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Annual Report

iMGP Global Select Fund (FKA iMGP Equity Fund)

iMGP International Fund

iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund

iMGP SBH Focused Small Value Fund

iMGP Alternative Strategies Fund

iMGP High Income Alternatives Fund

iMGP Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund

iMGP DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF

iMGP DBi Hedge Strategy ETF

iMGP RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF

December 31, 2022

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Contents

This report is intended for shareholders of the funds and may not be used as sales literature unless preceded or accompanied by a current prospectus for the iMGP Funds. Statements and other information in this report are dated and are subject to change.

iM Global Partner Fund Management, LLC has ultimate responsibility for the funds’ performance due to its responsibility to oversee its investment managers and recommend their hiring, termination and replacement.

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iM Global Partner Fund Management

Commitment to Shareholders

We are deeply committed to making each iMGP Fund a highly satisfying long-term investment for shareholders. In following through on this commitment we are guided by our core values, which influence four specific areas of service:

First, we are committed to the IMGP concept.

Second, we will do all we can to ensure that the framework within which our stock pickers do their work further increases the odds of success.

Third, is our commitment to do all we can from an operational standpoint to maximize shareholder returns.

Fourth, is our commitment to communicate honestly about all relevant developments and expectations.

Our commitment to iMGP Funds is also evidenced by our own investment. Our retired founders and current employees have, collectively, substantial investments in the funds, as does our company retirement plan. In addition, we use the funds extensively in the client accounts of our investment advisor practice (through our affiliate Litman Gregory Wealth Management, LLC). We have no financial incentive to do so because the fees we receive from iMGPFunds held in client accounts are fully offset against the advisory fees paid by our clients. In fact, we have a disincentive to use the funds in our client accounts because each iMGP Fund is capacity constrained (they may be closed as mentioned above), and by using them in client accounts we are using up capacity for which we may not be paid. But we believe these funds offer value that we can’t get elsewhere and this is why we enthusiastically invest in them ourselves and on behalf of clients.

While we believe highly in the ability of the Funds’ sub-advisors, our commitments are not intended as guarantees of future results.

While the funds are no-load, there are management fees and operating expenses that do apply, as well as a 12b-1 fee that applies to Investor class shares. Please refer to the prospectus for further details.

Diversification does not assure a profit or protect against loss in a declining market.

Must be preceded or accompanied by a prospectus.

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iM Global Funds Performance

* The expense ratios disclosed in the performance table are based on the most recent prospectus and may not tie to what are disclosed in the financial highlights.

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Past performance does not guarantee future results. Index performance is not illustrative of fund performance. An investment cannot be made directly in an index. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the fund may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. To obtain the performance of the funds as of the most recently completed calendar month, please visit www.imgpfunds.com. Investment performance reflects fee waivers in effect. In the absence of such waivers, total return would be reduced.

The International and Alternative Strategies Funds each have contractual fee waivers in effect through April 30, 2024. The Advisor has agreed to limit the expenses of the Global Select, High Income Alternatives, SBH Focused Small Value, Oldfield International Value and Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Funds through April 30, 2024. See the Prospectus for more information.

Performance does not reflect taxes a shareholder might incur on the sale of shares. Performance does not reflect fees or commissions a shareholder may pay on the purchase or sale of shares.

A commission may apply when buying or selling shares of an ETF.

MSCI index returns source: MSCI. Neither MSCI nor any other party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the MSCI data makes any express or implied warranties or representations with respect to such data (or the results to be obtained by the use thereof), and all such parties hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of such data. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall MSCI, any of its affiliates, or any third party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the data have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential, or any other damages (including lost profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages. No further distribution or dissemination of the MSCI data is permitted without MSCI’s express written consent. Source note: Returns prior to 1999 are the MSCI ACWI ex-US GR index. Returns from 1999 onwards are MSCI ACWI ex-US NR index.

Must be preceded or accompanied by a prospectus.

Effective September 30, 2022 the name of the IMGP Equity Fund was changed to iMGP Global Select Fund.

Each of the funds may invest in foreign securities. Investing in foreign securities exposes investors to economic, political, and market risks and fluctuations in foreign currencies. Each of the funds may invest in the securities of small companies. Small-company investing subjects investors to additional risks, including security price volatility and less liquidity than investing in larger companies. Debt obligations of distressed companies typically are unrated, lower rated, in default or close to default and may become worthless. The International Fund will invest in emerging markets. Investments in emerging market countries involve additional risks such as government dependence on a few industries or resources, government-imposed taxes on foreign investment or limits on the removal of capital from a country, unstable government, and volatile markets. Investments in debt securities typically decrease when interest rates rise. This risk is usually greater for longer-term debt securities. Investments in mortgage-backed securities include additional risks that investor should be aware of including credit risk, prepayment risk, possible illiquidity, and default, as well as increased susceptibility to adverse economic developments. Investments in lower-rated and non-rated securities present a greater risk of loss to principal and interest than higher-rated securities. The funds may invest in master limited partnership units. Investing in MLP units may expose investors to additional liability and tax risks. Derivatives may involve certain costs and risks such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management, and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. Investing in derivatives could lose more than the amount invested. The funds may make short sales of securities, which involves the risk that losses may exceed the original amount invested.

A commission may apply when buying or selling an ETF.

