Index Fund |
$2,250 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low
Volatility
Index Fund |
$4,000 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt
Index
Fund |
$1,500 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets
ex-US
Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$13,500 |
3.00% |
NAME
OF FUND |
Fee
for In-Kind and
Cash
Purchases |
Maximum
Additional
Variable
Charge for
Cash
Purchase* |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets
Factor
Tilt Index Fund |
$25,000 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$500 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index
Fund |
$350 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select
Index
Fund
|
$3,000 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap
Core
Index Fund |
$500 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed
Markets
ex-US Core Index Fund |
$4,500 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets
Core
Index Fund |
$6,000 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream
Natural
Resources Index Fund |
$1,500 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad
Infrastructure
Index Fund |
$2,000 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index
Fund |
$2,000 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$0 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$350 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index
Fund |
$350 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend
Index
Fund |
$3,500 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend
Defensive
Index Fund |
$3,500 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend
Dynamic
Index Fund |
$3,500 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration
TIPS
Index Fund |
$0 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration
TIPS
Index Fund |
$0 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index
Fund |
$400 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond
Index
Fund |
$250 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate
Bond
Index Fund |
$250 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond
Index
Fund |
$250 |
3.00% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade
Corporate
Core Index Fund |
$250 |
3.00% |
NAME
OF FUND |
Fee
for In-Kind and
Cash
Redemptions |
Maximum
Additional
Variable
Charge for
Cash
Redemption* |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$350 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality
Low
Volatility Index Fund |
$2,250 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low
Volatility
Index Fund |
$4,000 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt
Index
Fund |
$1,500 |
2.00% |
NAME
OF FUND |
Fee
for In-Kind and
Cash
Redemptions |
Maximum
Additional
Variable
Charge for
Cash
Redemption* |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets
ex-US
Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$13,500 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets
Factor
Tilt Index Fund |
$25,000 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$500 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index
Fund |
$350 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select
Index
Fund |
$3,000 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap
Core
Index Fund |
$500 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed
Markets
ex-US Core Index Fund |
$4,500 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets
Core
Index Fund |
$6,000 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream
Natural
Resources Index Fund |
$1,500 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad
Infrastructure
Index Fund |
$2,000 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index
Fund |
$2,000 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$0 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$350 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index
Fund |
$350 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend
Index
Fund |
$3,500 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend
Defensive
Index Fund |
$3,500 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend
Dynamic
Index Fund |
$3,500 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration
TIPS
Index Fund |
$0 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 5-Year Target Duration
TIPS
Index Fund |
$0 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Index
Fund |
$400 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond
Index
Fund |
$250 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate
Bond
Index Fund |
$250 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond
Index
Fund |
$250 |
2.00% |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade
Corporate
Core Index Fund |
$250 |
2.00% |
Fund |
Short-Term |
Long-Term |
Total |
FlexShares®
US Quality Low Volatility Index Fund |
$7,362,077 |
$3,522,962 |
$10,885,039 |
FlexShares®
Developed Markets ex-US Quality Low
Volatility
Index Fund |
$3,241,058 |
$1,909,114 |
$5,150,172 |
FlexShares®
Emerging Markets Quality Low Volatility Index
Fund |
$785,129 |
$589,333 |
$1,374,462 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund |
$32,585,524 |
$15,183,546 |
$47,769,070 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Developed Markets ex-US Factor
Tilt
Index Fund |
$28,949,295 |
$98,444,810 |
$127,394,105 |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Emerging Markets Factor Tilt Index
Fund |
$26,007,227 |
$52,199,866 |
$78,207,093 |
FlexShares®
US Quality Large Cap Index Fund |
$3,666,731 |
$3,900,599 |
$7,567,330 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
US ESG Select Index Fund |
$7,156,636 |
$279,916 |
$7,436,552 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global ESG Select Index Fund |
$7,080,589 |
$843,836 |
$7,924,425 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate US Large Cap Core Index Fund |
$290,150 |
$315,156 |
$605,306 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Developed Markets ex-US Core
Index
Fund |
$1,620,184 |
$569,465 |
$2,189,649 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Emerging Markets Core Index
Fund(1) |
$171,773 |
$58,389 |
$230,162 |
Fund |
Short-Term |
Long-Term |
Total |
FlexShares®
Morningstar Global Upstream Natural Resources
Index
Fund |
$385,239,809 |
$712,945,463 |
$1,098,185,272 |
FlexShares®
STOXX®
Global Broad Infrastructure Index
Fund |
$63,184,453 |
$167,771,864 |
$230,956,317 |
FlexShares®
Global Quality Real Estate Index Fund |
$44,579,447 |
$20,674,775 |
$65,254,222 |
FlexShares®
Real Assets Allocation Index Fund |
$108,379 |
$632,282 |
$740,661 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$99,572,290 |
$50,432,373 |
$150,004,663 |
FlexShares®
Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund |
$30,400,105 |
$8,288,179 |
$38,688,284 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Index Fund |
$123,079,184 |
$73,811,933 |
$196,891,117 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Defensive Index
Fund |
$18,194,421 |
$10,992,385 |
$29,186,806 |
FlexShares®
International Quality Dividend Dynamic Index
Fund |
$14,626,606 |
$9,459,668 |
$24,086,274 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx 3-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$117,222,701 |
$29,565,410 |
$146,788,111 |
FlexShares®
iBoxx
5-Year Target Duration TIPS Index Fund |
$19,478,364 |
$18,726,941 |
$38,205,305 |
FlexShares®
Disciplined Duration MBS Ready Index Fund |
$7,966,616 |
$6,411,813 |
$14,378,429 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Corporate Bond Index Fund |
$8,223,295 |
$18,382,608 |
$26,605,903 |
FlexShares®
Credit-Scored US Long Corporate Bond Index
Fund |
$3,219,212 |
$8,905,748 |
$12,124,960 |
FlexShares®
High Yield Value-Scored Bond Index Fund |
$78,144,414 |
$53,532,417 |
$131,676,831 |
FlexShares®
ESG
& Climate Investment Grade Corporate
Core
Index Fund |
$5,644,513 |
$2,404,823 |
$8,049,336 |
U N I T E D S T A T E S
TABLE OF CONTENTS
8 | ||||
9 | ||||
10 | ||||
10 | ||||
Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structures |
10 | |||
13 | ||||
13 | ||||
13 | ||||
Material Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Risk Oversight Failures |
14 | |||
14 | ||||
15 | ||||
15 | ||||
16 | ||||
16 | ||||
17 | ||||
19 | ||||
19 | ||||
19 | ||||
20 | ||||
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation |
20 | |||
21 | ||||
21 | ||||
21 | ||||
21 | ||||
22 | ||||
22 | ||||
22 | ||||
22 | ||||
23 | ||||
23 | ||||
23 | ||||
23 | ||||
24 | ||||
24 | ||||
24 | ||||
25 | ||||
25 | ||||
25 | ||||
26 | ||||
26 | ||||
26 | ||||
26 |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 2 of 98 |
27 | ||||
Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Management Proposals |
27 | |||
27 | ||||
28 | ||||
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions |
29 | |||
29 | ||||
29 | ||||
30 | ||||
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations |
30 | |||
31 | ||||
31 | ||||
31 | ||||
32 | ||||
32 | ||||
32 | ||||
32 | ||||
33 | ||||
33 | ||||
33 | ||||
33 | ||||
33 | ||||
34 | ||||
34 | ||||
Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Shareholder Proposals |
34 | |||
Shareholder Proposals to put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy |
34 | |||
35 | ||||
35 | ||||
35 | ||||
36 | ||||
36 | ||||
36 | ||||
36 | ||||
36 | ||||
37 | ||||
37 | ||||
37 | ||||
38 | ||||
38 | ||||
38 | ||||
39 | ||||
39 | ||||
39 | ||||
39 | ||||
39 |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 3 of 98 |
40 | ||||
41 | ||||
41 | ||||
41 | ||||
41 | ||||
42 | ||||
42 | ||||
42 | ||||
43 | ||||
43 | ||||
43 | ||||
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S |
43 | |||
44 | ||||
46 | ||||
46 | ||||
46 | ||||
46 | ||||
47 | ||||
47 | ||||
48 | ||||
48 | ||||
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals |
48 | |||
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay |
49 | |||
Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale |
50 | |||
50 | ||||
52 | ||||
52 | ||||
Pay-for-Performance Misalignment – Application to Equity Plans |
53 | |||
53 | ||||
53 | ||||
53 | ||||
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m)) |
53 | |||
54 | ||||
54 | ||||
55 | ||||
55 | ||||
56 | ||||
56 | ||||
56 | ||||
57 | ||||
57 | ||||
58 | ||||
58 | ||||
59 | ||||
59 | ||||
59 |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 4 of 98 |
60 | ||||
60 | ||||
60 | ||||
60 | ||||
60 | ||||
61 | ||||
61 | ||||
62 | ||||
62 | ||||
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals |
63 | |||
63 | ||||
63 | ||||
Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization |
63 | |||
63 | ||||
64 | ||||
64 | ||||
64 | ||||
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time |
64 | |||
65 | ||||
65 | ||||
65 | ||||
65 | ||||
66 | ||||
66 | ||||
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) – Proposals for Extensions |
67 | |||
67 | ||||
68 | ||||
68 | ||||
68 | ||||
68 | ||||
68 | ||||
Going Private/Dark Transactions (Leveraged buyouts and Minority Squeeze-outs) |
68 | |||
69 | ||||
69 | ||||
70 | ||||
70 | ||||
71 | ||||
71 | ||||
72 | ||||
72 | ||||
Report on the Distribution of Stock Options by Gender and Race |
72 | |||
72 |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 5 of 98 |
Report on Progress Towards Glass Ceiling Commission Recommendations |
73 | |||
Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity |
73 | |||
Report on/Eliminate Use of Racial Stereotypes in Advertising |
73 | |||
74 | ||||
74 | ||||
74 | ||||
75 | ||||
75 | ||||
76 | ||||
Report on the Impact of Health Pandemics on Company Operations |
76 | |||
76 | ||||
76 | ||||
77 | ||||
77 | ||||
78 | ||||
78 | ||||
78 | ||||
79 | ||||
79 | ||||
79 | ||||
80 | ||||
80 | ||||
80 | ||||
81 | ||||
81 | ||||
81 | ||||
82 | ||||
82 | ||||
82 | ||||
83 | ||||
83 | ||||
83 | ||||
Report on the Sustainability of Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFO) |
84 | |||
84 | ||||
84 | ||||
84 | ||||
85 | ||||
85 | ||||
85 | ||||
85 | ||||
85 | ||||
85 | ||||
Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients |
86 | |||
86 | ||||
87 |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 6 of 98 |
87 | ||||
87 | ||||
88 | ||||
88 | ||||
88 | ||||
88 | ||||
88 | ||||
89 | ||||
89 | ||||
89 | ||||
90 | ||||
90 | ||||
90 | ||||
91 | ||||
91 | ||||
Disclosure on Credit in Low- and Lower-middle-income countries (LMIC) or Forgive LMIC Debt |
91 | |||
91 | ||||
92 | ||||
92 | ||||
92 | ||||
92 | ||||
92 | ||||
93 | ||||
93 | ||||
93 | ||||
Closed End Funds-Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes |
93 | |||
93 | ||||
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Non-fundamental Restriction |
94 | |||
94 | ||||
94 | ||||
94 | ||||
94 | ||||
95 | ||||
95 | ||||
95 | ||||
95 | ||||
96 | ||||
96 | ||||
96 | ||||
Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval |
96 | |||
96 | ||||
96 |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 7 of 98 |
INTRODUCTION
ISS’ Social Advisory Services division recognizes that socially responsible investors have dual objectives: financial and social. Socially responsible investors invest for economic gain, as do all investors, but they also require that the companies in which they invest conduct their business in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.
These dual objectives carry through to socially responsible investors’ proxy voting activity once the security selection process is completed. In voting their shares, socially responsible institutional shareholders are concerned not only with sustainable economic returns to shareholders and good corporate governance but also with the ethical behavior of corporations and the social and environmental impact of their actions.
Social Advisory Services has, therefore, developed proxy voting guidelines that are consistent with the dual objectives of socially responsible shareholders. On matters of social and environmental import, the guidelines seek to reflect a broad consensus of the socially responsible investing community. Generally, we take as our frame of reference policies that have been developed by groups such as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church, Domini Social Investments, and other leading church shareholders and socially responsible mutual fund companies. Additionally, we incorporate the active ownership and investment philosophies of leading globally recognized initiatives such as the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI), the United Nations Global Compact, and environmental and social European Union Directives.
On matters of corporate governance, executive compensation, and corporate structure, Social Advisory Services guidelines are based on a commitment to create and preserve economic value and to advance principles of good corporate governance consistent with responsibilities to society as a whole.
The guidelines provide an overview of how Social Advisory Services recommends that its clients vote. We note that there may be cases in which the final vote recommendation on a particular company varies from the vote guideline due to the fact that we closely examine the merits of each proposal and consider relevant information and company-specific circumstances in arriving at our decisions. Where Social Advisory Services acts as voting agent for its clients, it follows each client’s voting policy, which may differ in some cases from the policies outlined in this document. Social Advisory Services updates its guidelines on an annual basis to take into account emerging issues and trends on environmental, social, and corporate governance topics, in addition to evolving market standards, regulatory changes, and client feedback.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 8 of 98 |
1. |
Board of Directors |
A corporation’s board of directors sits at the apogee of the corporate governance system. Though they normally delegate responsibility for the management of the business to the senior executives they select and oversee, directors bear ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the corporation’s business. The role of directors in publicly held corporations has undergone considerable change in recent years. Once derided as rubber stamps for management, directors of public corporations today are expected to serve as effective guardians of shareholders’ interests.
Voting on directors and board-related issues is the most important use of the shareholder franchise, not simply a routine proxy item. Although uncontested director elections do not present alternative nominees from whom to choose, a high percentage of opposition votes is an expression of shareholder dissatisfaction and should be sufficient to elicit a meaningful response from management.
The role and responsibilities of directors has increasingly been the subject of much discussion and debate, given the current economic climate and the difficulties many companies now face in their respective markets. Influential organizations, including the American Law Institute, the American Bar Association, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the Business Roundtable have issued reports and recommendations regarding the duties and accountability of corporate boards. Both mainstream and alternative media outlets have highlighted the numerous gaps within risk oversight of company boards and individual directors, and many institutional investors, in response, have capitalized on their rights as stakeholders to prompt changes. Corporations have taken notice, implementing many of the reforms championed by their shareholders.
Although differences of opinion remain, a fairly strong consensus has emerged on a number of key issues. It is widely agreed that the board’s most important responsibility is to ensure that the corporation is managed in the shareholders’ best long-term economic interest. This will often require boards to consider the impact of their actions on other constituencies, including employees, customers, local communities, and the environment.
∎ |
The board’s principal functions are widely agreed to consist of the following: |
∎ |
To select, evaluate, and if necessary, replace management, including the chief executive officer; |
∎ |
To review and approve major strategies and financial objectives; |
∎ |
To advise management on significant issues; |
∎ |
To assure that effective controls are in place to safeguard corporate assets, manage risk, and comply with the law; and |
∎ |
To nominate directors and otherwise ensure that the board functions effectively. |
Boards are expected to have a majority of directors independent of management. The independent directors are expected to organize much of the board’s work, even if the chief executive officer also serves as Chairman of the board. Key committees of the board are expected to be entirely independent of management. It is expected that boards will engage in critical self-evaluation of themselves and of individual members. Individual directors, in turn, are expected to devote significant amounts of time to their duties, to limit the number of directorships they accept, and to own a meaningful amount of stock in companies on whose boards they serve. Directors are ultimately responsible to the corporation’s shareholders. The most direct expression of this responsibility is the requirement that directors be elected to their positions by the shareholders. Shareholders are also asked to vote on a number of other matters regarding the role, structure, and composition of the board. Social Advisory Services classifies directors as either executive, non-independent non-executive, or independent directors.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 9 of 98 |
Uncontested Election of Directors
Four broad principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:
1. |
Board Accountability: Accountability refers to the promotion of transparency into a company’s governance practices and annual board elections and the provision to shareholders the ability to remove problematic directors and to vote on takeover defenses or other charter/bylaw amendments. These practices help reduce the opportunity for management entrenchment. |
2. |
Board Responsiveness: Directors should be responsive to shareholders, particularly in regard to shareholder proposals that receive a majority vote or management proposals that receive significant opposition and to tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered. Furthermore, shareholders should expect directors to devote sufficient time and resources to oversight of the company. |
3. |
Director Independence: Without independence from management, the board may be unwilling or unable to effectively set company strategy and scrutinize performance or executive compensation. |
4. |
Director Diversity/Competence: Companies should seek a diverse board of directors who can add value to the board through their specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives. |
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees1 considered on a case-by-case basis):
Board Accountability
Vote against or withhold from the entire board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) for the following:
Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structures
Classified Board Structure: The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant an against/withhold recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.
Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards: The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.
Director Performance Evaluation: The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to a classified board structure, supermajority vote requirements, a majority vote standard for director elections with no carve out for contested elections, inability for shareholders to call special meetings or act by written consent, a multi-class capital structure, and/or a non-shareholder approved poison pill.
1 A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question.
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Poison Pills: Generally vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case) if:
∎ |
The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature2; |
∎ |
The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or |
∎ |
The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders3. |
Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill2 (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:
∎ |
The disclosed rationale for the adoption; |
∎ |
The trigger; |
∎ |
The company’s market capitalization (including absolute level and sudden changes); |
∎ |
A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; and |
∎ |
Other factors as relevant. |
Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments: Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders. Considering the following factors:
∎ |
The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification; |
∎ |
Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment; |
∎ |
The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter; |
∎ |
The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions; |
∎ |
The company’s ownership structure; |
∎ |
The company’s existing governance provisions; |
∎ |
The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and |
∎ |
Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders. |
Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:
∎ |
Classified the board; |
∎ |
Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; |
∎ |
Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws; |
∎ |
Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or |
∎ |
Adopted another provision deemed egregious. |
2 If the short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, Social Advisory Services will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption.
3 Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient.
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Problematic Governance Structure: For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting4 of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights:
∎ |
Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; |
∎ |
A classified board structure; or |
∎ |
Other egregious provisions. |
A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.
Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.
Unequal Voting Rights: Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees1, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a common stock structure with unequal voting rights5.
Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:
∎ |
Newly-public companies6 with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public; |
∎ |
Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs; |
∎ |
Situations where the super-voting shares represent less than 5% of total voting power and therefore considered to be de minimis; or |
∎ |
The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained. |
Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions: Vote against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board, where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:
∎ |
The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot; |
∎ |
The board’s rationale for seeking ratification; |
∎ |
Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail; |
∎ |
Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request; |
∎ |
The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision; |
∎ |
The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings; |
∎ |
Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal; |
∎ |
The company’s ownership structure; and |
∎ |
Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals. |
Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals: Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the governance committee if:
4 Includes companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.
5 This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”).
6 Newly-public companies generally include companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.
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∎ |
The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis. |
Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Generally continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.
Problematic Audit-Related Practices
Vote against/withhold from the members of the audit committee if:
∎ |
The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive (see discussion under “Auditor Ratification); |
∎ |
The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or |
∎ |
There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm. |
Vote case-by-case on members of the audit committee and potentially the full board if:
∎ |
Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted. |
Problematic Compensation Practices
In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item, or, in egregious situations, vote against/withhold from members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:
∎ |
There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay-for-performance); |
∎ |
The company maintains significant problematic pay practices including options backdating, excessive perks and overly generous employment contracts etc.; |
∎ |
The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders; |
∎ |
The company reprices underwater options for stock, cash, or other consideration without prior shareholder approval, even if allowed in the firm’s equity plan; |
∎ |
The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or |
∎ |
The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions. |
Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.
Problematic Pledging of Company Stock
Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:
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∎ |
The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity; |
∎ |
The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume; |
∎ |
Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time; |
∎ |
Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and |
∎ |
Any other relevant factors. |
Material Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Risk Oversight Failures
Vote against/withhold from directors individually, committee members, or potentially the entire board, due to:
∎ |
Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight7, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately guard against or manage ESG risks; |
∎ |
A lack of sustainability reporting in the company’s public documents and/or website in conjunction with a failure to adequately manage or mitigate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks; |
∎ |
Failure to replace management as appropriate; or |
∎ |
Egregious actions related to the director(s)’ service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company. |
Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero
For companies that are significant GHG emitters8, through its operations or value chain, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where Social Advisory Services determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory.
For 2024, minimum steps needed to be considered to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory are (all minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with policy):
∎ |
The company has detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including: |
∎ |
Board governance measures; |
∎ |
Corporate strategy; |
∎ |
Risk management analyses; and |
∎ |
Metrics and targets. |
∎ |
The company has declared a Net Zero target by 2050 or sooner and the target includes scope 1, 2, and relevant scope 3 emissions. |
∎ |
The company has set a medium-term target for reducing its GHG emissions. |
Expectations about what constitutes “minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory” will increase over time.
7 Examples of failure of risk oversight include but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant environmental incidents including spills and pollution; large scale or repeat workplace fatalities or injuries; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock.
8 For 2024, companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.
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Board Responsiveness
Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:
∎ |
The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are: |
∎ |
Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote; |
∎ |
Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation; |
∎ |
The subject matter of the proposal; |
∎ |
The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings; |
∎ |
Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders; |
∎ |
The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and |
∎ |
Other factors as appropriate. |
∎ |
The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered; |
∎ |
At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote. |
Vote case-by-case on compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Say on Pay proposal if:
∎ |
The company’s previous say-on-pay received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast. Factors that will be considered are: |
∎ |
The company’s response, including: |
∎ |
Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated); |
∎ |
Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition; |
∎ |
Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns; |
∎ |
Other recent compensation actions taken by the company; |
∎ |
Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated; |
∎ |
The company’s ownership structure; and |
∎ |
Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness. |
∎ |
The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast. |
Director Independence
Vote against/withhold from the entire board if the full board is less than majority independent.
Vote against/withhold from non-independent directors (executive directors and non-independent non-executive directors per the Categorization of Directors) when:
∎ |
The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee; |
∎ |
The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or |
∎ |
The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee. |
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Composition
Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except nominees who served only part of the fiscal year9) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:
∎ |
Medical issues/illness; |
∎ |
Family emergencies; and |
∎ |
If the director’s total service was three meetings or fewer and the director missed only one meeting. |
In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.
If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.
Overboarded Directors: Vote against or withhold from individual directors who:
∎ |
Sit on more than five public company boards; or |
∎ |
Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own—withhold only at their outside boards10. |
Board Diversity
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from incumbent nominating committee members if:
∎ |
The board is not comprised of at least 40 percent underrepresented gender identities11; or |
∎ |
The board is not comprised of at least 20 percent racially or ethnically diverse directors. |
Vote against or withhold from other directors on a case-by-case basis.
9 Nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy.
10 Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Social Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.
11 Underrepresented gender identities include directors who identify as women or as non-binary.
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Classification of Directors – U.S.
1. |
Executive Director |
1.1. |
Current officeri of the company or one of its affiliatesii. |
2. |
Non-Independent Non-Executive Director |
Board Identification
2.1. |
Director identified as not independent by board. |
Controlling/Significant Shareholder
2.2. |
Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group). |
Current Employment at Company or Related Company
2.3. |
Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives). |
2.4. |
Officeri, former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company. |
Former Employment
2.5. |
Former CEO of the companyiii,iv. |
2.6. |
Former non-CEO officeri of the company or an affiliateii within the past five years. |
2.7. |
Former officeri of an acquired company within the past five yearsiv. |
2.8. |
Officeri of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years. |
2.9. |
Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be madev. |
Family Members
2.10. |
Immediate family membervi of a current or former officeri of the company or its affiliatesii within the last five years. |
2.11. |
Immediate family membervi of a current employee of company or its affiliatesii where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role). |
Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships
2.12. |
Director who (or whose immediate family membervi) currently provides professional servicesvii in excess of $10,000 per year to: the company, an affiliateii, or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; or who is (or whose immediate family membervi is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services. |
2.13. |
Director who (or whose immediate family membervi) currently has any material transactional relationshipviii with the company or its affiliatesii; or who is (or whose immediate family membervi is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationshipviii (excluding investments in the company through a private placement). |
2.14. |
Director who (or whose immediate family membervi) is a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowmentsviii from the company or its affiliatesii. |
Other Relationships
2.15. |
Party to a voting agreementix to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote. |
2.16. |
Has (or an immediate family membervi has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its compensation committeex. |
2.17. |
Founderxi of the company but not currently an employee. |
2.18. |
Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers. |
2.19. |
Any materialxii relationship with the company. |
3. |
Independent Director |
3.1. |
No materialxii connection to the company other than a board seat. |
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Footnotes:
i The definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes: the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will generally be classified as a Non-Independent Non-Executive Director under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation exceeding $10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Director.
ii “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. Social Advisory Services uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.
iii Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).
iv When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, Social Advisory Services will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.
v Social Advisory Services will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. Social Advisory Services will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.
vi “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.
vii Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include, but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; legal services; property management services; realtor services; lobbying services; executive search services; and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services; IT tech support services; educational services; and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of $10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.
viii A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity exceeding the greater of $200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of $1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NYSE listing standards. In the case of a company which follows neither of the preceding standards, Social Advisory Services will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).
ix Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as independent directors if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement
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does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders’ interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.
x Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on each other’s boards and at least one serves on the other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).
xi The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, Social Advisory Services may deem him or her an independent outsider.
xii For purposes of Social Advisory Services’ director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.
Board-Related Management Proposals
Classification/Declassification of the Board
Under a classified board structure only one class of directors would stand for election each year, and the directors in each class would generally serve three-year terms. Although staggered boards can provide continuity for companies at the board level, there are also a number of downsides to the structure. First, a classified board can also be used to entrench management and effectively preclude most takeover bids or proxy contests. Board classification forces dissidents and would-be acquirers to negotiate with the incumbent board, which has the authority to decide on offers without a shareholder vote. In addition, when a board is classified, it is difficult to remove individual members for either poor attendance or poor performance; shareholders would only have the chance to vote on a given director every third year when he or she comes up for election. The classified board structure can also limit shareholders’ ability to withhold votes from inside directors that sit on key board committee, or to withhold votes from an entire board slate to protest the lack of board diversity. According to ISS’ 2012 Board Practices study, the number of S&P 500 companies with classified boards has continued to fall. In 2015, only 17 percent of S&P 500 companies maintained staggered boards, compared to 25 percent in 2014, 30 percent in 2013, and 39 percent in 2010. While we recognize that there are some advantages to classified boards, based on the latest studies on classified boards, the fact that classified boards can make it more difficult for shareholders to remove individual directors, and the fact that classified boards can be used as an antitakeover device, Social Advisory Services recommends against the adoption of classified boards.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually. |
∎ |
Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board of directors. |
Majority Vote Threshold for Director Elections
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections.
Vote against if no carve-out for plurality in contested elections is included.
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Cumulative Voting
Most corporations provide that shareholders are entitled to cast one vote for each share owned. Under a cumulative voting scheme the shareholder is permitted to have one vote per share for each director to be elected. Shareholders are permitted to apportion those votes in any manner they wish among the director candidates. Shareholders have the opportunity to elect a minority representative to a board through cumulative voting, thereby ensuring representation for all sizes of shareholders. For example, if there is a company with a ten-member board and 500 shares outstanding—the total number of votes that may be cast is 5,000. In this case a shareholder with 51 shares (10.2 percent of the outstanding shares) would be guaranteed one board seat because all votes may be cast for one candidate.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulative voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting unless:
∎ |
The company has proxy access12, thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and |
∎ |
The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections. |
Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (insider voting power > 50%).
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals on director and officer indemnification, liability protection, and exculpation13.
Consider the stated rationale for the proposed change. Also consider, among other factors, the extent to which the proposal would:
∎ |
Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care. |
∎ |
Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of loyalty. |
∎ |
Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness. |
∎ |
Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to indemnify. |
Vote for those proposals providing such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if both of the following apply:
∎ |
If the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and |
∎ |
If only the individual’s legal expenses would be covered. |
12 A proxy access right that meets the recommended guidelines.
13 Indemnification: the condition of being secured against loss or damage.
Limited liability: a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff.
Exculpation: to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director or officer to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer.
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Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies
Shareholder ability to remove directors, with or without cause, is either prescribed by a state’s business corporation law, an individual company’s articles of incorporation, or its bylaws. Many companies have sought shareholder approval for charter or bylaw amendments that would prohibit the removal of directors except for cause, thus ensuring that directors would retain their directorship for their full-term unless found guilty of self-dealing. By requiring cause to be demonstrated through due process, management insulates the directors from removal even if a director has been performing poorly, not attending meetings, or not acting in the best interests of shareholders.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause. |
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Vote for proposals to restore shareholder ability to remove directors with or without cause. |
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Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies. |
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Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies. |
Board Size
Proposals which would allow management to increase or decrease the size of the board at its own discretion are often used by companies as a takeover defense. Social Advisory Services supports management proposals to fix the size of the board at a specific number, thus preventing management, when facing a proxy contest, from increasing the board size without shareholder approval. By increasing the size of the board, management can make it more difficult for dissidents to gain control of the board. Fixing the size of the board also prevents a reduction in the size of the board as a strategy to oust independent directors. Fixing board size also prevents management from increasing the number of directors in order to dilute the effects of cumulative voting.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for proposals that seek to fix the size of the board. |
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Vote case-by-case on proposals that seek to change the size or range of the board. |
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Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board outside of a specific range without shareholder approval. |
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on how reasonable the criteria are and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.
