January 29,
2021 | |
Nuveen NWQ Flexible Income
Fund |
|||
Ticker
Symbols: Class A—NWQAX, Class C—NWQCX, Class R6—NQWFX,
Class I—NWQIX |
Page | ||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
S- |
||
A- |
||
B- |
Name, Business
Address and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal
Occupation(s) During Past Five Years |
Number
of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years | |
Independent
Trustees: |
||||||
|
||||||
Jack
B. Evans 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1948 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite* Length of Service— Since 2006 |
Chairman
(since 2019), formerly, President (1996-2019), The Hall-Perrine Foundation
(private philanthropic corporation); Life Trustee of Coe College and the
Iowa College Foundation; formerly, Director, Public Member, American Board
of Orthopaedic Surgery (2015-2020); formerly, Director (1998-2003),
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; formerly, President and Chief Operating
Officer (1972-1995), SCI Financial Group, Inc. (regional financial
services firm); formerly, Member and President Pro Tem of the Board of
Regents for the State of Iowa University System; formerly, Director, The
Gazette Company (media and publishing). |
149 |
Director
and Chairman (since 2009), United Fire Group, a publicly held company;
formerly, Director (2000-2013), Alliant Energy. | |
|
||||||
William
C. Hunter 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1948 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2006 |
Dean
Emeritus, formerly, Dean (2006-2012), Tippie College of Business,
University of Iowa; past Director (2005-2015) and past President
(2010-2014) of Beta Gamma Sigma, Inc., The International Business Honor
Society; formerly, Director (1997-2007), Credit Research Center at
Georgetown University; formerly, Dean and Distinguished Professor of
Finance (2003-2006), School of Business at the University of Connecticut;
previously, Senior Vice President and Director of Research (1995-2003) at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. |
149 |
Director
(since 2009) of Wellmark, Inc.; formerly, Director (2004-2018) of Xerox
Corporation. |
Name, Business
Address and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal
Occupation(s) During Past Five Years |
Number
of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Albin
F. Moschner 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1952 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2016 |
Founder
and Chief Executive Officer, Northcroft Partners, LLC (management
consulting) (since 2012); previously, held positions at Leap Wireless
International, Inc. (consumer wireless services), including Consultant
(2011-2012), Chief Operating Officer (2008-2011) and Chief Marketing
Officer (2004-2008); formerly, President, Verizon Card Services division
of Verizon Communications, Inc. (telecommunication services) (2000-2003);
formerly, President, One Point Services at One Point Communications
(telecommunication services) (1999-2000); formerly, Vice Chairman of the
Board, Diba, Incorporated (internet technology provider) (1996-1997);
formerly, various executive positions (1991-1996) and Chief Executive
Officer (1995-1996) of Zenith Electronics Corporation (consumer
electronics). |
149 |
Formerly,
Chairman (2019) and Director (2012-2019), USA Technologies, Inc., a
provider of solutions and services to facilitate electronic payment
transactions; formerly, Director, Wintrust Financial Corporation
(1996-2016). |
|
|||||
John
K. Nelson 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1962 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2013 |
Member
of Board of Directors of Core12 LLC (private firm which develops branding,
marketing and communications strategies for clients) (since 2008); served
The President's Council of Fordham University (2010-2019) and previously a
Director of the Curran Center for Catholic American Studies (2009-2018);
formerly, senior external advisor to the Financial Services practice of
Deloitte Consulting LLP (2012-2014); former Chair of the Board of Trustees
of Marian University (2010-2014 as trustee, 2011-2014 as Chair); formerly
Chief Executive Officer of ABN AMRO Bank N.V., North America, and Global
Head of the Financial Markets Division (2007-2008), with various executive
leadership roles in ABN AMRO Bank N.V. between 1996 and 2007. |
149 |
None |
Name, Business
Address and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal
Occupation(s) During Past Five Years |
Number
of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Judith
M. Stockdale 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1947 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2006 |
Board
Member of the Land Trust Alliance (national public charity addressing
natural land and water conservation in the U.S.) (since 2013); formerly,
Board Member of the U.S. Endowment for Forestry and Communities (national
endowment addressing forest health, sustainable forest production and
markets, and economic health of forest-reliant communities in the U.S.)
(2013-12/2019); formerly, Executive Director (1994-2012), Gaylord and
Dorothy Donnelley Foundation (private foundation endowed to support both
natural land conservation and artistic vitality); prior thereto, Executive
Director, Great Lakes Protection Fund (endowment created jointly by seven
of the eight Great Lake states’ Governors to take a regional approach to
improving the health of the Great Lakes) (1990-1994). |
149 |
None |
|
|||||
Carole
E. Stone 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1947 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2007 |
Former
Director, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (2006-2017) and C2 Options
Exchange, Incorporated (2009-2017); formerly, Commissioner, New York State
Commission on Public Authority Reform (2005-2010). |
149 |
Formerly,
Director (2010-2020), Cboe Global Markets, Inc. (formerly named CBOE
Holdings, Inc.). |
|
|||||
Matthew
Thornton III 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1958 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2020 |
Formerly,
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (2018-2019), FedEx
Freight Corporation, a subsidiary of FedEx Corporation (“
FedEx ® |
149 |
Member
of the Board of Directors (since 2014), The Sherwin-Williams Company
(develops, manufactures, distributes and sells paints, coatings and
related products); Member of the Board of Directors (since 2020), Crown
Castle International (provider of communications
infrastructure). |
Name, Business
Address and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal
Occupation(s) During Past Five Years |
Number
of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Terence
J. Toth 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1959 |
Chair
of the Board and Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2008 |
Formerly,
Co-Founding Partner, Promus Capital (investment advisory firm)
(2008-2017); Director, Quality Control Corporation (manufacturing) (since
2012); formerly, Director, Fulcrum IT Service LLC (information technology
services firm to government entities) (2010-2019); formerly, Director,
LogicMark LLC (health services) (2012-2016); formerly, Director, Legal
& General Investment Management America, Inc. (asset management)
(2008-2013); formerly, CEO and President, Northern Trust Global
Investments (financial services) (2004-2007); Executive Vice President,
Quantitative Management & Securities Lending (2000-2004); prior
thereto, various positions with Northern Trust Company (financial
services) (since 1994); Member, Catalyst Schools of Chicago Board (since
2008) and Mather Foundation Board (philanthropy) (since 2012) and is Chair
of its Investment Committee; formerly, Member, Chicago Fellowship Board
(philanthropy) (2005-2016); formerly, Member, Northern Trust Mutual Funds
Board (2005-2007), Northern Trust Global Investments Board (2004-2007),
Northern Trust Japan Board (2004-2007), Northern Trust Securities Inc.
Board (2003-2007) and Northern Trust Hong Kong Board (1997-2004). |
149 |
None |
|
|||||
Margaret
L. Wolff 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1955 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2016 |
Formerly,
Of Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Mergers &
Acquisitions Group) (legal services) (2005-2014); Member of the Board of
Trustees of New York-Presbyterian Hospital (since 2005); Member (since
2004) and Chair (since 2015) of the Board of Trustees of The John A.
Hartford Foundation (philanthropy dedicated to improving the care of older
adults); formerly, Member (2005-2015) and Vice Chair (2011-2015) of the
Board of Trustees of Mt. Holyoke College. |
149 |
Formerly,
Member of the Board of Directors (2013-2017) of Travelers Insurance
Company of Canada and The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company
(each, a part of Travelers Canada, the Canadian operation of The Travelers
Companies, Inc.). |
Name, Business
Address and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal
Occupation(s) During Past Five Years |
Number
of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee |
Other Directorships Held by Trustee During Past Five Years |
|
|||||
Robert
L. Young 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1963 |
Trustee |
Term—Indefinite*
Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Formerly,
Chief Operating Officer and Director, J.P. Morgan Investment Management
Inc. (financial services) (2010-2016); formerly, President and Principal
Executive Officer (2013-2016), and Senior Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer (2005-2010), of J.P. Morgan Funds; formerly, Director
and various officer positions for J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc.
(formerly, JPMorgan Funds Management, Inc. and formerly, One Group
Administrative Services) and JPMorgan Distribution Services, Inc.
(financial services) (formerly, One Group Dealer Services, Inc.)