© 2021 Morningstar, Inc. All Rights Reserved. The information contained herein: (1) is proprietary to Morningstar; (2) may not be copied or distributed; and (3) is not warranted to be accurate, complete or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Merger arbitrage investments risk loss if a proposed reorganization in which the fund invests is renegotiated or terminated.

Investments in absolute return strategies are not untended to outperform stocks and bonds during strong market rallies.

Multi-investment management styles may lead to higher transaction expenses compared to single investment management styles. Outcomes depend on the skill of the sub-advisors and advisor and the allocation of assets amongst them.

Past performance does not guarantee future results.

Mutual fund investing involves risk; loss of principal is possible.

Performance discussion for the Alternative Strategies is specifically related to the Institutional share class.

Some of the comments are based on current management expectation and are considered “forward-looking statements”. Actual future results, however, may prove to be different from our expectations. You can identify forward-looking statement by words such as “estimate”, “may”, “expect”, “should”,

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“could”, “believe”, “plan”, and similar terms. We cannot promise future returns and our opinions are a reflection of our best judgment at the time this report is compiled.

Opinions expressed are subject to change, are not guaranteed and should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security.

See pages 8, 14, 20, and 25 for each equity fund’s top contributors. See pages 10, 16, 22, and 26 for each equity fund’s portfolio composition. See pages 38 for the Alternative Strategies Fund’s individual strategy portfolio allocations. See pages 85 for the High Income Alternative Fund’s individual strategy portfolio allocations. Fund holdings and/or sector allocations are subject to change at any time and are not recommendations to buy or sell any security.

Diversification does not assure a profit or protect against a loss in a declining market.

Leverage may cause the effect of an increase or decrease in the value of the portfolio securities to be magnified and the fund to be more volatile than if leverage was not used.

References to other mutual funds should not be interpreted as an offer of these securities.

iM Global Partner Fund Management LLC has ultimate responsibility for the performance of the iMGP Funds due to its responsibility to oversee the investment managers and recommend their hiring, termination and replacement.

Any tax or legal information provided is merely a summary of our understanding and interpretation of some of the current income tax regulations and it is not exhaustive. Investors must consult their tax advisor or legal counsel for advice and information concerning their particular situation. Neither the Funds nor any of their representatives may give legal or tax advice.

Please see page 187 for index definitions. You cannot invest directly in an index.

Please see page 190 for industry definitions.

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iMGP Funds, 2022 Annual Shareholder Letter

Dear Fellow Shareholder,

2022 Market Recap

A difficult year ended with a thud for U.S. stocks. After a 14% rally in October and November, the S&P 500 Index dropped 5.8% in December to close out the year with an 18.1% loss, its largest annual decline since 2008. Foreign stock markets held up much better in the fourth quarter — developed international stocks (MSCI EAFE Index) gained 17.3% (one of their best quarters ever) and Emerging Market (EM)stocks (MSCI EM Index) were up 9.7% — but still saw significant losses for the year. For the full year, developed international stocks were down 14.5% in dollar terms (almost four percentage points better than the S&P 500), while EM stocks were down a bit more than the S&P 500 with a 20.1% drop. These annual returns were despite the U.S. dollar (DXY Index) appreciating 8.3% for the year, which reduces dollar-based foreign equity returns one-for-one. In the fourth quarter, however, the dollar dropped 7.7%, providing a tailwind to EM and international equity returns for U.S. investors.

Turning to the fixed-income markets, core investment-grade bonds (Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, “Agg”)) had a solid fourth quarter, gaining 1.9%. But this was still the worst year for core bonds in at least 95 years, with the Agg Bond Index dropping 13.0%. The key driver, of course, was the sharp rise in bond yields; the 10-year Treasury yield ended the year at 3.9%, up from just 1.5% a year prior. High-yield bonds (ICE BofA Merrill Lynch U.S. High Yield Index) had a strong fourth quarter, up 4.0%, but were down 11.2% for the year. Floating rate loans (Morningstar LSTA Leveraged Loan index) were the best segment within the bond markets, down less than 1% for the year. Municipal bonds were down 8% (Morningstar National Muni Bond Category).

Alternative strategies and nontraditional asset classes generally outperformed traditional stock and bond indexes. The standout was trend-following managed futures strategies, which gained roughly 27% (SG Trend Index) for the year, despite fourth quarter losses. Flexible/nontraditional bond funds (Morningstar Nontraditional Bond category) were down roughly half as much as core bonds.

Investment Outlook

Inflation and monetary policy remain the financial markets’ key macro focus. U.S. inflation data have improved, suggesting we’ve seen the peak in inflation for this cycle. But core inflation remains far above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target, and the Fed’s message is that it intends to maintain restrictive (tight) monetary policy throughout 2023. On the economic growth front, key leading indicators deteriorated further in the fourth quarter, which along with tight monetary policy point to a likely recession in the year ahead. On the positive side, it should be milder than the 2007-08 and 2000-01 recessions.

Analysis of past data on recessions, earnings declines and stock valuations suggest a real possibility of further double-digit declines in the S&P 500 from current levels. Foreign stock markets are also at risk from a U.S. and global recession, but given their cheaper starting valuations, the medium term expected returns are attractive.