Board Refreshment
Board refreshment is best implemented through an ongoing program of individual director evaluations, conducted annually, to ensure the evolving needs of the board are met and to bring in fresh perspectives, skills, and diversity as needed.
Term/Tenure Limits
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals regarding director term/tenure limits, considering:
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The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit; |
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The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process; |
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Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures; |
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Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to non-independent directors; and |
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Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner. |
Age Limits
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.
Board-Related Shareholder Proposals/Initiatives
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access
Contested elections of directors frequently occur when a board candidate or slate runs for the purpose of seeking a significant change in corporate policy or control. Competing slates will be evaluated based upon the personal qualifications of the candidates, the economic impact of the policies that they advance, and their expressed and demonstrated commitment to the interests of all shareholders.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors:
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Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry; |
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Management’s track record; |
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Background to the proxy contest; |
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Qualifications of director nominees (both slates); |
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Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management; |
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Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); |
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Stock ownership positions; and |
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Impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment. |
In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).
Annual Election (Declassification) of the Board
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to repeal classified (staggered) boards and to elect all directors annually.
Vote against proposals to classify the board.
Majority Threshold Voting Shareholder Proposals
A majority vote standard requires that for directors to be elected (or re-elected) to serve on the company’s board they must receive support from holders of a majority of shares voted. Shareholders have expressed strong support for shareholder proposals on majority threshold voting. Social Advisory Services believes shareholders should have
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a greater voice in the election of directors and believes majority threshold voting represents a viable alternative to the plurality system in the U.S. Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for precatory and binding resolutions requesting that the board change the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.
Majority of Independent Directors
Social Advisory Services believes that a board independent from management is of vital importance to a company and its shareholders. Accordingly, Social Advisory Services will cast votes in a manner that shall encourage the independence of boards.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed threshold by Social Advisory Services’ definition of independence. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to strengthen the definition of independence for board directors. |
Establishment of Independent Committees
Most corporate governance experts agree that the key board committees (audit, compensation, and nominating/corporate governance) of a corporation should include only independent directors. The independence of key committees has been encouraged by regulation. Social Advisory Services believes that initiatives to increase the independent representation of these committees or to require that these committees be independent should be supported.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors.
Independent Board Chair
One of the principle functions of the board is to monitor and evaluate the performance of the CEO. The chairperson’s duty to oversee management is obviously compromised when he or she is required to monitor himself or herself. Generally Social Advisory Services recommends a vote for shareholder proposals that would require that the position of board chair be held by an individual with no materials ties to the company other than their board seat.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that would require the board chair to be independent of management.
Establishment of Board Committees
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee to address broad corporate policy topics or to provide a forum for ongoing dialogue on issues such as the environment, human or labor rights, shareholder relations, occupational health and safety etc. when the
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formation of such committees appears to be a potentially effective method of protecting or enhancing shareholder value. In evaluating such proposals, the following factors will be considered:
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Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
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Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
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Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
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Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and |
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The scope and structure of the proposal. |
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.
Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.
Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee candidate who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:
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The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers; |
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The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought; |
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The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and |
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The scope and structure of the proposal. |
Board Policy on Shareholder Engagement
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholders proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:
∎ |
Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board; |
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Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders; |
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The company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and |
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The company has an independent chairman or a lead director (according to Social Advisory Services’ definition). This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders. |
Proxy Access
Social Advisory Services supports proxy access as an important shareholder right, one that is complementary to other best-practice corporate governance features. However, in the absence of a uniform standard, proposals to enact proxy access may vary widely; as such, a case-by-case approach will be undertaken in evaluating these proposals.
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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:
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Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power; |
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Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group; |
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Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group; |
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Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board. |
Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access.
Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.
Board Refreshment
Term/Tenure Limits
Supporters of term limits argue that this requirement would bring new ideas and approaches to a board. However, we prefer to look at directors and their contributions to the board individually rather than impose a strict rule.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for the company to adopt director term/tenure limits, considering:
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The scope of the shareholder proposal; and |
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Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment. |
Age Limits
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.
CEO Succession Planning
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering at a minimum, the following factors:
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The reasonableness/scope of the request; and |
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The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process. |
Vote No Campaigns
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.
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2. |
Ratification of Auditors |
Annual election of the outside accountants is best practice standard. While it is recognized that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside accountants, we believe that outside accountants must ultimately be accountable to shareholders. A Blue Ribbon Commission report concluded that audit committees must improve their current level of oversight of independent accountants. Given the rash of accounting misdeeds that were not detected by audit panels or auditors, shareholder ratification is an essential step in restoring investor confidence. Shareholders should have the right to weigh in on the choice of the audit firm, and all companies should put ratification on the ballot of their annual meeting. Special consideration will be given when non-audit fees exceed audit fees, as high non-audit fees can compromise the independence of the auditor. Social Advisory Services will also monitor both auditor tenure and whether auditor ratification has been pulled from the ballot.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to ratify auditors, unless any of the following apply:
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The non-audit fees paid represent 25 percent or more of the total fees paid to the auditor; |
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An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; |
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There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position; or |
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Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. |
Auditor-Related Shareholder Proposals
Ratify Auditors/Ensure Auditor Independence
These shareholder proposals request that the board allow shareholders to ratify the company’s auditor at each annual meeting. Annual ratification of the outside accountants is standard practice. While it is recognized that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside accountants, we believe that outside accountants must ultimately be accountable to shareholders.
Given the rash of accounting irregularities that were not detected by audit panels or auditors, shareholder ratification is an essential step in restoring investor confidence. Social Advisory Services believes that shareholders should have the ability to ratify the auditor on an annual basis.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals to allow shareholders to vote on auditor ratification. |
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Vote for proposals that ask a company to adopt a policy on auditor independence. |
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Vote for proposals that seek to limit the non-audit services provided by the company’s auditor. |
Auditor Rotation
To minimize any conflict of interest that may rise between the company and its auditor, Social Advisory Services supports the rotation of auditors. Currently, SEC rules provide that partners should be rotated every five years. However, Social Advisory Services also believes that the long tenure of audit firms at U.S. companies can be problematic.
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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to rotate company’s auditor every five years or more. Social Advisory Services believes that proposing a rotation period less than five years is unreasonably restrictive and may negatively affect audit quality and service while increasing expense.
3. |
Takeover Defenses / Shareholder Rights |
Corporate takeover attempts come in various guises. Usually, a would-be acquirer makes a direct offer to the board of directors of a targeted corporation. The bidder may offer to purchase the company for cash and/or stock. If the board approves the offer, a friendly transaction is completed and presented to shareholders for approval. If, however, the board of directors rejects the bid, the acquirer can make a tender offer for the shares directly to the targeted corporation’s shareholders. Such offers are referred to as hostile tender bids.
Not wishing to wait until they are subjects of hostile takeover attempts, many corporations have adopted antitakeover measures designed to deter unfriendly bids or buy time. The most common defenses are the shareholders rights protection plan, also known as the poison pill, and charter amendments that create barriers to acceptance of hostile bids. In the U.S., poison pills do not require shareholder approval. However, shareholders must approve charter amendments, such as classified boards or supermajority vote requirements. In brief, the very existence of defensive measures can foreclose the possibility of tenders and hence, opportunities to premium prices for shareholders.
Anti-takeover statutes generally increase management’s potential for insulating itself and warding off hostile takeovers that may be beneficial to shareholders. While it may be true that some boards use such devices to obtain higher bids and to enhance shareholder value, it is more likely that such provisions are used to entrench management. The majority of historical evidence on individual corporate anti-takeover measures indicates that heavily insulated companies generally realize lower returns than those having managements that are more accountable to shareholders and the market. The evidence also suggests that when states adopt their own anti-takeover devices, or endorse those employed by firms, shareholder returns are harmed. Moreover, the body of evidence appears to indicate that companies in states with the strongest anti-takeover laws experience lower returns than they would absent such statutes.
Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Management Proposals
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)
Poison pills are corporate-sponsored financial devices that, when triggered by potential acquirers, do one or more of the following: 1) dilute the acquirer’s equity holdings in the target company; 2) dilute the acquirer’s voting interests in the target company; or 3) dilute the acquirer’s equity holdings in the post-merger company. Poison pills generally allow shareholders to purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company (flip-in pill) and/or the potential acquirer (flip-out pill) at a price far out of line with fair market value. Depending on the type of pill, the triggering event can either transfer wealth from the target company or dilute the equity holdings of current shareholders. Poison pills insulate management from the threat of a change in control and provide the target board with veto power over takeover bids. Because poison pills greatly alter the balance of power between shareholders and management, shareholders should be allowed to make their own evaluation of such plans.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:
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No lower than a 20 percent trigger, flip-in or flip-over provision; |
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A term of no more than three years; |
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No deadhand, slowhand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill; |
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Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill. |
In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments
The financial crisis has prompted widespread losses in certain industries. This has resulted in previously profitable companies considering the adoption of a poison pill and/or NOL protective amendment to protect their NOL tax assets, which may be lost upon an acquisition of 5 percent of a company’s shares.
When evaluating management proposals seeking to adopt NOL pills or protective amendments, the purpose behind the proposal, its terms, and the company’s existing governance structure should be taken into account to assess whether the structure actively promotes board entrenchment or adequately protects shareholder rights. While Social Advisory Services acknowledges the high estimated tax value of NOLs, which benefit shareholders, the ownership acquisition limitations contained in an NOL pill/protective amendment coupled with a company’s problematic governance structure could serve as an antitakeover device.
Given the fact that shareholders will want to ensure that such an amendment does not remain in effect permanently, Social Advisory Services will also closely review whether the pill/amendment contains a sunset provision or a commitment to cause the expiration of the NOL pill/protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOLs.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:
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The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5%); |
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The value of the NOLs; |
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Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs); |
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The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and |
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Any other factors that may be applicable. |
Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:
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∎ |
The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing five-percent holder); |
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The value of the NOLs; |
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Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL); |
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The company‘s existing governance structure including; board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; |
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Any other factors that may be applicable. |
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.
In addition, voting against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:
∎ |
The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot; |
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The board’s rationale for seeking ratification; |
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Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail; |
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Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request; |
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The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision; |
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The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings; |
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Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal; |
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The company’s ownership structure; and |
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Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals. |
Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirements
Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change at a company.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for proposals to reduce supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations. For companies with shareholder(s) who own a significant amount of company stock, vote case-by-case, taking into account: a) ownership structure; b) quorum requirements; and c) supermajority vote requirements. |
∎ |
Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations. |
Shareholder Ability to Call a Special Meeting
Most state corporation statutes allow shareholders to call a special meeting when they want to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly scheduled annual meetings. Sometimes this right applies only if a shareholder or a group of shareholders own a specified percentage of shares, with 10 percent being the most common. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.
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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account: a) shareholders’ current right to call special meetings; b) minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred); c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; d) investor ownership structure; and e) shareholder support of and management’s response to previous shareholder proposals. |
∎ |
Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings. |
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent
Consent solicitations allow shareholders to vote on and respond to shareholder and management proposals by mail without having to act at a physical meeting. A consent card is sent by mail for shareholder approval and only requires a signature for action. Some corporate bylaws require supermajority votes for consents while at others, standard annual meeting rules apply. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Generally vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to take action by written consent. |
∎ |
Vote for proposals to allow or facilitate shareholder action by written consent, taking into consideration: a) shareholders’ current right to act by written consent; b) consent threshold; c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; d) Investor ownership structure; and e) shareholder support of and management’s response to previous shareholder proposals. |
∎ |
Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions; a) an unfettered14 right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold; b) a majority vote standard in uncontested director elections; c) no non-shareholder-approved pill, and; d) an annually elected board. |
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations
In 2008, the Delaware courts handed down two decisions, which, read together, indicate a judicial move toward a narrower interpretation of companies’ advance notice bylaws. These recent court decisions have encouraged companies to take a closer look at their bylaw provisions to ensure that broad language does not provide loopholes for activist investors. Specifically, companies are including language designed to provide more detailed advance notice provisions and to ensure full disclosure of economic and voting interests in a shareholder’s notice of proposals, including derivatives and hedged positions.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory and shareholder review.
To be reasonable, the company’s deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year’s meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter
14 “Unfettered” means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.
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than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120 day window). The submittal window is the period under which shareholders must file their proposals/nominations prior to the deadline.
In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent’s economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.
Fair Price Provisions
Fair price provisions were originally designed to specifically defend against the most coercive of takeover devises, the two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer. In such a hostile takeover, the bidder offers cash for enough shares to gain control of the target. At the same time the acquirer states that once control has been obtained, the target’s remaining shares will be purchased with cash, cash and securities or only securities. Since the payment offered for the remaining stock is, by design less valuable than the original offer for the controlling shares, shareholders are forced to sell out early to maximize their value. Standard fair price provisions require that, absent board or shareholder approval of the acquisition, the bidder must pay the remaining shareholders the same price for their shares that brought control.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price. |
∎ |
Generally, vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares. |
Greenmail
Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of shares, the practice discriminates against most shareholders. This transferred cash, absent the greenmail payment, could be put to much better use for reinvestment in the company, payment of dividends, or to fund a public share repurchase program.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for proposals to adopt antigreenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments. |
∎ |
Review on a case-by-case basis antigreenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments. |
Confidential Voting
Confidential voting, or voting by secret ballot, is one of the key structural issues in the proxy system. It ensures that all votes are based on the merits of proposals and cast in the best interests of fiduciary clients and pension plan beneficiaries. In a confidential voting system, only vote tabulators and inspectors of election may examine individual proxies and ballots; management and shareholders are given only vote totals. In an open voting system, management can determine who has voted against its nominees or proposals and then re-solicit those votes before the final vote count. As a result, shareholders can be pressured to vote with management at companies with which they maintain, or would like to establish, a business relationship. Confidential voting also protects
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employee shareholders from retaliation. Shares held by employee stock ownership plans, for example, are important votes that are typically voted by employees.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to adopt confidential voting.
Control Share Acquisition Provisions
Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders. |
∎ |
Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions. |
∎ |
Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares. |
Control Share Cash-Out Provisions
Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to “cash-out” of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.
Disgorgement Provisions
Disgorgement provisions require an acquirer or potential acquirer of more than a certain percentage of a company’s stock to disgorge, or pay back, to the company any profits realized from the sale of that company’s stock purchased 24 months before achieving control status. All sales of company stock by the acquirer occurring within a certain period of time (between 18 months and 24 months) prior to the investor’s gaining control status are subject to these recapture-of-profits provisions.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.
State Takeover Statutes
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freezeout provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, antigreenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions).
Vote for opting into stakeholder protection statutes if they provide comprehensive protections for employees and community stakeholders. Social Advisory Services would be less supportive of takeover statutes that only serve to protect incumbent management from accountability to shareholders and which negatively influence shareholder value.
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Freeze-Out Provisions
Freeze-out provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions.
Reincorporation Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:
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Reasons for reincorporation; |
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Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; |
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Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state. |
Reincorporations into “tax havens” will be given special consideration.
While a firm’s country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, Social Advisory Services will generally apply U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on country of incorporation.
Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.
Vote for proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders.
Shareholder Litigation Rights
Federal Forum Selection Provisions
Federal forum selection provisions require that U.S. federal courts be the sole forum for shareholders to litigate claims arising under federal securities law.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify “the district courts of the United States” as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.
Vote against provisions that restrict the forum to a particular federal district court; unilateral adoption (without a shareholder vote) of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.
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Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters
Exclusive forum provisions in the charter or bylaws restrict shareholders’ ability to bring derivative lawsuits against the company, for claims arising out of state corporate law, to the courts of a particular state (generally the state of incorporation).
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the state of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.
For states other than Delaware, vote case-by-case on exclusive forum provisions, taking into consideration:
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The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision; |
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Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum; |
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The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and |
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Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections. |
Generally vote against provisions that specify a state other than the state of incorporation as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters, or that specify a particular local court within the state; unilateral adoption of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.
Fee Shifting
Fee-shifting provisions in the charter or bylaws require that a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation and its directors and officers.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against provisions that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).
Unilateral adoption of a fee-shifting provision will generally be considered an ongoing failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.
Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Shareholder Proposals
Shareholder Proposals to put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: (1) a shareholder approved poison pill in place; or(2) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:
∎ |
Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or |
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The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from |
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seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.
If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.
Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirements
Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments. |
∎ |
Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations. |
Remove Antitakeover Provisions
There are numerous antitakeover mechanisms available to corporations that can make takeovers prohibitively expensive for a bidder or at least guarantee that all shareholders are treated equally. The debate over antitakeover devices centers on whether these devices enhance or detract from shareholder value. One theory argues that a company’s board, when armed with these takeover protections, may use them as negotiating tools to obtain a higher premium for shareholders. The opposing view maintains that managements afforded such protection are more likely to become entrenched than to actively pursue the best interests of shareholders. Such takeover defenses also serve as obstacles to the normal functioning of the marketplace which, when operating efficiently, should replace incapable and poorly performing managements.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to remove antitakeover provisions.
Reimburse Proxy Solicitation Expenses
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.
Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:
∎ |
The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election; |
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One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected; |
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Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; |
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The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw. |
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Virtual Shareholder Meetings
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only15 meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.
Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:
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Scope and rationale of the proposal; and |
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Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices. |
4. |
Miscellaneous Governance Provisions |
Bundled Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Review on a case-by-case basis bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances where the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.
Adjourn Meeting
Companies may ask shareholders to adjourn a meeting in order to solicit more votes. Generally, shareholders already have enough information to make their vote decisions. Once their votes have been cast, there is no justification for spending more money to continue pressing shareholders for more votes.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal. |
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Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction. Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.” |
Changing Corporate Name
Proposals to change a company’s name are generally routine matters. Generally, the name change reflects a change in corporate direction or the result of a merger agreement.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for changing the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely affect shareholder value.
15 Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.
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Amend Quorum Requirements
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration:
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The new quorum threshold requested; |
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The rationale presented for the reduction; |
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The market capitalization of the company (size, inclusion in indices); |
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The company’s ownership structure; |
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Previous voter turnout or attempts to achieve quorum; |
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Any provisions or commitments to restore quorum to a majority of shares outstanding, should voter turnout improve sufficiently; and |
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Other factors as appropriate. |
In general, a quorum threshold kept as close to a majority of shares outstanding as is achievable is preferred.
Vote case-by-case on directors who unilaterally lower the quorum requirements below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration the factors listed above.
Amend Minor Bylaws
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).
Other Business
Other business proposals are routine items to allow shareholders to raise other issues and discuss them at the meeting. Only issues that may be legally discussed at meetings may be raised under this authority. However, shareholders cannot know the content of these issues so they are generally not supported.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against other business proposals.
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5. |
Capital Structure |
The equity in a corporate enterprise (that is, the residual value of the company’s assets after the payment of all debts) belongs to the shareholders. Equity securities may be employed, or manipulated, in a manner that will ultimately enhance or detract from shareholder value. As such, certain actions undertaken by management in relation to a company’s capital structure can be of considerable significance to shareholders. Changes in capitalization usually require shareholder approval or ratification.
Common Stock Authorization
State statutes and stock exchanges require shareholder approval for increases in the number of common shares. Corporations increase their supply of common stock for a variety of ordinary business purposes: raising new capital, funding stock compensation programs, business acquisitions, and implementation of stock splits or payment of stock dividends.
General Authorization Requests
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:
∎ |
If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares. |
∎ |
If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares. |
∎ |
If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage. |
∎ |
In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization. |
Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:
∎ |
The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes; |
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On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization; |
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The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or |
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The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval. |
However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:
∎ |
In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern; |
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The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or |
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A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios. |
For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.
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Specific Authorization Requests
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:
∎ |
twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and |
∎ |
the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above. |
Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Social Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.
Reverse Stock Splits
Reverse splits exchange multiple shares for a lesser amount to increase share price. Increasing share price is sometimes necessary to restore a company’s share price to a level that will allow it to be traded on the national stock exchanges. In addition, some brokerage houses have a policy of not monitoring or investing in very low priced shares. Reverse stock splits help maintain stock liquidity.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:
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The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or |
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The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Social Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:
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Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting; |
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Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing; |
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The company’s rationale; or |
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Other factors as applicable. |
Preferred Stock Authorization
Preferred stock is an equity security which has certain features similar to debt instruments, such as fixed dividend payments, seniority of claims to common stock, and in most cases no voting rights. The terms of blank check preferred stock give the board of directors the power to issue shares of preferred stock at their discretion—with
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voting rights, conversion, distribution and other rights to be determined by the board at time of issue. Blank check preferred stock can be used for sound corporate purposes but could be used as a device to thwart hostile takeovers without shareholder approval.
General Authorization Requests
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate services:
∎ |
If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares. |
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If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares. |
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If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage. |
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In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization. |
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If no preferred shares are currently issued and outstanding, vote against the request, unless the company discloses a specific use for the shares. |
Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:
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If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;16 |
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The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”); |
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The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they’re convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders; |
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The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares; |
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On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization; |
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The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or |
∎ |
The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval. |
However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:
∎ |
In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern; |
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The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or |
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A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios. |
16 To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan.
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For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.
Specific Authorization Requests
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:
∎ |
twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and |
∎ |
the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above. |
Blank Check Preferred Stock
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote against proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend distribution, and other rights (“blank check” preferred stock). |
∎ |
Vote against proposals to increase the number of blank check preferred stock authorized for issuance when no shares have been issued or reserved for a specific purpose. |
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Vote for proposals to create “declawed” blank check preferred stock (stock that cannot be used as a takeover defense). |
∎ |
Vote for requests to require shareholder approval for blank check authorizations. |
Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock
Stock that has a fixed per share value that is on its certificate is called par value stock. The purpose of par value stock is to establish the maximum responsibility of a stockholder in the event that a corporation becomes insolvent. Proposals to reduce par value come from certain state level requirements for regulated industries such as banks, and other legal requirements relating to the payment of dividends.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action. |
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Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value. |
Unequal Voting Rights/Dual Class Structure
Incumbent managers use unequal voting rights with the voting rights of their common shares superior to other shareholders in order to concentrate their power and insulate themselves from the wishes of the majority of shareholders. Dual class exchange offers involve a transfer of voting rights from one group of shareholders to another group of shareholders typically through the payment of a preferential dividend. A dual class recapitalization also establishes two classes of common stock with unequal voting rights, but initially involves an equal distribution of preferential and inferior voting shares to current shareholders.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:
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∎ |
The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, including: a) the company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or b) the new class of shares will be transitory; |
∎ |
The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; |
∎ |
The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder. |
Preemptive Rights
Preemptive rights permit shareholders to share proportionately in any new issues of stock of the same class. These rights guarantee existing shareholders the first opportunity to purchase shares of new issues of stock in the same class as their own and in the same proportion. The absence of these rights could cause stockholders’ interest in a company to be reduced by the sale of additional shares without their knowledge and at prices unfavorable to them. Preemptive rights, however, can make it difficult for corporations to issue large blocks of stock for general corporate purposes. Both corporations and shareholders benefit when corporations are able to arrange issues without preemptive rights that do not result in a substantial transfer of control.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to create or abolish preemptive rights. In evaluating proposals on preemptive rights, we look at the size of a company, the characteristics of its shareholder base and the liquidity of the stock.
Debt Restructurings
Proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt-restructuring plan will be analyzed considering the following issues:
∎ |
Dilution: How much will the ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be? |
∎ |
Change in Control: Will the transaction result in a change in control/management at the company? Are board and committee seats guaranteed? Do standstill provisions and voting agreements exist? Is veto power over certain corporate actions in place? |
∎ |
Financial Issues: company’s financial situation, degree of need for capital, use of proceeds, and effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital; |
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Terms of the offer: discount/premium in purchase price to investor including any fairness opinion, termination penalties and exit strategy; |
∎ |
Conflict of interest: arm’s length transactions and managerial incentives; |
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Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives. |
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Review on a case-by-case basis proposals regarding debt restructurings. |
∎ |
Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved. |
Share Repurchase Programs
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:
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∎ |
Greenmail, |
∎ |
The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics, |
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Threats to the company’s long-term viability, or |
∎ |
Other company-specific factors as warranted. |
Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.
Conversion of Securities
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities, taking into account the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.
Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.
Recapitalization
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account:
∎ |
Whether the capital structure is simplified; |
∎ |
Liquidity is enhanced; |
∎ |
Fairness of conversion terms; |
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Impact on voting power and dividends; |
∎ |
Reasons for the reclassification; |
∎ |
Conflicts of interest; |
∎ |
Other alternatives considered. |
Tracking Stock
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as:
∎ |
Adverse governance changes; |
∎ |
Excessive increases in authorized capital stock; |
∎ |
Unfair method of distribution; |
∎ |
Diminution of voting rights; |
∎ |
Adverse conversion features; |
∎ |
Negative impact on stock option plans; |
∎ |
Alternatives such as spin-offs. |
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 20 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.
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For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.
Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.
Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.
6. |
Executive and Director Compensation |
The global financial crisis resulted in significant erosion of shareholder value and highlighted the need for greater assurance that executive compensation is principally performance-based, fair, reasonable, and not designed in a manner that would incentivize excessive risk-taking by managements. The financial crisis raised questions about the role of pay incentives in influencing executive behavior and motivating inappropriate or excessive risk-taking that could threaten a corporation‘s long-term viability. The safety lapses that led to the disastrous explosions at BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig and Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine, and the resulting unprecedented losses in shareholder value; a) underscore the importance of incorporating meaningful economic incentives around social and environmental considerations in compensation program design, and b) exemplify the costly liabilities of failing to do so.
Evolving disclosure requirements have opened a wider window into compensation practices and processes, giving shareholders more opportunity and responsibility to ensure that pay is designed to create and sustain value. Companies in the U.S. are now required to evaluate and discuss potential risks arising from misguided or misaligned compensation programs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation (management “say on pay”), an advisory vote on the frequency of say on pay, as well as a shareholder advisory vote on golden parachute compensation. The advent of “say on pay” votes for shareholders in the U.S. has provided a new communication mechanism and impetus for constructive engagement between shareholders and managers/directors on pay issues.
The socially responsible investing community contends that corporations should be held accountable for their actions and decisions, including those around executive compensation. Social Advisory Services believes that executive pay programs should be fair, competitive, reasonable, and create appropriate incentives, and that pay for performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. Most investors expect corporations to adhere to certain best practice pay considerations in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs, including:
∎ |
Appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: executive pay practices must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. Evaluating appropriate alignment of pay incentives with shareholder value creation includes taking into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance, the mix between fixed and variable pay, equity-based plan costs, and performance goals - including goals tied to social and environmental considerations. |
∎ |
Avoiding arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: this includes assessing the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, guaranteed compensation, and practices or policies that fail to adequately mitigate against or address environmental, social and governance failures. |
∎ |
Independent and effective compensation committees: oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed) should be promoted. |
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Clear and comprehensive compensation disclosures: shareholders expect companies to provide informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly. |
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∎ |
Avoiding inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: compensation to outside directors should not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, this may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices. |
A non-exhaustive list of best pay practices includes:
∎ |
Employment contracts: Companies should enter into employment contracts under limited circumstances for a short time period (e.g., new executive hires for a three-year contract) for limited executives. The contracts should not have automatic renewal feature and should have a specified termination date. |
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Severance agreements: Severance provisions should not be so appealing that it becomes an incentive for the executive to be terminated. Severance provisions should exclude excise tax gross-up. The severance formula should be reasonable and not overly generous to the executive (e.g., severance multiples of 1X, 2X, or 3X and use pro-rated target/average historical bonus and not maximum bonus). Failure to renew employment contract, termination under questionable events, or poor performance should not be considered as appropriate reasons for severance payments. |
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Change-in-control payments: Change-in-control payments should only be made when there is a significant change in company ownership structure, and when there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties associated with the change in company ownership structure (“double-triggered”). Change-in-control provisions should exclude excise tax gross-up and eliminate the acceleration of vesting of equity awards upon a change in control unless provided under a double-trigger scenario. Similarly, change in control provisions in equity plans should be double-triggered. A change in control event should not result in an acceleration of vesting of all unvested stock options or removal of vesting/performance requirements on restricted stock/performance shares, unless there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties. |
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Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs): SERPS should not include sweeteners that can increase the SERP value significantly or even exponentially, such as additional years of service credited for pension calculation, inclusion of variable pay (e.g. bonuses and equity awards) into the formula. Pension formula should not include extraordinary annual bonuses paid close to retirement years, and should be based on the average, not the maximum level of compensation earned. |
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Deferred compensation: Above-market returns or guaranteed minimum returns should not be applied on deferred compensation. |
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Disclosure practices: The Compensation Discussion & Analysis should be written in plain English, with as little “legalese” as possible and formatted using section headers, bulleted lists, tables, and charts where possible to ease reader comprehension. Ultimately, the document should provide detail and rationale regarding compensation, strategy, pay mix, goals/metrics, challenges, competition and pay for performance linkage, etc. in a narrative fashion. |
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Responsible use of company stock: Companies should adopt policies that prohibit executives from speculating in company’s stock or using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps or other similar arrangements. Such behavior undermines the ultimate alignment with long-term shareholders’ interests. In addition, the policy should prohibit or discourage the use of company stock as collateral for margin loans, to avoid any potential sudden stock sales (required upon margin calls), that could have a negative impact on the company’s stock price. |
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Long-term focus: Executive compensation programs should be designed to support companies’ long-term strategic goals. A short-term focus on performance does not necessarily create sustainable shareholder value, since long-term goals may be sacrificed to achieve short-term expectations. Compensation programs embedding a long-term focus with respect to company goals better align with the long-term interests of shareholders. Granting stock options and restricted stock to executives that vest in five years do not necessarily provide a long-term focus, as executives can sell the company shares once they vest. However, requiring senior executives to hold company stock until they retire can encourage a long-term focus on company performance. |
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Criteria for Evaluating Executive Pay
Pay-for-Performance Evaluation
Social Advisory Services conducts a five-part pay analysis to evaluate the degree of alignment between the CEO’s pay with the company’s performance over a sustained period. From a shareholders’ perspective, performance is predominantly gauged by the company’s stock performance over time. Even when financial, non-financial or operational measures are utilized in incentive awards, the achievement related to these measures should ultimately translate into superior shareholder returns in the long-term. With respect to companies in the Russell 3000 or Russel 3000E Indices17, this analysis considers the following:
Pay-for-Performance Elements
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The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period,18 and the rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period |
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Absolute Alignment: The absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.19 |
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Equity Pay Mix: The ratio of the CEO’s performance- vs. time-based equity awards. |
Pay Equity (Quantum) Elements
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Multiple of Median: The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year. |
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Internal Pay Disparity: The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to other named executive officers (NEOs) – i.e., an excessive differential between CEO total pay and that of the next highest-paid NEO as well as CEO total pay relative to the average NEO pay. |
If the above pay-for-performance analysis demonstrates unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of non-Russell 3000 index companies, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, the following qualitative factors will be evaluated to determine how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:
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The ratio of performance-based compensation to overall compensation, including whether any relevant social or environmental factors are a component of performance-contingent pay elements; |
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The presence of significant environmental, social or governance (ESG) controversies that have the potential to pose material risks to the company and its shareholders; |
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Any downward discretion applied to executive compensation on the basis of a failure to achieve performance goals, including ESG performance objectives; |
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The completeness of disclosure and rigor of performance goals; |
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The company’s peer group benchmarking practices; |
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Actual results of financial/non-financial and operational metrics, such as growth in revenue, profit, cash flow, workplace safety, environmental performance, etc., both absolute and relative to peers; |
17 The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.
18 The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are closest to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry and also within a market cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s.