(1999-2017). |
149 |
None |
Name, Business
Address and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length
of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Officers of the
Trust: |
|||
Mark
J. Czarniecki 901 Marquette Avenue Minneapolis, MN 55402 1979 |
Vice
President and Secretary |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2013 |
Vice
President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2016)
and Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2017); Vice President, Associate
General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC
(since 2018); Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Nuveen, LLC
(since 2013). |
Diana
R. Gonzalez 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1978 |
Vice
President and Assistant Secretary |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Vice
President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since
2017); Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Nuveen, LLC (since
2017); Associate General Counsel of Jackson National Asset Management
(2012-2017). |
Nathaniel
T. Jones 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1979 |
Vice
President and Treasurer |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2016 |
Managing
Director (since 2017), formerly, Senior Vice President (2016-2017),
formerly, Vice President (2011-2016) of Nuveen, LLC; Managing Director
(since 2015) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Chartered Financial
Analyst. |
Tina
M. Lazar 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1961 |
Vice
President |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2006 |
Managing
Director (since 2017), formerly, Senior Vice President (2014-2017) of
Nuveen Securities, LLC. |
Brian
J. Lockhart 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1974 |
Vice
President |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Managing
Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Managing Director
(since 2017), formerly, Vice President (2010-2017) of Nuveen, LLC; Head of
Investment Oversight (since 2017), formerly, Team Leader of Manager
Oversight (2015-2017); Chartered Financial Analyst and Certified Financial
Risk Manager. |
Jacques
M. Longerstaey 8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1963 |
Vice
President |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Senior
Managing Director, Chief Risk Officer, Nuveen, LLC (since 2019); Senior
Managing Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; formerly,
Chief Investment and Model Risk Officer, Wealth & Investment
Management Division, Wells Fargo Bank (NA) (2013–2019). |
Kevin
J. McCarthy 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1966 |
Vice
President and Assistant Secretary |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2007 |
Senior
Managing Director (since 2017) and Secretary and General Counsel (since
2016) of Nuveen Investments, Inc., formerly, Executive Vice President
(2016-2017), Managing Director and Assistant Secretary (2008-2016); Senior
Managing Director (since 2017) and Assistant Secretary (since 2008) of
Nuveen Securities, LLC, formerly, Executive Vice President (2016-2017) and
Managing Director (2008-2016); Senior Managing Director (since 2017),
Secretary (since 2016) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC, formerly, Co-General
Counsel (2011-2020), Executive Vice President (2016-2017), Managing
Director (2008-2016) and Assistant Secretary (2007-2016); Senior Managing
Director (since 2017), Secretary (since 2016) of Nuveen Asset Management,
LLC, formerly, Associate General Counsel (2011-2020), Executive Vice
President (2016-2017) and Managing Director and Assistant Secretary
(2011-2016); Vice President (since 2007) and Secretary (since 2016),
formerly, Assistant Secretary, of NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC,
Santa Barbara Asset Management, LLC, and Winslow Capital Management, LLC
(since 2010); Senior Managing Director (since 2017) and Secretary (since
2016) of Nuveen Alternative Investments, LLC. |
Name, Business
Address and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length
of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Jon
Scott Meissner 8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1973 |
Vice
President and Assistant Secretary |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Managing
Director of Mutual Fund Tax and Financial Reporting groups at Nuveen, LLC
(since 2017); Managing Director (since 2019) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC;
Senior Director of Teachers Advisors, LLC and TIAA-CREF Investment
Management, LLC (since 2016); Senior Director (since 2015) Mutual
Fund Taxation to the TIAA-CREF Funds, the TIAA-CREF Life Funds, the TIAA
Separate Account VA-1 and the CREF Accounts; has held various positions
with TIAA since 2004. |
Deann
D. Morgan 730 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017 1969 |
Vice
President |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2020 |
President
of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since 2020); Executive Vice President,
Global Head of Product at Nuveen, LLC (since November 2019); Co-Chief
Executive Officer of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since March 2020); Managing
Member of MDR Collaboratory LLC (since 2018); Managing Director, Head of
Wealth Management Product Structuring & COO Multi Asset Investing, The
Blackstone Group (2013-2017). |
Christopher
M. Rohrbacher 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1971 |
Vice
President and Assistant Secretary |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2008 |
Managing
Director (since 2017), General Counsel (since 2020) and Assistant
Secretary (since 2016), formerly, Senior Vice President (2016-2017), of
Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Managing Director (since 2017) of Nuveen
Securities, LLC; Managing Director, Associate General Counsel and
Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (since 2020); Managing
Director (since 2017), and Associate General Counsel (since 2016),
formerly, Senior Vice President (2012-2017) and Assistant General Counsel
(2008-2016) of Nuveen, LLC. |
William
A. Siffermann 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1975 |
Vice
President |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2017 |
Managing
Director (since 2017), formerly Senior Vice President (2016-2017) and Vice
President (2011-2016) of Nuveen, LLC. |
Christopher
E. Stickrod 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1976 |
Chief
Administrative Officer |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2020 |
Senior
Managing Director (since 2017) and Head of Advisory Product (since 2020),
formerly, Managing Director (2016-2017) and Senior Vice President
(2013-2016) of Nuveen, LLC; Senior Managing Director of Nuveen Securities,
LLC (since 2018) and of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since
2019). |
E.
Scott Wickerham 8500 Andrew Carnegie Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28262 1973 |
Vice
President and Controller |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2019 |
Senior
Managing Director, Head of Fund Administration at Nuveen, LLC (since
2019), formerly, Managing Director; Senior Managing Director (since 2019),
of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; Principal Financial Officer, Principal
Accounting Officer and Treasurer (since 2017) of the TIAA-CREF Funds, the
TIAA-CREF Life Funds, the TIAA Separate Account VA-1 and Treasurer (since
2017) to the CREF Accounts; Senior Director, TIAA-CREF Fund Administration
(2014-2015); has held various positions with TIAA since 2006. |
Mark
L. Winget 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1968 |
Vice
President and Assistant Secretary |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2008 |
Vice
President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Securities, LLC (since 2008);
Vice President and Assistant Secretary of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC (since
2019); Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary
of Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (since 2020); Vice President (since 2010)
and Associate General Counsel (since 2019), formerly, Assistant General
Counsel (2008-2016) of Nuveen,
LLC. |
Name, Business
Address and Year of Birth |
Position(s) Held with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length
of Time Served with the Trust |
Principal Occupation(s)
During Past Five Years |
Gifford
R. Zimmerman 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 1956 |
Vice
President and Chief Compliance Officer |
Term—Until August 2021 Length of Service— Since 2006 |
Formerly,
Managing Director (2004-2020) and Assistant Secretary (1994-2020) of
Nuveen Investments, Inc.; formerly, Managing Director (2002-2020) and
Assistant Secretary (2002-2020) of Nuveen Securities, LLC; formerly,
Managing Director (2002-2020), Assistant Secretary (1997-2020) and
Co-General Counsel (2011-2020) of Nuveen Fund Advisors, LLC; formerly,
Managing Director, Assistant Secretary and Associate General Counsel of
Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (2011-2020); formerly, Vice President and
Assistant Secretary of NWQ Investment Management Company, LLC, Santa
Barbara Asset Management, LLC (2006-2020) and Winslow Capital Management,
LLC (2010-2020); Chartered Financial Analyst. |
Name of
Trustee |
Aggregate Compensation From Fund |
Amount of
Total Compensation that Has Been Deferred |
Total Compensation From Nuveen Funds Paid to Trustee |
||||||||||||||||
Jack
B. Evans
|
$ |
3,972 |
$ |
318 |
$ |
403,711 |
|||||||||||||
William
C. Hunter
|
4,154 |
— |
425,500 |
||||||||||||||||
Albin
F. Moschner
|
3,804 |
— |
385,300 |
||||||||||||||||
John
K. Nelson
|
4,343 |
— |
441,000 |
||||||||||||||||
Judith
M. Stockdale
|
3,941 |
939 |
400,320 |
||||||||||||||||
Carole
E. Stone
|
4,141 |
1,621 |
421,393 |
||||||||||||||||
Matthew
Thornton III
1 |
— |
— |
— |
||||||||||||||||
Terence
J. Toth
|
4,809 |
— |
484,300 |
||||||||||||||||
Margaret
L. Wolff
|
3,794 |
1,248 |
385,632 |
||||||||||||||||
Robert
L. Young
|
4,127 |
4,127 |
416,682 |
Name of
Trustee |
Dollar Range of Equity Securities In the Fund |
Aggregate Dollar
Range of Equity Securities in All Registered Investment Companies Overseen by Trustee in Family of Investment Companies | ||||
Jack
B. Evans
|
$ |
0 |
Over
$100,000 | |||
William
C. Hunter
|
$ |
0 |
Over
$100,000 | |||
Albin
F. Moschner
|
$10,001-
$50,000 |
Over
$100,000 | ||||
John
K. Nelson
|
$ |
0 |
Over
$100,000 | |||
Judith
M. Stockdale
|
$ |
0 |
Over
$100,000 | |||
Carole
E. Stone
|
$ |
0 |
Over
$100,000 | |||
Matthew
Thornton III
1 |
$ |
0 |
$0 | |||
Terence
J. Toth
|
$50,001-
$100,000 |
Over
$100,000 | ||||
Margaret
L. Wolff
|
$ |
0 |
Over
$100,000 | |||
Robert
L. Young
|
$ |
0 |
Over
$100,000 |
Complex-Level
Asset |
Effective Rate
at | ||
Breakpoint
Level* |
Breakpoint
Level | ||
$55
billion