Given the sharp rise in yields, bonds haven’t been this attractive in more than a decade. When estimating returns for core investment-grade bonds over longer periods of time, the starting yield is a good approximation of subsequent returns. At year-end, the Agg Bond Index was yielding 4.7% and our 5-year expected potential return for core bonds is now in a range of 5% to 5.6%. Moreover, we believe core bonds have the potential to deliver a positive return if a recession plays out, providing valuable downside protection while riskier assets such as stocks get hit. Beyond core bonds, there are other segments within the bond markets, including high-yield and asset-backed securities, that offer attractive risk/return potential in the hands of experienced and skilled investors.

Given this macro and market backdrop, the iMGP Funds family offers several strong options that we believe can improve the risk-adjusted performance of a traditional stock/bond balanced portfolio: namely, our DBi Managed Futures Strategy ETF, DBi Hedge Strategy ETF, Alternative Strategies Fund, High Income Alternatives Fund, RBA Responsible Global Allocation ETF and Dolan McEniry Corporate Bond Fund.

For more risk-tolerant investors, our high-conviction, concentrated iMGP equity funds seek to generate long-term capital growth exceeding passive indexes. They can serve as core equity holdings or as satellite positions around core equity-market index allocations.

We believe the iMGP Funds can fill a valuable role within diversified investment portfolios. Each Fund is sub-advised by highly disciplined, deeply experienced, and skilled investors who we believe can outperform their respective benchmarks and peer groups over full market cycles.

We strongly encourage shareholders to read the enclosed individual fund and ETF semi-annual reports for portfolio manager commentary and performance details.

Closing Thoughts

As 2022 has reminded investors, we should “expect the unexpected, and expect to be surprised.” We believe 2023 will likely present our sub-advisors with some excellent long-term investment opportunities.

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Unfortunately, we also expect an earnings recession in the next year that will help create those opportunities. While challenging, it is critical for long-term investors to stay the course through these rough periods. The shorter-term discomfort on the downside is the price one pays to earn the long-term “equity risk premium” – the additional return from owning riskier assets such as stocks that most investors need to build long-term wealth and achieve their financial objectives.

As always, we thank you for your continued trust and confidence.

Sincerely,

Jeremy DeGroot, President and Portfolio Manager

Jack Chee, Portfolio Manager

Jason Steuerwalt, Portfolio Manager

Kiko Vallarta, Portfolio Manager

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iMGP Global Select Fund 2022 Annual Report

During the year, the fund (formerly named iMGP Equity Fund) was successfully restructured to a broader global equity mandate. The changes were made at the end of July 2022—making full year results versus a single benchmark inapplicable. The fund fell 25.52% in calendar year 2022.

Since the start of August through year-end 2022, the fund fell 5.2%–modestly trailing the 4.6% loss for its primary benchmark, MSCI World Index. A broader global index that includes emerging-markets stocks, MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI), fell 4.4% over the same five-month period. The Morningstar Global Large-Stock Blend category lost 3.58%. For the fourth quarter, the fund’s 12.73% return outperformed the MSCI World Index return of 9.77%, the MSCI ACWI return of 9.76%, and the Morningstar Global Large-Stock Blend category return of 10.43%.

Key Performance Drivers

Performance comments are limited to the post-restructuring period.

From August 2022 to December 2022, small-cap position, Five Below gained 39.2%. The stock was the highest absolute gainer over that period. The company is owned by the Polen Global SMID team (led by Rob Forker). Five Below is a leading, high-growth, value retailer in the United States. The stock rose on the back of strong quarterly results with earnings coming in ahead of expectations. This contrasted with many of its retail rivals, who have struggled. In a backdrop of slowing retail demand, Five Below is seen to have an attractive value proposition with products that deliver on value as the customer wallet shrinks. Forker believes the company can compound its value over the next five years at 20% per annum driven by a combination of mid-teens new store expansion, comparable store growth, and modest margin expansion off its fixed-cost leverage. The company has over 1,300 stores in the United States today and is guiding to 3,500 over time. Polen has done independent analysis and believe that the 3,500 figure is achievable. Given the fundamentals and the long runway for growth, Polen views valuation as remaining very attractive even after the recent performance. The company remains one of the top positions in the portfolio.

Universal Health Services contributed to returns thanks to a 25.7% gain over the five-month period ending December 2022. The position is owned by Scott Moore and Chad Baumler of Nuance Investments. Universal Health Services is a leading hospital operator in the United States with business segments split close to equally in terms of earnings between acute care hospitals and behavioral/psychiatric care hospitals. In acute care, they have a significant presence primarily in Texas, Nevada, California, and Florida, and leading market share positions in nearly all of their acute care metropolitan areas. In behavioral care, they are a top-two player with a national footprint and are a leading provider in the United Kingdom as well. Behavioral care is highly fragmented and the services they provide treat substance abuse, PTSD, Autism, Schizophrenia and other psychiatric conditions. Nuance considers their balance sheet to be the strongest among hospital operators, with approximately 2.5x leverage versus some competitors in the 5x-7x range. In 2021 and early 2022, Nuance believed the company was under-earning due to unusually high labor costs, primarily related to nursing. The nursing labor market was tight before

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COVID-19, and since then the problem has been further exacerbated due to rolling waves of employees testing positive and missing work, and higher rates of burnout/ early retirement. According to Nuance, this led to above normal use of premium nursing (traveling/ temporary) at rates significantly higher than normal nursing wages and resulted in widespread employee turnover throughout the industry as nurses chose to take temporary jobs. The company was spending approximately 3.5% of revenue on premium labor which is more than double pre-COVID-19 levels, according to Nuance’s research. They also capped their behavioral hospital capacity in many markets due to staff shortages as behavioral nurses took acute care temporary jobs. Ultimately, Moore and Baumler believed that higher base wages and less need for premium labor to treat COVID-19 would bring the labor market into balance. The company was also able to take advantage of what is viewed as a highly accretive repurchase plan. Universal Health Services was expected to earn around $10 per share in 2022 per Wall Street consensus estimates, which compared favorably to Nuance’s view of normal earnings of closer to $14 per share. At the end of third quarter, 2022, with the stock price at approximately $90, the stock was trading at less than 8x Nuance’s estimate of normal earnings versus history, and their view of its normal P/E, closer to 14x.