19 Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.
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Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards); |
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Realizable pay compared to grant pay; and |
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Any other factors deemed relevant. |
Problematic Pay Practices
Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:
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Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements; |
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Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and |
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Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements. |
The list of examples below highlights certain problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:
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Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options); |
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Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups); |
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New or materially amended agreements that provide for: |
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Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus); |
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CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition; |
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CIC excise tax gross-up entitlements (including “modified” gross-ups); |
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Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions; |
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Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits; |
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Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible; |
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Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason); |
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E&S Incentives: A lack of any LTI and STI performance metrics, incentives, and/or a lack of disclosure on LTI and STI performance metrics related to E&S criteria; and |
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Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors. |
The above examples are not an exhaustive list. Please refer to the U.S. Compensation Policies FAQ document for additional detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as problematic and may lead to negative vote recommendations.
Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking
Assess company policies and disclosure related to compensation that could incentivize excessive risk-taking, for example:
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Multi-year guaranteed bonuses; |
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A single or common performance metric used for short- and long-term plans; |
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Lucrative severance packages; |
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High pay opportunities relative to industry peers; |
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Disproportionate supplemental pensions; |
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Mega annual equity grants that provide unlimited upside with no downside risk. |
Factors that potentially mitigate the impact of risky incentives include rigorous claw-back provisions and robust stock ownership/holding guidelines.
Options Backdating
The following factors should be examined on a case-by-case basis to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud, as well as those instances in which companies that subsequently took corrective action. Cases where companies have committed fraud are considered most egregious.
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Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes; |
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Duration of options backdating; |
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Size of restatement due to options backdating; |
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Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; |
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Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future. |
Board Communications and Responsiveness
Consider the following factors case-by-case when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:
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Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or |
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Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account: |
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The company’s response, including: |
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Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated); |
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Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition; |
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Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns; |
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Other recent compensation actions taken by the company; |
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Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated; |
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The company’s ownership structure; and |
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Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness. |
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals
The Dodd-Frank Act mandates advisory votes on executive compensation (Say on Pay or “SOP”) for a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders that includes required SEC compensation disclosures. This non-binding shareholder vote on compensation must be included in a proxy or consent or authorization at least once every three years.
In general, the SOP ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices – dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against the SOP proposal rather than voting against or
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withhold from the compensation committee. However, if there is no SOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior SOP proposal, then Social Advisory Services will recommend a vote against or withhold votes from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then a vote against an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval may be appropriate. In evaluating SOP proposals, Social Advisory Services will also assess to what degree social and environmental considerations are incorporated into compensation programs and executive pay decision-making – to the extent that proxy statement Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosures permit.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a case-by-case basis.
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Vote against management Say on Pay proposals if: |
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There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay-for-performance); |
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The company maintains problematic pay practices; |
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The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders. |
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Vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if: |
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There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP is warranted due to pay-for-performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof; |
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The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast; |
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The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, including option repricing or option backdating; or |
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The situation is egregious. |
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Vote against an equity plan on the ballot if: |
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A pay for performance misalignment exists, and a significant portion of the CEO’s misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, taking into consideration: |
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Magnitude of pay misalignment; |
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Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and |
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The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer (NEO) level. |
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay
The Dodd-Frank Act, in addition to requiring advisory votes on compensation (SOP), requires that each proxy for the first annual or other meeting of the shareholders (that includes required SEC compensation disclosures) occurring after Jan. 21, 2011, include an advisory voting item to determine whether, going forward, the “say on pay” vote by shareholders to approve compensation should occur every one, two, or three years.
Social Advisory Services will recommend a vote for annual advisory votes on compensation. The SOP is at its essence a communication vehicle, and communication is most useful when it is received in a consistent and timely manner. Social Advisory Services supports an annual SOP vote for many of the same reasons it supports annual director elections rather than a classified board structure: because this provides the highest level of accountability and direct communication by enabling the MSOP vote to correspond to the majority of the information presented in the accompanying proxy statement for the applicable shareholders’ meeting. Having SOP votes every two or three years, covering all actions occurring between the votes, would make it difficult to create the meaningful and coherent communication that the votes are intended to provide. Under triennial elections, for example, a company would not know whether the shareholder vote references the compensation year being discussed or a previous year, making it more difficult to understand the implications of the vote.
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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.
Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale
This is a proxy item regarding specific advisory votes on “golden parachute” arrangements for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) that is required under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Social Advisory Services places particular focus on severance packages that provide inappropriate windfalls and cover certain tax liabilities of executives.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or extended arrangements.
Features that may result in an against recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):
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Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance; |
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Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards; |
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Excessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus); |
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Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable (as opposed to a provision to provide excise tax gross-ups); |
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Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or |
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Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or |
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The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote. |
Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.
In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s advisory vote on compensation (“management “say on pay”), Social Advisory Services will evaluate the “say on pay” proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.
Equity-Based Incentive Plans
As executive pay levels continue to soar, non-salary compensation remains one of the most sensitive and visible corporate governance issues. The financial crisis raised questions about the role of pay incentives in influencing executive behavior, including their appetite for risk-taking. Although shareholders may have little say about how much the CEO is paid in salary and bonus, they do have a major voice in approving stock incentive plans.
Stock-based plans can transfer significant amounts of wealth from shareholders to executives and directors and are among the most economically significant issues that shareholders are entitled to vote on. Rightly, the cost of these plans must be in line with the anticipated benefits to shareholders. Clearly, reasonable limits must be set on dilution as well as administrative authority. In addition, shareholders must consider the necessity of the various pay programs and examine the appropriateness of award types. Consequently, the pros and cons of these proposals necessitate a case-by-case evaluation.
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Factors that increase the cost (or have the potential to increase the cost) of plans to shareholders include: excessive dilution, options awarded at below-market discounts, permissive policies on pyramiding, restricted stock giveaways that reward tenure rather than results, sales of shares on concessionary terms, blank-check authority for administering committees, option repricing or option replacements, accelerated vesting of awards in the event of defined changes in corporate control, stand-alone stock appreciation rights, loans or other forms of assistance, or evidence of improvident award policies.
Positive plan features that can offset costly features include: plans with modest dilution potential (i.e. appreciably below double-digit levels), bars to pyramiding and related safeguards for investor interests. Also favorable are performance programs with a duration of two or more years, bonus schemes that pay off in non-dilutive, fully deductible cash, 401K and other thrift or profit sharing plans, and tax-favored employee stock purchase plans. In general, we believe that stock plans should afford incentives, not sure-fire, risk-free rewards.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on equity-based compensation plans20 depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “equity plan scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:
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Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both: |
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SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and |
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SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants. |
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Plan Features: |
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Automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control (CIC); |
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Discretionary vesting authority; |
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Liberal share recycling on various award types; |
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Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan; |
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Dividends payable prior to award vesting. |
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Grant Practices: |
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The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; |
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Vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (3-year look-back); |
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The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years); |
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The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions; |
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Whether the company maintains a claw-back policy; |
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Whether the company has established post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements. |
Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following apply:
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Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition; |
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The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies- or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies); |
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The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a pay-for-performance disconnect; |
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The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or |
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Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests. |
20 Proposals evaluated under the EPSC policy generally include those to approve or amend (1) stock option plans for employees and/or employees and directors, (2) restricted stock plans for employees and/or employees and directors, and (3) omnibus stock incentive plans for employees and/or employees and directors.
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Each of these factors is described below.
Generally vote against equity plans if the cost is unreasonable. For non-employee director plans, vote for the plan if certain factors are met.
FURTHER INFORMATION ON CERTAIN EPSC FACTORS:
Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)
The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors. SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types. See discussion of specific types of awards.
Except for proposals subject to Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company’s benchmark.21
Repricing Provisions
Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. “Repricing” includes the ability to do any of the following:
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Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs; |
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Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs. |
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The cancellation of underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or |
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Cash buyouts of underwater options. |
While the above cover most types of repricing, Social Advisory Services may view other provisions as akin to repricing depending on the facts and circumstances.
Also, vote against or withhold from members of the compensation committee who approved repricing (as defined above or otherwise determined by Social Advisory Services), without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.
Vote against plans if the company has a history of repricing without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.
21 For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company’s SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors.
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Pay-for-Performance Misalignment – Application to Equity Plans
If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for problematic pay practices, vote against the plan.
Social Advisory Services may recommend a vote against the equity plan if the plan is determined to be a vehicle for pay-for-performance misalignment. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:
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Severity of the pay-for-performance misalignment; |
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Whether problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or |
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Whether equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the other NEOs. |
Three-Year Value Adjusted Burn Rate
A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Value-Adjusted Burn Rate benchmarks will be calculated as the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.
The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate will be calculated as follows:
Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).
Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control
Generally vote against equity plans if the plan provides for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition could include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.
Other Compensation Plans
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))
Cash bonus plans can be an important part of an executive’s overall pay package, along with stock-based plans tied to long-term total shareholder returns. Over the long term, stock prices are an excellent indicator of management performance. However, other factors, such as economic conditions and investor reaction to the stock market in general and certain industries in particular, can greatly impact the company’s stock price. As a result, a cash bonus plan can effectively reward individual performance and the achievement of business unit objectives that are independent of short-term market share price fluctuations.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.
Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:
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Addresses administrative features only; or |
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Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent directors, per Social Advisory Services’ Categorization of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time after the company’s initial public offering (IPO), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below). |
Vote against such proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:
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Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per Social Advisory Services’ Categorization of Directors. |
Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes
Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:
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If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments may potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments. |
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If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments. |
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If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments are not deemed to potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown for informational purposes. |
In the first two case-by-case evaluation scenarios, the EPSC evaluation/score is the more heavily weighted consideration.
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs)
Employee stock purchase plans enable employees to become shareholders, which gives them a stake in the company’s growth. However, purchase plans are beneficial only when they are well balanced and in the best interests of all shareholders. From a shareholder’s perspective, plans with offering periods of 27 months or less are preferable. Plans with longer offering periods remove too much of the market risk and could give participants excessive discounts on their stock purchases that are not offered to other shareholders.
Qualified Plans
Qualified employee stock purchase plans qualify for favorable tax treatment under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code. Such plans must be broad-based, permitting all full-time employees to participate. Some companies also permit part-time staff to participate. Qualified ESPPs must be expensed under SFAS 123 unless the plan meets the following conditions; a) purchase discount is 5 percent or below; b) all employees can participate in the program; and 3) no look-back feature in the program. Therefore, some companies offer nonqualified ESPPs.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:
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Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value; |
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Offering period is 27 months or less; and |
∎ |
The number of shares allocated to the plan is ten percent or less of the outstanding shares. |
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Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where any of the following apply:
∎ |
Purchase price is less than 85 percent of fair market value; or |
∎ |
Offering period is greater than 27 months; or |
∎ |
The number of shares allocated to the plan is more than ten percent of the outstanding shares. |
Non-Qualified Plans
For nonqualified ESPPs, companies provide a match to employees’ contributions instead of a discount in stock price. Also, limits are placed on employees’ contributions. Some companies provide a maximum dollar value for the year and others specify the limits in terms of a percent of base salary, excluding bonus or commissions. For plans that do not qualify under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code, a plan participant will not recognize income by participating in the plan, but will recognize ordinary compensation income for federal income tax purposes at the time of the purchase.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:
∎ |
Broad-based participation (i.e., all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company); |
∎ |
Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary; |
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Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; |
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No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase since there is a company matching contribution. |
Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when any of the plan features do not meet the above criteria. If the company matching contribution exceeds 25 percent of employee’s contribution, evaluate the cost of the plan against its allowable cap.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is an employee benefit plan that makes the employees of a company also owners of stock in that company. The plans are designed to defer a portion of current employee income for retirement purposes.
The primary difference between ESOPs and other employee benefit plans is that ESOPs invest primarily in the securities of the employee’s company. In addition, an ESOP must be created for the benefit of non-management level employees and administered by a trust that cannot discriminate in favor of highly paid personnel.
Academic research of the performance of ESOPs in closely held companies found that ESOPs appear to increase overall sales, employment, and sales per employee over what would have been expected absent an ESOP. Studies have also found that companies with an ESOP are also more likely to still be in business several years later, and are more likely to have other retirement oriented benefit plans than comparable non-ESOP companies.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).
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Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:
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Historic trading patterns – the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term; |
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Rationale for the re-pricing – was the stock price decline beyond management’s control? |
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Is this a value-for-value exchange? |
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Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve? |
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Option vesting – does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period? |
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Term of the option – the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option; |
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Exercise price – should be set at fair market or a premium to market; |
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Participants – executive officers and directors should be excluded. |
If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company’s total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.
In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing. Repricing after a recent decline in stock price triggers additional scrutiny and a potential vote against the proposal. At a minimum, the decline should not have happened within the past year. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.
Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.
Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock. |
∎ |
Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange. |
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Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, Social Advisory Services will not make any adjustments to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation. |
Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
One-time Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.
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Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:
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Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating; |
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Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; |
∎ |
There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants. |
Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management’s control. A review of the company’s historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term.
Ongoing TSO program: Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the ongoing TSO program, structure and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited, to the following:
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Eligibility; |
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Vesting; |
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Bid-price; |
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Term of options; |
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Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and |
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Option repricing policy. |
Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.
401(k) Employee Benefit Plans
The 401(k) plan is one of the most popular employee benefit plans among U.S. companies. A 401(k) plan is any qualified plan under Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code that contains a cash or deferred arrangement. In its simplest form, an employee can elect to have a portion of his salary invested in a 401(k) plan before any income taxes are assessed. The money can only be withdrawn before retirement under penalty. However, because the money contributed to the plan is withdrawn before taxes (reducing the employee’s income tax), a properly planned 401(k) plan will enable an employee to make larger contributions to a 401(k) plan than to a savings plan, and still take the same amount home.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.
Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote on a case-by-case basis on proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes. An acceptable parachute should include, but is not limited to, the following:
∎ |
The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management; |
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The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable W-2 compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs; |
∎ |
Change-in-control payments should be double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure. |
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Director Compensation
The board’s legal charge of fulfilling its fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care is put to the ultimate test through the task of the board setting its own compensation. Directors themselves oversee the process for evaluating board performance and establishing pay packages for board members.
Shareholders provide limited oversight of directors by electing individuals who are primarily selected by the board, or a board nominating committee, and by voting on stock-based plans for directors designed by the board compensation committee. Additionally, shareholders may submit and vote on their own resolutions seeking to limit or restructure director pay. While the cost of compensating non-employee directors is small in absolute terms, compared to the cost of compensating executives, it is still a critical aspect of a company’s overall corporate governance structure.
Overall, director pay levels are rising in part because of the new forms of pay in use at many companies, as well as because of the increased responsibilities arising from the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements. In addition to an annual retainer fee, many companies also pay fees for attending board and committee meetings, fees for chairing a committee, or a retainer fee for chairing a committee.
Director compensation packages should be designed to provide value to directors for their contribution. Given that many directors are high-level executives whose personal income levels are generally high, cash compensation may hold little appeal. Stock-based incentives on the other hand reinforce the directors’ role of protecting and enhancing shareholder value. The stock-based component of director compensation should be large enough to ensure that when faced with a situation in which the interests of shareholders and management differ, the board will have a financial incentive to think as a shareholder. Additionally, many companies have instituted equity ownership programs for directors. Social Advisory Services recommends that directors receive stock grants equal to three times of their annual retainer, as it is a reasonable starting point for companies of all sizes and industries. A vesting schedule for director grants helps directors to meet the stock ownership guidelines and maintains their long-term interests in the firm.
Director compensation packages should also be designed to attract and retain competent directors who are willing to risk becoming a defendant in a lawsuit and suffer potentially adverse publicity if the company runs into financial difficulties or is mismanaged.
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:
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If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and |
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An assessment of the following qualitative factors: |
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The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile; |
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The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation; |
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Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements; |
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Equity award vesting schedules; |
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The mix of cash and equity-based compensation; |
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Meaningful limits on director compensation; |
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The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and |
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The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation. |
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Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors
Stock-based plans may take on a variety of forms including: grants of stock or options, including: discretionary grants, formula based grants, and one-time awards; stock-based awards in lieu of all or some portion of the cash retainer and/or other fees; and deferred stock plans allowing payment of retainer and/or meeting fees to be taken in stock, the payment of which is postponed to some future time, typically retirement or termination of directorship.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:
∎ |
The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; |
∎ |
The company’s three year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; and |
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The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk). |
On occasion, director stock plans that set aside a relatively small number of shares will exceed the plan cost or burn rate benchmark when combined with employee or executive stock compensation plans. In such cases, vote for the plan if all of the following qualitative factors in the board’s compensation are met and disclosed in the proxy statement:
∎ |
The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile; |
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The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation; |
∎ |
Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirement; |
∎ |
Equity award vesting schedules; |
∎ |
The mix of cash and equity-based compensation; |
∎ |
Meaningful limits on director compensation; |
∎ |
The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; |
∎ |
The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation. |
Outside Director Stock Awards/Options in Lieu of Cash
These proposals seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash. By doing this, a director’s interest may be more closely aligned with those of shareholders.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals that seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash.
Director Retirement Plans
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors. |
∎ |
Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors. |
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Shareholder Proposals on Compensation
Increase Disclosure of Executive Compensation
The SEC requires that companies disclose, in their proxy statements, the salaries of the top five corporate executives (who make at least $100,000 a year). Companies also disclose their compensation practices and details of their stock-based compensation plans. While this level of disclosure is helpful, it does not always provide a comprehensive picture of the company’s compensation practices. For shareholders to make informed decisions on compensation levels, they need to have clear, concise information at their disposal. Increased disclosure will help ensure that management: (1) has legitimate reasons for setting specific pay levels; and (2) is held accountable for its actions.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking increased disclosure on executive compensation issues including the preparation of a formal report on executive compensation practices and policies.
Limit Executive Compensation
Proposals that seek to limit executive or director compensation usually focus on the absolute dollar figure of the compensation or focus on the ratio of compensation between the executives and the average worker of a specific company. Proponents argue that the exponential growth of executive salaries is not in the best interests of shareholders, especially when that pay is exorbitant when compared to the compensation of other workers.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for proposals to prepare reports seeking to compare the wages of a company’s lowest paid worker to the highest paid workers. |
∎ |
Vote case-by-case on proposals that seek to establish a fixed ratio between the company’s lowest paid workers and the highest paid workers. |
Stock Ownership Requirements
Corporate directors should own some amount of stock of the companies on which they serve as board members. Stock ownership is a simple method to align the interests of directors with company shareholders. Nevertheless, many highly qualified individuals such as academics and clergy who can offer valuable perspectives in boardrooms may be unable to purchase individual shares of stock. In such a circumstance, the preferred solution is to look at the board nominees individually and take stock ownership into consideration when voting on the merits of each candidate.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.
Prohibit/Require Shareholder Approval for Option Repricing
Repricing involves the reduction of the original exercise price of a stock option after the fall in share price. Social Advisory Services does not support repricing since it undermines the incentive purpose of the plan. The use of options as an incentive means that employees must bear the same risks as shareholders in holding these options. Shareholder resolutions calling on companies to abandon the practice of repricing or to submit repricings to a shareholder vote will be supported.
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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to limit repricing. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to have option repricings submitted for shareholder ratification. |
Severance Agreements/Golden Parachutes
Golden parachutes are designed to protect the employees of a corporation in the event of a change in control. With Golden Parachutes senior level management employees receive a payout during a change in control at usually two to three times base salary.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requiring that executive severance (including change-in-control related) arrangements or payments be submitted for shareholder ratification.
Factors that will be considered include, but are not limited to:
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The company’s severance or change-in-control agreements in place, and the presence of problematic features (such as excessive severance entitlements, single triggers, excise tax gross-ups, etc.); |
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Any existing limits on cash severance payouts or policies which require shareholder ratification of severance payments exceeding a certain level; |
∎ |
Any recent severance-related controversies; and |
∎ |
Whether the proposal is overly prescriptive, such as requiring shareholder approval of severance that does not exceed market norms. |
Cash Balance Plans
A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that treats an earned retirement benefit as if it was a credit from a defined contribution plan, but which provides a stated benefit at the end of its term. Because employer contributions to these plans are credited evenly over the life of a plan, and not based on a seniority formula they may reduce payouts to long-term employees who are currently vested in plans.
Cash-balance pension conversions have undergone congressional and federal agency scrutiny following high-profile EEOC complaints on age discrimination and employee anger at companies like IBM. While significant change is unlikely in the short-tm, business interests were concerned enough that the National Association of Manufacturers and other business lobbies formed a Capitol Hill coalition to preserve the essential features of the plans and to overturn an IRS ruling. Driving the push behind conversions from traditional pension plans to cash-balance plans are the substantial savings that companies generate in the process. Critics point out that these savings are gained at the expense of the most senior employees. Resolutions call on corporate boards to establish a committee of outside directors to prepare a report to shareholders on the potential impact of pension-related proposals now being considered by national policymakers in reaction to the controversy spawned by the plans.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals calling for non-discrimination in retirement benefits. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking a company to give employees the option of electing to participate in either a cash balance plan or in a defined benefit plan. |
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Performance-Based Equity Awards
Social Advisory Services supports compensating executives at a reasonable rate and believes that executive compensation should be strongly correlated to performance. Social Advisory Services supports equity awards that provide challenging performance objectives and serve to motivate executives to superior performance and as performance-contingent stock options as a significant component of compensation.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposal requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:
∎ |
First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards. |
∎ |
Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test. |
In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.
Pay for Superior Performance
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals based on a case-by-case analysis that requests the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation plan for senior executives. The proposal has the following principles:
∎ |
Sets compensation targets for the Plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median; |
∎ |
Delivers a majority of the Plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards; |
∎ |
Provides the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and non-financial performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan; |
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Establishes performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies; |
∎ |
Limits payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance. |
Consider the following factors in evaluating this proposal:
∎ |
What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven? |
∎ |
If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group? |
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Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure? |
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What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to? |
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally, vote for shareholder proposals that call for non-binding shareholder ratification of the compensation of the Named Executive Officers and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the Summary Compensation Table.
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).
Vote on a case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment, and eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity. The following factors will be taken into regarding this policy:
∎ |
The company’s current treatment of equity in change-of-control situations (i.e. is it double triggered, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares; |
∎ |
Current employment agreements, including potential problematic pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements. |
Tax Gross-up Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.
Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s) and fees paid.
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.
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Recoup Bonuses
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote on a case-by-case on proposals to recoup unearned incentive bonuses or other incentive payments made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned later turn out to have been in error. This is line with the clawback provision in the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. The following will be taken into consideration:
∎ |
If the company has adopted a formal recoupment bonus policy; |
∎ |
If the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems; |
∎ |
If the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent. |
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use of company stock will be considered.
Bonus Banking
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:
∎ |
The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation; |
∎ |
Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and |
∎ |
Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place. |
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans. The following factors will be taken into account:
∎ |
The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained; |
∎ |
The time period required to retain the shares; |
∎ |
Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements; |
∎ |
Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives; |
∎ |
Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and |
∎ |
Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus long-term focus. |
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Non-Deductible Compensation
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure of the extent to which the company paid non-deductible compensation to senior executives due to Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), while considering the company’s existing disclosure practices.
Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the addition of certain safeguards in prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives. Safeguards may include:
∎ |
Adoption, amendment, or termination of a 10b5-1 Plan must be disclosed in a Form 8-K; |
∎ |
Amendment or early termination of a 10b5-1 Plan allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board; |
∎ |
Request that a certain number of days that must elapse between adoption or amendment of a 10b5-1 Plan and initial trading under the plan; |
∎ |
Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a 10b5-1 Plan; |
∎ |
An executive may not trade in company stock outside the 10b5-1 Plan; |
∎ |
Trades under a 10b5-1 Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive. |
7. |
Mergers and Corporate Restructurings |
A merger occurs when one corporation is absorbed into another and ceases to exist. The surviving company gains all the rights, privileges, powers, duties, obligations and liabilities of the merged corporation. The shareholders of the absorbed company receive stock or securities of the surviving company or other consideration as provided by the plan of merger. Mergers, consolidations, share exchanges, and sale of assets are friendly in nature, which is to say that both sides have agreed to the combination or acquisition of assets.
Shareholder approval for an acquiring company is generally not required under state law or stock exchange regulations unless the acquisition is in the form of a stock transaction which would result in the issue of 20 percent or more of the acquirer’s outstanding shares or voting power, or unless the two entities involved require that shareholders approve the deal. Under most state laws, however, a target company must submit merger agreements to a shareholder vote. Shareholder approval is required in the formation of a consolidated corporation.
Mergers and Acquisitions
M&A analyses are inherently a balance of competing factors. Bright line rules are difficult if not impossible to apply to a world where every deal is different. Ultimately, the question for shareholders (both of the acquirer and the target) is the following: Is the valuation fair? Shareholders of the acquirer may be concerned that the deal values the target too highly. Shareholders of the target may be concerned that the deal undervalues their interests.
Vote recommendation will be based on primarily an analysis of shareholder value, which itself can be affected by ancillary factors such as the negotiation process. The importance of other factors, including corporate governance and social and environmental considerations however, should not fail to be recognized.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on mergers and acquisitions are considered on a case-by-case basis. A review and evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction is conducted, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:
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Valuation: Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction and strategic rationale; |
∎ |
Market reaction: How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal; |
∎ |
Strategic rationale: Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions; |
∎ |
Negotiations and process: Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable? |
∎ |
Conflicts of interest: Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? |
∎ |
Governance: Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? |
∎ |
Stakeholder impact: Impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc. |
Corporate Reorganization/Restructuring Plans (Bankruptcy)
The recent financial crisis has placed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations as a potential alternative for distressed companies. While the number of bankruptcies has risen over the past year as evidenced by many firms, including General Motors and Lehman Brothers, the prevalence of these reorganizations can vary year over year due to, among other things, market conditions and a company’s ability to sustain its operations. Additionally, the amount of time that lapses between a particular company’s entrance into Chapter 11 and its submission of a plan of reorganization varies significantly depending on the complexity, timing, and jurisdiction of the particular case. These plans are often put to a vote of shareholders (in addition to other interested parties), as required by the Bankruptcy Code.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:
∎ |
Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company; |
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Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company; |
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Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an official equity committee); |
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The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s); |
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Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; |
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Governance of the reorganized company. |
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:
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Valuation: Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity. |
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Market reaction: How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price. |
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Deal timing: A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date. |
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Negotiations and process: What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors. |
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Conflicts of interest: How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 percent of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24 month timeframe. |
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Voting agreements: Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights? |
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Governance: What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger? |
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Stakeholder Impact: Impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc. |
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) – Proposals for Extensions
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC extension proposals taking into account the length of the requested extension, the status of any pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process, any added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders, and any prior extension requests.
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Length of request: Typically, extension requests range from two to six months, depending on the progression of the SPAC’s acquistion process. |
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Pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process: Sometimes an intial business combination was already put to a shareholder vote, but, for varying reasons, the transaction could not be consummated by the termination date and the SPAC is requesting an extension. Other times, the SPAC has entered into a definitive transaction agreement, but needs additional time to consummate or hold the shareholder meeting. |
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Added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders: Sometimes the SPAC sponsor (or other insiders) will contribute, typically as a loan to the company, additional funds that will be added to the redemption value of each public share as long as such shares are not redeemed in connection with the extension request. The purpose of the “equity kicker” is to incentivize shareholders to hold their shares through the end of the requested extension or until the time the transaction is put to a shareholder vote, rather than electing redeemption at the extension proposal meeting. |
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Prior extension requests: Some SPACs request additional time beyond the extension period sought in prior extension requests. |
Spin-offs
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on spin-offs should be considered on a case-by-case basis depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, valuation of spinoff, fairness opinion, benefits to the parent company, conflicts of interest, managerial incentives, corporate governance changes, changes in the capital structure.
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Asset Purchases
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on asset purchase proposals should be made on a case-by-case after considering the purchase price, fairness opinion, financial and strategic benefits, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives for the business, non-completion risk.