|
0.2000% | ||
$56
billion
|
0.1996% | ||
$57
billion
|
0.1989% | ||
$60
billion
|
0.1961% | ||
$63
billion
|
0.1931% | ||
$66
billion
|
0.1900% | ||
$71
billion
|
0.1851% | ||
$76
billion
|
0.1806% | ||
$80
billion
|
0.1773% | ||
$91
billion
|
0.1691% | ||
$125
billion
|
0.1599% | ||
$200
billion
|
0.1505% | ||
$250
billion
|
0.1469% | ||
$300
billion
|
0.1445% |
Management Fees Paid to
the Adviser Net of Fee Waivers and Expense Reimbursements |
||||||||||||||||||
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2018 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2019 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2020 |
||||||||||||||||
$ |
4,676,358 |
$ |
6,598,344 |
$ |
9,005,639 |
Fee Waivers and
Expense Reimbursements from the Adviser |
||||||||||||||||||
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2018 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2019 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2020 |
||||||||||||||||
$954,647 |
$1,090,096 |
$1,270,019 |
Portfolio
Manager |
Type
of Account Managed |
Number
of Accounts |
Assets |
Number
of Accounts with Performance-Based Fees |
Assets
of Accounts with Performance-Based Fees | |||||||
Thomas
J. Ray
|
Registered
Investment Companies |
6 |
$ |
1.2
billion |
0 |
$ |
0 | |||||
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles |
3 |
2.2
billion |
0 |
0 | ||||||||
Other
Accounts* |
1,013 |
894.7
million |
0 |
0 | ||||||||
Susi
Budiman
|
Registered
Investment Companies |
3 |
735.8
million |
0 |
0 | |||||||
Other
Pooled Investment Vehicles |
3 |
2.2
billion |
0 |
0 | ||||||||
Other
Accounts* |
1,010 |
865.2
million |
0 |
0 |
A |
-
$0 |
|||
B |
-
$1 - $10,000 |
|||
C |
-
$10,001 - $50,000 |
|||
D |
-
$50,001 - $100,000 |
|||
E |
-
$100,001 - $500,000 |
|||
F
|
-
$500,001 - $1,000,000 |
|||
G |
-
More than $1 million |
Portfolio
Manager |
Dollar
Range of Equity Securities Beneficially Owned in Fund Managed |
|||
Thomas
J. Ray
|
G | |||
Susi
Budiman
|
E |
Gross
income from securities lending activities |
$ |
2,221 |
||
Fees
and/or compensation paid by the Fund for securities lending activities and
related services: |
||||
Fees
paid to Securities Lending Agent from a revenue split |
(176 |
) | ||
Fees
paid for any cash collateral management service (including fees deducted
from a pooled cash collateral reinvestment vehicle) that are not included
in the revenue split |
(210 |
) | ||
Administrative
fees not included in the revenue split |
— |
|||
Indemnification
fees not included in the revenue split |
— |
|||
Rebate
(paid to borrower) |
— |
|||
Other
fees not included in the revenue split |
— |
|||
Aggregate
fees/compensation for securities lending activities |
(386 |
) | ||
Net
income from securities lending activities |
$ |
1,835 |
Aggregate
Brokerage Commissions Paid by the Fund | ||||||||||
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2018 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2019 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2020 | ||||||||
$ |
140,593 |
$ |
160,854 |
$ |
149,840 |
Broker/Dealer |
Issuer |
Aggregate
Fund Holdings of Broker/Dealer or Parent (as of September 30, 2020) | ||||
Bank
of America |
Bank
of America Corp |
$ |
30,543,941 | |||
Merrill
Lynch International & Co. |
10,775,414 | |||||
Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. |
Citigroup
Global Markets Holdings Inc. |
11,919,643 | ||||
Citigroup
Inc. |
32,331,707 | |||||
Goldman
Sachs & Co. |
Goldman
Sachs Group Inc. |
7,507,633 | ||||
JP
Morgan Securities, Inc. |
JPMorgan
Chase & Co. |
18,483,687 | ||||
Morgan
Stanley & Co. |
Morgan
Stanley |
5,276,596 | ||||
Wells
Fargo Securities, LLC |
Wells
Fargo & Co. |
27,762,451 |
Name
of Fund and Class |
Name
and Address of Owner |
Percentage
of Ownership | ||||
Nuveen
NWQ Flexible Income Fund Class A Shares |
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market Street St Louis MO 63103-2523 |
14.68% | ||||
|
||||||
Charles
Schwab & Co Inc Special Custody A/C FBO Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main Street San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
14.67% | |||||
|
||||||
National
Financial Services LLC For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4 th 499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
10.38% | |||||
|
||||||
Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney LLC For the Exclusive Bene of its Cust 1 New York Plz Fl 12 New York NY 10004-1932 |
10.30% | |||||
|
||||||
American
Enterprise Investment Serv 707 2 nd Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
9.08% | |||||
|
||||||
LPL
Financial Omnibus Customer Account Attn Mutual Fund Trading 4707 Executive Dr San Diego CA 92121-3091 |
8.83% | |||||
|
||||||
Pershing
LLC One Pershing Plaza Jersey City NJ 07399-0002 |
7.10% | |||||
|
||||||
JP
Morgan Securities LLC Omnibus Account for the Exclusive Benefit Of Customers 4 Chase Metrotech Ctr 3 rd Mutual Fund Department Brooklyn NY 11245-0003 |
6.31% | |||||
|
Name
of Fund and Class |
Name
and Address of Owner |
Percentage
of Ownership | ||||
Raymond
James Omnibus for Mutual Funds House Acct Attn: Courtney Waller 880 Carillon Parkway St Petersburg FL 33716-1102 |
6.30% | |||||
|
||||||
Nuveen
NWQ Flexible Income Fund Class C Shares |
Wells Fargo Clearing Services LLC Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market St Saint Louis MO 63103-2523 |
21.99% | ||||
|
||||||
Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney LLC For the Exclusive Bene of its Cust 1 New York Plz Fl 12 New York NY 10004-1932 |
11.60% | |||||
|
||||||
American
Enterprise Investment Serv 707 2 nd Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
10.68% | |||||
|
||||||
Raymond
James Omnibus for Mutual Funds House Acct Attn: Courtney Waller 880 Carillon Parkway St Petersburg FL 33716-1102 |
10.25% | |||||
|
||||||
Charles
Schwab & Co Inc Special Custody A/C FBO Customers Attn Mutual Funds 211 Main Street San Francisco CA 94105-1905 |
10.05% | |||||
|
||||||
LPL
Financial Omnibus Customer Account Attn Mutual Fund Trading 4707 Executive Dr San Diego CA 92121-3091 |
7.80% | |||||
|
||||||
Pershing
LLC One Pershing Plaza Jersey City NJ 07399-0002 |
7.29% | |||||
|
||||||
UBS
WM USA Omni Account M/F Spec Cdy A/C EBOC UBSFSI 1000 Harbor Blvd Weehawken NJ 07086-6761 |
6.61% | |||||
|
||||||
National
Financial Services LLC For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4 th 499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
5.51% |
Name of Fund and
Class |
Name and Address of
Owner |
Percentage
of Ownership | ||||
|
||||||
Nuveen
NWQ Flexible Income Fund Class R6 Shares |
Employee Pension Plan of the Ludwig Group Inc 666 3 rd New York NY 10017-4030 |
41.65% | ||||
|
||||||
Wells
Fargo Bank NA FBO Beaver Falls Pension Plan PO Box 1533 Minneapolis MN 55480-1533 |
26.19% | |||||
|
||||||
SEI
Private Trust Company C/O First Hawaiian Bank 1 Freedom Valley Drive Oaks PA 19456-9989 |
17.49% | |||||
|
||||||
Pershing
LLC One Pershing Plaza Jersey City NJ 07399-0002 |
5.11% | |||||
|
||||||
Nuveen
NWQ Flexible Income Fund Class I Shares |
American Enterprise Investment Svc 707 2 nd Minneapolis MN 55402-2405 |
20.61% | ||||
|
||||||
LPL
Financial Omnibus Customer Account Attn Mutual Fund Trading 4707 Executive Dr San Diego CA 92121-3091 |
11.80% | |||||
|
||||||
Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney LLC For the Exclusive Bene of its Cust 1 New York Plz Fl 12 New York NY 10004-1932 |
9.48% | |||||
|
||||||
National
Financial Services LLC For the Exclusive Benefit of our Customers Attn Mutual Fund Dept 4 th 499 Washington Blvd Jersey City NJ 07310-1995 |
7.77% | |||||
|
||||||
Wells
Fargo Clearing Services LLC Special Custody Acct for the Exclusive Benefit of Customer 2801 Market St Saint Louis MO 63103-2523 |
7.65% | |||||
|
||||||
Mitra
& Co C/O Reliance Trust Company WI Mailcode: BD1N – Attn: MF 4900 W Brown Deer Rd Milwaukee WI 53223-2422 |
7.44% | |||||
|
Name of Fund and
Class |
Name and Address of
Owner |
Percentage
of Ownership | ||||
Raymond
James Omnibus for Mutual Funds House Acct Attn: Courtney Waller 880 Carillon Parkway St Petersburg FL 33716-1102 |
7.14% | |||||
|
||||||
UBS
WM USA Omni Account M/F Spec Cdy A/C EBOC UBSFSI 1000 Harbor Blvd Weehawken NJ 07086-6761 |
6.87% | |||||
|
||||||
Pershing
LLC One Pershing Plaza Jersey City NJ 07399-0002 |
6.50% |
Expiration
Year |
Capital
Loss Carry-Forwards | ||
Not
subject to expiration |
$ |
72,357,595 |
Net
asset value per share
|
$ |
21.36 | |
Per
share sales charge—4.75% of public offering price (5.01% of net asset
value per share)
|
1.07 | ||
Per
share offering price to the public
|
$ |
22.43 |
Annual
Distribution Fee |
Annual
Service Fee |
Total
12b-1 Fee | |||||||
Class
A
|
— |
0.25 |
% |
0.25 |
% | ||||
Class
C
|
0.75 |
% |
0.25 |
% |
1.00 |
% |
12b-1
Fees Incurred by the Fund for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2020 | ||||
Class
A
|
$
619,486 | |||
Class
C
|
2,492,724 |
Amount
of Underwriting Commissions |
||||||||||||||||||
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2018 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2019 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2020 |
||||||||||||||||
$ |
1,454 |
$ |
1,435 |
$ |
1,375 |
Amount
Retained by the Distributor |
|||||||||||||||||
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2018 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2019 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2020 |
|||||||||||||||
$ |
152 |
$ |
157 |
$ |
134 |
Amount
of Compensation on Redemptions and Repurchases |
|||||||||||||||||
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2018 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2019 |
Fiscal
Year Ended September 30, 2020 |
|||||||||||||||
$ |
60 |
$ |
53 |
$ |
68 |
AAA |
An
obligation rated ‘AAA’ has the highest rating assigned by S&P Global
Ratings. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation is extremely strong. |
AA |
An
obligation rated ‘AA’ differs from the highest-rated obligations only to a
small degree. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on
the obligation is very strong. |
A |
An
obligation rated ‘A’ is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects
of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in
higher-rated categories. However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its
financial commitments on the obligation is still strong. |
BBB |
An
obligation rated ‘BBB’ exhibits adequate protection parameters. However,
adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to
weaken the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation. |
BB,
B, CCC, CC, and C |
Obligations
rated ‘BB’, ‘B’, ‘CCC’, ‘CC’, and ‘C’ are regarded as having significant
speculative characteristics. ‘BB’ indicates the least degree of
speculation and ‘C’ the highest. While such obligations will likely have
some quality and protective characteristics, these may be outweighed by
large uncertainties or major exposure to adverse