Amazon.com fell nearly 38% over the five-month period and detracted from returns. The position is owned by the Polen Global Growth team. Amazon’s most recent earnings results (Q3-22) were mixed. On the positive side, revenue growth accelerated in the company’s ad business despite much slower revenue growth from other ad competitors. On the negative side, Q3 operating margins were lower than expected and management provided weaker than expected revenue and margin guidance for the Q4 holiday quarter. One of the primary culprits here is the international segment which is being negatively impacted by slower growth and higher costs in many regions, but particularly Europe. AWS also decelerated to 28% growth and looks to decelerate further into Q4, but this trend is not all that different from what Polen saw across competitors, and the AWS backlog looks healthy. It’s taking some time to pull costs out of the business, but management has announced some major expense reductions. Polen believes the business should also return to a more “normal” revenue growth rate as tough comparisons ease. All this should lead to much better earnings growth in 2023. There is no change to Polen’s long-term thesis on Amazon, namely, that the company’s higher-margin business segments (cloud, subscriptions, advertising, third-party) should grow faster than its core ecommerce business, and this mix effect should lift the company’s operating margins over the next several years.

MillerKnoll’s share price fell 28.75% from the start of August 2022 through the end of the year. This position, owned by Scharf Investments, detracted from fund returns. The company was formed by the merger of Herman Miller and Knoll, Inc. in 2021, creating the largest office furnishing company worldwide. Part of Scharf’s investment thesis is that they believe MillerKnoll, as the leader in office furnishings, will be a major beneficiary as in-office work recovers from its pandemic lows. Several large multinational employers have begun requiring increased time in-office and, anecdotally, managers have been responding to economic uncertainty with requesting more in-person days. If the labor market continues to weaken, Scharf believes that managers will have more leverage to require time in-office. In addition, in a new hybrid work environment, they believe offices may have to be reconfigured to encourage greater workplace collaboration. MillerKnoll could potentially benefit from the reconfiguration given its broad product portfolio and long-standing dealer relationships. Finally, Scharf believes growing small footprint stores targeted at the retail market have the potential to tap into the home office market.

Coming into the year, MillerKnoll margins were depressed due to pandemic-related supply chain issues and demand slowdowns. The combination of recession fears, higher interest rates, and the prospect of a slower than expected return to office has weighed on the company’s share price as near-term earnings expectations have been reduced. As a result, the company is now trading at a depressed valuation on depressed earnings. Scharf believes investors’ myopic focus on near-term recession risks has created a compelling long-term opportunity for patient investors.

While the ultimate recovery may be delayed due to an economic downturn, Scharf believes that MillerKnoll has a multitude of opportunities to drive an eventual recapture in both margins and revenues from current pandemic depressed levels. They believe both the Knoll acquisition and management’s retail expansion strategy have the potential to generate revenue growth and margin expansion opportunities over time. In addition, an improving supply chain environment coupled with the company’s strong price increases will likely further expand both revenues and margins. Scharf believes these factors will eventually result in a strong earnings recovery, as well as improving free cash flow generation. While it may take time for fundamentals to fully improve, MillerKnoll’s recent quarterly results showed margin growth in key segments, as well as better than expected synergies. Scharf is hopeful that their patience will ultimately be rewarded with a strong earnings recovery.

Portfolio Mix

The Global Select Fund is built stock by stock from the bottom-up and can at times look very different from its benchmark. We believe this is key to generating excess long-term returns.

The fund starts its first full calendar year with its broader global mandate with the following portfolio mix:

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iMGP Global Select Fund 2022 Annual Report

iMGP Global Select Fund Value of Hypothetical $10,000

The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP Global Select Fund from December 31, 1996 to December 31, 2022 compared with the Russell 3000 Index, Morningstar Global Large-Stock Blend Category and MSCI World Index.

The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.

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iMGP Global Select Fund (formerly iMGP Equity Fund)

SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES at December 31, 2022

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.

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iMGP Global Select Fund (formerly iMGP Equity Fund)

SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES at December 31, 2022 (Continued)

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.

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iMGP International Fund 2022 Annual Report

The iMGP International Fund declined 21.58% in 2022, underperforming the 14.45% loss for the MSCI EAFE Index. It also trailed the losses of 16.00% and 15.77% of MSCI ACWI ex. US Index and Morningstar Foreign Large Blend category, respectively. Since the fund’s 1997 inception, the fund has an annualized return of 5.85%—comparing favorably to the 4.52% return for MSCI EAFE and 3.73% gain for the category. The fund changed its primary benchmark at the end of Q3 2021 the MSCI EAFE Index to reflect the mandate of the managers to primarily focus on developed markets.