Asset Sales
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on asset sales should be made on a case-by-case basis after considering the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, potential elimination of diseconomies, anticipated financial and operating benefits, anticipated use of funds, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, and conflicts of interest.
Liquidations
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on liquidations should be made on a case-by-case basis after reviewing management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation. Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.
Joint Ventures
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account percentage of assets/business contributed, percentage ownership, financial and strategic benefits, governance structure, conflicts of interest, other alternatives and non-completion risk.
Appraisal Rights
Rights of appraisal provide shareholders who do not approve of the terms of certain corporate transactions the right to demand a judicial review in order to determine the fair value for their shares. The right of appraisal generally applies to mergers, sales of essentially all assets of the corporation, and charter amendments that may have a materially adverse effect on the rights of dissenting shareholders.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore, or provide shareholders with, rights of appraisal.
Going Private/Dark Transactions (Leveraged buyouts and Minority Squeeze-outs)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following: offer price/premium, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives/offers considered, and non-completion risk.
Vote case-by-case on “going dark” transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:
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Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock); |
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Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following: |
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Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction? |
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Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction? |
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Does the company have strong corporate governance? |
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Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction? |
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Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders? |
Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements taking into consideration:
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Dilution to existing shareholders’ position. |
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The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. |
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Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; conversion features; termination penalties; exit strategy. |
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The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial issues. |
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When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, Social Advisory Services will consider whether it is affected by liquidity, due diligence, control and monitoring issues, capital scarcity, information asymmetry and anticipation of future performance. |
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Financial issues include but are not limited to examining the following: a) company’s financial situation; b) degree of need for capital; c) use of proceeds; d) effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital; e) current and proposed cash burn rate; and f) going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets. |
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Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives. A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger or sale of part or all of the company. |
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Control issues including: a) Change in management; b) change in control; c) guaranteed board and committee seats; d) standstill provisions; e) voting agreements; f) veto power over certain corporate actions. |
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Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium |
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Conflicts of interest |
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Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor. |
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Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests? |
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Market reaction |
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The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one day impact on the unaffected stock price. |
Vote for the private placement if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.
Formation of Holding Company
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration: a) the reasons for the change; b) any financial or tax benefits; c) regulatory benefits; d) increases in capital structure; and e) changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company. |
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Vote against the formation of a holding company, absent compelling financial reasons to support the transaction, if the transaction would include either: a) increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum; or b) adverse changes in shareholder rights. |
Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives, selling the company or liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders. These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:
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Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight; |
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Signs of entrenched board and management; |
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Strategic plan in place for improving value; |
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Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; |
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Whether company is actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor. |
8. |
Social and Environmental Proposals |
Socially responsible shareholder resolutions are receiving a great deal more attention from institutional shareholders today than they have in the past. In addition to the moral and ethical considerations intrinsic to many of these proposals, there is a growing recognition of their potential impact on the economic performance of the company. Among the reasons for this change are:
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The number and variety of shareholder resolutions on social and environmental issues has increased; |
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Many of the sponsors and supporters of these resolutions are large institutional shareholders with significant holdings, and therefore, greater direct influence on the outcomes; |
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The proposals are more sophisticated – better written, more focused, and more sensitive to the feasibility of implementation; |
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Investors now understand that a company’s response to social and environmental issues can have serious economic consequences for the company and its shareholders. |
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for social and environmental shareholder proposals that promote good corporate citizens while enhancing long-term shareholder and stakeholder value. Vote for disclosure reports that seek additional information particularly when it appears companies have not adequately addressed shareholders’ social, workforce, and environmental concerns. In determining vote recommendations on shareholder social, workforce, and environmental proposals, Social Advisory Services will analyze the following factors:
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Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable; |
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Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company’s short-term or long-term share value; |
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Whether the company’s analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive; |
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The degree to which the company’s stated position on the issues could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to boycott or selective purchasing; |
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Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board; |
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Whether the issues presented in the proposal are best dealt with through legislation, government regulation, or company-specific action; |
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The company’s approach compared with its peers or any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal; |
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Whether the company has already responded in an appropriate or sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal; |
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Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s environmental or social practices; |
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If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether sufficient information is publicly available to shareholders and whether it would be unduly burdensome for the company to compile and avail the requested information to shareholders in a more comprehensive or amalgamated fashion; |
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Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal. |
In general, Social Advisory Services supports proposals that request the company to furnish information helpful to shareholders in evaluating the company’s operations. In order to be able to intelligently monitor their investments shareholders often need information best provided by the company in which they have invested. Requests to report such information will merit support. Requests to establish special committees of the board to address broad corporate policy and provide forums for ongoing dialogue on issues including, but not limited to shareholder relations, the environment, human rights, occupational health and safety, and executive compensation, will generally be supported, particularly when they appear to offer a potentially effective method for enhancing shareholder value. We will closely evaluate proposals that ask the company to cease certain actions that the proponent believes are harmful to society or some segment of society with special attention to the company’s legal and ethical obligations, its ability to remain profitable, and potential negative publicity if the company fails to honor the request. Social Advisory Services supports shareholder proposals that improve the company’s public image, and reduce exposure to liabilities.
Diversity and Equality
Diversity and Equality
Significant progress has been made in recent years in the advancement of gender and racial diversity in the workplace and the establishment of greater protections against discriminatory practices in the workplace. In the U.S, there are many civil rights laws that are enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, and nationality. However, discrimination on the basis of federally protected characteristics continues. The SEC’s revised disclosure rules now require information on how boards factor diversity into the director nomination process, as well as disclosure on how the board assesses the effectiveness of its diversity policy.
Shareholder proposals on diversity may target a company’s board nomination procedures or seek greater disclosure on a company’s programs and procedures on increasing the diversity of its workforce, and make reference to one or more of the following points:
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Violations of workplace anti-discrimination laws lead to expensive litigation and damaged corporate reputations that are not in the best interests of shareholders; |
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Employers already prepare employee diversity reports for the EEOC, so preparing a similar report to shareholders can be done at minimal cost; |
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The presence of gender and ethnic diversity in workforce and customer pools gives companies with diversified boards a practical advantage over their competitors as a result of their unique perspectives; |
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Efforts to increase diversity on corporate boards can be made at reasonable costs; |
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Reports can be prepared “at reasonable expense” describing efforts to encourage diversified representation on their boards; |
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Add Women and Minorities to the Board
Board diversification proposals ask companies to put systems in place to increase the representation of gender, ethnic, and racial diversity as well as union members or other underrepresented minority groups on boards of directors.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to take steps to increase diversity to the board. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on board diversity. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt nomination charters or amend existing charters to include reasonable language addressing diversity. |
Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audits
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, considering company disclosures, policies, actions, and engagements.
Report on the Distribution of Stock Options by Gender and Race
Companies have received requests from shareholders to prepare reports documenting the distribution of the stock options and restricted stock awards by race and gender of the recipient. Proponents of these proposals argue that, in the future, there will be a shift toward basing racial and gender discrimination suits on the distribution of corporate wealth through stock options. The appearance of these proposals is also in response to the nationwide wage gap and under representation of minorities and women at the highest levels of compensation.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the distribution of stock options by race and gender of the recipient.
Prepare Report/Promote EEOC-Related Activities
Filers of proposals on this issue generally ask a company to make available, at a reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information, data the company includes in its annual report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) outlining the make-up of its workforce by race, gender and position. Shareholders also ask companies to report on any efforts they are making to advance the representation of underrepresented gender, ethnic, and racial identities in their workforce. The costs of violating federal laws that prohibit discrimination by corporations are high and can affect corporate earnings. The Equal Opportunities Employment Commission does not release the companies’ filings to the public, unless it is involved in litigation and this information is difficult to obtain from other sources. Companies need to be sensitive to diverse workforce employment issues as new generations of workers become increasingly diverse. This information can be provided with little cost to the company and does not create an unreasonable burden on management.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its diversity and/or affirmative action programs. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals calling for legal and regulatory compliance and public reporting related to nondiscrimination, affirmative action, workplace health and safety, and labor policies and practices that effect long-term corporate performance. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals requesting nondiscrimination in salary, wages and all benefits. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals calling for action on equal employment opportunity and antidiscrimination. |
Report on Progress Towards Glass Ceiling Commission Recommendations
In November 1995, the Glass Ceiling Commission (Commission), a bipartisan panel of leaders from business and government, issued a report describing “an unseen yet unbreachable barrier that keeps women and minorities from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder.” The Commission recommended that companies take practical steps to rectify this disparity, such as including diversity goals in business plans, committing to affirmative action for qualified employees and initiating family-friendly labor policies. Shareholders have submitted proposals asking companies to report on progress made toward the Commission’s recommendations.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its progress against the Glass Ceiling Commission’s recommendations. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to eliminate the “glass ceiling” for women and minority employees. |
Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity
Federal law bans workplace discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and/or queer (LGBTQ) employees, and some states have additionally enacted workplace protections for these employees. Although an increasing number of US companies have explicitly banned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in their equal employment opportunity (EEO) statements, many still do not. Shareholder proponents and other activist groups concerned with LGBTQ rights, such as the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and the Pride Foundation, have targeted U.S. companies that do not specifically restrict discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in their EEO statements. Shareholder proposals on this topic ask companies to change the language of their EEO statements in order to put in place anti-discrimination protection for their LGBTQ employees. In addition, proposals may seek disclosure on a company’s general initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, including reference to such items as support of LGBTQ employee groups, diversity training that addresses sexual orientation, and non-medical benefits to domestic partners of LGBTQ employees.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals to include language in EEO statements specifically barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on a company’s initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. |
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Vote against shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate protection already afforded to LGBTQ employees. |
Report on/Eliminate Use of Racial Stereotypes in Advertising
Many companies continue to use racial stereotypes or images perceived as racially insensitive in their advertising campaigns. Filers of shareholder proposals on this topic often request companies to give more careful consideration to the symbols and images that are used to promote the company.
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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking more careful consideration of using racial stereotypes in advertising campaigns, including preparation of a report on this issue.
Gender, Race, or Ethnicity Pay Gap
Over the past several years, shareholders have filed resolutions requesting that companies report whether a gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap exists, and if so, what measures are being taken to eliminate the gap.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender, race, or ethnicity, or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender, race, or ethinicity pay gap.
Labor and Human Rights
Investors, international human rights groups, and labor advocacy groups have long been making attempts to safeguard worker rights in the international marketplace. In instances where companies themselves operate factories in developing countries for example, these advocates have asked that the companies adopt global corporate standards that guarantee sustainable wages and safe working conditions for their workers abroad. Companies that contract out portions of their manufacturing operations to foreign companies have been asked to ensure that the products they receive from those contractors have not been made using forced labor, child labor, or other forms of modern slavery. These companies are asked to adopt formal vendor standards that, among other things, include some sort of monitoring mechanisms. Globalization, relocation of production overseas, and widespread use of subcontractors and vendors; often make it difficult to obtain a complete picture of a company’s labor practices in global markets. Deadly accidents at factories, most notably in Bangladesh and Pakistan, have continued to intensify these concerns. Many investors believe that companies would benefit from adopting a human rights policy, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labour Organization’s Core Labor Standards. Efforts that seek greater disclosure on a company’s global labor practices, including its supply chain, and that seek to establish minimum standards for a company’s operations will be supported. In addition, requests for independent monitoring of overseas operations will be supported.
Social Advisory Services generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of principles or codes relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights; such as the use of slave, child, or prison labor; a government that is illegitimate; or there is a call by human rights advocates, pro-democracy organizations, or legitimately-elected representatives for economic sanctions. The use of child labor or forced labor is unethical and can damage corporate reputations. Poor labor practices can lead to litigation against the company, which can be costly and time consuming.
Codes of Conduct and Vendor Standards
Shareholders have submitted proposals that pertain to the adoption of codes of conduct or provision, greater disclosure on a company’s international workplace standards, or that request human rights risk assessment. Companies have been asked to adopt a number of different types of codes, including a workplace code of conduct, standards for international business operations, human rights standards, International Labour Organization (ILO) standards and the SA 8000 principles. The ILO is an independent agency of the United Nations which consists of 187 member nations represented by workers, employers, and governments. The ILO’s general mandate is to promote a decent workplace for all individuals. The ILO sets international labor standards in the form of its conventions and then monitors compliance with the standards. The seven conventions of the ILO fall under four broad categories: Right to organize and bargain collectively, Nondiscrimination in employment, Abolition of forced labor, and End of child labor. Each of the 187 member-nations of the ILO is bound to respect and promote these rights to the best of their abilities. SA 8000 is a set of labor standards, based on the principles of the ILO conventions and other human rights conventions, and covers eight workplace conditions, including: child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, discrimination,
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disciplinary practices, working hours and compensation. Companies have also turned to the United Nations “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,” - a set of guidelines that create a framework for states to protect human rights, corporations to respect human rights, and rights-holders to access remediation.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals to implement human rights standards and workplace codes of conduct. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct, SA 8000 Standards, or human rights due diligence practices. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that call for the adoption of principles or codes of conduct relating to company investments in countries with patterns of human rights abuses. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that call for independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with codes. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that seek publication of a “Code of Conduct” by the company’s foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring that they satisfy all applicable standards and laws protecting employees’ wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, and other rights. |
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Vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on, or the adoption of, vendor standards including: reporting on incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts and providing public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with foreign suppliers that manufacture products for sale in the U.S. using forced labor, child labor, or that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employee’s wages and working conditions. |
Adopt/Report on MacBride Principles
These resolutions have called for the adoption of the MacBride Principles for operations located in Northern Ireland. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is well documented that Northern Ireland’s Catholic community faced much higher unemployment figures than the Protestant community. In response to this problem, the U.K. government instituted the New Fair Employment Act of 1989 (and subsequent amendments) to address the sectarian hiring problems.
Many companies believe that the Act adequately addresses the problems and that further action, including adoption of the MacBride Principles, only duplicates the efforts already underway. In evaluating a proposal to adopt the MacBride Principles, shareholders must decide whether the principles will cause companies to divest, and therefore worsen the unemployment problem, or whether the principles will promote equal hiring practices. Proponents believe that the Fair Employment Act does not sufficiently address the sectarian hiring problems. They argue that the MacBride Principles serve to stabilize the situation and promote further investment.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to report on or implement the MacBride Principles.
Community Impact Assessment/Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
A number of U.S. public companies have found their operations or expansion plans in conflict with local indigenous groups. In order to improve their standing with indigenous groups and decrease any negative publicity companies may face, some concerned shareholders have sought reports requesting that companies review their obligations, actions and presence on these groups. Some companies have made progress in working with indigenous groups.
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However, shareholders who are concerned with the negative impact that the company’s operations may have on the indigenous people’s land and community, have sought reports detailing the impact of the company’s actions and presence on these groups.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking to prepare reports on a company’s environmental and health impact on communities.
Report on Risks of Outsourcing
Consumer interest in keeping costs low through comparison shopping, coupled with breakthroughs in productivity have prompted companies to look for methods of increasing profit margins while keeping prices competitive. Through a practice known as off-shoring, the outsourcing or moving of manufacturing and service operations to foreign markets with lower labor costs, companies have found one method where the perceived savings potential is quite substantial. Shareholder opponents of outsourcing argue that there may be long-term consequences to offshore outsourcing that outweigh short-term benefits such as backlash from a public already sensitive to off-shoring, security risks from information technology development overseas, and diminished employee morale. Shareholder proposals addressing outsourcing ask that companies prepare a report to shareholders evaluating the risk to the company’s brand name and reputation in the U.S. from outsourcing and off-shoring of manufacturing and service work to other countries.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholders proposals asking companies to report on the risks associated with outsourcing or off-shoring.
Report on the Impact of Health Pandemics on Company Operations
Following the COVID-19 pandemic, among other historic pandemics, the distribution of treatments vastly differed in effectiveness between regions. With limited access to adequate treatments, the increasing death toll is expected to have profound social, political, and economic impact globally, including on the companies or industries with operations in affected areas. In the past, shareholder proposals asked companies to develop policies to provide affordable drugs in historically disadvantaged regions. However, in recent years, shareholders have changed their tactic, asking instead for reports on the impact of these pandemics on company operations, including both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical companies operating in high-risk areas. This change is consistent with the general shift in shareholder proposals towards risk assessment and mitigation.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking for companies to report on the impact of pandemics, such as COVID-19, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, on their business strategies.
Mandatory Arbitration
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims.
Sexual Harassment
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment.
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Operations in High-Risk Markets
In recent years, shareholder advocates and human rights organizations have highlighted concerns associated with companies operating in regions that are politically unstable, including state sponsors of terror. The U.S. government has active trade sanction regimes in place against specific companies, or persons, including Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, among others. These sanctions are enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which is part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as well as U.S. Customs and Border Patrol for sanctioned goods. However, these countries do not comprise an exhaustive list of countries considered to be high-risk markets.
Shareholder proponents have filed resolutions addressing a variety of concerns around how investments and operations in high-risk regions may support, or be perceived to support, potentially oppressive governments. Proponents contend that operations in these countries may lead to potential reputational, regulatory, and/or supply chain risks as a result of operational disruptions. Concerned shareholders have requested investment withdrawals or cessation of operations in high-risk markets as well as reports on operations in high-risk markets. Such reports may seek additional disclosure from companies on criteria employed for investing in, continuing to operate in, and withdrawing from specific countries.
Depending on the country’s human rights record, investors have also asked companies to refrain from commencing new projects in the country of concern until improvements are made. In addition, investors have sought greater disclosure on the nature of a company’s involvement in the country and on the impact of their involvement or operations.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests for a review of and a report outlining the company’s potential financial and reputation risks associated with operations in “high-risk” markets, such as a terrorism-sponsoring state or otherwise, taking into account:
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The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption; |
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Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures; |
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Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws; |
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Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws; |
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Whether the company has been recently involved in significant controversies or violations in “high-risk” markets. |
Reports on Operations in Burma/Myanmar
Since the early 1960s, Burma (also known as Myanmar) has been ruled by a military dictatorship that has been condemned for human rights abuses, including slave labor, torture, rape and murder. Many companies have pulled out of Burma over the past decade given the controversy surrounding involvement in the country. Oil companies continue be the largest investors in Burma and therefore are the usual targets of shareholder proposals on this topic. However, proposals have also been filed at other companies, including financial companies, for their involvement in the country.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards in connection with involvement in Burma. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on Burmese operations and reports on costs of continued involvement in the country. |
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Vote shareholder proposals to pull out of Burma on a case-by-case basis. |
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Reports on Operations in China
Documented human rights abuses in China continue to raise concerns among investors, specifically with respect to alleged use of forced and child labor in supply chains across industries such as apparel, solar energy, technology manufacturing, and more. Reports have identified U.S. companies with direct or indirect ties to companies controlled by the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In addition, a number of Chinese companies have been connected to the use of state-sponsored labor of Uyghur and other Muslim minority groups. The Chinese government has explained these forced labor transfer programs as policies to combat terrorism, religious extremism, and poverty in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals requesting more disclosure on a company’s involvement in China |
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Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that ask a company to terminate a project or investment in China. |
Product Sales to Repressive Regimes
Certain Internet technology companies have been accused of assisting repressive governments in violating human rights through the knowing misuse of their hardware and software. Human rights groups have accused companies such as Yahoo!, Cisco, Google, and Microsoft of allowing the Chinese government to censor and track down dissenting voices on the internet.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that companies cease product sales to repressive regimes that can be used to violate human rights. |
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Vote for proposals to report on company efforts to reduce the likelihood of product abuses in this manner. |
Internet Privacy/Censorship and Data Security
Information technology sector companies have been at the center of shareholder advocacy campaigns regarding concerns over Internet service companies and technology providers’ alleged cooperation with potentially repressive regimes, notably the Chinese government. Shareholder proposals, submitted at various companies, advocated for companies to take steps to stop abetting repression and censorship of the Internet and/or review their human rights policies taking this issue into consideration. Resolution sponsors generally argue that the Chinese government is using IT company technologies to track, monitor, identify, and, ultimately, suppress political dissent. In the view of proponents, this process of surveillance and associated suppression violates internationally accepted norms outlined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
While early shareholder resolutions on Internet issues focused on censorship by repressive regimes and net neutrality, proponents have recently raised concerns regarding privacy and data security in the wake of increased breaches that result in the misuse of personal information. On Oct. 13, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a guidance document about the disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents. In the document, the SEC references the negative consequences that are associated with cyber-attacks, such as: remediation costs, including those required to repair relationships with customers and clients; increased cyber-security protection costs; lost revenues from unauthorized use of the information or missed opportunities to attract clients; litigation; and reputational damage. The document says that while the federal securities laws do not explicitly require disclosure of cybersecurity risks and incidents, some disclosure requirements may impose an obligation on the company to disclose such information and provides scenarios where disclosure may be required. According to the FBI’s 2021 Internet Crime report, potential losses from cybercrimes hit $6.9 billion, up 64% from 2018.
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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for resolutions requesting the disclosure and implementation of Internet privacy and censorship policies and procedures considering:
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The level of disclosure of policies and procedures relating to privacy, freedom of speech, Internet censorship, and government monitoring of the Internet; |
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Engagement in dialogue with governments and/or relevant groups with respect to the Internet and the free flow of information; |
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The scope of business involvement and of investment in markets that maintain government censorship or monitoring of the Internet; |
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The market-specific laws or regulations applicable to Internet censorship or monitoring that may be imposed on the company; and |
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The level of controversy or litigation related to the company’s international human rights policies and procedures. |
Disclosure on Plant Closings
Shareholders have asked that companies contemplating plant closures consider the impact of such closings on employees and the community, especially when such plan closures involve a community’s largest employers. Social Advisory Services usually recommends voting for greater disclosure of plant closing criteria. In cases where it can be shown that companies have been proactive and responsible in adopting these criteria, Social Advisory Services recommends against the proposal.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on plant closing criteria if the company has not provided such information.
Climate Change
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan22, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:
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The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards; |
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Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3); |
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The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant); |
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Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based; |
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Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050; |
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Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years; |
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Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance; |
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Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy; |
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Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and |
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The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers. |
22 Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.
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Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:
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The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure; |
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The company’s actual GHG emissions performance; |
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Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and |
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Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive. |
Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Climate change has emerged as the most significant environmental threat to the planet to date. Scientists generally agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a “greenhouse effect” that traps the planet’s heat. Environmentalists claim that the Greenhouse Gases(GHG) produced by the industrial age have caused recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. Climate change skeptics have described the rise and fall of global temperatures as naturally occurring phenomena and depicted human impact on climate change as minimal. Shareholder proposals requesting companies to issue a report to shareholders, “at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information,” on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the report include descriptions of corporate efforts to reduce emissions, companies’ financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat, and their goals in reducing these emissions from their operations. Shareholder proponents argue that there is scientific proof that the burning of fossil fuels causes global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, and that a report on the company’s role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces related to climate change-on its operations and investments, or on how the company identifies, measures, and manage such risks. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reduction of GHG or adoption of GHG goals in products and operations. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on responses to regulatory and public pressures surrounding climate change, and for disclosure of research that aided in setting company policies around climate change. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals requesting reports on greenhouse gas emissions from companies’ operations and/or products. |
Invest in Clean/Renewable Energy
Filers of proposals on renewable energy ask companies to increase their investment in renewable energy sources and to work to develop products that rely more on renewable energy sources. Increased use of renewable energy will reduce the negative environmental impact of energy companies. In addition, as supplies of oil and coal exist in the earth in limited quantities, renewable energy sources represent a competitive, and some would argue essential, long-term business strategy.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s activities related to the development of renewable energy sources. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking increased investment in renewable energy sources unless the terms of the resolution are overly restrictive. |
Energy Efficiency
Reducing the negative impact to the environment can be done through the use of more energy efficient practices and products. Shareholders propose that corporations should have energy efficient manufacturing processes and should market more energy efficient products. This can be done by utilizing renewable energy sources that are cost-competitive and by implementing energy efficient operations.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report on company energy efficiency policies and/or goals.
Environment
Proposals addressing environmental and energy concerns are plentiful, and generally seek greater disclosure on a particular issue or seek to improve a company’s environmental practices in order to protect the world’s natural resources. In addition, some proponents cite the negative financial implications for companies with poor environmental practices, including liabilities associated with site clean-ups and lawsuits, as well as arguments that energy efficient products and clean environmental practices are sustainable business practices that will contribute to long-term shareholder value. Shareholders proponents point out that the majority of independent atmospheric scientists agree that global warming poses a serious problem to the health and welfare of our planet, citing the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Shareholder activists argue that companies can report on their greenhouse gas emissions within a few months at reasonable cost. The general trend indicates a movement towards encouraging companies to have proactive environmental policies, focusing on maximizing the efficient use of non-renewable resources and minimizing threats of harm to human health or the environment.
Environmental/Sustainability Reports
Shareholders may request general environmental disclosures or reports on a specific location/operation, often requesting that the company detail the environmental risks and potential liabilities of a specific project. Increasingly, companies have begun reporting on environmental and sustainability issues using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards. The GRI was established in 1997 with the mission of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance. The GRI was developed by Ceres (formerly known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, CERES) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
Ceres was formed in the wake of the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, when a consortium of investors, environmental groups, and religious organizations drafted what were originally named the Valdez Principles. Later to be renamed the CERES Principles, and now branded as the Ceres Roadmap 2030, corporate signatories to the Ceres Roadmap 2030 pledge to publicly report on environmental issues, including protection of the biosphere, sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of wastes, energy conservation, and employee and community risk reduction in a standardized form.
The Equator Principles are the financial industry’s benchmark for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing. The Principles were first launched in June 2003 and were ultimately adopted by over forty financial institutions during a three year implementation period. The principles were subsequently revised in July 2006 to take into account the new performance standards approved by the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC). The third iteration of the Principles was launched in June
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2013 and it amplified the banks’ commitments to social responsibility, including human rights, climate change, and transparency. Financial institutions adopt these principles to ensure that the projects they venture in are developed in a socially responsible manner and reflect sound environmental management practices.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company’s environmental and social practices, and/or associated risks and liabilities. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of sustainability reports. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the CERES Roadmap 2030. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the Equator Principles. |
Operations in Environmentally Sensitive Areas
Canadian Oil Sands
Proposals asking for a report on oil sands operations in the Athabasca region of Alberta, Canada have appeared at a number of oil and gas companies. Alberta’s oil sands contain a reserve largely thought to be one of the world’s largest potential energy sources. Rising oil sands production in Alberta has been paralleled with concerns from a variety of stakeholders—including environmental groups, local residents, and shareholders—regarding the environmental impacts of the complicated extraction and upgrading processes required to convert oil sands into a synthetic crude oil. The high viscosity of bitumen makes its extraction a challenging and resource-intensive process; the most common extraction technique involves pumping steam into the oil sands to lower the viscosity of bitumen in order to pump it to the surface.
One of the most prominent issues concerning oil sands is the large volume of greenhouse gases (GHG) associated with production. Oil sands are by far one of the most energy-intensive forms of oil production, releasing three times more GHG emissions from production than conventional oil.
Shareholders have kept up pressure on the issue of potential long-term risks to companies posed by the environmental, social, and economic challenges associated with Canadian oil sands operations. Resolutions on the topic have focused on requesting greater transparency on the ramifications of oil sands development projects.
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) is a federally protected wilderness along Alaska’s North Slope. In the past, legislation proposed in both the House and Senate that, if passed, would allow a portion of this area to be leased to private companies for development and production of oil, has been witnessed. Oil companies have expressed an interest in bidding for these leases given the opportunity. In response, shareholder activists have filed resolutions asking these companies to cancel any plans to drill in the ANWR and cease their lobbying efforts to open the area for drilling. Proponents of shareholder proposals on this issue argue that the Coastal Plain section of the ANWR is the most environmentally sensitive area of the refuge, that the majority of Alaska’s North Slope that is not federally designated wilderness already provides the oil industry with sufficient resources for oil production, and that advocates of drilling in ANWR overstate the benefit to be derived from opening the wilderness to oil production. Those in favor of opening the area up to drilling note that only a small portion of ANWR would be considered for exploration, and if drilling were to take place, it would be on less than one percent of the entire area, that modern technology reduces the environmental impact of oil drilling on both the land and
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surrounding wildlife, and that oil production in ANWR would have considerable benefit to company shareholders, Alaskans, and the United States as a whole.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for requests for reports on potential environmental damage as a result of company operations in protected regions. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to prepare reports or adopt policies on operations that include mining, drilling or logging in environmentally sensitive areas. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to curb or reduce the sale of products manufactured from materials extracted from environmentally sensitive areas such as old growth forests. |
Hydraulic Fracturing
Shareholder proponents have elevated concerns on the use of hydraulic fracturing, an increasingly controversial process in which water, sand, and a mix of chemicals are blasted horizontally into tight layers of shale rock to extract natural gas. As this practice has gained more widespread use, environmentalists have raised concerns that the chemicals mixed with sand and water to aid the fracturing process can contaminate ground water supplies. Proponents of resolutions at companies that employ hydraulic fracturing are also concerned that wastewater produced by the process could overload the waste treatment plants to which it is shipped. Shareholders have asked companies that utilize hydraulic fracturing to report on the environmental impact of the practice and to disclose policies aimed at reducing hazards from the process.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests seeking greater transparency on the practice of hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks.
Phase Out Chlorine-Based Chemicals
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified chlorine bleaching of pulp and paper as a major source of dioxin, a known human carcinogen linked to have negative effects to humans and animals. A number of shareholder proposals have been filed in recent years asking companies to report on the possible phase-out of chlorine bleaching in the production of paper because of the practice’s negative environmental impact.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals to prepare a report on the phase-out of chlorine bleaching in paper production. |
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Vote on a case-by-case basis on shareholder proposals asking companies to cease or phase-out the use of chlorine bleaching. |
Land Procurement and Development
Certain real estate developers including big-box large retailers have received criticism over their processes for acquiring and developing land. Given a 2005 Supreme Court decision allowing for the usage of eminent domain laws in the U.S. to take land from property-owners for tax generating purposes, as well as certain controversies outside of the U.S. with land procurement, some shareholders would like assurances that companies are acting ethically and with local stakeholders in mind.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for land procurement and utilize the policies in their decision-making.