conditions. |
BB |
An
obligation rated ‘BB’ is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other
speculative issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or
exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions that could
lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity to meet its financial
commitments on the obligation. |
B |
An
obligation rated ‘B’ is more vulnerable to nonpayment than obligations
rated ‘BB’, but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its
financial commitments on the obligation. Adverse business, financial, or
economic conditions will likely impair the obligor’s capacity or
willingness to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation. |
CCC |
An
obligation rated ‘CCC’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is
dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for
the obligor to meet its financial commitments on the obligation. In the
event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, the obligor
is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial commitments on
the obligation. |
CC |
An
obligation rated ‘CC’ is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment. The
‘CC’ rating is used when a default has not yet occurred but S&P Global
Ratings expects default to be a virtual certainty, regardless of the
anticipated time to default. |
C |
An
obligation rated ‘C’ is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment, and the
obligation is expected to have lower relative seniority or lower ultimate
recovery compared with obligations that are rated higher. |
D |
An
obligation rated ‘D’ is in default or in breach of an imputed promise. For
non-hybrid capital instruments, the ‘D’ rating category is used when
payments on an obligation are not made on the date due, unless S&P
Global Ratings believes that such payments will be made within five
business days in the absence of a stated grace period or within the
earlier of the stated grace period or 30 calendar days. The ‘D’ rating
also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking
of similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual
certainty, for example due to automatic stay provisions. A rating on an
obligation is lowered to ‘D’ if it is subject to a distressed exchange
offer. |
A-1 |
A
short-term obligation rated ‘A-1’ is rated in the highest category by
S&P Global Ratings. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial
commitments on the obligation is strong. Within this category, certain
obligations are designated with a plus sign (+). This indicates that the
obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments on these obligations
is extremely strong. |
A-2 |
A short-term
obligation rated ‘A-2’ is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects
of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in
higher rating categories. However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its
financial commitments on the obligation is satisfactory. |
A-3 |
A
short-term obligation rated ‘A-3’ exhibits adequate protection parameters.
However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more
likely to weaken an obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitments
on the obligation. |
B |
A
short-term obligation rated ‘B’ is regarded as vulnerable and has
significant speculative characteristics. The obligor currently has the
capacity to meet its financial commitments; however, it faces major
ongoing uncertainties that could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity
to meet its financial commitments. |
C |
A
short-term obligation rated ‘C’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and
is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions
for the obligor to meet its financial commitments on the
obligation. |
D |
A
short-term obligation rated ‘D’ is in default or in breach of an imputed
promise. For non-hybrid capital instruments, the ‘D’ rating category is
used when payments on an obligation are not made on the date due, unless
S&P Global Ratings believes that such payments will be made within any
stated grace period. However, any stated grace period longer than five
business days will be treated as five business days. The ‘D’ rating also
will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of a
similar action and where default on an obligation is a virtual certainty,
for example due to automatic stay provisions. A rating on an obligation is
lowered to ‘D’ if it is subject to a distressed exchange
offer. |
Aaa |
Obligations
rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest quality, subject to the lowest
level of credit risk. |
Aa |
Obligations
rated Aa are judged to be of high quality and are subject to very low
credit risk. |
A |
Obligations
rated A are judged to be upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit
risk. |
Baa |
Obligations
rated Baa are judged to be medium-grade and subject to moderate credit
risk and as such may possess certain speculative
characteristics. |
Ba |
Obligations
rated Ba are judged to be speculative and are subject to substantial
credit risk. |
B |
Obligations
rated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit
risk. |
Caa |
Obligations
rated Caa are judged to be speculative of poor standing and are subject to
very high credit risk. |
Ca |
Obligations
rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default,
with some prospect of recovery of principal and interest. |
C |
Obligations
rated C are the lowest rated and are typically in default, with little
prospect for recovery of principal or interest. |
P-1 |
Ratings
of Prime-1 reflect a superior ability to repay short-term
obligations. |
P-2 |
Ratings of Prime-2
reflect a strong ability to repay short-term obligations. |
P-3 |
Ratings
of Prime-3 reflect an acceptable ability to repay short- term
obligations. |
NP |
|
MIG
1 |
This
designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is
afforded by established cash flows, highly reliable liquidity support, or
demonstrated broad-based access to the market for refinancing. |
MIG
2 |
This
designation denotes strong credit quality. Margins of protection are
ample, although not as large as in the preceding group. |
MIG
3 |
This
designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Liquidity and cash-flow
protection may be narrow, and market access for refinancing is likely to
be less well-established. |
SG |
This
designation denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Debt instruments in
this category may lack sufficient margins of
protection. |
VMIG
1 |
This
designation denotes superior credit quality. Excellent protection is
afforded by the superior short-term credit strength of the liquidity
provider and structural and legal protections that ensure the timely
payment of purchase price upon demand. |
VMIG
2 |
This
designation denotes strong credit quality. Good protection is afforded by
the strong short-term credit strength of the liquidity provider and
structural and legal protections that ensure the timely payment of
purchase price upon demand. |
VMIG
3 |
This
designation denotes acceptable credit quality. Adequate protection is
afforded by the satisfactory short-term credit strength of the liquidity
provider and structural and legal protections that ensure the timely
payment of purchase price upon demand. |
SG |
This designation
denotes speculative-grade credit quality. Demand features rated in this
category may be supported by a liquidity provider that does not have a
sufficiently strong short-term rating or may lack the structural and/or
legal protections necessary to ensure the timely payment of purchase price
upon demand. |
AAA |
Highest
credit quality. ‘AAA’ ratings denote the lowest expectation of default
risk. They are assigned only in cases of exceptionally strong capacity for
payment of financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely to be
adversely affected by foreseeable events. |
AA |
Very
high credit quality. ‘AA’ ratings denote expectations of very low default
risk. They indicate very strong capacity for payment of financial
commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to foreseeable
events. |
A |
High
credit quality. ‘A’ ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The
capacity for payment of financial commitments is considered strong. This
capacity may, nevertheless, be |
|
more
vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for
higher ratings. |
BBB |
Good
credit quality. ‘BBB’ ratings indicate that expectations of default risk
are currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is
considered adequate, but adverse business or economic conditions are more
likely to impair this capacity. |
BB |
Speculative.
‘BB’ ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk,
particularly in the event of adverse changes in business or economic
conditions over time; however, business or financial flexibility exists
that supports the servicing of financial commitments. |
B |
Highly
speculative. ‘B’ ratings indicate that material default risk is present,
but a limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are
currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is vulnerable
to deterioration in the business and economic environment. |
CCC |
Substantial
credit risk. Default is a real possibility. |
CC |
Very
high levels of credit risk. Default of some kind appears
probable. |
C |
Near
default. A default or default-like process has begun, or the issuer is in
standstill, or for a closed funding vehicle, payment capacity is
irrevocably impaired. Conditions that are indicative of a ‘C’ category
rating for an issuer include: |
RD |
Restricted
default. ‘RD’ ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch’s opinion has
experienced: |
D |
Default.
‘D’ ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch’s opinion has entered into
bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other
formal winding-up procedure, or that has otherwise ceased
business. |
F1 |
Highest
short-term credit quality. Indicates the strongest intrinsic capacity for
timely payment of financial commitments; may have an added “+” to denote
any exceptionally strong credit feature. |
F2 |
Good
short-term credit quality. Good intrinsic capacity for timely payment of
financial commitments. |
F3 |
Fair
short-term credit quality. The intrinsic capacity for timely payment of
financial commitments is adequate. |
B |
Speculative
short-term credit quality. Minimal capacity for timely payment of
financial commitments, plus heightened vulnerability to near term adverse
changes in financial and economic conditions. |
C |
High
short-term default risk. Default is a real possibility. |
RD |
Restricted
default. Indicates an entity that has defaulted on one or more of its
financial commitments, although it continues to meet other financial
obligations. Typically applicable to entity ratings only. |
D |
Default.