MSCI index returns source: MSCI. Neither MSCI nor any other party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the MSCI data makes any express or implied warranties or representations with respect to such data (or the results to be obtained by the use thereof), and all such parties hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of such data. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall MSCI, any of its affiliates, or any third party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the data have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential, or any other damages (including lost profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages. No further distribution or dissemination of the MSCI data is permitted without MSCI’s express written consent. Source note: Returns prior to 1999 are the MSCI ACWI ex-US GR index. Returns from 1999 onwards are MSCI ACWI ex-US NR index.

Key Performance Drivers

Both sector allocation and security selection detracted from returns in 2022. The fund’s overweight to technology stocks and underweight to the energy sector were the main detractors from sector allocation standpoint. The financials and health care sectors were the to top two detractors within security selection. The fund benefited from security selection in the technology and materials sectors.

Within the health care sector, the main detractor was ICON. This position was held by the Polen Team throughout the entire year but a position in the company was added by Mark Little of Lazard Asset Management during the fourth quarter. ICON shares underperformed during 2022 as the pace of drug development spending slowed and the business lapped robust growth from the prior year. ICON remains a global leader in contract research organization services to biopharma companies and is well positioned to continue gaining market share in the years ahead. Following a sizable acquisition in 2021, ICON now holds the #1 or #2 position in most markets in which they compete. Their scale and global presence, depth of therapeutic and scientific expertise, site and patient access, and decentralized clinical trial solutions, an area that Polen think’s the world is headed post-COVID, should allow them to continue growing ahead of the overall market. ICON’s long-term target is for 7- 9% organic revenue growth and mid-teens earnings per share growth. Trading at 18x forward consensus earnings, and with a long runway to continue growing steadily, ICON is attractively valued.

The largest detractor in 2022 was a position in Credit Suisse (owned by David Herro of Harris Associates). Credit Suisse Group faced several challenges in 2022 and its share price fell over the 12-month period. The company has suffered from a succession of negative internal and external events, which produced consistent quarterly net income losses during the year. Most recently, third-quarter results were impeded by a CHF 3.7 billion impairment of deferred tax assets (DTA). The DTA is attributed to the company’s securitized products segment, and the expected spin-off of this segment prompted the charge. Although the DTA impairment is a non-cash charge, it necessitated a larger than expected capital raise of CHF 4 billion to enable reaching its target ranges. However, Credit Suisse has instituted some restructuring initiatives to reinstate profitability. These efforts include de-risking operations, which drove management to conduct a strategic review on its investment bank to identify opportunities to transform it into a capital-light, advisory led banking business with a reduced absolute cost base in the medium term. Another area of focus is digitizing the company’s processes that management anticipates will generate cost savings of CHF 650 million. While management acknowledged that these programs may elevate operating expenditures in the near term,

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these endeavors are aimed to save costs and boost efficiency moving forward. In addition, Credit Suisse saw the departure of some key executive team members in 2022 including CEO Thomas Gottstein, CFO David Mathers and General Counsel Romeo Cerutti. In Herro’s view, Credit Suisse’s new leadership team is a material upgrade and positions the company to better realize benefits from its restructuring plan that appears to be quite methodical and well contemplated. Ultimately, however, Herro decided to exit the Credit Suisse position in the Fund due to the concentrated nature of the portfolio and instead to add to positions that, in his view, offer a more attractive investment on a risk-adjusted basis.

On the positive side, the fund’s position in Aon contributed to returns in the financials sector. Aon, owned by the Polen team, is an outsourced services provider helping businesses of all sizes locate cost effective insurance and risk management solutions via scaled global distribution networks. Aon is one of the world’s leading insurance brokerage houses, distributing insurance policies to businesses on a recurring basis. Throughout 2022 Aon reported robust broad-based growth across business units and geographies. This growth was driven by solid new business wins, strong retention and renewals, and a “modest” boost from pricing due to inflation on asset values. In the wake of Hurricane Ian, the reinsurance unit continues to show their ability to flex their analytics muscle and create innovative solutions for insurance carrier clients looking to diversify and offload risk. Aon is a durable, highly cash flow generative business that is performing well in a difficult macro backdrop as we would expect, and at just over 20x forward earnings per share Aon’s total returns growth at a low to mid-teens rate offers fair risk reward.

The fund’s top contributor in 2022 was Glencore. The position, held by Herro, was volatile early in the year and rose mainly in the third and fourth quarters. In August, the company delivered a solid set of first-half earnings results, as marketing segment earnings increased over 100% year-over-year and profit of $3.7 billion handily surpassed the company’s long-term range of $2.2-$3.2 billion for the year. Furthermore, adjusted earnings in the coal segment reached $8.9 billion for the first half, which outpaced our full-year expectations of $15.4 billion. Management later participated in some corporate actions with the goal of enhancing the company’s value. The Australian Foreign Investment Review Board approved Metals Acquisition Corp’s purchase of CSA Copper Mine from Glencore. In addition, Glencore management announced plans to purchase all of Newmont’s stake in the MARA Project, an Argentina-based copper and gold mine, for $124.9 million along with other considerations. At its investor update event in December, Glencore issued its nine-month production report and lowered full-year output targets across most commodities as the company faced negative weather, labor, and supply chain issues in certain geographies. Even so, management still expects fiscal second-half marketing segment earnings will exceed $1.6 billion, which would fall at the high end of the previously established long-term guidance range. The company also announced plans to close 12 coal mines by 2035 as it endeavors to achieve its climate priorities.