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Report on the Sustainability of Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFO)
The potential environmental impact on water, aquatic ecosystems, and local areas from odor and chemical discharges from CAFOs has led to lawsuits and EPA regulations. Certain shareholders have asked companies to provide additional details on their CAFOs in addition to those with which the companies contract to raise their livestock.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests that companies report on the sustainability and the environmental impacts of both company-owned and contract livestock operations.
Adopt a Comprehensive Recycling Policy
A number of companies have received proposals to step-up their recycling efforts, with the goal of reducing the company’s negative impact on the environment and reducing costs over the long-term.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals requesting the preparation of a report on the company’s recycling efforts. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to increase their recycling efforts or to adopt a formal recycling policy. |
Nuclear Energy
Nuclear power continues to be a controversial method of producing electricity. Opponents of nuclear energy are primarily concerned with serious accidents and the related negative human health consequences, and with the difficulties involved in nuclear waste storage.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s nuclear energy procedures. |
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Vote case-by-case on proposals that ask the company to cease the production of nuclear power. |
Water Use
Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report evaluating the business risks linked to water use and impacts on the company’s supply chain, including subsidiaries and bottling partners. Such proposals also ask companies to disclose current policies and procedures for mitigating the impact of operations on local communities in areas of water scarcity.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s risks linked to water use. |
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Vote for resolutions requesting companies to promote the “human right to water” as articulated by the United Nations. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for water use that incorporate social and environmental factors. |
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Compliance to relevant Climate Accords
With the Paris Agreement operational as of November 2016, ratifying countries have agreed to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases and pursue efforts to limit global temperature increase to well below 2°C. The Agreement provides a framework for increasingly ambitious climate action to be carried out by all parties over time.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on how they will meet GHG reduction targets of the countries in which they operate, or their compliance to relevant science-based climate accords, such as the Paris Agreement.
Health and Safety
Toxic Materials
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on policies and activities to ensure product safety. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to disclose annual expenditures relating to the promotion and/or environmental cleanup of toxins. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the feasibility of removing, or substituting with safer alternatives, all “harmful” ingredients used in company products. |
Product Safety
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Generally vote for proposals requesting the company to report on or adopt consumer product safety policies and initiatives. |
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Generally vote for proposals requesting the study, adoption and/or implementation of consumer product safety programs in the company’s supply chain. |
Workplace/Facility Safety
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals requesting workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts. |
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Vote shareholder proposals requesting companies report on or implement procedures associated with their operations and/or facilities on a case-by-case basis. |
Report on Firearm Safety Initiatives
Shareholders may ask for a company to report on policies and procedures that are aimed at curtailing the incidence of gun violence. Such a report may include: implementation of the company’s contract instruction to distributors not to sell the company’s weapons at gun shows or through pawn shops; recalls or retro-fits of products with safety-related defects causing death or serious injury to consumers, as well as development of systems to identify and remedy these defects; names and descriptions of products that are developed or are being developed for a combination of higher caliber/maximum capacity and greater conceal-ability; and the company’s
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involvement in promotion campaigns that could be construed as aimed at children. The Sandy Hook Principles were established to commemorate the victims of gun violence and to encourage positive corporate behavior in response to the proliferation of gun violence in America.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals requesting the company report on risks associated with firearms, firearm sales, marketing, and societal impacts. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to report on its efforts to promote firearm safety. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to stop the sale of firearms and accessories. |
Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients
Shareholders have asked companies engaged in the development of genetically modified agricultural products to adopt a policy of not marketing or distributing such products until “long term safety testing” demonstrates that they are not harmful to humans, animals or the environment. Until further long term testing demonstrates that these products are not harmful, companies in the restaurant and prepared foods industries have been asked to remove genetically altered ingredients from products they manufacture or sell, and label such products in the interim. Shareholders have also asked supermarket companies to do the same for their own private label brands.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals to label products that contain genetically engineered products or products from cloned animals. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to phase out the use of genetically engineered ingredients in their products. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on the use of genetically engineered organisms in their products. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on the financial, legal, and operational risks posed by the use of genetically engineered organisms. |
Tobacco-related Proposals
Under the pressure of ongoing litigation and negative media attention due to higher youth smoking rates and e-cigarettes, tobacco companies and even non-tobacco companies with ties to the industry have received an assortment of shareholder proposals seeking increased responsibility and social consciousness from tobacco companies and firms affiliated with the tobacco industry.
In June 2009, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act was signed into law, giving the FDA authority to regulate the tobacco industry for the first time, including the power to block or approve new products as well as the nicotine and other content in existing tobacco products. This legislation restricts tobacco marketing and sales to youth, requires warning labels, bans cigarettes and e-cigarettes with characterizing flavor, and generally implement standards for tobacco products to protect public health.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking a report on underage tobacco prevention policies and standards. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report on the public health risk of tobacco sales. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking producers of tobacco product components (such as filters, adhesives, flavorings, and paper products) to halt sales to tobacco companies or produce a report outlining the risks and potential liabilities of the production of these components. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals seeking a report on a tobacco company’s advertising approach. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to cease investment in tobacco companies. |
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Vote for proposals calling for tobacco companies to cease the production of tobacco products. |
Adopt Policy/Report on Drug Pricing
Pharmaceutical drug pricing, both within the United States and internationally, has raised many questions of the companies that are responsible for creating and marketing these treatments. Shareholder proponents, activists and even some legislators have called upon drug companies to restrain pricing of prescription drugs.
The high cost of prescription drugs is a vital issue for senior citizens across the country. Seniors have the greatest need for prescription drugs, accounting for a significant portion of all prescription drug sales, but they often live on fixed incomes and are underinsured.
Proponents note that efforts to reign-in pharmaceutical costs will not negatively impact research and development (R&D) costs and that retail drug prices are consistently higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized nations. Pharmaceutical companies often respond that adopting a formal drug pricing policy could put the company at a competitive disadvantage.
Against the backdrop of the AIDS crisis in Africa, many shareholders have called on companies to address the issue of affordable drugs for the treatment of AIDS, as well as tuberculosis and malaria throughout the developing world. When analyzing such resolutions, consideration should be made of the strategic implications of pricing policies in the market.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals to prepare a report on drug pricing. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt a formal policy on drug pricing. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that call on companies to develop a policy to provide affordable HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria drugs in third-world nations. |
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Vote for proposals asking for reports on the economic effects and legal risks of limiting pharmaceutical products to Canada or certain wholesalers. |
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Vote case-by-case proposals requesting that companies adopt policies not to constrain prescription drug re-importation by limiting supplies to foreign markets. |
Government and Military
Weapons-related proposals may target handguns, landmines, defense contracting, or sale of weapons to foreign governments.
Prepare Report to Renounce Future Landmine Production
Although very few companies currently produce landmines, some companies continue to have links to landmine production or produce components that are used to make landmines. Shareholders have asked companies to renounce the future development of landmines or their components, or to prepare a report on the feasibility of such a renouncement.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking a report on the renouncement of future landmine production.
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Prepare Report on Foreign Military Sales
Shareholders have filed proxy resolutions asking companies to account for their policies surrounding the sale of military equipment to foreign governments. The proposals can take various forms. One resolution simply calls on companies to report on their foreign military sales, provide information on military product exports, disclose the company’s basis for determining whether those sales should be made, and any procedures used to market or negotiate those sales. Another resolution calls for companies to report on “offsets” e.g. guarantee of new jobs in the purchasing country and technology transfers. Offsets involve a commitment by military contractors and the U.S. government to direct benefits back to a foreign government as a condition of a military sale.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals to report on foreign military sales or offset agreements. |
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Vote case-by-case on proposals that call for outright restrictions on foreign military sales. |
Depleted Uranium/Nuclear Weapons
Depleted uranium is the less radioactive uranium that is left behind after enriched uranium is produced for nuclear reactor fuel and fissile material for nuclear weapons. The main difference is that depleted uranium contains at least three times less U-235 than natural uranium. However, it is still weakly radioactive. Shareholders want reports on companies’ policies, procedures and involvement in the said substance and nuclear weapons.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report on involvement, policies, and procedures related to depleted uranium and nuclear weapons.
Adopt Ethical Criteria for Weapons Contracts
Shareholders have requested that companies review their code of conduct and statements of ethical criteria for military production-related contract bids, awards, and execution to incorporate environmental factors and sustainability issues related to the contract bidding process. Sustainability is a business model that requires companies to balance the needs and interests of various stakeholders while concurrently sustaining their businesses, communities, and the environment for future generations.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and amend, if necessary, the company’s code of conduct and statements of ethical criteria for military production-related contract bids, awards and execution.
Animal Welfare
Animal Rights/Testing
Shareholders and animal rights groups, including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), may file resolutions calling for the end to painful and unnecessary animal testing on laboratory animals by companies developing products for the cosmetics and medical supply industry. Since advanced testing methods now produce many reliable results without the use of live animals, Social Advisory Services generally supports proposals on this issue. In cases where it can be determined that alternative testing methods are unreliable or are required by law, Social Advisory Services recommends voting against such proposals. Other resolutions call for the adoption of animal welfare standards that would ensure humane treatment of animals on vendors’ farms and slaughter houses. Social Advisory Services will generally vote in favor of such resolutions.
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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to limit unnecessary animal testing where alternative testing methods are feasible or not barred by law. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to adopt or/and report on company animal welfare standards or animal-related risks. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the operational costs and liabilities associated with selling animals. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate cruel product testing methods. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to monitor, limit, report, or eliminate the outsourcing of animal testing to overseas laboratories. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt or adhere to a public animal welfare policy at both company and contracted laboratory levels. |
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Vote for shareholder proposals to evaluate, adopt, or require suppliers to adopt Controlled Atmosphere Killing (CAK) slaughter methods. |
Political and Charitable Giving
Lobbying Efforts
Shareholders have asked companies to report on their lobbying efforts on proposed legislation or to refute established scientific research regarding climate change, the health effects of smoking, fuel efficiency standards etc. Proponents have pointed to potential legislation on climate change, the lethargic pace of improvements in fuel efficiency standards in the U.S. automotive industry, and the highly litigious nature surrounding the tobacco industry as rationales for greater transparency on corporate lobbying practices that would shed light on whether companies are acting in the best long-term interests of their shareholders. Proponents of lobbying resolutions typically request enhanced disclosure of lobbying policies and expenditures, including a report on the policies and procedures related to lobbying, amounts used for various types of lobbying, and any membership or payments to a tax-exempt organization that writes and endorses model legislation.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
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Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on their lobbying activities, including efforts to challenge scientific research and influence governmental legislation. |
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Vote for proposals requesting information on a company’s lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures. |
Political Contributions/Non-Partisanship
As evidenced by the U.S. Supreme Court’s January 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission that lifted restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections, changes in legislation that governs corporate political giving have, rather than limiting such contributions, increased the potential for corporate contributions to the political process and the complexity of tracking such contributions.
Proponents of political spending resolutions generally call for enhanced disclosure of political contributions, including a report on the policies and procedures for corporate political campaign contributions and trade association expenditures, the respective amounts of such donations using company funds, or an assessment of the impacts of such contributions on the firm’s image, sales and profitability. Shareholder advocates of these proposals are concerned with the lack of transparency on political giving and the increasing involvement and influence of corporations in the political process.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 89 of 98 |
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for proposals calling for a company to disclose political and trade association contributions, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive. |
∎ |
Vote for proposals calling for a company to maintain a policy of political non-partisanship. |
∎ |
Vote against proposals asking a company to refrain from making any political contributions. |
Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s alignment of political contributions, lobbying, and electioneering spending with a company’s publicly stated values and policies, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive. Additionally, Social Advisory Services will consider whether:
∎ |
The company’s policies, management, board oversight, governance processes, and level of disclosure related to direct political contributions, lobbying activities, and payments to trade associations, political action committees, or other groups that may be used for political purposes; |
∎ |
The company’s disclosure regarding: the reasons for its support of candidates for public offices; the reasons for support of and participation in trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and other political activities; |
∎ |
Any incongruencies identified between a company’s direct and indirect political expenditures and its publicly stated values and priorities; |
∎ |
Recent significant controversies related to the company’s direct and indirect lobbying, political contributions, or political activities. |
Charitable Contributions
Shareholder proponents of charitable-contributions related resolutions may seek greater disclosure on a company’s charitable donations including dollar amounts, sponsorships, and policies on corporate philanthropy. Social Advisory Services is generally supportive of increased transparency around corporate charitable giving. However, some resolutions extend beyond mere disclosure requests and attempt to influence or restrict companies’ contributions to specific types of beneficiaries in a manner that furthers particular objectives supported by the proposal sponsors. Social Advisory Services believes that management is better positioned to decide what criteria are appropriate for making corporate charitable contributions. Also, some of the proposals may require companies to poll their shareholders as part of the grant-making process. Since majority of companies generally have thousands of shareholders, contacting, confirming, and processing each individual opinion and/or consent would be a burdensome and expensive exercise.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Generally vote for shareholder resolutions seeking enhanced transparency on corporate philanthropy. |
∎ |
Vote against shareholder proposals imposing charitable giving criteria or requiring shareholder ratification of grants. |
∎ |
Vote against shareholder proposals requesting that companies prohibit charitable contributions. |
Disclosure on Prior Government Service
Shareholders have asked companies to disclose the identity of any senior executive and/or other high-level employee, consultant, lobbyist, attorney, or investment banker who has served in government. Although the movement of individuals between government and the private sector may benefit both, the potential also exists for conflicts of interest, especially in industries that have extensive dealings with government agencies.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 90 of 98 |
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the disclosure of prior government service of the company’s key executives.
Consumer Lending and Economic Development
Adopt Policy/Report on Predatory Lending Practices
Predatory lending involves charging excessive fees to subprime borrowers without adequate disclosure. More specifically, predatory lending includes misleading subprime borrowers about the terms of a loan, charging excessive fees that are folded into the body of a refinancing loan, including life insurance policies or other unnecessary additions to a mortgage, or lending to homeowners with insufficient income to cover loan payments.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the development of a policy or preparation of a report to guard against predatory lending practices.
Disclosure on Credit in Low- and Lower-middle-income countries (LMIC) or Forgive LMIC Debt
Shareholders have asked banks and other financial services firms to develop and disclose lending policies for low-and lower-middle-income countries (LMIC). Proponents are concerned that, without such policies, lending to LMIC may contribute to the outflow of capital, the inefficient use of capital, and corruption, all of which increase the risk of loan loss. In the interest of promoting improved LMIC lending practices and responsible loan disclosure, Social Advisory Services generally supports voting for such proposals. In cases where it can be determined that companies have been proactive and responsible in developing such policies, Social Advisory Services may recommend a vote against the proposal’s adoption. Social Advisory Services usually opposes proposals that call for outright loan forgiveness; such action represents an unacceptable loss to lending institutions and their shareholders. Social Advisory Services may support such proposals at banks that have failed to make reasonable provisions for non-performing loans as a means to encourage a change in policy.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for shareholder proposals asking for disclosure on lending practices in low and lower-middle-income countries, unless the company has demonstrated a clear proactive record on the issue. |
∎ |
Vote against shareholder proposals asking banks to forgive loans outright. |
∎ |
Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for loan forgiveness at banks that have failed to make reasonable provisions for non-performing loans. |
∎ |
Vote for proposals to restructure and extend the terms of non-performing loans. |
Community Investing
Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report addressing the company’s community investing efforts. Such proposals also ask companies to review their policies regarding their investments in different communities.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals that seek a policy review or report addressing the company’s community investing efforts.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 91 of 98 |
Miscellaneous
Adult Entertainment
Traditionally, there have not been many proposals filed in the area of adult entertainment. However, with the consolidation of the communications industry, a number of large companies have ended up with ownership of cable companies. These cable companies may offer their customers access to pay-per-view programming or channels intended for adult audiences. Proponents of shareholder proposals on this issue ask cable companies and companies with interests in cable companies to assess the costs and benefits of continuing to distribute sexually-explicit content, including the potential negative impact on the company’s image.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that seek a review of the company’s involvement with pornography.
Abortion/Right to Life Issues
Shareholder proposals pertaining to abortion and right to life issues have appeared more frequently recently, especially in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision overturning Roe v. Wade in 2022. Social Advisory Services considers each shareholder proposals on its individual merit, rather than relying on a wide-reaching policy application, and considers numerous contributing factors such as legislative updates, health privacy rights, and language of the proposal.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Decided on a case-by-case basis.
Anti-Social Proposals
A number of ‘anti-social’ shareholder proposals have been filed at companies requesting increased disclosure. While these proposals’ requests are very similar to those submitted by shareholder advocates within traditional socially responsible investor circles, the underlying motives for filing the proposals appear to be very different. In addition to charitable contribution proposals, anti-social proposals addressing climate change, sustainability, and conflicts of interest may be seen at shareholder meetings. Despite implicitly different motivations in some of these proposals, the underlying requests for increased disclosure, in some cases, may be worth shareholder support.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote against shareholder proposals that do not seek to ultimately advance the goals of the social investment community. |
∎ |
Vote case-by-case on anti-social shareholder proposals seeking a review or report on the company’s charitable contributions. |
Violence and Adult Themes in Video Games
Perceptions of increased sex and violence in video games have led certain shareholders to question the availability of adult-themed content to children and teens. The Entertainment Software Ratings Board, which provides ratings for video games, has classified approximately 34 percent of the total games it reviews as either Teen, Mature, or Adults Only.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on company policies related to the sale of mature-rated video games to children and teens.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 92 of 98 |
Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors
Proponents of these proposals feel that social and environmental criteria should be factored into the formulas used in determining executive compensation packages. The shareholder sponsors of the resolutions look to companies to review current compensation practices and to include social or environmental performance criteria such as accounting for “poor corporate citizenship” and meeting environmental or workplace safety objectives and metrics when evaluating executive compensation. Some of the non-financial criteria that proponents of these resolutions seek to be incorporated in compensation program design include workplace safety, environmental stewardship, or diversity and customer/employee satisfaction – as part of a written policy used to align compensation with performance on non-financial factors alongside financial criteria.
Proponents believe that factors such as poor environmental performance, workplace lawsuits, etc. could have a significant adverse impact on a company’s financial performance if not proactively and adequately addressed, and that these factors should be considered along with traditional financial considerations when determining executive pay. The significant stock price declines and massive losses in shareholder value stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster and the tragic explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine that killed 29 employees is a sobering reminder of the need to have the right management incentives in place to ensure that social and environmental risks are actively managed and mitigated against. Given the proliferation of derivative lawsuits targeted at firms such as Halliburton, Transocean and Cameron International that were suppliers to or partners with BP in a capacity that ignored safety considerations or that contributed to the economic and ecological disaster, investors are increasingly mindful of the far-reaching implications that exposure to social or environmental risks could have on shareholder value at portfolio companies.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for shareholder proposals calling for linkage of executive pay to non-financial factors including performance against social and environmental goals, customer/employee satisfaction, corporate downsizing, community involvement, human rights, or predatory lending. |
∎ |
Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on linking executive pay to non-financial factors. |
9. |
Mutual Fund Proxies |
Election of Trustees and Directors
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings. However, mutual fund boards do not usually have compensation committees, so do not withhold for the lack of this committee.
Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For closed-end management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at CEFs that have not provided a compelling rationale for opting-in to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a by-law amendment to a shareholder vote.
Investment Advisory Agreement
An investment advisory agreement is an agreement between a mutual fund and its financial advisor under which the financial advisor provides investment advice to the fund in return for a fee based on the fund’s net asset size.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 93 of 98 |
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on investment advisory agreements should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors:
∎ |
Proposed and current fee schedules; |
∎ |
Fund category/investment objective; |
∎ |
Performance benchmarks; |
∎ |
Share price performance as compared with peers; |
∎ |
Resulting fees relative to peers; |
∎ |
Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control). |
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Non-fundamental Restriction
Fundamental investment restrictions are limitations within a fund’s articles of incorporation that limit the investment practices of the particular fund.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non-fundamental restriction, considering the following factors:
∎ |
The fund’s target investments; |
∎ |
The reasons given by the fund for the change; and |
∎ |
The projected impact of the change on the portfolio. |
Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Non-fundamental
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals to change a fund’s fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.
Distribution Agreements
Distribution agreements are agreements between a fund and its distributor which provide that the distributor is paid a fee to promote the sale of the fund’s shares.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on distribution agreement proposals, considering the following factors:
∎ |
Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives; |
∎ |
The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance; |
∎ |
The competitiveness of the fund in the industry; and |
∎ |
The terms of the agreement. |
Approving New Classes or Series of Shares
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares.
Convert Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund
Although approval of these proposals would eliminate the discount at which the fund’s shares trade. The costs associated with converting the fund, in addition to the potential risks to long-term shareholder value, outweigh the potential benefits of the conversion.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 94 of 98 |
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on conversion proposals, considering the following factors:
∎ |
Past performance as a closed-end fund; |
∎ |
Market in which the fund invests; |
∎ |
Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and |
∎ |
Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals. |
Proxy Contests
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proxy contests, considering the following factors:
∎ |
Past performance relative to its peers; |
∎ |
Market in which fund invests; |
∎ |
Measures taken by the board to address the issues; |
∎ |
Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals; |
∎ |
Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents; |
∎ |
Independence of directors; |
∎ |
Experience and skills of director candidates; |
∎ |
Governance profile of the company; |
∎ |
Evidence of management entrenchment. |
Preferred Stock Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares, considering the following factors:
∎ |
Stated specific financing purpose; |
∎ |
Possible dilution for common shares; |
∎ |
Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes. |
Mergers
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on merger proposals, considering the following factors:
∎ |
Resulting fee structure; |
∎ |
Performance of both funds; |
∎ |
Continuity of management personnel; and |
∎ |
Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights. |
Business Development Companies – Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV) if:
∎ |
The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date that is less than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940; |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 95 of 98 |
∎ |
A majority of the independent directors who have no financial interest in the sale have made a determination as to whether such sale would be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders prior to selling shares below NAV; and |
∎ |
The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either: |
∎ |
Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one-and three-year median TSRs; or |
∎ |
Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholders. |
Change in Fund’s Subclassification
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes in a fund’s sub-classification, considering the following factors: a) potential competitiveness; b) current and potential returns; c) risk of concentration; d) consolidation in target industry.
Changing the Domicile of a Fund
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on re-incorporations, considering the following factors: a) regulations of both states; b) required fundamental policies of both states; c) the increased flexibility available.
Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors: a) strategies employed to salvage the company; b) the fund’s past performance; c) the terms of the liquidation.
Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate subadvisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one subadviser.
Name Change Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on name change proposals, considering the following factors: a) political/economic changes in the target market; b) consolidation in the target market; and c) current asset composition.
1940 Act Policies
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote case-by-case on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors: a) potential competitiveness; b) regulatory developments; c) current and potential returns; and d) current and potential risk. |
∎ |
Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation. |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 96 of 98 |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 97 of 98 |
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W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 98 of 98 |
INTERNATIONAL SRI PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 2024 Policy Recommendations Published January 2024 W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions |
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Stock Option Plans – Adjustment for Dividend (Nordic Region) |
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Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Management Proposals |
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Exclusive Forum Proposals (TSX-Listed Companies and Venture Companies) |
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INTRODUCTION
ISS’ Social Advisory Services division recognizes that socially responsible investors have dual objectives: financial and social. Socially responsible investors invest for economic gain, as do all investors, but they also require that the companies in which they invest conduct their business in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.
These dual objectives carry through to socially responsible investors’ proxy voting activity once the security selection process is completed. In voting their shares, socially responsible institutional shareholders are concerned not only with sustainable economic returns to shareholders and good corporate governance but also with the ethical behavior of corporations and the social and environmental impact of their actions.
Social Advisory Services has, therefore, developed proxy voting guidelines that are consistent with the dual objectives of socially responsible shareholders. On matters of social and environmental import, the guidelines seek to reflect a broad consensus of the socially responsible investing community. Generally, we take as our frame of reference policies that have been developed by groups such as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church, Domini Social Investments, and other leading church shareholders and socially responsible mutual fund companies. Additionally, we incorporate the active ownership and investment philosophies of leading globally recognized initiatives such as the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI), the United Nations Global Compact, and environmental and social European Union Directives.
On matters of corporate governance, executive compensation, and corporate structure, Social Advisory Services guidelines are based on a commitment to create and preserve economic value and to advance principles of good corporate governance consistent with responsibilities to society as a whole.
The guidelines provide an overview of how Social Advisory Services recommends that its clients vote. We note that there may be cases in which the final vote recommendation on a particular company varies from the vote guideline due to the fact that we closely examine the merits of each proposal and consider relevant information and company-specific circumstances in arriving at our decisions. Where Social Advisory Services acts as voting agent for its clients, it follows each client’s voting policy, which may differ in some cases from the policies outlined in this document. Social Advisory Services updates its guidelines on an annual basis to take into account emerging issues and trends on environmental, social, and corporate governance topics, in addition to evolving market standards, regulatory changes, and client feedback.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 5 of 40 |
1. |
Operational Items |
Financial Results/Director and Auditor Reports
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for approval of financial statements and director and auditor reports, unless:
∎ |
There are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used; or |
∎ |
The company is not responsive to shareholder questions about specific items that should be publicly disclosed. |
Approval of Non-Financial Information Statement/Report
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for the approval of mandatory non-financial information statement/report, unless the independent assurance services provider has raised material concerns about the information presented.
Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for the reelection of auditors and proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees, unless:
∎ |
The name of the proposed auditors has not been published; |
∎ |
There are serious concerns about the effectiveness of the auditors; |
∎ |
The lead audit partner(s) has been linked with a significant auditing controversy; |
∎ |
There is a reason to believe that the auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position; |
∎ |
The lead audit partner(s) has previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company; |
∎ |
The auditors are being changed without explanation; |
∎ |
Fees for non-audit services exceed either 100 percent of standard audit-related fees or any stricter limit set in local best practice recommendations or law; or |
∎ |
Audit fees are undisclosed. |
In circumstances where fees for non-audit services include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events, such as initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spinoffs, and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees which are an exception to the standard “non-audit fee” category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit fees.
For concerns relating to the audit procedures, independence of auditors, and/or name of auditors, Social Advisory Services will focus on the auditor election and/or the audit committee members. For concerns relating to fees paid to the auditors, Social Advisory Services will focus on remuneration of auditors if this is a separate voting item, otherwise Social Advisory Services would focus on the auditor election.
Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for the appointment or reelection of statutory auditors, unless:
∎ |
There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures used; |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 6 of 40 |
∎ |
Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or |
∎ |
The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company. |
Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings (UK and Ireland)
For FTSE 350 companies, Social Advisory Services will note where four or fewer audit committee meetings have been held during the reporting period.
For FTSE All-Share companies, excluding investment companies, Social Advisory Services will draw attention to cases where three meetings, or fewer, of the Audit Committee have been held.
This recognizes the importance and complexity of the Committee’s role, and the likely increased focus on audit committee oversight of the external auditor.
Allocation of Income
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for approval of the allocation of income, unless:
∎ |
The dividend payout ratio has been consistently below 30 percent without adequate explanation; or |
∎ |
The payout is excessive given the company’s financial position. |
Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on stock (scrip) dividend proposals, considering factors such as:
∎ |
Whether the proposal allows for a cash option; and |
∎ |
If the proposal is in line with market standards. |
Amendments to Articles of Association (Bylaws)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote amendments to the articles of association on a case-by-case basis.
Virtual Meetings (UK/Ireland and Europe)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals allowing for the convening of hybrid1 shareholder meetings.
Vote case-by-case on proposals concerning virtual-only meetings2, considering:
1 The phrase “hybrid shareholder meeting” refers to an in-person meeting in which shareholders are also permitted to participate online.
2 The phrase “virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively through the use of online technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 7 of 40 |
∎ |
Whether the company has committed to ensuring shareholders will have the same rights participating electronically as they would have for an in-person meeting; |
∎ |
Rationale of the circumstances under which virtual-only meetings would be held; |
∎ |
In-person or hybrid meetings are not precluded; |
∎ |
Whether an authorization is restricted in time or allows for the possibility of virtual-only meetings indefinitely; and |
∎ |
Local laws and regulations concerning the convening of virtual meetings. |
Amendments to Constitution Regarding Virtual-Only Meetings (Australia)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally, vote for proposals which allow the company to convene hybrid1 shareholder meetings.
Generally, vote against proposals that will permit the company to convene virtual-only2 shareholder meetings, except under exceptional circumstances.
Generally, vote against proposals where the proposed wording in a company’s amended constitution is ambiguous, and nevertheless creates an ability for the company to convene virtual-only meetings outside exceptional circumstances.
Allow Company to Conduct Virtual Only Shareholder Meetings (Japan)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals allowing companies to conduct virtual only shareholder meetings. However, if the company specifies in the articles that it intends to hold virtual only meetings only in unusual situations such as the spread of an infectious disease or the occurrence of a natural disaster, vote for the article amendments.
Change in Company Fiscal Term
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for resolutions to change a company’s fiscal term unless a company’s motivation for the change is to postpone its AGM.
Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against resolutions to lower the stock ownership disclosure threshold below 5 percent unless specific reasons exist to implement a lower threshold.
Amend Quorum Requirements
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote proposals to amend quorum requirements for shareholder meetings on a case-by-case basis.