Indicates a broad-based default event for an entity, or the default of a
short-term obligation. |
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7 |
| |||
1. |
|
|
|
8 |
| |
|
|
|
8 |
| ||
|
|
|
8 |
| ||
|
|
|
9 |
| ||
|
|
|
11 |
| ||
|
|
|
12 |
| ||
|
|
|
13 |
| ||
|
|
|
16 |
| ||
|
|
|
16 |
| ||
|
|
|
17 |
| ||
|
|
|
17 |
| ||
|
|
|
17 |
| ||
|
|
|
17 |
| ||
|
|
|
17 |
| ||
|
|
|
17 |
| ||
|
|
|
18 |
| ||
|
|
|
18 |
| ||
|
|
|
18 |
| ||
|
|
|
18 |
| ||
|
|
|
18 |
| ||
|
|
|
19 |
| ||
|
|
|
19 |
| ||
|
|
|
19 |
| ||
|
|
|
19 |
| ||
|
|
|
20 |
| ||
|
|
|
20 |
| ||
|
|
|
20 |
| ||
|
|
|
20 |
| ||
|
|
|
21 |
| ||
2. |
|
|
|
22 |
| |
|
|
|
22 |
| ||
|
|
|
22 |
| ||
|
|
|
22 |
| ||
|
|
|
22 |
| ||
3. |
|
|
|
24 |
| |
|
|
|
24 |
| ||
|
|
|
24 |
| ||
|
|
|
24 |
| ||
|
|
|
24 |
| ||
|
|
|
25 |
| ||
|
|
|
25 |
| ||
|
|
|
25 |
| ||
|
|
|
25 |
| ||
|
|
|
25 |
| ||
|
|
|
25 |
| ||
|
|
|
26 |
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
2 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
26 |
| ||
|
|
|
26 |
| ||
|
|
|
27 |
| ||
|
|
|
27 |
| ||
|
|
|
27 |
| ||
|
|
|
27 |
| ||
|
|
|
28 |
| ||
|
|
|
28 |
| ||
|
|
|
28 |
| ||
|
|
|
29 |
| ||
|
|
|
29 |
| ||
|
|
|
29 |
| ||
|
|
|
30 |
| ||
|
|
|
30 |
| ||
|
|
|
30 |
| ||
|
|
|
30 |
| ||
4. |
|
|
|
31 |
| |
|
|
|
31 |
| ||
|
|
|
31 |
| ||
|
|
|
31 |
| ||
|
|
|
32 |
| ||
|
|
|
32 |
| ||
|
|
|
32 |
| ||
|
|
|
32 |
| ||
|
|
|
32 |
| ||
|
|
|
33 |
| ||
|
|
|
33 |
| ||
|
|
|
33 |
| ||
|
|
|
33 |
| ||
|
|
|
34 |
| ||
|
|
|
34 |
| ||
|
|
|
34 |
| ||
|
|
|
34 |
| ||
|
|
|
34 |
| ||
|
|
|
34 |
| ||
|
|
|
35 |
| ||
|
|
|
35 |
| ||
|
|
|
35 |
| ||
|
|
|
35 |
| ||
|
|
|
36 |
| ||
|
|
|
36 |
| ||
|
|
|
36 |
| ||
|
|
|
37 |
| ||
|
|
|
38 |
| ||
|
|
|
38 |
| ||
|
|
|
39 |
| ||
|
|
|
39 |
| ||
|
|
|
39 |
| ||
5. |
|
|
|
41 |
| |
|
|
|
41 |
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
3 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
41 |
| ||
|
|
|
42 |
| ||
|
|
|
42 |
| ||
|
|
|
43 |
| ||
|
|
|
44 |
| ||
|
|
|
44 |
| ||
|
|
|
44 |
| ||
|
|
|
45 |
| ||
|
|
|
46 |
| ||
|
|
|
46 |
| ||
|
|
|
46 |
| ||
|
|
|
46 |
| ||
|
|
|
47 |
| ||
|
|
|
47 |
| ||
|
|
|
48 |
| ||
|
|
|
48 |
| ||
|
|
|
48 |
| ||
|
|
|
48 |
| ||
|
|
|
48 |
| ||
|
|
|
48 |
| ||
|
|
|
48 |
| ||
|
|
|
48 |
| ||
|
|
|
49 |
| ||
|
|
|
49 |
| ||
|
|
|
49 |
| ||
|
|
|
50 |
| ||
|
|
|
50 |
| ||
|
|
|
50 |
| ||
|
|
|
51 |
| ||
|
|
|
51 |
| ||
|
|
|
51 |
| ||
|
|
|
51 |
| ||
|
|
|
51 |
| ||
|
|
|
52 |
| ||
|
|
|
52 |
| ||
|
|
|
52 |
| ||
|
|
|
52 |
| ||
|
|
|
53 |
| ||
|
|
|
53 |
| ||
|
|
|
53 |
| ||
|
|
|
54 |
| ||
|
|
|
54 |
| ||
|
|
|
54 |
| ||
|
|
|
54 |
| ||
|
|
|
55 |
| ||
|
|
|
55 |
| ||
6. |
|
|
|
56 |
| |
|
|
|
56 |
| ||
|
|
|
56 |
| ||
|
|
|
56 |
| ||
|
|
|
56 |
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
4 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
56 |
| ||
|
|
|
56 |
| ||
7. |
|
|
|
57 |
| |
|
|
|
57 |
| ||
|
|
|
57 |
| ||
|
|
|
57 |
| ||
|
|
|
57 |
| ||
|
|
|
58 |
| ||
|
|
|
58 |
| ||
|
|
|
58 |
| ||
|
|
|
58 |
| ||
|
|
|
58 |
| ||
|
|
|
59 |
| ||
|
|
|
59 |
| ||
|
|
|
59 |
| ||
|
|
|
60 |
| ||
|
|
|
60 |
| ||
|
|
|
61 |
| ||
|
|
|
61 |
| ||
|
|
|
61 |
| ||
|
|
|
61 |
| ||
|
|
|
62 |
| ||
|
|
|
62 |
| ||
|
|
|
62 |
| ||
|
|
|
62 |
| ||
|
|
|
62 |
| ||
|
|
|
63 |
| ||
|
|
|
63 |
| ||
|
|
|
63 |
| ||
|
|
|
63 |
| ||
|
|
|
63 |
| ||
|
|
|
64 |
| ||
|
|
|
64 |
| ||
|
|
|
64 |
| ||
|
|
|
64 |
| ||
|
|
|
64 |
| ||
|
|
|
65 |
| ||
|
|
|
65 |
| ||
|
|
|
65 |
| ||
|
|
|
65 |
| ||
|
|
|
66 |
| ||
|
|
|
66 |
| ||
|
|
|
66 |
| ||
|
|
|
66 |
| ||
|
|
|
66 |
| ||
|
|
|
67 |
| ||
|
|
|
67 |
| ||
8. |
|
|
|
68 |
| |
|
|
|
68 |
| ||
|
|
|
68 |
| ||
|
|
|
68 |
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
5 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
68 |
| ||
|
|
|
68 |
| ||
|
|
|
68 |
| ||
|
|
|
68 |
| ||
|
|
|
69 |
| ||
|
|
|
69 |
| ||
|
|
|
69 |
| ||
|
|
|
69 |
| ||
|
|
|
69 |
| ||
|
|
|
|
69 |
| |
|
|
|
70 |
| ||
|
|
|
70 |
| ||
|
|
|
70 |
| ||
|
|
|
70 |
| ||
|
|
|
70 |
| ||
|
|
|
71 |
| ||
|
|
|
71 |
| ||
|
|
|
71 |
| ||
|
|
|
71 |
| ||
|
|
|
71 |
| ||
|
|
|
71 |
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
6 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
U.S.
Domestic Issuers – which have a majority of outstanding shares held in the
U.S. and meet other criteria, as determined by the SEC, and are subject to
the same disclosure and listing standards as U.S. incorporated companies –
are generally covered under standard U.S. policy guidelines.
|
|
◾ |
|
Foreign
Private Issuers (FPIs) – which do not meet the Domestic Issuer criteria
and are exempt from most disclosure requirements (e.g., they do not file
DEF14A reports) and listing standards (e.g., for required levels of board
and committee independence) – are covered under a combination of policy
guidelines: |
|
◾ |
|
FPI
Guidelines (see the
Americas
Regional Proxy Voting Guidelines ), which apply certain minimum
independence and disclosure standards in the evaluation of key proxy
ballot items, such as the election of directors and approval of financial
reports; and
|
|
◾ |
|
For
other issues, guidelines for the market that is responsible for, or most
relevant to, the item on the ballot. |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
7 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: 1 case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Independent
directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
non-independent director
serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the
full board functions as that committee; or
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests
that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
8 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Executive Director
|
|
1.1. |
Current
officer
1 2 |
|
2. |
Non-Independent
Non-Executive Director
|
|
Board Identification |
|
2.1. |
Director
identified as not independent by the board.
|
|
Controlling/Significant Shareholder |
|
2.2. |
Beneficial
owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may
be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of
a group). |
|
Current Employment at Company or Related Company |
|
2.3. |
Non-officer employee
of the firm (including employee representatives).
|
|
2.4. |
Officer
1 |
|
Former Employment |
|
2.5. |
Former
CEO of the company.