The fund benefited from a position in Informa (owned by Little). Informa shares performed well in 2022. The business has struggled through the pandemic as restrictions on travel and events hampered the exhibition business. Activity recovered modestly in 2021 and picked up steam in 2022. The valuation of the shares remained depressed throughout most of 2021, which ultimately prompted management to divest part of the portfolio (Informa Intelligence) at a very attractive multiple. This crystallization of value within the group combined with a faster pace of recovery in exhibitions supported the shares throughout the year. The balance sheet has now been repaired and the topline should continue to improve as sales have yet to recover to 2019 levels.

Portfolio Mix

The International Fund is built stock by stock from the bottom-up and can at times look very different from its benchmark. We believe this is key to generating excess long-term returns.

Over the last 12 months, the overall portfolio mix changed modestly.

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iMGP International Fund Managers

iMGP International Fund Value of Hypothetical $10,000

The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP International Fund from November 30, 1997 to December 31, 2022 compared with the MSCI EAFE Index, Morningstar Foreign Large Blend Category and MSCI ACWI Ex USA Index.

The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.

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iMGP International Fund

SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES at December 31, 2022

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.

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iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund 2022 Annual Report

The iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund declined 14.89% in 2022, underperforming the 5.58% loss for the MSCI EAFE Value Index. It matched the 14.45% loss of the MSCI EAFE Index. The fund trailed the Morningstar Foreign Large Blend category’s loss of 9.15%. Since the fund’s inception, the fund has an annualized return of 1.02%—trailing the 4.38% of the MSCI EAFE Value Index but ahead of the 0.19% loss for MSCI EAFE Index.

MSCI index returns source: MSCI. Neither MSCI nor any other party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the MSCI data makes any express or implied warranties or representations with respect to such data (or the results to be obtained by the use thereof), and all such parties hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of such data. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall MSCI, any of its affiliates, or any third party involved in or related to compiling, computing, or creating the data have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential, or any other damages (including lost profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages. No further distribution or dissemination of the MSCI data is permitted without MSCI’s express written consent. Source note: Returns prior to 1999 are the MSCI ACWI ex-US GR index. Returns from 1999 onwards are MSCI ACWI ex-US NR index.

Manager Commentary

At the core of our investment approach is classic, contrarian, bottom-up, Value investing. For more than a decade through the end of 2021, the value style of investing has lagged in a world of Quantitative Easing (QE) and ultra-low interest rates where the cost of capital was distorted, and investors chased growth irrespective of valuation and often common sense. 2022 will go down as the year of ‘regime change’ where the received wisdom, built up in a world of QE, started to crumble.

We think that this change in market regime is fundamental, and we look forward to many more years of the resurgence in value. If value and growth areas of the market are to resume their historical relationship, there remains significant return potential for value from our style of investing and from our international equity strategy.

Since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the fund’s relative performance has suffered. For the 12-month period ending January 2022, the Fund was up 17%, comparing favorably to MSCI EAFE Value’s gain of 12.93% and MSCI EAFE’s return of 7.0%. We are obviously very disappointed that the Fund has suffered so significantly in the seven-month period between the invasion of Ukraine and the end of September but cheered that the Fund kept pace with the strong recovery in international markets in the final quarter of the year. We believe that the fund will recover from this set back and note that the weighted average upside of the stocks in the fund is exceptionally attractive at over 50%.

With the invasion of Ukraine, Europe was seen as the epicenter of geopolitical risk and global investors fled the region, which negatively impacted our performance in the second and third quarters. The UK investments suffered additionally by a self-induced crisis with Prime Minister Liz Truss’s mini budget in the Autumn which negatively impacted on Sterling, UK bonds and domestically exposed equities. This hit the share prices of both domestic (BT, Tesco, Lloyds) and dollar cost (easyJet) companies. Our exposure to the UK accounted for some 70% of the underperformance versus MSCI EAFE Value for the year. With the departure of Liz Truss and arrival of Rishi Sunak as Prime Minister, we have seen a marked stabilization in the UK bond market and the currency, but we think that the domestically exposed areas of the UK equity market remain substantially undervalued with their falls significantly overdoing any impact on their operating fundamentals.

Key Performance Drivers

The worst performer in the fund for the year was easyJet, the UK and European low-cost airline. 2022 was a poor year for airlines but especially for easyJet. The recovery in air travel is coming through following the curtailments seen during the pandemic. However, easyJet

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suffered because its airports failed to restore operations fast enough to meet demand, leading to travel chaos and cancelled flights. At the same time, we witnessed a rising cost of jet fuel and increasing concerns around consumer discretionary spend in 2023. One of the attractions of easyJet was that it operates from these capacity constrained, primary airports. With limited spare capacity at these airports, easyJet is largely competing against the legacy flag carrier airlines. The competitive cost advantage easyJet has against these has only increased over time and is enhanced during industry downturns, as in the pandemic. Many of easyJet’s competitors are now in financial distress and facing significant cost inflation having had to succumb to aircrew wage demands after taking state aid. The operating issues at airports have been largely resolved and even in a weakening consumer environment easyJet should demonstrate significant profit recovery from here. In a sector that is meaningful to the transition to net zero, easyJet appears to be a leader in the detail and commitment of their strategy. It has a strong balance sheet and good fleet optionality over the coming years—as it takes on new, more fuel-efficient planes further increasing its competitive advantage. This has not been reflected in the share price which is down 42% over the year (in local currency) and remains below the pandemic low in March 2020. The market value of easyJet is currently around £2.5bn which is roughly half that pre-pandemic. However, forecast EBITDA for 2023 (just taking the market consensus) is the same as that achieved in 2019 and significantly higher in the subsequent years. The upside to our target valuation is currently the highest in the portfolio and stands at a multiple of the current share price.