Transact Other Business
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against other business when it appears as a voting item.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 8 of 40 |
2. |
Board of Directors |
Director Elections
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management nominees in the election of directors, unless:
∎ |
Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner; |
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There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements; |
∎ |
There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest; |
∎ |
There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests; |
∎ |
The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards, including board independence standards; |
∎ |
There are specific concerns about the individual, such as criminal wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities; or |
∎ |
Absences at board and key committee3 meetings have not been explained (in countries where this information is disclosed). |
Vote for employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee and are required by law to be on those committees. Vote against employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee, if they are not required to be on those committees.
Diversity
Social Advisory Services will evaluate gender diversity on boards in international markets when reviewing director elections, to the extent that disclosures and market practices permit.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from incumbent members of the nominating committee if the board lacks at least one director of an underrepresented gender identity4.
∎ |
For Japan, if the company has an audit-committee-board structure or a traditional two-tier board structure as opposed to three committees, vote against incumbent representative directors if the board lacks at least one director of an underrepresented gender identity. |
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For Malaysia, vote against or withhold from incumbent members of the nominating committee if the board is not comprised of at least 30 percent underrepresented gender identities. |
∎ |
For Canada, UK, Ireland, and Australia, vote against or withhold from incumbent members of the nominating committee if: |
∎ |
the board is not comprised of at least 40 percent underrepresented gender identities; or |
∎ |
the board is not comprised of at least 20 percent racially or ethnically diverse directors. |
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For Continental European markets, generally vote against or withhold from incumbent members of the nominating committee if the board is not comprised of at least 40 percent underrepresented gender identities. |
∎ |
Vote against or withhold from other directors on a case-by-case-basis. |
3 Key committees are usually the ones performing the functions of audit, remuneration and nomination (plus risk for financial institutions).
4 Underrepresented gender identities include directors who identify as women or as non-binary.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 9 of 40 |
Material ESG Failures
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against or withhold from directors individually, on a committee, or potentially the entire board due to:
∎ |
Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight5, including demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately manage or mitigate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks; |
∎ |
A lack of sustainability reporting in the company’s public documents and/or website in conjunction with a failure to adequately manage or mitigate ESG risks; |
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Failure to replace management as appropriate; or |
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Egregious actions related to the director(s)’ service on the boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company. |
Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For companies that are significant (GHG) emitters6, through their operations or value chain, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent board chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where Social Advisory Services determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory.
For 2024, minimum steps needed to be considered to be aligned with a net Zero by 2050 trajectory are (all minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with policy):
∎ |
The company has detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including: |
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Board governance measures; |
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Corporate strategy; |
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Risk management analyses; and |
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Metrics and targets. |
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The company has declared a target of Net Zero by 2050 or sooner and the target includes scope 1, 2, and relevant scope 3 emissions. |
∎ |
The company has set a medium-term target for reducing its GHG emissions. |
Expectations about what constitutes “minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory” will increase over time.
For director elections, Social Advisory Services will also take into consideration market-specific provisions which are listed below:
5 Examples of failure of risk oversight include, but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant environmental incidents including spills and pollution; large scale or repeat workplace fatalities or injuries; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock.
6 For 2024, companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 10 of 40 |
Canadian Guidelines
Board Structure and Independence (TSX)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote withhold for any Executive Director or Non-Independent, Non-Executive Director where:
∎ |
The board is less than majority independent; or |
∎ |
The board lacks a separate compensation or nominating committee. |
Non-Independent Directors on Key Committees (TSX)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote withhold for members of the audit, compensation, or nominating committee who:
∎ |
Are Executive Directors; |
∎ |
Are Controlling Shareholders; or |
∎ |
Is a Non-employee officer of the company or its affiliates if he/she is among the five most highly compensated. |
Non-Independent Directors on Key Committees (TSX-V)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote withhold for Executive Directors, Controlling Shareholders or a Non-employee officer of the company or its affiliates if he/she is among the five most highly compensated who:
∎ |
Are members of the audit committee; |
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Are members of the compensation committee or the nominating committee and the committee is not majority independent; or |
∎ |
Are board members and the entire board fulfills the role of a compensation committee or a nominating committee and the board is not majority independent. |
Overboarded Directors (TSX)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote withhold for individual director nominees who:
∎ |
Are non-CEO directors and serve on more than five public company boards; or |
∎ |
Are CEOs of public companies who serve on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own – withhold only at their outside boards7. |
Transitioning directors: It is preferable for a director to step down from a board at the annual meeting to ensure orderly transitions, which may result in a director being temporarily overboarded (e.g. joining a new board in March but stepping off another board in June). Social Advisory Services will generally not count a board for policy application purposes when it is publicly-disclosed that the director will be stepping off that board at its next annual meeting. This disclosure must be included within the company’s proxy circular to be taken into consideration.
7 Although a CEO’s subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Social Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationship.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 11 of 40 |
Conversely, Social Advisory Services will include the new boards that the director is joining even if the shareholder meeting with his or her election has not yet taken place.
Overboarded Directors (Venture)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote withhold for individual director nominees who:
∎ |
Are non-CEO directors and serve on more than five public company boards; or |
∎ |
Are CEOs of public companies who serve on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own – withhold only at their outside boards7. |
Transitioning directors: It is preferable for a director to step down from a board at the annual meeting to ensure orderly transitions, which may result in a director being temporarily overboarded (e.g. joining a new board in March but stepping off another board in June). Social Advisory Services will generally not count a board for policy application purposes when it is publicly-disclosed that the director will be stepping off that board at its next annual meeting. This disclosure must be included within the company’s proxy circular to be taken into consideration. Conversely, Social Advisory Services will include the new boards that the director is joining even if the shareholder meeting with his or her election has not yet taken place.
Externally-Managed Issuers (EMIs) – TSX and TSXV
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say-on-pay resolutions where provided, or on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board as appropriate, when an issuer is externally-managed and has provided minimal or no disclosure about their management services agreements and how senior management is compensated. Factors taken into consideration may include but are not limited to:
∎ |
The size and scope of the management services agreement; |
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Executive compensation in comparison to issuer peers and/or similarly structured issuers; |
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Overall performance; |
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Related party transactions; |
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Board and committee independence; |
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Conflicts of interest and process for managing conflicts effectively; |
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Disclosure and independence of the decision-making process involved in the selection of the management services provider; |
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Risk mitigating factors included within the management services agreement such as fee recoupment mechanisms; |
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Historical compensation concerns; |
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Executives’ responsibilities; and |
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Other factors that may reasonably be deemed appropriate to assess an externally-managed issuer’s governance framework. |
Unilateral Adoption of an Advance Notice Provision
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally withhold from individual directors, committee members, or the entire board as appropriate in situations where an advance notice policy has been adopted by the board but has not been included on the voting agenda at the next shareholders’ meeting.
Continued lack of shareholder approval of the advanced notice policy in subsequent years may result in further withhold recommendations.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 12 of 40 |
European Guidelines
In European markets, Social Advisory Services looks at different factors to make determinations regarding director elections. The following factors are taken into account:
Director Terms
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against the election or re-election of any director when his/her term is not disclosed or when it exceeds four years and adequate explanation for non-compliance has not been provided.
Under best practice recommendations, companies should shorten the terms for directors when the terms exceed the limits suggested by best practices. The policy will be applied to all companies, for bundled as well as unbundled items.
Beyond that, as directors should be accountable to shareholders on a more regular basis, Social Advisory Services may consider moving to maximum board terms of less than four years in the future.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against article amendment proposals to extend board terms.
In cases where a company’s articles provide for a shorter limit and where the company wishes to extend director terms from three or fewer years to four years, for example, Social Advisory Services will recommend a vote against, based on the general principle that director accountability is maximized by elections with a short period of renewal.
Bundling of Proposals to Elect Directors
Bundling together proposals that could be presented as separate voting items is not considered good market practice, because bundled resolutions leave shareholders with an all-or-nothing choice, skewing power disproportionately towards the board and away from shareholders. As director elections are one of the most important voting decisions that shareholders make, directors should be elected individually.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For the markets of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia vote against the election or reelection of any directors if the company proposes a single slate of directors.
Bundled director elections in Poland may be supported for companies that go beyond market practice by disclosing the names of nominees on a timely basis
Board Independence
Widely-held companies
A. Non-controlled companies
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if:
∎ |
Fewer than 50 percent of the board members elected by shareholders, excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives, would be independent, or |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 13 of 40 |
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Fewer than one-third of all board members would be independent. |
Portugal is excluded from Provision (1.) in the above-mentioned voting policy.
B. Controlled companies
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if less than one-third of the board members are independent.
Board Leadership
Given the importance of board leadership, Social Advisory Services may consider that the chair of the board should be an independent non-executive director according to the Social Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors.
Non-widely held companies
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if less than one-third of the board members are independent.
Definition of terms
‘Widely-held companies’ are determined based on their membership in a major index and/or the number of Social Advisory Services clients holding the securities. For Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, this is based on membership on a local blue-chip market index and/or MSCI EAFE companies. For Portugal, it is based on membership in the PSI-20 and/or MSCI EAFE index.
A company is considered to be controlled for the purposes of the above-mentioned voting policies if a shareholder, or multiple shareholders acting in concert, control a majority of the company’s equity capital (i.e. 50 percent + one share). If a company is majority-controlled by virtue of a shareholder structure in which shareholders’ voting rights do not accrue in accordance with their equity capital commitment (e.g. unequal or multi-class share structures), the company will not be classified as controlled unless the majority shareholder/majority shareholding group also holds a majority of the company’s equity capital.
Disclosure of Nominee Names
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against the election or reelection of any and all director nominees when the names of the nominees are not available at the time the proxy analysis is being written.
This policy will be applied to all companies in these markets, for bundled and unbundled items.
Combined Chair/CEO
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally, vote against the (re)election of combined chair/CEOs at widely held European companies.
When the company provides assurance that the chair/CEO would only serve in the combined role on an interim basis (no more than two years), the vote recommendation would be made on a case-by-case basis.
In the above-mentioned situation, Social Advisory Services will consider the rationale provided by the company and whether it has set up adequate control mechanisms on the board (such as a lead independent director, a high overall level of board independence, and a high level of independence on the board’s key committees).
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 14 of 40 |
Election of Former CEO as Chair of the Board
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against the (re)election of a former CEO to the supervisory board or board of directors in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands if the former CEO is to be chair of the relevant board. To this end, companies are expected to confirm prior to the general meeting that the former CEO will not be (re)appointed as chair of the relevant board.
Given the importance of board leadership, Social Advisory Services may consider that the chair of the board should be an independent non-executive director according to the Social Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors.
Overboarded Directors
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: In Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, Social Advisory Services will generally recommend a vote against a candidate when they hold an excessive number of board appointments, as defined by the following guidelines:
∎ |
Any person who holds more than five mandates at listed companies will be classified as overboarded. For the purposes of calculating this limit, a non-executive directorship counts as one mandate, a non-executive chair position counts as two mandates, and a position as executive director (or a comparable role) is counted as three mandates. |
∎ |
Also, any person who holds the position of executive director (or a comparable role) at one company and serves as a non-executive chair at a different company will be classified as overboarded. |
An adverse vote recommendation will not be applied to a director within a company where they serve as CEO; instead, any adverse vote recommendations will be applied to their additional seats on other company boards. For chairs, negative recommendations would first be applied towards non-executive, non-chair positions held, but the chair position itself would be targeted where they are being elected as chair for the first time or, when in aggregate their chair positions are three or more in number, or if the chair holds an outside executive position.
One Board Seat per Director
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: In cases where a director holds more than one board seat on a single board and the corresponding votes, manifested as one seat as a physical person plus an additional seat(s) as a representative of a legal entity, vote against the election/reelection of such legal entities and in favor of the physical person.
However, an exception is made if the representative of the legal entity holds the position of CEO. In such circumstances, Social Advisory Services will typically recommend a vote in favor of the legal entity and against the election/reelection of the physical person.
While such occurrences are rare, there have been cases where a board member may have multiple board seats and corresponding votes. Holding several board seats concurrently within one board increases this person’s direct influence on board decisions and creates an inequality among board members.
This situation has manifested in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. This is not a good corporate governance practice, as it places disproportionate influence and control in one person.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 15 of 40 |
Composition of Committees
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
For widely-held companies, generally vote against the (re)election of any non-independent members of the audit committee if fewer than 50 percent of the audit committee members, who are elected by shareholders in such capacity or another – excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives – would be independent.
Generally vote against the election or reelection of the non-independent member of the audit committee designated as chair of that committee.
For widely-held companies, generally vote against the (re)election of any non-independent members of the remuneration committee if fewer than 50 percent of the remuneration committee members, who are elected by shareholders in such capacity or another - excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives - would be independent.
For all companies:
Generally vote against the (re)election of executives who serve on the company’s audit or remuneration committee.
∎ |
Social Advisory Services may recommend against if the disclosure is too poor to determine whether an executive serves or will serve on a committee. |
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If a company does not have an audit or a remuneration committee, Social Advisory Services may consider that the entire board fulfills the role of a committee. In such case, Social Advisory Services may recommend against the executives, including the CEO, up for election to the board. |
Voto di Lista (Italy)
In Italy, director elections generally take place through the voto di lista mechanism (similar to slate elections). Since the Italian implementation of the European Shareholder Rights Directive (effective since Nov. 1, 2010), Italian issuers whose shares are listed on the Italian regulated market Euronext Milan must publish the various lists 21 days in advance of the meeting.
Since shareholders only have the option to support one such list, where lists are published in sufficient time, Social Advisory Services will recommend a vote on a case-by-case basis, determining which list of nominees it considers is best suited to add value for shareholders.
Those companies that are excluded from the provisions of the European Shareholder Rights Directive generally publish lists of nominees seven days before the meeting. In the case where nominees are not published in sufficient time, Social Advisory Services will recommend a vote against the director elections before the lists of director nominees are disclosed. Once the various lists of nominees are disclosed, Social Advisory Services will issue an alert to its clients and, if appropriate, change its vote recommendation to support one particular list.
Composition of the Nominating Committee
Vote for proposals in Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to elect or appoint a nominating committee consisting mainly of non-board members.
Vote for shareholder proposals calling for disclosure of the names of the proposed candidates at the meeting, as well as the inclusion of a representative of minority shareholders in the committee.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 16 of 40 |
Vote against proposals where the names of the candidates (in the case of an election) or the principles for the establishment of the committee have not been disclosed in a timely manner.
Vote against proposals in Sweden to elect or appoint such a committee if the company is on the MSCI-EAFE or local main index and the following conditions exist:
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A member of the executive management would be a member of the committee; |
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More than one board member who is dependent on a major shareholder would be on the committee; or |
∎ |
The chair of the board would also be the chair of the committee. |
In cases where the principles for the establishment of the nominating committee, rather than the election of the committee itself, are being voted on, vote against the adoption of the principles if any of the above conditions are met for the current committee, and there is no publicly available information indicating that this would no longer be the case for the new nominating committee.
Election of Censors (France)
Social Advisory Services will generally recommend a vote against proposals seeking shareholder approval to elect a censor, to amend bylaws to authorize the appointment of censors, or to extend the maximum number of censors to the board.
However, Social Advisory Services will recommend a vote on a case-by-case basis when the company provides assurance that the censor would serve on a short-term basis (maximum one year) with the intent to retain the nominee before his/her election as director. In this case, consideration shall also be given to the nominee’s situation (notably overboarding or other factors of concern).
In consideration of the principle that censors should be appointed on a short-term basis, vote against any proposal to renew the term of a censor or to extend the statutory term of censors.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 17 of 40 |
International Guidelines
Overboarding – Brazil and Americas Regional
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally, vote against management nominees who:
∎ |
Sit on more than five public company boards; or |
∎ |
Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own—recommend against only at their outside boards8. |
Generally, vote against the bundled election of directors if one or more nominees, if elected, would be overboarded.
Overboarding – Philippines
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against the election of a board-nominated candidate who sits on more than a total of five (5) publicly-listed boards.
Cumulative Voting – Middle East and Africa (MEA)
Under a cumulative voting system, each share represents a number of votes equal to the size of the board that will be elected. These votes may be apportioned equally among the candidates or, if a shareholder wishes to exclude some nominees, among the desired candidates.
For MEA markets, when directors are elected through a cumulative voting system, or when the number of nominees exceeds the number of board vacancies, vote case-by-case on directors, taking into consideration additional factors to identify the nominees best suited to add value for shareholders.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote to abstain from all candidates if the disclosure provided by the company is not sufficient to allow the assessment of independence and the support of all proposed candidates on equal terms.
If the disclosure is sufficient to allow an assessment of the independence of proposed candidates, generally vote in favor of the following types of candidates:
∎ |
Candidates who can be identified as representatives of minority shareholders of the company, or independent candidates: |
∎ |
Candidates whose professional background may have the following benefits: |
∎ |
Increasing the diversity of incumbent directors ’ professional profiles and skills (thanks to their financial expertise, international experience, executive positions/directorships at other listed companies, or other relevant factors. |
∎ |
Bringing to the current board of directors relevant experience in areas linked to the company’s business, evidenced by current or past board memberships or management functions at other companies. |
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Incumbent board members and candidates explicitly supported by the company’s management. |
8 Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards with publicly-traded common stock will be counted as separate boards, Social Advisory Services will not recommend an against vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 18 of 40 |
Please see the International Classification of Directors on the following page.
Classification of Directors – International Policy
Executive Director
∎ |
Employee or executive of the company or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company; |
∎ |
Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company. |
Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)
∎ |
Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED; |
∎ |
Any director specifically designated as a representative of a shareholder of the company; |
∎ |
Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant shareholder of the company; |
∎ |
Any director who is also an employee or executive of a subsidiary, associate, joint venture, or company that is affiliated with a significant[1] shareholder of the company; |
∎ |
Any director who is nominated by a dissenting significant shareholder unless there is a clear lack of material[2] connection with the dissident, either currently or historically; |
∎ |
Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 10 percent of the company’s stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., members of a family that beneficially own less than 10 percent individually, but collectively own more than 10 percent), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances); |
∎ |
Government representative; |
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Currently provides or has provided (or a relative[3] provides) during the most recently concluded financial year under review professional services[4] to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or of one of its affiliates in the last fiscal year in excess of USD 10,000 per year; |
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Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which the company maintains a transactional/commercial relationship (unless the company discloses information to apply a materiality test[5]); |
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Any director who has a conflicting relationship with the company, including but not limited to cross-directorships with executive directors or the chair of the company; |
∎ |
Relative [3] of a current or former executive of the company or its affiliates; |
∎ |
A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the general meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder); |
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Founder/co-founder/SPAC sponsors[6]/member of founding family but not currently an employee or executive; |
∎ |
Former executive or employee (five-year cooling off period)[7]; |
∎ |
Years of service[7] is generally not a determining factor unless it is recommended best practice in a market and/or in extreme circumstances, in which case it may be considered. |
∎ |
Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance[8]. |
Independent NED
∎ |
No material[2] connection, either direct or indirect, to the company (other than a board seat) or to a significant shareholder. |
Employee Representative
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 19 of 40 |
∎ |
Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as “employee representative” and considered a non-independent NED). |
Footnotes
[1] At least 10 percent of the company’s stock, unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold.
[2] For purposes of Social Advisory Services’ director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship financial, personal, or otherwise that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.
[3] “Relative” follows the definition of “immediate family members” which covers spouses, parents, children, stepparents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.
[4] Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature and generally include the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; and legal services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transaction (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship.
[5] A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding transactions) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is equivalent to either 1 percent of the company’s turnover or 1 percent of the turnover of the company or organization with which the director is associated. OR, a business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is more than 10 percent of the company’s shareholder equity or the transaction value, (of all outstanding financing operations), compared to the company’s total assets, is more than 5 percent.
[6] Depending how SPAC sponsors benefit from the transaction, a misalignment of sponsors and shareholders’ interests may be characterized. Potential conflicts of interest could arise if sponsors benefit from share classes with special rights attached.
[7] For example, in continental Europe and Latin America, directors with a tenure exceeding 12 years will be considered non-independent. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, directors with a tenure exceeding nine years will be considered non-independent, unless the company provides sufficient and clear justification that the director is independent despite their long tenure. For purposes of independence classification of directors incorporated in the Middle East and Africa region, this criterion will be taken into account in accordance with market best practice and disclosure standards and availability.
[8] For MEA markets, directors’ past services as statutory auditor/partner of the statutory audit firm will be taken into account, with cooling-off periods in accordance with local market best practice.
Contested Director Elections
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For contested elections of directors, e.g. the election of shareholder nominees or the dismissal of incumbent directors, Social Advisory Services will make its recommendation on a case-by-case basis, determining which directors are considered best suited to add value for shareholders.
The analysis will generally be based on, but not limited to, the following major decision factors:
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Company performance relative to its peers; |
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Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents; |
∎ |
Independence of directors/nominees; |
∎ |
Experience and skills of board candidates; |
∎ |
Governance profile of the company; |
∎ |
Evidence of management entrenchment; |
∎ |
Responsiveness to shareholders; |
∎ |
Whether a takeover offer has been rebuffed; and |
W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M | 20 of 40 |
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Whether minority or majority representation is being sought. |
When analyzing a contested election of directors, Social Advisory Services will generally focus on two central questions: (1) Have the proponents proved that board change is warranted? And if so, (2) Are the proponent board nominees likely to effect positive change (i.e., maximize long-term shareholder value).
Discharge of Board and Management
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, unless there is reliable information about significant and compelling controversies that the board is not fulfilling its fiduciary duties such as:
∎ |
A lack of oversight or actions by board members which invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest; |
∎ |
Any legal issues (e.g. civil/criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the past or related to currently alleged actions yet to be confirmed (and not only the fiscal year in question), such as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions; |
∎ |
Other material failures of governance, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately manage or mitigate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks; or |
∎ |
A lack of sustainability reporting in the company’s public documents and/or website in conjunction with a failure to adequately manage or mitigate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks. |
For markets which do not routinely request discharge resolutions (e.g. common law countries or markets where discharge is not mandatory), analysts may voice concern in other appropriate agenda items, such as approval of the annual accounts or other relevant resolutions, to enable shareholders to express discontent with the board.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals to remove approval of discharge of board and management from the agenda.
Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote proposals seeking indemnification and liability protection for directors and officers on a case-by-case basis. |
∎ |
Vote against proposals to indemnify auditors. |
Board Structure
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for proposals to fix board size. |
∎ |
Vote against the introduction of classified boards and mandatory retirement ages for directors. |
∎ |
Vote against proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board. |
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3. |
Capital Structure |
Share Issuance Requests
General Issuances
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Evaluate share issuance requests on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration market-specific guidelines as applicable.
For European markets, vote for issuance authorities with pre-emptive rights to a maximum of 50 percent over currently issued capital and as long as the share issuance authorities’ periods are clearly disclosed (or implied by the application of a legal maximum duration) and in line with market-specific practices and/or recommended guidelines (e.g. issuance periods limited to 18 months for the Netherlands).
Vote for issuance authorities without pre-emptive rights to a maximum of 10 percent (or a lower limit if local market best practice recommendations provide) of currently issued capital as long as the share issuance authorities’ periods are clearly disclosed (or implied by the application of a legal maximum duration) and in line with market-specific practices and/or recommended guidelines (e.g. issuance periods limited to 18 months for the
Netherlands).
These thresholds are mutually exclusive.
When calculating the defined limits, all authorized and conditional capital authorizations are considered, including existing authorizations that will remain valid beyond the concerned shareholders’ meeting.
For UK and Irish companies, generally vote for a resolution to authorize the issuance of equity, unless:
∎ |
The general issuance authority exceeds one-third (33 percent) of the issued share capital. Assuming it is no more than one-third, a further one-third of the issued share capital may also be applied to a fully pre-emptive rights issue taking the acceptable aggregate authority to two-thirds (66 percent); |
∎ |
The routine authority to disapply pre-emption rights exceeds 20 percent of the issued share capital, provided that any amount above 10 percent is to be used for the purposes of an acquisition or a specified capital investment. For the general disapplication authority and specific disapplication authority, a further disapplication of up to 2 percent may be used for each authority for the purposes of a follow-on offer. |
Social Advisory Services will generally support resolutions seeking authorities in line with the Investment Association’s Share Capital Management Guidelines and the Pre-Emption Group Statement of Principles9. Social Advisory Services will support an authority to allot up to two-thirds of the existing issued share capital, providing that any amount in excess of one-third of existing issued shares would be applied to fully pre-emptive rights issues only.
Under the Pre-Emption Group Principles, companies can seek shareholder approval for a general authority of up to 10 percent, of issued ordinary share capital (with a further authority of no more than 2 percent to be used only for the purposes of making a follow-on offer); and a further 10 percent authority to be used only for purposes of an acquisition or a specified capital investment (with a further authority for no more than 2 percent to be used only for the purposes of making a follow-on offer).
A company which receives approval for an authority of this nature but is then subsequently viewed as abusing the authority in a manner not in line with Pre-emption Group Principles – for example, by issuing shares up to 10
9 https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/cd763f78-d306-43bf-99f7-7fb282200c4d/PEG_Statement-of-Principles.pdf
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percent for purposes other than set out in the guidelines or by using a cash-box structure10 to issue more than the authority approved at the previous AGM – is likely to receive a negative recommendation on the share issuance authorities at the following AGM.
In line with the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association guidelines, the authority to issue shares and the authority to disapply pre-emption rights should not be bundled together, or with any other voting issue. It is good practice, in terms of duration, for the authorities to last no more than 15 months or until the next AGM, whichever is the shorter period.
For French companies:
∎ |
Vote for general issuance requests with preemptive rights, or without preemptive rights but with a binding “priority right,” for a maximum of 50 percent over currently issued capital. |
∎ |
Generally vote for general authorities to issue shares without preemptive rights up to a maximum of 10 percent of share capital. When companies are listed on a regulated market, the maximum discount on share issuance price proposed in the resolution must, in addition, comply with the legal discount for a vote for to be warranted. |
For Hong Kong companies, generally vote for the general issuance mandate for companies that:
∎ |
Limit the request to 10 percent or less of the relevant class of issued share capital for issuance for cash and non-cash consideration; |
∎ |
Limit the discount to 10 percent of the market price of shares (rather than the maximum 20 percent permitted by the Listing Rules) for issuance for cash and non-cash consideration; and |
∎ |
Have no history of renewing the general issuance mandate several times within a period of one year which may result in the share issuance limit exceeding 10 percent of the relevant class of issued share capital for issuance for cash and non-cash consideration within the 12-month period. |
Generally vote for a general issuance of equity or equity-linked securities without preemptive rights when the share issuance limit is not more than 10 percent of the company’s issued share capital and 50 percent with preemptive rights for all Singapore companies, with the exception of Catalist-listed companies and Real Estate Investment Trusts.
For Singapore companies listed on the Catalist market of the SGX, generally vote for a general issuance of equity or equity-linked securities without preemptive rights when the share issuance limit is not more than 20 percent of the company’s issued share capital and 100 percent with preemptive rights. For Real Estate Investment Trusts, generally vote for a general issuance of equity or equity-linked securities without preemptive rights when the unit issuance limit is not more than 20 percent of its issued unit capital and 50 percent with preemptive rights.
∎ |
For companies listed on the Main Market and ACE Market of the Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd (Exchange), vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 10 percent of currently issued capital. For real estate investment trusts (REITs), vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital. |
For Latin American companies, generally vote for issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 100 percent over currently issued capital. Vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital. Specific Issuances requested will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
10 A “cash box” structure refers to a method of raising cash from the issue of equity securities for non-cash consideration through the acquisition of a special purpose vehicle whose principal asset is cash.
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For shelf registration programs at Latin American companies (Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru), vote on a case-by-case basis on all requests, with or without preemptive rights. Approval of a multi-year authority for the issuance of securities under Shelf Registration Programs will be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration, but not limited to, the following:
∎ |
Whether the company has provided adequate and timely disclosure including detailed information regarding the rationale for the proposed program; |
∎ |
Whether the proposed amount to be approved under such authority, the use of the resources, the length of the authorization, the nature of the securities to be issued under such authority, including any potential risk of dilution to shareholders is disclosed; and |
∎ |
Whether there are concerns regarding questionable finances, the use of the proceeds, or other governance concerns |
Increases in Authorized Capital
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to increase authorized capital on a case-by-case basis if such proposals do not include the authorization to issue shares from the (pre-)approved limit.
In case the proposals to increase authorized capital include the authorization to issue shares according to the (pre-)approved limit without obtaining separate shareholder approval, the general issuance policy applies.
Reduction of Capital
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders. |
∎ |
Vote proposals to reduce capital in connection with corporate restructuring on a case-by-case basis. |
Capital Structures
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share, one-vote capital structure. |
∎ |
Vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional supervoting shares. |
Preferred Stock
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote for the creation of a new class of preferred stock or for issuances of preferred stock up to 50 percent of issued capital unless the terms of the preferred stock would adversely affect the rights of existing shareholders. |
∎ |
Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible preferred stock as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets Social Advisory Services’ guidelines on equity issuance requests. |
∎ |
Vote against the creation of a new class of preference shares that would carry superior voting rights to the common shares. |
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∎ |
Vote against the creation of blank check preferred stock unless the board clearly states that the authorization will not be used to thwart a takeover bid. |
∎ |
Vote proposals to increase blank check preferred authorizations on a case-by-case basis. |
Debt Issuance Requests
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
∎ |
Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a case-by-case basis, with or without pre-emptive rights. |
∎ |
Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible debt instruments as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets Social Advisory Services’ guidelines on equity issuance requests. |
∎ |
Vote for proposals to restructure existing debt arrangements unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect the rights of shareholders. |
Pledging of Assets for Debt
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote proposals to approve the pledging of assets for debt on a case-by-case basis.