3,
4 |
|
2.6. |
Former
non-CEO officer
1 2 |
|
2.7. |
Former
officer
1 4 |
|
2.8. |
Officer
1 |
|
2.9. |
Former
interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service
was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s
employment agreement will be made.
5 |
|
Family Members |
|
2.10. |
Immediate
family member
6 1 2 |
|
2.11. |
Immediate
family member
6 2 non-Section 16
officer in a key strategic role). |
|
Professional, Transactional, |
and Charitable Relationships |
|
2.12. |
Director
who (or whose immediate family member
6 7 2 6 |
|
2.13. |
Director
who (or whose immediate family member
6 8 2 6 8 |
|
2.14. |
Director
who (or whose immediate family member
6 ) non-profit organization
that receives material grants or endowments
8 2 |
|
Other Relationships |
|
2.15. |
Party
to a voting agreement
9 |
|
2.16. |
Has
(or an immediate family member
6 10 |
|
2.17. |
Founder
11 |
|
2.18. |
Director
with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers.
|
|
2.19. |
Any
material
12 |
|
3. |
Independent Director
|
|
3.1. |
No
material
12 |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
9 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
10 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Medical
issues/illness; |
|
◾ |
|
Family
emergencies; and |
|
◾ |
|
Missing
only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).
|
|
◾ |
|
Sit
on more than five public company boards; or
|
|
◾ |
|
Are
CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public
companies besides their own—withhold only at their outside boards
4 |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
11 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of
a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a
management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision
that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous
year. Factors that will be considered are:
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosed
outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;
|
|
◾ |
|
Rationale
provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
subject matter of the proposal; |
|
◾ |
|
The
level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;
|
|
◾ |
|
Actions
taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement
with shareholders; |
|
◾ |
|
The
continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as
either shareholder or management proposals); and
|
|
◾ |
|
Other
factors as appropriate. |
|
◾ |
|
The
board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are
tendered;
|
|
◾ |
|
At
the previous board election, any director received more than
50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company
has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against
vote.
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s previous
say-on-pay |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s response, including: |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the
frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants
(including whether independent directors participated);
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the
say-on-pay |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’
concerns; |
|
◾ |
|
Other
recent compensation actions taken by the company;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s ownership structure; and |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
12 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the
highest degree of responsiveness. |
|
◾ |
|
The
board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less
frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes
cast. |
|
◾ |
|
The
company has a poison pill that was not approved by shareholders
6 .
However, vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill,
including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the
trigger, without shareholder approval; or |
|
◾ |
|
The
pill, whether short-term
7 |
|
◾ |
|
A
classified board structure; |
|
◾ |
|
A
supermajority vote requirement; |
|
◾ |
|
Either
a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections, or a majority
vote standard in contested elections; |
|
◾ |
|
The
inability of shareholders to call special meetings;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
inability of shareholders to act by written consent;
|
|
◾ |
|
A
multi-class capital structure; and/or |
|
◾ |
|
A
non-shareholder-approved poison
pill. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
13 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without
shareholder ratification; |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding
the amendment; |
|
◾ |
|
The
level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s
unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on
bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s ownership structure; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s existing governance provisions; |
|
◾ |
|
The
timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a
significant business development; and |
|
◾ |
|
Other
factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the
impact of the amendment on shareholders. |
|
◾ |
|
Classified
the board; |
|
◾ |
|
Adopted
supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; or
|
|
◾ |
|
Eliminated
shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws. |
|
◾ |
|
Supermajority
vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;
|
|
◾ |
|
A
classified board structure; or |
|
◾ |
|
Other
egregious provisions. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
14 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same
ballot; |
|
◾ |
|
The
board’s rationale for seeking ratification;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing
provision; |
|
◾ |
|
The
history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the
company’s past meetings; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s ownership structure; and |
|
◾ |
|
Previous use
of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’
ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited
to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder
proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or
time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule
14a-8. Vote against
or withhold on an ongoing basis. |
|
◾ |
|
The
non-audit fees paid
to the auditor are
excessive ;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements
from its auditor; or |
|
◾ |
|
There
is persuasive evidence that the Audit Committee entered into an
inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the
ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal
recourse against the audit firm. |
|
◾ |
|
Poor
accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious
concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses
identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth,
chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at
remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against
votes are warranted. |
|
◾ |
|
There
is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (
pay for
performance ); |
|
◾ |
|
The
company maintains significant
problematic pay
practices ; or |
|
◾ |
|
The
board exhibits a significant level of
poor
communication and responsiveness to shareholders.
|
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
15 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC
provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when
required under SEC provisions. |
|
◾ |
|
The
presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement,
that prohibits future pledging activity; |
|
◾ |
|
The
magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares
outstanding, market value, and trading volume;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged
shares over time; |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding
requirements do not include pledged company stock; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Any
other relevant factors. |
|
◾ |
|
Material
failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight
9 , or
fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
|
|
◾ |
|
Failure
to replace management as appropriate; or |
|
◾ |
|
Egregious
actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise
substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee
management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.
|
|
General
Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection
with public
“vote-no” campaigns,
evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for
voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into
consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly
available information. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
16 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Long-term
financial performance of the company relative to its industry;
|
|
◾ |
|
Management’s
track record; |
|
◾ |
|
Background
to the contested election; |
|
◾ |
|
Nominee
qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;
|
|
◾ |
|
Strategic
plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;
|
|
◾ |
|
Likelihood
that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and
|
|
◾ |
|
Stock
ownership positions. |
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that
prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or
speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging,
holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a
loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use
of company stock will be considered. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
robustness of the company’s board evaluation process;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director
tenures; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to
non-independent directors;
and |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive
it in a discriminatory manner. |
|
◾ |
|
The
scope of the shareholder proposal; and |
|
◾ |
|
Evidence of
problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack
of board refreshment. |
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder
proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory
retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.
|
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
17 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote for proposals seeking to fix the board size or
designate a range for the board size. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the
board. |
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a
CEO succession planning policy, considering, at a minimum, the following
factors: |
|
◾ |
|
The
reasonableness/scope of the request; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning
process. |
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to
eliminate cumulate voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or
provide for cumulative voting, unless: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company has proxy access
10 ,
thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s
ballot; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a
carve-out for
plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats,
and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Eliminate
entirely directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for
violating the duty of care. |
|
◾ |
|
Expand
coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more
serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.
|
|
◾ |
|
Expand
the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of
company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was
permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the
company’s board (
i.e. , “permissive
indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to
indemnify. |
|
◾ |
|
If the
director was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that s/he
reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and
|
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
18 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
If only
the director’s legal expenses would be covered.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise,
and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the
issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board
oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
scope and structure of the proposal. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Existing
oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the
issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾ |
|
Level
of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾ |
|
Company
performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;
|
|
◾ |
|
Board
committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry
sector; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
scope and structure of the proposal. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
scope and rationale of the proposal; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current board leadership structure;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s governance structure and practices;
|
|
◾ |
|
Company
performance; and |
|
◾ |
|
Any
other relevant factors that may be applicable.
|
|
◾ |
|
A
majority
non-independent board
and/or the presence of
non-independent directors
on key board committees; |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
19 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
A
weak or poorly-defined lead independent director role that fails to serve
as an appropriate counterbalance to a combined CEO/chair role;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
presence of an executive or
non-independent chair
in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and
chair, and/or departure from a structure with an independent chair;
|
|
◾ |
|
Evidence
that the board has failed to oversee and address material risks facing the
company; |
|
◾ |
|
A
material governance failure, particularly if the board has failed to
adequately respond to shareholder concerns or if the board has materially
diminished shareholder rights; or |
|
◾ |
|
Evidence
that the board has failed to intervene when management’s interests are
contrary to shareholders’ interests. |
|
General
Recommendation: ISS’
Classification of Directors .) |
|
General
Recommendation: carve-out for
a plurality vote standard in contested elections is included.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Ownership
threshold: |
|
◾ |
|
Ownership
duration: |
|
◾ |
|
Aggregation: |
|
◾ |
|
Cap: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
20 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Established
a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to
facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of
the board; |
|
◾ |
|
Effectively
disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;
|
|
◾ |
|
Company
has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority
withhold vote on a director nominee; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company has an independent chair or a lead director, according to I
SS’
definition . This individual must be made available for periodic
consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
21 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
terms of the auditor agreement—the degree to which these agreements impact
shareholders’ rights; |
|
◾ |
|
The
motivation and rationale for establishing the agreements;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
quality of the company’s disclosure; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s historical practices in the audit area.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
An
auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and
is therefore not independent; |
|
◾ |
|
There
is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion
that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial
position; |
|
◾ |
|
Poor
accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of
concern, such as fraud or misapplication of GAAP; or
|
|
◾ |
|
Fees
for
non-audit services
(“Other” fees) are excessive. |
|
◾ |
|
Non-audit (“other”)
fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation
fees |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case non-audit services.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
tenure of the audit firm; |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
22 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
length of rotation specified in the proposal;
|
|
◾ |
|
Any
significant audit-related issues at the company;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
number of Audit Committee meetings held each year;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
number of financial experts serving on the committee; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated
for both audit quality and competitive price.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
23 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Any
impediments to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws (i.e.
supermajority voting requirements); |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s ownership structure and historical voting turnout;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the board could amend bylaws adopted by shareholders; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
shareholders would retain the ability to ratify any board-initiated
amendments. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: cash-out statutes.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
24 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
General
Recommendation: freeze-out provisions.