BT, the incumbent telecom operator in the UK, was the second largest faller for the year but the largest detractor to fund performance in the year given its larger weighting in the Fund. The shares fell 30% in local currency, but 38% in US dollars. The UK’s seemingly self-induced ‘Gilt scare’ led to a liquidity crisis for many mature UK pension funds and BT’s £47bn pension fund was no exception. The scheme warned that it may need ‘support’ from the company, which spooked investors. However, liquidity has returned to the Gilt market, investors calmed and at this stage we see no material changes to our outlook for BT’s cash flows. We also note the potential positive impact on deficit funding from the higher discount rates. The operating fundamentals for the business remain intact. In November we met with BT’s CEO, Philip Jansen. He, like us, is bullish on the medium-term prospects for the company. BT’s build rate for fiber to the home is impressive and Jansen explained that their operating efficiency and higher-than-expected take-up of the new fiber offerings suggested that returns on fiber investment will exceed his prior expectation. BT’s fixed line network division, Openreach, is actively consulting with its customers (such as Sky, TalkTalk and Vodafone) on a new wholesale pricing scheme that would effectively share these excess returns from the fiber build out with them and lock them in. The regulatory asset value for the Openreach business is £17 billion and yet the market capitalization for the whole of BT is less than £12 billion. We see fair value at around 275p a share, about 140% above the year end price. While we await the fair value, the shares offer a well-covered (over 2.5x) dividend yield of c.6.8% and trade on a forward price to earnings of less than 6x.

The Continental European companies we hold in the portfolio have solid fundamentals and have, in the most part, increased their long-term earnings power through the year. For us this means the long-term value remains intact and falls in their share prices have represented a buying opportunity. It is something we took advantage of in several cases during the year with timely additions to Siemens, Sanofi and Bayer.

The fund also suffered from its exposure to China and the country’s commitment to its zero-COVID policy that hurt the economy and our holdings in Alibaba and LG H&H. We believed that this policy was unsustainable and therefore would not be maintained. With the almost complete abandonment of COVID-related restrictions in China in November, we saw recoveries in the share prices of these companies of more than 50% each in the last two months of the year. From year-end levels, we see upside of around 50% for LG H&H and 170% for Alibaba.

A notable bright spot in 2022 was the exposure to Japan. The best performer and largest positive contributor to the Fund during the year was Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), a Japanese industrial conglomerate. MHI had been a deeply unfashionable investment in recent years. It suffered from the fall in demand for its gas turbine business and was hit hard in the pandemic given that it is a tier one supplier to Boeing and had to abandon its development of a regional jet. But in 2022 it benefitted from a reappraisal of its fortunes, as it remains the largest defense contractor in Japan and it is seen as a potential beneficiary of the World’s move to net zero carbon emissions. The shares rose 102%, in local currency terms in 2022. It had been the largest negative contributor to overall performance in 2021, with the share price down 13% and we had started 2022 buying more. Since the rapid advance in the shares during the year it has now reached our view of fair value and we have been using this share price strength to reduce our holding.

Another positive contributor in Japan was Mitsubishi UFJ Group (MUFG), our third best performer of the year. We often say that in Japan ‘out of necessity comes virtue’ and this has been the case with MUFG, the largest bank in Japan. In a world of negative interest rates their net interest income has been crushed, roughly halving over the last ten years. This has forced them to grow their international footprint in Southeast Asia (primarily Thailand and Indonesia), cut costs and return capital to shareholders via the dividend and share buy backs. But given the collapse in net interest income it has been an uphill battle. It could not prevent the decline in returns and a de-rating from over 1.0x price to book value in 2009 to less than 0.5x. We saw ample opportunity to improve shareholder returns, given they held a stake in Morgan Stanley that at times equated to over 40% of their entire market value. They also had capital gains on cross shareholdings which they have been actively reducing.

In late 2021, they announced the disposal of their US retail operations to US Bancorp for $8bn, which was completed at the end of 2022. This deal frees up capital that MUFG can return to shareholders. Our investment thesis for MUFG has never relied on an improvement in the macroeconomic backdrop although any increase in net interest margins would create further upside. The surprise move at the end of the year by the Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda to lift its target band on the ten year Government bond from 0.25% to 0.50% seems

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small but it is very significant in terms of macroeconomic backdrop and direction of travel. It signals the start of the end to MUFG’s long suffering battle against negative interest rates. The shares have re-rated positively but still trade on an attractive 0.65x price to book value.

In December we initiated a new position in CK Hutchison Holdings (CKH). This is a Hong Kong listed conglomerate controlled by the Li family, with a current market value of about $24 billion. We have followed this company for many years. We have watched from the side-lines, as the share price has fallen from a peak of over HK$120 in 2015 (with the merger of Hutchison Whampoa and Cheung Kong) to a low of $40 in November of 2022.