Increase in Borrowing Powers
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote proposals to approve increases in a company’s borrowing powers on a case-by-case basis.
Unequal Voting Rights
Accountability for Capital Structure with Unequal Voting Rights:
For meetings held on or after Feb. 1, 2024, at widely-held companies, generally vote against directors or against the discharge of (non-executive) directors, if the company employs a stock structure with unequal voting rights11. Vote recommendations will generally be directed against the nominees primarily responsible for, or benefiting from, the unequal vote structure.
Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:
∎ |
Newly-public companies12 with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public; |
∎ |
Situations where the unequal voting rights are considered de minimis13 or |
∎ |
The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, for example such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained or a commitment to abolish the structure by the next AGM. |
11 This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares” or “double-voting” shares).
12 Newly-public companies generally include companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.
13 Distortion between voting and economic power does not exceed 10 percent, where this is calculated relative to the entire share capital for multiple share classes and on individual shareholder or concert level in case of loyalty share structures.
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Share Repurchase Plans
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for market repurchase authorities (share repurchase programs) if the terms comply with the following criteria:
∎ |
A repurchase limit of up to 10 percent of issued share capital; |
∎ |
A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company’s issued share capital in treasury (“on the shelf”); and |
∎ |
Duration of no more than 18 months. |
Authorities to repurchase shares in excess of the 10 percent repurchase limit will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Such share repurchase authorities under special circumstances, which are required to be publicly disclosed by the company, may be supported provided that, on balance, the proposal is in shareholders’ interests. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:
∎ |
A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company’s issued share capital in treasury (“on the shelf”); and |
∎ |
Duration of no more than 18 months. |
In addition, Social Advisory Services will recommend against any proposal where:
∎ |
The repurchase can be used for takeover defenses; |
∎ |
There is clear evidence of abuse of similar authorities; |
∎ |
There is no safeguard against selective buybacks; and/or |
∎ |
Pricing provisions and safeguards are deemed to be unreasonable in light of market practice. |
Market-Specific Exceptions
For Singapore, generally vote for resolutions authorizing the company to repurchase its own shares, unless the premium over the average trading price of the shares as implied by the maximum price paid exceeds 5 percent for on-market repurchases and 20 percent for off-market repurchases.
Reissuance of Shares Repurchased
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests to reissue any repurchased shares unless there is clear evidence of abuse of this authority in the past.
Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests to capitalize reserves for bonus issues of shares or to increase par value.
Private Placement
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For Canadian companies, vote case-by-case on private placement issuances taking into account:
∎ |
Whether other resolutions are bundled with the issuance; |
∎ |
Whether the rationale for the private placement issuance is disclosed; |
∎ |
Dilution to existing shareholders’ position: |
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∎ |
issuance that represents no more than 30 percent of the company’s outstanding shares on a non-diluted basis is considered generally acceptable; |
∎ |
Discount/premium in issuance price to the unaffected share price before the announcement of the private placement; |
∎ |
Market reaction: The market’s response to the proposed private placement since announcement; and |
∎ |
Other applicable factors, including conflict of interest, change in control/management, evaluation of other alternatives. |
Generally vote for the private placement issuance if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved or the company’s auditor/management has indicated that the company has going concern issues.
4. |
Compensation |
Preamble
The assessment of compensation follows the Social Advisory Services Global Principles on Executive and Director Compensation which are detailed below. These principles take into account global corporate governance best practice.
The Global Principles on Compensation underlie market-specific policies in all markets:
∎ |
Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures; |
∎ |
Maintain appropriate pay structure with emphasis on long-term shareholder value; |
∎ |
Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure;” |
∎ |
Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee; |
∎ |
Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors. |
European Guidelines
In line with European Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC, Social Advisory Services believes that seeking annual shareholder approval for a company’s compensation policy is a positive corporate governance provision.
In applying the Five Global Principles, Social Advisory Services has formulated European Compensation Guidelines which take into account local codes of governance, market best practice, and the Recommendations published by the European Commission. Social Advisory Services analyzes compensation-related proposals based on the role of the beneficiaries and has therefore divided its executive and director compensation policy into two domains:
∎ |
Executive compensation-related proposals; and |
∎ |
Non-executive director compensation-related proposals. |
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Executive Compensation-Related Proposals
Social Advisory Services will evaluate management proposals seeking ratification of a company’s executive compensation-related items on a case-by-case basis, and, where relevant, will take into account the European Pay for Performance (EP4P) model14 outcomes within a qualitative review of a company’s remuneration practices.
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Social Advisory Services will generally recommend a vote against a company’s compensation-related proposal if such proposal fails to comply with one or a combination of several of the global principles and their corresponding rules:
∎ |
Provide shareholders with clear and comprehensive compensation disclosures: |
∎ |
Information on compensation-related proposals shall be made available to shareholders in a timely manner; |
∎ |
The level of disclosure of the proposed compensation policy and remuneration report shall be sufficient for shareholders to make an informed decision and shall be in line with what local market best practice standards dictate; |
∎ |
Remuneration report disclosure is expected to include amongst others: amounts paid to executives, alignment between company performance and payout to executives, disclosure of variable incentive targets and according levels of achievement and performance awards made, after the relevant performance period (ex-post), and disclosure and explanation of use of any discretionary authority or derogation clause by the board or remuneration committee to adjust pay outcomes. |
∎ |
Companies are expected to provide meaningful information regarding the average remuneration of employees of the company, in a manner which permits comparison with directors’ remuneration. |
∎ |
Companies shall adequately disclose all elements of the compensation, including: |
∎ |
Any short- or long-term compensation component must include a maximum award limit. |
∎ |
Long-term incentive plans must provide sufficient disclosure of (i) the exercise price/strike price (options); (ii) discount on grant; (iii) grant date/period; (iv) exercise/vesting period; and, if applicable, (v) performance criteria. |
∎ |
Discretionary payments, if applicable. |
∎ |
The derogation policy, if applicable, which shall clearly define and limit any elements (e.g., base salary, STI, LTI, etc.) and extent (e.g., caps, weightings, etc.) to which derogations may apply. |
∎ |
Maintain appropriate pay structure with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: |
∎ |
The structure of the company’s short-term incentive plan shall be appropriate. |
∎ |
The compensation policy must notably avoid guaranteed or discretionary compensation. |
∎ |
The structure of the company’s long-term incentives shall be appropriate, including, but not limited to, dilution, vesting period, and, if applicable, performance conditions. |
∎ |
Equity-based plans or awards that are linked to long-term company performance will be evaluated using Social Advisory Services’ general policy for equity-based plans; and |
14 Definition of Pay-for-Performance Evaluation:
Social Advisory Services annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to measure the alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the European Main Indices, this analysis considers the following:
§ |
Peer Group Alignment: |
✓ |
The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period. |
✓ |
The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median. |
§ |
Absolute Alignment – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period. |
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∎ |
For awards granted to executives, Social Advisory Services will generally require a clear link between shareholder value and awards, and stringent performance-based elements. |
∎ |
The balance between short- and long-term variable compensation shall be appropriate |
∎ |
The company’s executive compensation policy must notably avoid disproportionate focus on short-term variable element(s) |
∎ |
Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: |
∎ |
The board shall demonstrate good stewardship of investor’s interests regarding executive compensation practices (principle being supported by Pay for Performance Evaluation). |
∎ |
There shall be a clear link between the company’s performance and variable incentives. Financial and non-financial conditions, including ESG criteria, are relevant as long as they reward an effective performance in line with the purpose, strategy, and objectives adopted by the company. |
∎ |
There shall not be significant discrepancies between the company’s performance, financial and non-financial, and real executive payouts. |
∎ |
The level of pay for the CEO and members of executive management should not be excessive relative to peers, company performance, and market practices. |
∎ |
Significant pay increases shall be explained by a detailed and compelling disclosure. |
∎ |
Termination payments15 must not be in excess of (i) 24 months’ pay or of (ii) any more restrictive provision pursuant to local legal requirements and/or market best practices. |
∎ |
Arrangements with a company executive regarding pensions and post-mandate exercise of equity-based awards must not result in an adverse impact on shareholders’ interests or be misaligned with good market practices. |
∎ |
Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: |
∎ |
No executives may serve on the compensation committee. |
∎ |
In certain markets the compensation committee shall be composed of a majority of independent members, as per Social Advisory Services policies on director election and board or committee composition. |
∎ |
Compensation committees should use the discretion afforded them by shareholders to ensure that rewards properly reflect business performance16. |
In addition to the above, Social Advisory Services will generally recommend a vote against a compensation-related proposal if such proposal is in breach of any other supplemental market-specific voting policies.
Non-Executive Director Compensation
∎ |
Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors. |
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to award cash fees to non-executive directors.
15 Termination payments’ means any payment linked to early termination of contracts for executive or managing directors, including payments related to the duration of a notice period or a non-competition clause included in the contract.
16 In cases where a remuneration committee uses its discretion to determine payments, it should provide a clear explanation of its reasons, which are expected to be clearly justified by the financial results and the underlying performance of the company.
The remuneration committee should disclose how it has taken into account any relevant environmental, social, and governance (ESG) matters when determining remuneration outcomes. Such factors may include (but are not limited to): workplace fatalities and injuries, significant environmental incidents, large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies and/or significant adverse legal judgments or settlements.
It is relatively rare that a remuneration committee chooses to amend the targets used for either the annual bonus or the LTIP following the start of the performance period, but where this has occurred, it is good practice for the company to demonstrate how the revised targets are in practice no less challenging than the targets which were originally set.
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Vote against where:
∎ |
Documents (including general meeting documents, annual report) provided prior to the general meeting do not mention fees paid to non-executive directors. |
∎ |
Proposed amounts are excessive relative to other companies in the country or industry. |
∎ |
The company intends to increase the fees excessively in comparison with market/sector practices, without stating compelling reasons that justify the increase. |
∎ |
Proposals provide for the granting of stock options, performance-based equity compensation (including stock appreciation rights and performance-vesting restricted stock), and performance-based cash to non-executive directors. |
∎ |
Proposals introduce retirement benefits for non-executive directors. |
Vote on a case-by-case basis where:
∎ |
Proposals include both cash and share-based components to non-executive directors. |
∎ |
Proposals bundle compensation for both non-executive and executive directors into a single resolution. |
Equity-Based Compensation Guidelines
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for equity based compensation proposals or the like if the plan(s) is(are) in line with long-term shareholder interests and align the award with shareholder value. This assessment includes, but is not limited to, the following factors:
∎ |
The volume of awards (to be) transferred to participants under all outstanding plans must not be excessive: awards must not exceed 5 percent of a company’s issued share capital. This number may be up to 10 percent for high-growth companies or particularly well-designed plans (e.g., with challenging performance criteria, extended vesting/performance period, etc.); |
∎ |
The plan(s) must be sufficiently long-term in nature/structure: the vesting of awards (i) must occur no less than three years from the grant date, and (ii) if applicable, should be conditioned on meeting performance targets that are measured over a period of at least three consecutive years; |
∎ |
If applicable, performance conditions must be fully disclosed, measurable, quantifiable, and long-term oriented; |
∎ |
The awards must be granted at market price. Discounts, if any, must be mitigated by performance criteria or other features that justify such discount. |
Employee Share Purchase Plans
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for employee stock purchase plans if the number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the company’s issued share capital.
Compensation-Related Voting Sanctions
Should a company be deemed:
∎ |
To have egregious remuneration practices; |
∎ |
To have failed to follow market practice by not submitting expected resolutions on executive compensation; or |
∎ |
To have failed to respond to significant shareholder dissent on remuneration-related proposals; |
An adverse vote recommendation could be applied to any of the following on a case-by case basis:
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∎ |
The reelection of the chair of the remuneration committee or, where relevant, any other members of the remuneration committee; |
∎ |
The reelection of the board chair; |
∎ |
The discharge of directors; or |
∎ |
The annual report and accounts. |
This recommendation could be made in addition to other adverse recommendations under existing remuneration proposals (if any).
Stock Option Plans – Adjustment for Dividend (Nordic Region)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against stock option plans in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden if evidence is found that they contain provisions that may result in a disconnect between shareholder value and employee/executive reward.
This includes one or a combination of the following:
∎ |
Adjusting the strike price for future ordinary dividends AND including expected dividend yield above 0 percent when determining the number of options awarded under the plan; |
∎ |
Having significantly higher expected dividends than actual historical dividends; |
∎ |
Favorably adjusting the terms of existing options plans without valid reason; and/or |
∎ |
Any other provisions or performance measures that result in undue award. |
This policy applies to both new plans and amendments to introduce the provisions into already existing stock option plans. Social Advisory Services will make an exception if a company proposes to reduce the strike price by the amount of future special (extraordinary) dividends only.
Generally vote against if the potential increase of share capital amounts to more than 5 percent for mature companies or 10 percent for growth companies or if options may be exercised below the market price of the share at the date of grant, or that employee options do not lapse if employment is terminated.
Share Matching Plans (Sweden and Norway)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation:
Social Advisory Services considers the following factors when evaluating share matching plans:
∎ |
For every share matching plan, Social Advisory Services requires a holding period. |
∎ |
For plans without performance criteria, the shares must be purchased at market price. |
∎ |
“For broad-based share matching plans directed at all employees, Social Advisory Services accepts an arrangement up to a 1:1 ratio, i.e. no more than one free share is awarded for every share purchased at market value. |
In addition, for plans directed at executives, we require that sufficiently challenging performance criteria be attached to the plan. Higher discounts demand proportionally higher performance criteria.
The dilution of the plan when combined with the dilution from any other proposed or outstanding employee stock purchase/stock matching plans, must comply with Social Advisory Services’ guidelines.
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Canadian Guidelines
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a case-by-case basis.
Vote against management say on pay (MSOP) proposals, withhold from compensation committee members (or in rare cases where the full board is deemed responsible, all directors including the CEO), and/or against an equity-based incentive plan proposal if:
∎ |
There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance) |
∎ |
The company maintains problematic pay practices; or |
∎ |
The board exhibits poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders. |
Pay for Performance
∎ |
Rationale for determining compensation (e.g., why certain elements and pay targets are used, how they are used in relation to the company’s business strategy, and specific incentive plan goals, especially retrospective goals) and linkage of compensation to long-term performance; |
∎ |
Evaluation of peer group benchmarking used to set target pay or award opportunities; |
∎ |
Analysis of company performance and executive pay trends over time, taking into account our Pay-for-Performance policy; |
∎ |
Mix of fixed versus variable and performance versus non-performance-based pay. |
Pay Practices
∎ |
Assessment of compensation components included in the Problematic Pay Practices policy such as: perks, severance packages, employee loans, supplemental executive pension plans, internal pay disparity and equity plan practices (including option backdating, repricing, option exchanges, or cancellations/surrenders and re-grants, etc.); |
∎ |
Existence of measures that discourage excessive risk taking which include but are not limited to: clawbacks, holdbacks, stock ownership requirements, deferred compensation practices etc. |
Board Communications and Responsiveness
∎ |
Clarity of disclosure (e.g. whether the company’s Form 51-102F6 disclosure provides timely, accurate, clear information about compensation practices in both tabular format and narrative discussion); |
∎ |
Assessment of board’s responsiveness to investor concerns on compensation issues (e.g., whether the company engaged with shareholders and / or responded to majority-supported shareholder proposals relating to executive pay). |
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Management Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals for an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation. Vote against these resolutions in cases where boards have failed to demonstrate good stewardship of investors’ interests regarding executive compensation practices.
In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices-- dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather than withholding or voting against the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then vote against or withhold from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative
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factors involve equity-based compensation, then vote against an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval.
Equity Compensation Plans
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on equity-based compensation plans using an “equity plan scorecard” (EPSC) approach. Under this approach, certain features and practices related to the plan17 are assessed in combination, with positively-assessed factors potentially counterbalancing negatively-assessed factors and vice-versa. Factors are grouped into three pillars:
∎ |
Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both: |
∎ |
SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and |
∎ |
SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants. |
∎ |
Plan Features: |
∎ |
Absence of problematic change-in-control (CIC) provisions, including: |
∎ |
Single-trigger acceleration of award vesting in connection with a CIC; and |
∎ |
Settlement of performance-based equity at target or above in the event of a CIC-related acceleration of vesting regardless of performance. |
∎ |
No financial assistance to plan participants for the exercise or settlement of awards; |
∎ |
Public disclosure of the full text of the plan document; and |
∎ |
Reasonable share dilution from equity plans relative to market best practices. |
∎ |
Grant Practices: |
∎ |
Reasonable three-year average burn rate relative to market best practices; |
∎ |
Meaningful time vesting requirements for the CEO’s most recent equity grants (three-year lookback); |
∎ |
The issuance of performance-based equity to the CEO; |
∎ |
A clawback provision applicable to equity awards; and |
∎ |
Post-exercise or post-settlement share-holding requirements (S&P/TSX Composite Index only). |
Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors, as determined by an overall score, indicates that the plan is not in shareholders’ interests. In addition, vote against the plan if any of the following unacceptable factors have been identified:
∎ |
Discretionary or insufficiently limited non-employee director participation; |
∎ |
An amendment provision which fails to adequately restrict the company’s ability to amend the plan without shareholder approval; |
∎ |
A history of repricing stock options without shareholder approval (three-year look-back); |
∎ |
The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant pay-for-performance disconnect under certain circumstances; or |
∎ |
Any other plan features that are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests. |
17 In cases where certain historic grant data are unavailable (e.g. following an IPO or emergence from bankruptcy), Special Cases models will be applied which omit factors requiring these data.
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Director Compensation – TSX
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: On a case-by-case basis, generally withhold from members of the committee responsible for director compensation (or, where no such committee has been identified, the board chair or full board) where director compensation practices which pose a risk of compromising a non-employee director’s independence or which otherwise appear problematic from the perspective of shareholders have been identified, including:
∎ |
Excessive (relative to standard market practice) inducement grants issued upon the appointment or election of a new director to the board (consideration will be given to the form in which the compensation has been issued and the board’s rationale for the inducement grant); |
∎ |
Performance-based equity grants to non-employee directors which could pose a risk of aligning directors’ interests away from those of shareholders and toward those of management; and |
∎ |
Other significant problematic practices relating to director compensation. |
Other Compensation Plans
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs, ESOPs)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for broadly based (preferably all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more beneficial ownership of the company) employee stock purchase plans where the following apply:
∎ |
Reasonable limit on employee contribution (may be expressed as a fixed dollar amount or as a percentage of base salary excluding bonus, commissions and special compensation); |
∎ |
Employer contribution of up to 25 percent of employee contribution and no purchase price discount or employer contribution of more than 25 percent of employee contribution and SVT cost of the company’s equity plans is within the allowable cap for the company; |
∎ |
Purchase price is at least 80 percent of fair market value with no employer contribution; |
∎ |
Potential dilution together with all other equity-based plans is 10 percent of outstanding common shares or less; and |
∎ |
The Plan Amendment Provision requires shareholder approval for amendments to: |
∎ |
The number of shares reserved for the plan; |
∎ |
The allowable purchase price discount; |
∎ |
The employer matching contribution amount. |
Treasury funded ESPPs, as well as market purchase funded ESPPs requesting shareholder approval, will be considered to be incentive based compensation if the employer match is greater than 25 percent of the employee contribution. In this case, the plan will be run through the Social Advisory Services compensation model to assess the Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) cost of the plan together with the company’s other equity-based compensation plans.
Eligibility and administration are also key factors in determining the acceptability of an ESPP/ESOP plan.
Social Advisory Services will also take into account other compensation and benefit programs, in particular pensions.
Deferred Share Unit Plans
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for Deferred Compensation Plans if:
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∎ |
Potential dilution, together with all other equity-based compensation, is ten percent of the outstanding common shares or less. |
Other elements of director compensation to evaluate in conjunction with deferred share units include:
∎ |
Director stock ownership guidelines of a minimum of three times annual cash retainer; |
∎ |
Vesting schedule or mandatory deferral period which requires that shares in payment of deferred units may not be paid out until the end of three years; |
∎ |
The mix of remuneration between cash and equity; and |
∎ |
Other forms of equity-based compensation, i.e. stock options, restricted stock. |
International Guidelines
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Evaluate executive and director compensation proposals on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the Global Principles as applicable.
5. |
Environmental and Social Issues |
Social and Environmental Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote in favor of social and environmental proposals that seek to promote good corporate citizenship while enhancing long-term shareholder and stakeholder value. In determining votes on shareholder social and environmental proposals, the following factors are considered:
∎ |
Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable; |
∎ |
Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company’s short-term or long-term share value; |
∎ |
Whether the company’s analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive; |
∎ |
The degree to which the company’s stated position on the issues could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to boycott or selective purchasing; |
∎ |
Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board; |
∎ |
Whether the issues presented in the proposal are best dealt with through legislation, government regulation, or company-specific action; |
∎ |
The company’s approach compared with its peers or any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal; |
∎ |
Whether the company has already responded in an appropriate or sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal; |
∎ |
Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s environmental or social practices; |
∎ |
If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not sufficient information is publicly available to shareholders and whether it would be unduly burdensome for the company to compile and avail the requested information to shareholders in a more comprehensive or amalgamated fashion; and |
∎ |
Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal. |
Generally vote for social and environmental shareholder proposals that seek greater disclosure on topics such as human/labor rights, workplace safety, environmental practices and climate change risk, sustainable business practices etc.
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Vote all other social and environmental proposals on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the considerations outlined above.
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:
∎ |
The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards; |
∎ |
Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3); |
∎ |
The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant); |
∎ |
Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based; |
∎ |
Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050; |
∎ |
Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years; |
∎ |
Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance; |
∎ |
Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy; |
∎ |
Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and |
∎ |
The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers. |
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:
∎ |
The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure; |
∎ |
The company’s actual GHG emissions performance; |
∎ |
Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and |
∎ |
Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive. |
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6. |
Other Items |
Reorganizations/Restructurings
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote reorganizations and restructurings on a case-by-case basis.
Mergers and Acquisitions
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:
For every M&A analysis, Social Advisory Services reviews publicly available information as of the date of the report and evaluates the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:
∎ |
Valuation: Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, Social Advisory Services places emphasis on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale; |
∎ |
Market reaction: How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction will cause Social Advisory Services to scrutinize a deal more closely; |
∎ |
Strategic rationale: Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions; |
∎ |
Conflicts of interest: Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? Social Advisory Services will consider whether any special interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger; |
∎ |
Governance: Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance. |
∎ |
Stakeholder impact: Impact on community stakeholders including impact on workforce, environment, etc. |
Vote against if the companies do not provide sufficient information upon request to make an informed voting decision.
Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote proposals to waive mandatory takeover bid requirements on a case-by-case basis.
Reincorporation Proposals
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis.
Expansion of Business Activities
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for resolutions to expand business activities unless the new business takes the company into risky areas.
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Exclusive Forum Proposals (TSX-Listed Companies and Venture Companies)
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt an exclusive forum by-law or to amend by-laws to add an exclusive forum provision, taking the following into consideration:
∎ |
Jurisdiction of incorporation; |
∎ |
Board rationale for adopting exclusive forum; |
∎ |
Legal actions subject to the exclusive forum provision; |
∎ |
Evidence of past harm as a result of shareholder legal action against the company originating outside of the jurisdiction of incorporation; |
∎ |
Company corporate governance provisions and shareholder rights; |
∎ |
Any other problematic provisions that raise concerns regarding shareholder rights. |
Related-Party Transactions
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote related-party transactions on a case-by-case basis considering factors including, but not limited to, the following:
∎ |
The parties on either side of the transaction; |
∎ |
The nature of the asset to be transferred/service to be provided; |
∎ |
The pricing of the transaction (and any associated professional valuation); |
∎ |
The views of independent directors (where provided); |
∎ |
The views of an independent financial adviser (where appointed); |
∎ |
Whether any entities party to the transaction (including advisers) is conflicted; and |
∎ |
The stated rationale for the transaction, including discussions of timing. |
If there is a transaction that is deemed problematic and that was not put to a shareholder vote, Social Advisory Services may recommend against the election of the director(s) involved in the related-party transaction or against the full board.
In the case of Nigerian companies, vote for proposals relating to renewal of the general mandate for the company to enter into recurrent transactions with related parties necessary for its day-to-day operations in the absence of any concerns with the related party transactions concluded pursuant to this general mandate.
Antitakeover Mechanisms
Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against all antitakeover proposals unless they are structured in such a way that they give shareholders the ultimate decision on any proposal or offer.
Following the Florange act of 2016, for French companies listed on a regulated market, generally vote against any general authorities impacting the share capital (i.e. authorities for share repurchase plans and any general share issuances with or without preemptive rights) if they can be used for antitakeover purposes without shareholders’ prior explicit approval.
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7. |
Foreign Private Issuers |
Foreign private issuers (“FPIs”) are defined as companies whose business is administered principally outside the U.S., with more than 50 percent of assets located outside the U.S.; a majority of whose directors/officers are not U.S. citizens or residents; and a majority of whose outstanding voting shares are held by non-residents of the U.S. Companies that are incorporated outside of the U.S. and listed solely on U.S. exchanges, where they qualify as FPIs, will be subject to the following policy:
Vote against or withhold from non-independent director nominees at companies which fail to meet the following criteria: a majority-independent board, and the presence of an audit, compensation, and a nomination committee, each of which is entirely composed of independent directors. Where the design and disclosure levels of equity compensation plans are comparable to those seen at U.S. companies, U.S. compensation policy will be used to evaluate the compensation plan proposals. All other voting items will be evaluated using the relevant regional or market proxy voting guidelines.
While a firm’s country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, Social Advisory Services will generally apply its U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S. policies will also apply to companies listed on U.S. exchanges as Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) and that may be exempt from the disclosure and corporate governance requirements that apply to most companies traded on U.S. exchanges, including a number of SEC rules and stock market listing requirements. Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on the country of incorporation.
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PROXY VOTING POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES
Effective Date 12/15/2022
These policies and procedures (and the guidelines that follow) apply to the voting of proxies by Northern Trust Corporation affiliates (“Northern Trust”) for accounts over which Northern Trust has been granted proxy voting discretion.
NTAC:3NS-20
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Northern Trust will vote case by case on individual directors who attend fewer than 75 percent of board and board-committee meetings for two consecutive years |
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I. Director and Officer Indemnification and Liability Protection |
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D. Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Amend the Charter or Bylaws |
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D. Board of Directors Failure to Respond to Certain Majority Approved Shareholder Proposals |
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E. Board of Directors Failure to Adequately Respond to Rejected Board Compensation Proposals |
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NTAC:3NS-20 | i |
F. Compensation Committee Failure to Adequately Address Pay for Performance |
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Northern Trust generally allows for management discretion on matters related to stock distributions, such as stock splits and stock dividends |
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F. Shareholder Proposals Regarding Blank Check Preferred Stock |
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NTAC:3NS-20 | ii |
Northern Trust
Proxy Voting
Policies and Procedures
These policies and procedures (and the guidelines that follow) apply to the voting of proxies by
Northern Trust Corporation affiliates (“Northern Trust”) for accounts over which Northern Trust has been granted proxy voting discretion.
SECTION 1. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES
The fundamental precept followed by Northern Trust in voting proxies is to ensure that the manner in which shares are voted is in the best interest of clients/beneficiaries and the value of the investment. As used in these policies and procedures the term “clients/beneficiaries” means any person or entity having the legal or beneficial ownership interest, as the case may be, in a trust, custody or investment management account over which Northern Trust has discretionary voting authority.
Absent special circumstances of the types described in these policies and procedures, Northern Trust will generally exercise its proxy voting discretion in accordance with the guidelines set forth below. In situations where the application of Northern Trust’s guidelines would be inappropriate for particular proxy issues of non-U.S. companies due to local market standards, customs and best practices, Northern Trust will instruct its Proxy Voting Service (defined below in Section 3) to provide a vote recommendation based on the Proxy Voting Service’s relevant global guidelines. Examples of such issues include “poison pill” defenses, which are allowed to be approved by a company’s board of directors without shareholder approval in a number of countries, and definitions of director independence, which vary significantly from country to country.
The foregoing domestic and global proxy voting guidelines are collectively referred to in these policies and procedures as the “Proxy Guidelines”.
SECTION 2. PROXY COMMITTEE
Northern Trust’s Proxy Committee has responsibility for the content, interpretation and application of the Proxy Guidelines. Membership of the Proxy Committee consists of a group of senior Northern Trust investment and compliance officers. Meetings of the Proxy Committee may be called by the Chairperson or, in his or her absence, by any two committee members. Meetings may be conducted in person or telephonically. A majority of committee members present (in person or by proxy) will constitute a quorum for the transacting of business at any meeting. The approval of proxy votes or changes to these policies and procedures or the Proxy Guidelines may be made by majority vote of those present (in person or by proxy) at a meeting called for that purpose. Alternatively, the Committee may approve proxy votes or changes to these policies and procedures or the Proxy Guidelines by a majority vote communicated telephonically (without a meeting) or electronically, provided that any action so approved is properly documented and reflected in minutes of the next meeting of the Committee.
NTAC:3NS-20 | 1 |
SECTION 3. PROXY VOTING SERVICE
Northern Trust has delegated to an independent third party proxy voting service (“Proxy Voting Service”), the responsibility to review proxy proposals and to make voting recommendations to the Proxy Committee in a manner consistent with the Proxy Guidelines. For proxy proposals that under the Proxy Guidelines are to be voted on a case by case basis, Northern Trust provides supplementary instructions to the Proxy Voting Service to guide it in making vote recommendations. Northern Trust has instructed the Proxy Voting Service not to exercise any discretion in making vote recommendations and to seek guidance whenever it encounters situations that are either not covered by the Proxy Guidelines or where application of the Proxy Guidelines is unclear. In the event that the Proxy Voting Service does not or will not provide recommendations with respect to proxy proposals for securities over which Northern Trust or its affiliates have voting discretion, the relevant proxy analyst at Northern Trust responsible for the issuer or its business sector shall be responsible for reviewing the proxy proposal and making a voting recommendation to the Proxy Committee consistent with the Proxy Guidelines.