Freeze-out provisions
force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company
to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
25 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the
types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms;
and |
|
◾ |
|
Governance
features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later
date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to
amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors
accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard
in uncontested elections. |
|
General
Recommendation: fee-shifting whenever
plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including
cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock
ownership transfers that would result in a new
5-percent holder
or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing
5-percent holder);
|
|
◾ |
|
The
value of the NOLs;
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
26 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Shareholder
protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration
of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s existing governance structure including: board independence,
existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to
shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Any
other factors that may be applicable.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Shareholders
have approved the adoption of the plan; or
|
|
◾ |
|
The
board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that
it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to
adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking
stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill
adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification
vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved
by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately
terminate. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
No
lower than a 20 percent trigger,
flip-in or
flip-over; |
|
◾ |
|
A
term of no more than three years; |
|
◾ |
|
No
deadhand, slowhand,
no-hand, or
similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the
pill; |
|
◾ |
|
Shareholder
redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to
redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced,
10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written
consent to vote on rescinding the pill. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger
slightly below 5 percent);
|
|
◾ |
|
The
value of the NOLs;
|
|
◾ |
|
Shareholder
protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration
of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
27 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s existing governance structure including: board independence,
existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to
shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Any
other factors that may be applicable.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case non-votes in
the company’s vote-counting methodology. |
|
◾ |
|
The
scope and structure of the proposal; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s stated confidential voting policy (or other relevant policies)
and whether it ensures a “level playing field” by providing shareholder
proponents with equal access to vote information prior to the annual
meeting; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s vote standard for management and shareholder proposals and
whether it ensures consistency and fairness in the proxy voting process
and maintains the integrity of vote results;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company’s disclosure regarding its vote counting method and other
relevant voting policies with respect to management and shareholder
proposals are consistent and clear; |
|
◾ |
|
Any
recent controversies or concerns related to the company’s proxy voting
mechanics; |
|
◾ |
|
Any
unintended consequences resulting from implementation of the proposal; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Any
other factors that may be relevant. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same
ballot; |
|
◾ |
|
The
board’s rationale for seeking ratification;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing
provision; |
|
◾ |
|
The
history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the
company’s past meetings; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s ownership structure; and |
|
◾ |
|
Previous
use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
28 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is
contested in the election; |
|
◾ |
|
One
or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected;
|
|
◾ |
|
Shareholders
are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of
this bylaw. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case, |
|
◾ |
|
Reasons
for reincorporation; |
|
◾ |
|
Comparison
of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following
the reincorporation; and |
|
◾ |
|
Comparison
of corporation laws of original state and destination state.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Shareholders’
current right to act by written consent;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
consent threshold;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
|
|
◾ |
|
Investor
ownership structure; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Shareholder
support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.
|
|
◾ |
|
An
unfettered
11 right
for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold;
|
|
◾ |
|
A
majority vote standard in uncontested director elections;
|
|
◾ |
|
No
non-shareholder-approved pill;
and
|
|
◾ |
|
An
annually elected board. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Shareholders’
current right to call special meetings; |
|
◾ |
|
Minimum
ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10 percent
preferred); |
|
◾ |
|
The
inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
29 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Investor
ownership structure; and |
|
◾ |
|
Shareholder
support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.
|
|
General
Recommendation: non-shareholder constituencies
or other
non-financial effects
when evaluating a merger or business combination.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Vote
for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote
requirements. However, for companies with shareholder(s) who have
significant ownership levels, vote
case-by-case, |
|
◾ |
|
Ownership
structure; |
|
◾ |
|
Quorum
requirements; and |
|
◾ |
|
Vote
requirements. |
|
General Recommendation:
in-person meetings.
Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which
virtual-only
12 in-person meeting.
|
|
◾ |
|
Scope
and rationale of the proposal; and |
|
◾ |
|
Concerns
identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
30 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Past
Board Performance: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s use of authorized shares during the last three years;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
Current Request: |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
in the proxy statement of the specific purposes of the proposed increase;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not
approving the request; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
dilutive impact of the request as determined relative to an allowable
increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing
authorized shares) that reflects the company’s need for shares and total
shareholder returns. |
|
A. |
Most
companies:
100 percent |
|
B. |
Companies
with less than 50 percent of existing authorized shares either
outstanding or reserved for issuance:
50 percent |
|
C. |
Companies
with
one- and
three-year total shareholder returns (TSRs) in the bottom 10 percent
of the U.S. market as of the end of the calendar quarter that is closest
to their most recent fiscal year end:
50 percent |
|
D. |
Companies
at which both conditions (B and C) above are both present:
25 percent |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
31 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital
structure, such as: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the
company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or
|
|
◾ |
|
The
new class of shares will be transitory; |
|
◾ |
|
The
new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution
to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an
insider or significant shareholder. |
|
General
Recommendation: non-shareholder-approved shareholder
rights plan (poison pill). |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
size of the company; |
|
◾ |
|
The
shareholder base; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
liquidity of the stock. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Past
Board Performance: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s use of authorized preferred shares during the last three years;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
Current Request: |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
in the proxy statement of the specific purposes for the proposed increase;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not
approving the request; |
|
◾ |
|
In
cases where the company has existing authorized preferred stock, the
dilutive impact of the request as determined by an allowable increase
calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized
shares) that reflects the company’s need for shares and total shareholder
returns; and |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for
antitakeover purposes. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
32 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
More
simplified capital structure; |
|
◾ |
|
Enhanced
liquidity; |
|
◾ |
|
Fairness of
conversion terms; |
|
◾ |
|
Impact
on voting power and dividends; |
|
◾ |
|
Reasons
for the reclassification; |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts of
interest; and |
|
◾ |
|
Other
alternatives considered. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse
stock split if: |
|
◾ |
|
The
number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or
|
|
◾ |
|
The
effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the
allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock
Authorization policy. |
|
◾ |
|
Stock
exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going
concern without additional financing; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s rationale; or |
|
◾ |
|
Other
factors as applicable. |
|
General
Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and
foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S.
exchanges,
vote for management
proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all
shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board
authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of
company-specific concerns regarding: |
|
◾ |
|
Greenmail,
|
|
◾ |
|
The use
of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics,
|
|
◾ |
|
Threats
to the company’s long-term viability, or |
|
◾ |
|
Other
company-specific factors as warranted. |
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals
prohibiting executives from selling shares of company stock during periods
in which the company has announced that it may or will be repurchasing
shares of its stock. Vote for the proposal when there is a pattern of
abuse by executives exercising options or selling shares during periods of
share buybacks. |
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase
the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided
that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less
than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common
Stock Authorization policy. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
33 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Adverse
governance changes; |
|
◾ |
|
Excessive
increases in authorized capital stock; |
|
◾ |
|
Unfair
method of distribution; |
|
◾ |
|
Diminution
of voting rights; |
|
◾ |
|
Adverse
conversion features; |
|
◾ |
|
Negative
impact on stock option plans; and |
|
◾ |
|
Alternatives
such as
spin-off. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore or provide shareholders
with rights of appraisal. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Purchase
price; |
|
◾ |
|
Fairness
opinion; |
|
◾ |
|
Financial
and strategic benefits; |
|
◾ |
|
How the
deal was negotiated; |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts of
interest; |
|
◾ |
|
Other
alternatives for the business; |
|
◾ |
|
Non-completion risk.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Impact
on the balance sheet/working capital; |
|
◾ |
|
Potential
elimination of diseconomies; |
|
◾ |
|
Anticipated
financial and operating benefits; |
|
◾ |
|
Anticipated
use of funds; |
|
◾ |
|
Value
received for the asset; |
|
◾ |
|
Fairness
opinion; |
|
◾ |
|
How the
deal was negotiated; |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts of
interest. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
34 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Dilution to
existing shareholders’ positions; |
|
◾ |
|
Terms
of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including
any fairness opinion; termination penalties; exit strategy;
|
|
◾ |
|
Financial
issues - company’s financial situation; degree of need for capital; use of
proceeds; effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;
|
|
◾ |
|
Management’s
efforts to pursue other alternatives; |
|
◾ |
|
Control
issues - change in management; change in control, guaranteed board and
committee seats; standstill provisions; voting agreements; veto power over
certain corporate actions; and |
|
◾ |
|
Conflict of
interest - arm’s length transaction, managerial incentives.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
reasons for the change; |
|
◾ |
|
Any
financial or tax benefits; |
|
◾ |
|
Regulatory
benefits; |
|
◾ |
|
Increases in
capital structure; and |
|
◾ |
|
Changes
to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.
|
|
◾ |
|
Increases in
common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum (see
discussion under “Capital”); or |
|
◾ |
|
Adverse
changes in shareholder rights. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Offer
price/premium; |
|
◾ |
|
Fairness
opinion; |
|
◾ |
|
How the
deal was negotiated; |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
35 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts of
interest; |
|
◾ |
|
Other
alternatives/offers considered; and |
|
◾ |
|
Non-completion risk.