There is much on the face of it to deter global investors from CKH given its complexity, the uncertainty around Hong Kong’s future and the role of the controlling interests. But we believe that CKH is a collection of highly attractive assets (mostly European) on which the current discount has never been greater. CKH owns both majority and minority stakes in listed and unlisted businesses across five main industries: Retail, Ports, Infrastructure, Telecoms and Energy. It owns 75% of Watson, the world’s largest health and beauty retailer. It is one of the largest operators of ports globally. It is in telecoms, principally through the 3 Group in Europe but also in Asia. It has an infrastructure business in power generation, water and waste management and in Energy via its 16% stake in the Canadian-listed oil & gas company, Cenovus. The market valuation for the group equated to just the listed assets which account for some 40% of our gross asset value. This means that the value being attributed to its unlisted assets has turned negative for the first time (this includes some of its largest businesses in Retail, Ports and the 3 Group).

The historically high discount to our sum of the parts is attractive but what makes this a compelling investment is recent moves to create shareholder value. CKH has shown that it is not wedded to retaining ownership of these assets if it can create value for shareholders and it is engaging in significant portfolio restructuring. They are addressing the weakest part of their portfolio in the European telecoms space with the proposed merger of their UK assets with Vodafone’s for a minority stake in the combined UK business. We are receiving a 6% dividend yield and they are also buying back shares. CKH trades on a forward price to earnings ratio of just 5x, 5x EV/EBITDA and 0.3x price to. This is too cheap for a diversified group of relatively high quality and defensive businesses. One our conservative forecasts we see over 50% upside and a highly attractive total return of about 19% per annum.

In the month we also bought Henkel, the German based households products and chemicals company. It has three major divisions: Laundry and Home Care (35% of sales; with key brands Persil, Purex, Dixan and Sun), Beauty (20%; with key brands Schwarzkopf, Dial and Fa) and Adhesives (45%; key brands Loctite, Teroson and Pattex). Its biggest markets are Western Europe (30% of sales) and North America (27%). Henkel generates 40% of its sales from emerging markets.

Henkel is the global leader in industrial adhesives and this business has very attractive fundamentals. Adhesives represent a tiny part of the finished product but are often ‘mission critical’, together giving it strong pricing power. There is also a secular trend of growth here for industrial uses. One such area of growth is in autos, where demand from this industry accounts for around 20% of Henkel’s adhesive business. In the move to battery electric vehicles, it is estimated that Henkel’s content per car will nearly triple. We became very interested in Henkel at the start of the year, as the share price had fallen by 44% from its peak in 2017 after a series of profit warnings given underinvestment in some of its consumer brands (which flattered the sustainable operating margin) and concerns around raw material price increases in the consumer business. This effect on the share price was compounded in the year with the general malaise towards the German equity market. Market forecasts have now become more realistic and the quality of the Adhesives business can be seen with organic growth in the first nine months of the year coming in at c.14% (driven largely by price). The company has a strong balance sheet and therefore low financial risk. The company has been de-rated from 16x EV/EBITDA at the peak to around 8x today, with its historic median over the last 10 years being 12x. We have been conservative in our outlook but still see our investment in Henkel delivering a low-risk of about 15% return per annum from here which we think is attractive in the current market.

To fund these purchases, we used some of the cash we had in the portfolio and decided to sell the two smallest holdings in the portfolio in Nomura and Porsche. Whilst both had upside to our target valuations, our conviction in these holdings has diminished in recent months. Nomura has demonstrated poor fundamental performance for too long and the much hoped for transition to a more valuable advisory business has failed to materialise. We have been patient here, holding the shares for over 5 years and conducting deep due diligence with senior and operational management throughout. However, for a business that should have been geared to rising stock markets through until the end of 2021, the fundamental and stock price performance has been poor. Porsche SE has many attractions and was a much more recent purchase. The IPO of Porsche AG was a success in difficult markets and achieved a valuation of around 20x price to earnings for the luxury car business. However, we are increasingly concerned about the outlook for a business that relies heavily on sales to China. The VW Group (part owned by Porsche SE) is delivering historically high operating margins which we believe are not sustainable given the growing headwinds and longer-term industry outlook.

It is hard to stand apart from the crowd, particularly when performance is disappointing. It is this which ultimately underpins the long-term outperformance of Value over many previous decades. The duration of the relative drawdown in Value has been unprecedented and this created all manner of pressures on investors. Our culture and philosophical commitment to Value investing remains consistent. At the end of the year the portfolio had a weighted average upside of over 50% which remains high and attractive by historic standards. Our companies remain lowly valued with the overall portfolio on a forward price to earnings ratio of less than 9x on a weighted average basis, with strong fundamentals which gives us confidence that we will generate attractive long-term returns over the coming years.

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Portfolio Mix

The fund is built stock by stock from the bottom-up and can at times look very different from its benchmark. We believe this is key to generating excess long-term returns.

Over the last 12 months, the overall portfolio mix changed modestly.

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iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund Value of Hypothetical $10,000

The value of a hypothetical $10,000 investment in the iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund from November 30, 2020 to December 31, 2022 compared with the MSCI EAFE Value Index, Morningstar Foreign Large Value Category and MSCI EAFE Index.

The hypothetical $10,000 investment at fund inception includes changes due to share price and reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. The chart does not imply future performance. Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur fees, expenses or taxes, and cannot be invested in directly.

Performance quoted does not include a deduction for taxes that a shareholder would pay on the redemption of fund shares.

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iMGP Oldfield International Value Fund

SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES at December 31, 2022