The Proxy Committee will review the Proxy Voting Service on an annual basis. In connection with that review, it will assess: (1) the Proxy Voting Service’s capacity and competency in analyzing proxy issues; (2) the adequacy of the Proxy Voting Service’s staffing and personnel; (3) whether the Proxy Voting Service has robust policies and procedures that enable it to make proxy voting recommendations based on current and accurate information; and (4) the Proxy Voting Service’s ability to identify and address any real or potential conflicts of interests that exist or may have existed between the firm and its employees and the voting recommendations it made to Northern Trust. The Proxy Committee will also regularly monitor the Proxy Voting Service by requesting information from the Proxy Service to determine whether any real or potential conflicts of interest exist as a result of changes to the firm’s business or internal policies. The Proxy Voting Service will also be required to proactively communicate any (i) business changes or (ii) changes and updates to the firm’s policies and procedures that could impact the adequacy and quality of the proxy voting services or the firm’s ability to effectively manage conflicts.
SECTION 4. APPLICATION OF PROXY GUIDELINES
It is intended that the Proxy Guidelines will be applied with a measure of flexibility. Accordingly, except as otherwise provided in these policies and procedures, the Proxy Committee may vote proxies contrary to the recommendations of the Proxy Voting Service, or, in the circumstances described in Section 3 above, a Northern Trust proxy analyst, if it determines such action to be in the best interests of Northern Trust clients/beneficiaries. In the exercise of such discretion the Proxy Committee may take into account a wide array of factors relating to the matter under consideration, the nature of the proposal, and the company involved. As a result, a proxy may be voted in one manner in the case of one company and in a different manner in the case of another where, for example, the past history of the company, the character and integrity of its management, the role of outside directors, and the company’s record of producing performance for investors justifies a high degree of confidence in the company and the effect of the proposal on the value of the investment. Similarly, poor past performance, uncertainties about
NTAC:3NS-20 | 2 |
management and future directions, and other factors may lead to a conclusion that particular proposals present unacceptable investment risks and should not be supported. In addition, the proposals should be evaluated in context. For example, a particular proposal may be acceptable standing alone, but objectionable when part of an existing or proposed package, such as where the effect may be to entrench management. Special circumstances may also justify casting different votes for different clients/beneficiaries with respect to the same proxy vote.
The Proxy Committee will document the rationale for any proxy voted contrary to the recommendation of the Proxy Voting Service or, in the circumstances described in Section 3 above, a Northern Trust proxy analyst.
SECTION 5. MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Northern Trust has sought to address proxy related conflicts of interest in various ways, including the establishment, composition and authority of the Proxy Committee, and the delegation of primary responsibility for proxy review and vote recommendation functions to the Proxy Voting Service. For these reasons, the potential for conflicts of interest in the voting of proxies generally arises only where the Proxy Committee is considering the possibility of voting in a manner contrary to a vote recommendation received from the Proxy Voting Service or where the Proxy Voting Service has not provided a vote recommendation. In these situations, the Proxy Committee will need to determine whether a material conflict of interest exists. For example, a material conflict of interest could arise when a proxy relates to the following non-exclusive types of issues:
• |
Securities issued by Northern Trust Corporation or its affiliates. |
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Matters in which Northern Trust has a direct financial interest (such as shareholder approval of a change in mutual fund advisory fees where Northern Trust is the fund advisor). |
• |
Instances where Northern Trust, its board members, executive officers, and/or others maintain relationships with the issuers of securities, proponents of shareholder proposals, participants in proxy contests, corporate directors or candidates for directorships. |
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Instances where an attempt has been made to directly or indirectly influence the voting recommendation that is made. |
Where the Proxy Committee determines that it is subject to a material conflict of interest, it may resolve the conflict in any of the following ways, which may vary, consistent with its duty of loyalty and care, depending on the facts and circumstances of each situation and the requirements of applicable law:
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Following the vote recommendation of an independent fiduciary appointed for that purpose; |
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Voting pursuant to client direction; |
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Abstaining; or |
NTAC:3NS-20 | 3 |
• |
Voting pursuant to a “mirror voting” arrangement (under which shares are voted in the same manner and proportion as some or all of the other shares not voted by the Proxy Committee). |
SECTION 6. PROXY VOTING RECORDS; CLIENT DISCLOSURES
Northern Trust will maintain the following records relating to proxy votes cast under these policies and procedures:
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A copy of these policies and procedures. |
B. |
A copy of each proxy statement Northern Trust receives regarding client securities. |
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A record of each vote cast by Northern Trust on behalf of a client. |
D. |
A copy of any document created by the Proxy Committee that was material to making a decision how to vote proxies on behalf of a client or that memorialized the basis for that decision. |
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A copy of each written client request for information on how Northern Trust voted proxies on behalf of the client, and a copy of any written response by Northern Trust to any (written or oral) client request for information on how Northern Trust voted proxies on behalf of the requesting client. |
The foregoing records will be retained for such period of time as is required to comply with applicable laws and regulations. Northern Trust may rely on one or more third parties to make and retain the records referred to in items B. and C. above.
The Proxy Committee will cause copies of the foregoing records, as they relate to particular clients, to be provided to those clients upon request. It is generally the policy of Northern Trust not to disclose its proxy voting records to third parties, except as may be required by applicable laws and regulations.
SECTION 7. ERISA ACCOUNTS
Plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), are to be administered consistent with the terms of the governing plan documents and applicable provisions of ERISA. In cases where sole proxy voting discretion rests with Northern Trust, the foregoing policies and procedures will be followed, subject to the fiduciary responsibility standards of ERISA. These standards generally require fiduciaries to act prudently and to discharge their duties solely in the interests of participants and beneficiaries. The Department of Labor has indicated that the voting decisions of ERISA fiduciaries must generally focus on the course that would most likely increase the value of the stock being voted.
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The documents governing ERISA individual account plans may set forth various procedures for voting “employer securities” held by the plan. Where authority over the investment of plan assets is granted to plan participants, many individual account plans provide that proxies for employer securities will be voted in accordance with directions received from plan participants as to shares allocated to their plan accounts. In some cases, the governing plan documents may further provide that unallocated shares and/or allocated shares for which no participant directions are received will be voted in accordance with a proportional voting method in which such shares are voted proportionately in the same manner as are allocated shares for which directions from participants have been received. Consistent with Labor Department positions, it is the policy of Northern Trust to follow the provisions of a plan’s governing documents in the voting of employer securities unless it determines that to do so would breach its fiduciary duties under ERISA.
SECTION 8. MUTUAL FUNDS
Proxies of registered management investment companies will be voted subject to any applicable investment restrictions of the fund and, to the extent applicable, in accordance with any resolutions or other instructions approved by authorized persons of the fund.
SECTION 9. OTHER SPECIAL SITUATIONS
Proxies of funds or accounts that specify the use of proxy guidelines other than the Proxy Guidelines will be voted in accordance with these other guidelines. Northern Trust may choose not to vote proxies in certain situations or for certain accounts either where it deems the cost of doing so to be prohibitive or where the exercise of voting rights could restrict the ability of an account’s portfolio manager to freely trade the security in question. For example, in accordance with local law or business practices, many foreign companies prevent the sales of shares that have been voted for a certain period beginning prior to the shareholder meeting and ending on the day following the meeting (“share blocking”). Due to these restrictions, Northern Trust must balance the benefits to its clients of voting proxies against the potentially serious portfolio management consequences of a reduced flexibility to sell the underlying shares at the most advantageous time. For companies in countries with share blocking periods, the disadvantage of being unable to sell the stock regardless of changing conditions generally outweighs the advantages of voting at the shareholder meeting for routine items. Accordingly, Northern Trust will not vote those proxies in the absence of an unusual, significant vote. Various accounts over which Northern Trust has proxy voting discretion participate in securities lending programs administered by Northern Trust or a third party. Because title to loaned securities passes to the borrower, Northern Trust will be unable to vote any security that is out on loan to a borrower on a proxy record date. If Northern Trust has investment discretion, however, it reserves the right of the portfolio manager to instruct the lending agent to terminate a loan in situations where Northern Trust believes the benefits of voting the security outweigh the costs of terminating the loan, consistent with the terms and conditions of Northern Trust’s procedures for recall of securities out on loan. In such instances, Northern Trust shall recall the shares on loan on a best efforts basis.
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Northern Trust
Proxy Voting Guidelines
I. The Board of Directors
A. Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections
Northern Trust generally votes for director nominees in uncontested elections absent countervailing factors such as a lack of director independence (see below), chronic, unjustified absenteeism, concerns regarding the inattentiveness of the nominee, including the number of public company boards on which the nominee sits, and if the nominee sits on an audit, compensation or risk committee, concerns regarding the actions taken by such committees.
B. Director Independence
For any situations not already covered by a rule or regulation, Northern Trust will generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the board of a company be comprised of a majority of independent directors and will generally vote against shareholder proposals requesting that the board of a company be comprised of a supermajority of independent directors. Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals that request that the board audit, compensation and/or nominating committees include independent directors exclusively and withholds votes for the election of non-independent directors serving on an audit, compensation or nominating committee or board.
Northern Trust generally leaves the choice of chairman to the board’s discretion as Northern Trust’s support for proposals that principal committees consist exclusively of independent directors and that the board be comprised of a majority of independent directors provides sufficient checks and balances. However, Northern Trust will vote case by case on whether to support shareholder resolutions seeking the separation of chairman and CEO in circumstances where shareholder interests may be better served by having an independent chair. Such circumstances may include, during periods of organizational re-structuring, during periods of sustained under performance relative to peers, during a period of leadership transition, or where concerns arise as to the sufficiency of independence the board has from management.
Northern Trust generally supports the listing standards or local market practice on non-executive director independence. Northern Trust may apply a stricter standard for director independence at companies that exhibit poor governance practices. A non-executive director in these instances would not be considered independent if he or she:
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Has been an employee of the company within the last five years; |
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Has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company; |
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Is a company founder; |
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Represents a significant shareholder; or |
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Has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors, or senior employees. |
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C. Director Attendance
Northern Trust will vote case by case on individual directors who attend fewer than 75 percent of board and board-committee meetings for two consecutive years.
D. Lead Independent Director
Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals in support of the appointment of a lead independent director.
Northern Trust expects the role of the lead independent director to be set out within the board’s governance charter, with clearly defined powers that should include at minimum the ability to:
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serve as a liaison between the company’s independent directors and the CEO; |
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lead the annual evaluation of the CEO’s performance and the annual evaluation of the independent board of directors; • be available for consultation and direct communication with major stockholders, if they so request; • approve meeting agendas for the board and the nature of information sent to the board; • call a special meeting of the board or a special executive session of the independent directors; and • add items to the agenda of any regular or special meeting of the board deemed necessary or advisable. |
E. Overboarding Issues
Northern Trust generally votes against a director nominee if it is a CEO who sits on more than two public boards or a non-CEO who sits on more than four public boards.
F. Diversity
Companies benefit from a wide diversity of perspectives and backgrounds on their boards. The board should reflect the diversity of the workforce and society, ensuring that a variety of viewpoints are represented in corporate decision-making. Northern Trust believes that an effective board should be comprised of directors with a mix of skills and experience to ensure the Board has the necessary tools to perform its oversight function effectively; this includes diversity of background, experience, age, race, gender, ethnicity, and culture. Northern Trust may vote against one or more directors where we have concerns relating to the composition and diversity of the board.
G. Stock Ownership Requirements
Northern Trust generally votes against shareholder proposals requiring directors to own a minimum amount of company stock in order to qualify as a director, or to remain on the board.
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H. Board Evaluation and Refreshment
The board needs to ensure that it is positioned to change and evolve with the needs of the company. Boards should, on at least an annual basis, formally evaluate the CEO, the board as a whole, and individual directors. Evaluation of the board as a whole should consider the balance of skills, experience, independence, and knowledge of the company on the board relative to the company’s long-term strategic plan. Evaluation of the board should also consider the board’s diversity, including gender, how the board works together as a unit, and other factors relevant to its effectiveness. Individual evaluation should aim to show whether each director continues to contribute effectively and to demonstrate commitment to the role.
We expect the board to disclose in its annual report or proxy statement how performance evaluation of the board, its committees and its individual directors has been conducted. Northern Trust may vote against the independent chair, lead independent director or presiding director in circumstances where the board appears to lack mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers.
Northern Trust does not consider mandatory retirement age caps or term limits to be appropriate in circumstances where shareholder interests may be better served by a longer-serving non-executive director remaining on the board. For example during periods of organizational re-structuring or CEO/Chairman transition where constructive challenge from a longer serving non-executive director may be beneficial in the context of overall board composition and experience.
Northern Trust will generally vote against shareholder proposals to impose age and term limits unless the company is found to have poor board refreshment and director succession practices. Northern Trust will scrutinize boards that have a preponderance of non-executive directors with excessive long-tenures to ensure that new perspectives are being added to the board and that the board remains sufficiently independent from management.
I. Director and Officer Indemnification and Liability Protection
Proposals concerning director and officer indemnification and liability protection are evaluated on a case by case basis. Northern Trust generally votes for proposals providing indemnification protection to officers and directors, and for proposals limiting the liability of officers and directors for monetary damages, provided such proposals do not appear to conflict with applicable law and cover only future actions.
II. Proxy Contests
A. Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections
Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a case by case basis, considering the following factors:
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Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry; |
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Management’s track record; |
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Background to the proxy contest; |
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Qualifications of director nominees (both slates); |
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Evaluation of what each side is offering shareholders as well as the likelihood that the proposed objectives and goals can be met; |
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Stock ownership positions; and |
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Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) performance. |
B. Reimburse Proxy Solicitation Expenses
Decisions to provide full reimbursement for dissidents waging a proxy contest are made on a case by case basis. Northern Trust will generally support such proposals in cases where (i) Northern Trust votes in favor the dissidents, and (ii) the proposal is voted on the same proxy as the dissident slate and, as such, is specifically related to the contested proxy at issue.
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals allowing shareholders to elect replacements and fill vacancies.
III. Auditors
A. Ratifying Auditors
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals to ratify auditors, unless: an auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; or there is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position.
Northern Trust generally vote against auditor ratification and incumbent members of the Audit Committee if non-audit fees are excessive in relation to audit-related fees without adequate explanation.
Northern Trust generally votes against shareholder proposals that seek to restrict management’s ability to utilize selected auditors, subject to the qualifications set forth above.
IV. Proxy Contest Defenses
A. Board Structure: Staggered vs. Annual Elections
Northern Trust generally votes against proposals to classify the board and for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.
B. Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.
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Northern Trust generally votes for proposals allowing shareholders to elect replacements and fill vacancies.
C. Cumulative Voting
Northern Trust generally votes against proposals to eliminate cumulative voting, unless such proposals are intended to effectuate a majority voting policy.
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals to institute cumulative voting, unless the company has previously adopted a majority voting policy, or a majority voting shareholder proposal, consistent with Northern Trust’s majority voting guidelines, is on the ballot at the same time as the cumulative voting proposal, in which case Northern Trust generally votes against such cumulative voting proposals.
D. Majority Voting
In analyzing shareholder proposals calling for directors in uncontested elections to be elected by an affirmative majority of votes cast, Northern Trust focuses on whether or not the company has adopted a written majority voting (or majority withhold) policy that provides for a meaningful alternative to affirmative majority voting.
In cases where companies have not adopted a written majority voting (or majority withhold) policy, Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder majority voting proposals.
In cases where companies have adopted a written majority voting (or majority withhold) policy, Northern Trust generally votes against shareholder majority voting proposals, provided that the policy is set forth in the company’s annual proxy statement and either:
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Requires nominees who receive majority withhold votes to tender their resignation to the board; |
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Sets forth a clear and reasonable timetable for decision-making regarding the nominee’s status; and |
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Does not contain any specific infirmities that would render it an ineffective alternative to an affirmative majority voting standard or otherwise provides a meaningful alternative to affirmative majority voting. |
In determining the adequacy of a company’s majority voting (or majority withhold) policy, Northern Trust may also consider, without limitation, any factors set forth in the policy that are to be taken into account by the board in considering a nominee’s resignation and the range of actions open to the board in responding to the resignation (e.g., acceptance of the resignation, maintaining the director but curing the underlying causes of the withheld votes, etc.).
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E. Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to call special meetings, but may vote against such proposals and in favor of shareholder proposals to allow shareholders to call special meetings, taking into consideration the minimum ownership requirement called for in the resolution, existing shareholder rights mechanisms (e.g., proxy access, right to act by written consent, dual-class stock provisions and voting rights, quorum requirements on certain provisions, ability to amend bylaw and charter agreements, etc.), and the company’s overall record of responsiveness to shareholder concerns.
F. Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent
Northern Trust generally votes against shareholder proposals allowing shareholders to take action by written consent. Northern Trust will review on a case by case basis management proposals allowing shareholders to take action by written consent.
G. Shareholder Ability to Alter the Size of the Board
Northern Trust generally votes against proposals limiting management’s ability to alter the size of the board.
V. Tender Offer Defenses
A. Poison Pills
Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals that ask a company to submit its poison pill for shareholder ratification.
Northern Trust will review on a case by case basis management proposals to ratify a poison pill.
B. Fair Price Provisions
Northern Trust will review votes on a case by case on fair price proposals, taking into consideration whether the shareholder vote requirement embedded in the provision is no more than a majority of disinterested shares.
Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals to lower the shareholder vote requirement in existing fair price provisions.
C. Greenmail
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals to adopt anti-greenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.
Northern Trust votes anti-greenmail proposals on a case by case basis when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.
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D. Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Amend the Charter or Bylaws
Northern Trust generally votes against management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve charter and bylaw amendments.
Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments.
E. Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Approve Mergers
Northern Trust generally votes against management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve mergers and other significant business combinations, while taking into account ownership structure, quorum requirements, and vote requirements.
Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations, while taking into account ownership structure, quorum requirements, and vote requirements.
VI. Miscellaneous Governance Provisions
A. Confidential Voting
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals requiring confidential voting and independent vote tabulators.
B. Bundled Proposals
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis bundled or “conditioned” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, we examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, we vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, we support such proposals.
C. Shareholder Advisory Committees
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis, proposals to establish a shareholder advisory committee.
D. Board of Directors Failure to Respond to Certain Majority Approved Shareholder Proposals
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis on whether to withhold votes from certain directors in the event the board of directors has failed to adequately respond to a majority approved shareholder proposal. Northern Trust will generally not withhold votes from directors in cases where Northern Trust previously voted against the majority approved shareholder proposal. In cases where Northern Trust previously voted in favor of the majority approved shareholder proposal, it will first determine whether it is appropriate under the circumstances to withhold votes from any directors, and if it determines that such action is appropriate it will then determine
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the director or directors from which votes should be withheld. Factors that will be taken into consideration include the documented response of the board, if any, concerning its action or inaction relating to the relevant shareholder proposal, whether particular board members served on a committee that was responsible for determining a response to the shareholder proposal, the importance of retaining particular directors or groups of directors to protect shareholder value, and such other factors as Northern Trust may deem appropriate.
E. Board of Directors Failure to Adequately Respond to Rejected Board Compensation Proposals
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis on whether to withhold votes from certain directors in the event the board of directors has not adequately responded to situations in which board proposals for approval of executive compensation have failed to receive majority shareholder approval.
F. Compensation Committee Failure to Adequately Address Pay for Performance
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis on whether to withhold votes from the certain directors of the compensation committee during a period in which executive compensation appears excessive relative to performance and peers.
G. ESG Failures
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis on whether to withhold from certain directors due to material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately guard against or manage ESG risks.
H. Succession Policies
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering the scope of the request and the company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.
I. Proxy Access
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis on proxy access proposals. Northern Trust will consider a number of factors, including the company’s performance, the performance of the company’s board, the ownership thresholds and holding duration contained in the resolution and the proportion of directors that shareholders may nominate each year.
J. Other Business
Northern Trust opposes Other Business proposals where shareholders do not have the opportunity to review and understand the details of the proposal.
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VII. Capital Structure
A. Common Stock Authorization
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis, proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issue.
B. Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends
Northern Trust generally allows for management discretion on matters related to stock distributions, such as stock splits and stock dividends.
C. Unequal Voting Rights
Northern Trust believes that voting rights should align with the shareholders’ economic interests in the company. As such, Northern Trust will generally vote against multi class exchange offers and multi class recapitalizations. If a company has a pre-existing multi class voting structure with superior voting rights, Northern Trust expects the company to develop and implement a sunset provision. If no sunset provision is disclosed, Northern Trust may vote against the relevant committee member.
D. Reverse Stock Splits
Northern Trust generally votes for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split, provided that the reverse split does not result in an increase of authorized but unissued shares of more than 100% after giving effect to the shares needed for the reverse split.
E. Blank Check Preferred Authorization
Absent special circumstances (e.g., actions taken in the context of a hostile takeover attempt) indicating an abusive purpose, Northern Trust generally votes against proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend and distribution, and other rights, stock unless the voting, conversion, dividend and distribution, and other rights are specified and the voting rights are limited to one vote per share.
F. Shareholder Proposals Regarding Blank Check Preferred Stock
Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals requiring blank check preferred stock placements to be submitted for shareholder ratification unless the shares are to be issued for the purpose of raising capital or making acquisitions.
G. Adjust Par Value of Common Stock
Northern Trust generally votes for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock, while taking into account accompanying corporate governance concerns.
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H. Preemptive Rights
Northern Trust reviews on a case by case basis, proposals to create or abolish preemptive rights. In evaluating proposals on preemptive rights, we look at the size of a company and the characteristics of its shareholder base. We generally oppose preemptive rights for publicly-held companies with a broad stockholder base.
I. Debt Restructurings
Northern Trust reviews on a case by case basis, proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt restructuring plan. We consider the following issues:
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Dilution — How much will ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be? |
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Change in Control — Will the transaction result in a change in control of the company? |
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Bankruptcy — Is the threat of bankruptcy, which would result in severe losses in shareholder value, the main factor driving the debt restructuring? |
Generally, we approve proposals that facilitate debt restructurings unless there are clear signs of self-dealing or other abuses.
J. Share Repurchase Programs
Northern Trust generally votes for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms.
VIII. Executive and Director Compensation
A. Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans
Northern Trust believes that equity-based awards should align the economic interests of management, directors and employees with those of shareholders and votes case by case taking into account all relevant material facts and circumstances, including the total estimated cost of the company’s equity plan relative to its peers. Northern Trust will generally oppose new plans, or amendments to an existing plan, where:
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The company’s three year average burn rate exceeds 2% and exceeds an amount that is one standard deviation in excess of its GICS industry mean (segmented by Russell 3000 and non-Russell 3000 companies). A company that exceeds both the foregoing three year average burn rates amounts can avoid a negative vote if it commits in a public filing to maintain a burn rate over the next three fiscal years that is no higher than one standard deviation in excess of its industry mean as calculated at the time of the proposal. |
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The absolute change in ownership interest would be significantly reduced, and dilution would have a negative impact to future earnings; |
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The company has repriced underwater stock options during the past three years; or |
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The exercise price is less than 100% of fair market value at the time of grant. |
B. OBRA-Related Compensation Proposals
Northern Trust generally votes for the approval and amendment of plans for the purposes of complying with the provisions of Section 162(m) of OBRA.
C. Proposals Concerning Executive and Director Pay
Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals that request a company to adopt an annual advisory vote on executive compensation.
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis on shareholder advisory votes concerning the compensation of named executive officers, taking into account pay structure in relation to firm performance, problematic governance practices, and the company’s overall transparency and level of responsiveness to shareholder concerns. Northern Trust may, where appropriate, utilize a proprietary compensation scorecard model, in addition to company disclosures and outside research to arrive at a final decision. The scorecard considers factors including, but not limited to, profitability measures, overall pay of the top executive, company size, and historic performance.
Northern Trust will generally vote for an annual frequency of advisory votes on executive compensation unless the company provides a compelling rationale or unique circumstances.
Northern Trust generally votes on a case by case basis all other shareholder proposals that seek additional disclosure of executive and director pay information.
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis all other shareholder proposals that seek to limit executive and director pay.
D. Golden and Tin Parachutes
Northern Trust generally votes for shareholder proposals to have golden and tin parachutes submitted for shareholder ratification.
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis on shareholder advisory votes concerning the severance packages of named executive officers, taking into account the features of the package and the accompanying restructuring proposal.
E. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and Other Broad-Based Employee Stock Plans
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals to approve an ESOP or other broad-based employee stock purchase or ownership plan, or to increase authorized shares for such existing plans, except in cases when the number of shares allocated to such plans is “excessive” (i.e., generally greater than ten percent (10%) of outstanding shares).
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F. 401(k) Employee Benefit Plans
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.
IX. State of Incorporation
A. Voting on State Takeover Statutes
Northern Trust votes on a case by case basis proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freezeout provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, anti-greenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions).
B. Voting on Reincorporation Proposals
Proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation are examined on a case by case basis.
X. Mergers and Corporate Restructurings
A. Mergers and Acquisitions
Votes on mergers and acquisitions are considered on a case by case basis, taking into account at least the following:
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Anticipated financial and operating benefits; |
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Offer price (cost vs. premium); |
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Prospects of the combined companies; |
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How the deal was negotiated; and |
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ESG governance and their impact. |
Northern Trust generally votes on a case by case basis in cases where, in connection with a merger or acquisition seeking shareholder approval, a separate shareholder vote is required to approve any agreements or understandings regarding compensation disclosed pursuant to Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K (golden parachute arrangements).
B. Corporate Restructuring
Votes on corporate restructuring proposals, including minority squeezeouts, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, liquidations, and asset sales are considered on a case by case basis.
C. Spin-offs
Votes on spin-offs are considered on a case by case basis depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, market focus, and managerial incentives.
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D. Asset Sales
Votes on asset sales are made on a case by case basis after considering the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, and potential elimination of diseconomies.
E. Liquidations
Votes on liquidations are made on a case by case basis after reviewing management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.
F. Appraisal Rights
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals to restore, or provide shareholders with, rights of appraisal.
G. Changing Corporate Name
Northern Trust generally votes for changing the corporate name.
H. Adjourn Meeting
Northern Trust generally supports adjournment proposals that accompany mergers proposals also being supported. Otherwise, Northern Trust will vote against such proposals.
XI. Mutual Funds
A. Election of Trustees
Votes on trustee nominees are evaluated on a case by case basis.
B. Investment Advisory Agreement
Votes on investment advisory agreements are evaluated on a case by case basis.
C. Fundamental Investment Restrictions
Votes on amendments to a fund’s fundamental investment restrictions are evaluated on a case by case basis.
D. Distribution Agreements
Votes on distribution agreements are evaluated on a case by case basis.
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XII. Environmental and Social Issues
A. Environment
Northern Trust upholds environmental stewardship and recognizes that we all are stakeholders in the future of our global environment. Environmental factors increasingly represent significant operational risks and costs to business. At Northern Trust, our primary objective as an asset manager is to create long-term value for our clients. As a major global investor, Northern Trust has interest in how shareholder value is affected by a company’s management and impact on the natural and social environment, and recognizes that a well-developed environmental and social management system can enhance shareholder value in the long-term. We generally encourage reporting that is not unduly costly or burdensome and which does not place the company at a competitive disadvantage, but which provides meaningful information to enable shareholders to evaluate the impact of the company’s environmental policies and practices on its financial performance.
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals requesting increased disclosure regarding the environmental impact of a company’s operations and products and initiatives to curtail these risks, unless sufficient information has been disclosed to shareholders or is otherwise publicly available.
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals requesting the issuance of corporate sustainability reports, as well as disclosure, where relevant, concerning the emission of greenhouse gasses and the use of fracturing in connection with the extraction of natural gasses.
Northern Trust votes case by case for proposals requesting the adoption of GHG reduction goals from products and operations.
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals requesting the issuance of reports by a company detailing its energy efficiency plans.
B. Diversity and Equal Employment Opportunity
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals advocating the elimination of workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals requesting that a company take reasonable steps to ensure that women and minority candidates are in the pool from which board nominees are chosen or that request that women and minority candidates are routinely sought as part of every board search the company undertakes.
Northern Trust votes case by case on proposals requesting the issuance of a diversity report, including summary description of policies and programs to oriented toward increasing diversity or requests to disclose a comprehensive breakdown of workforce by race and gender.
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C. Consumer and Product Safety
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals that request a report or assessment of the safety of a company’s operations and a company’s products and services and efforts to promote their safe use.
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals requesting increased disclosure of a company’s policies and procedures for managing and mitigating risks related to cyber security and data privacy.
D. Supply Chain Management
Northern Trust votes case by case for proposals requesting increased disclosure on a company’s supply chain policies and processes and its management of related risks.
E. Animal Welfare
Northern Trust generally votes for proposals requesting increased disclosure or reporting regarding animal treatment issues that may impact a company’s operations and products, especially in relation to food production, unless sufficient information on that topic has already been disclosed to shareholders or is otherwise publicly available.
F. Political and Charitable Contributions
Northern Trust will generally vote for proposals to publish a company’s political or lobbying contributions, taking into consideration recent, significant controversies, fines or litigation regarding the company’s political contributions or trade association spending.
Northern Trust generally votes against shareholder proposals to eliminate, direct, or otherwise restrict charitable contributions.
In other social and environmental issues, Northern Trust generally supports the position of a company’s board of directors when voting on shareholder initiated social and environmental proposals. Although Northern Trust acknowledges that the economic and social considerations underlying such proposals are often closely intertwined, we believe that in most cases the management group and elected directors are best positioned to make corporate decisions on these proposals.
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