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination
of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);
|
|
◾ |
|
Balanced
interests of continuing vs.
cashed-out shareholders,
taking into account the following: |
|
◾ |
|
Are all
shareholders able to participate in the transaction?
|
|
◾ |
|
Will
there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the
transaction? |
|
◾ |
|
Does
the company have strong corporate governance?
|
|
◾ |
|
Will
insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?
|
|
◾ |
|
Does
the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that
may benefit shareholders? |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Percentage
of assets/business contributed; |
|
◾ |
|
Percentage
ownership; |
|
◾ |
|
Financial
and strategic benefits; |
|
◾ |
|
Governance
structure; |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts of
interest; |
|
◾ |
|
Other
alternatives; and |
|
◾ |
|
Non-completion risk.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Management’s
efforts to pursue other alternatives; |
|
◾ |
|
Appraisal
value of assets; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Valuation - Is the
value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer)
reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting
point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the
offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.
|
|
◾ |
|
Market reaction -
How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market
reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal.
|
|
◾ |
|
Strategic
rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the
value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive
or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a
favorable track record of successful integration of historical
acquisitions. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
36 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Negotiations and
process - Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at
arm’s-length? Was
the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best
price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify
the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process
(e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect
shareholder value. |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts of
interest - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction
disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to
non-insider shareholders?
As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the
company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did
not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have
influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the
merger. The CIC figure presented in the “ISS Transaction Summary” section
of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a
misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to
insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the
underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists.
|
|
◾ |
|
Governance - Will
the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the
current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction?
If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the
company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any
deterioration in governance. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Dilution to
existing shareholders’ position: The amount and timing of shareholder
ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed
shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. Although newly issued common
stock, absent preemptive rights, is typically dilutive to existing
shareholders, share price appreciation is often the necessary event to
trigger the exercise of “out of the money” warrants and convertible debt.
In these instances from a value standpoint, the negative impact of
dilution is mitigated by the increase in the company’s stock price that
must occur to trigger the dilutive event. |
|
◾ |
|
Terms
of the offer (discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including
any fairness opinion, conversion features, termination penalties, exit
strategy): |
|
◾ |
|
The
terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the
company and in light of company’s financial condition. Ideally, the
conversion price for convertible debt and the exercise price for warrants
should be at a premium to the then prevailing stock price at the time of
private placement. |
|
◾ |
|
When
evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium,
consider factors that influence the discount or premium, such as,
liquidity, due diligence costs, control and monitoring costs, capital
scarcity, information asymmetry, and anticipation of future performance.
|
|
◾ |
|
Financial
issues: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s financial condition; |
|
◾ |
|
Degree
of need for capital; |
|
◾ |
|
Use of
proceeds; |
|
◾ |
|
Effect
of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;
|
|
◾ |
|
Current
and proposed cash burn rate; |
|
◾ |
|
Going
concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.
|
|
◾ |
|
Management’s
efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a
process to evaluate alternatives: A fair, unconstrained process helps to
ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include
joint ventures, partnership, merger, or sale of part or all of the
company. |
|
◾ |
|
Control
issues: |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
37 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Change
in management; |
|
◾ |
|
Change
in control; |
|
◾ |
|
Guaranteed
board and committee seats; |
|
◾ |
|
Standstill
provisions; |
|
◾ |
|
Voting
agreements; |
|
◾ |
|
Veto
power over certain corporate actions; and |
|
◾ |
|
Minority
versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority
control premium. |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts
of interest: |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts
of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the
investor. |
|
◾ |
|
Were
the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s length? Are managerial
incentives aligned with shareholder interests?
|
|
◾ |
|
Market
reaction: |
|
◾ |
|
The
market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a
cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the
one-day impact
on the unaffected stock price. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Estimated
value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;
|
|
◾ |
|
Percentage
ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process
(particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee);
|
|
◾ |
|
The
cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of
reorganization addresses the cause(s); |
|
◾ |
|
Existence
of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Governance
of the reorganized company. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Valuation pre-merger value
of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the
target, if it is a private entity. |
|
◾ |
|
Market
reaction one-day impact
on the unaffected stock price. |
|
◾ |
|
Deal timing |
|
◾ |
|
Negotiations and
process |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts of
interest |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
38 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
third
party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target
because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair
market value of the target is at least equal to 80 perecnt of net assets
of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team
of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a
transaction to be completed within the
18-24 month
timeframe. |
|
◾ |
|
Voting
agreements |
|
◾ |
|
Governance |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case non-redeeming shareholders,
and any prior extension requests. |
|
◾ |
|
Length of
request |
|
◾ |
|
Pending
transaction(s) progression of the
acquisition process: |
|
◾ |
|
Added incentive for
non-redeeming shareholders |
|
◾ |
|
Prior extension
requests |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Tax
and regulatory advantages; |
|
◾ |
|
Planned
use of the sale proceeds; |
|
◾ |
|
Valuation
of spinoff; |
|
◾ |
|
Fairness
opinion; |
|
◾ |
|
Benefits
to the parent company; |
|
◾ |
|
Conflicts
of interest; |
|
◾ |
|
Managerial
incentives; |
|
◾ |
|
Corporate
governance changes; |
|
◾ |
|
Changes
in the capital structure. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Hiring
a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives;
|
|
◾ |
|
Selling
the company; or |
|
◾ |
|
Liquidating
the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders.
|
|
◾ |
|
Prolonged
poor performance with no turnaround in sight;
|
|
◾ |
|
Signs
of entrenched board and management (such as the adoption of takeover
defenses); |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
39 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Strategic
plan in place for improving value; |
|
◾ |
|
Likelihood
of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a
financial advisor. |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
40 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Maintain
appropriate
pay-for-performance |
|
2. |
Avoid
arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the
appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance
packages, and guaranteed compensation; |
|
3. |
Maintain
an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle
promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate
skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation
decision-making (
e.g. |
|
4. |
Provide
shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This
principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures
that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and
fairly; |
|
5. |
Avoid
inappropriate pay to
non-executive directors:
This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that
compensation to outside directors is reasonable and does not compromise
their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing
managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a
variety of generally accepted best practices.
|
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
There
is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance
(pay for performance); |
|
◾ |
|
The
company maintains significant problematic pay practices;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
board exhibits a significant level of
poor
communication and responsiveness to shareholders.
|
|
◾ |
|
There
is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP would otherwise be
warranted due to
pay-for-performance |
|
◾ |
|
The
board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received
less than 70 percent support of votes cast;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such
as option repricing or option backdating; or
|
|
◾ |
|
The
situation is egregious. |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
41 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Peer
Group
14 Alignment:
|
|
◾ |
|
The
degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the
CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a
three-year period. |
|
◾ |
|
The
rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer
group, each measured over a three-year period.
|
|
◾ |
|
The
multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the
most recent fiscal year. |
|
2. |
Absolute
Alignment
15 –
the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over
the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in
annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.
|
|
◾ |
|
The
ratio of performance- to time-based incentive awards;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
overall ratio of performance-based compensation to fixed or discretionary
pay; |
|
◾ |
|
The
rigor of performance goals; |
|
◾ |
|
The
complexity and risks around pay program design;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
transparency and clarity of disclosure; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s peer group benchmarking practices;
|
|
◾ |
|
Financial/operational
results, both absolute and relative to peers;
|
|
◾ |
|
Special
circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or
anomalous equity grant practices (e.g.,
bi-annual awards);
|
|
◾ |
|
Realizable
pay
16 compared
to grant pay; and |
|
◾ |
|
Any
other factors deemed relevant. |
|
◾ |
|
Problematic
practices related to
non-performance-based compensation
elements; |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
42 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Incentives
that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Pay
decisions that circumvent
pay-for-performance, |
|
◾ |
|
Repricing
or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder
approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater
options); |
|
◾ |
|
Extraordinary
perquisites or tax
gross-ups; |
|
◾ |
|
New
or materially amended agreements that provide for:
|
|
◾ |
|
Excessive
termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base
salary and average/target/most recent bonus);
|
|
◾ |
|
CIC
severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution
of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a
problematic Good Reason definition; |
|
◾ |
|
CIC
excise tax
gross-up entitlements
(including “modified”
gross-ups); |
|
◾ |
|
Multi-year
guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance
conditions; |
|
◾ |
|
Liberal
CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;
|
|
◾ |
|
Insufficient
executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs)
such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable
to the EMI’s executives is not possible; |
|
◾ |
|
Any
other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a
significant risk to investors. |
|
◾ |
|
Reason
and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs.
deliberate grant date changes; |
|
◾ |
|
Duration
of options backdating; |
|
◾ |
|
Size
of restatement due to options backdating;
|
|
◾ |
|
Corrective
actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or
re-pricing backdated
options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Adoption
of a grant policy that prohibits backdating and creates a fixed grant
schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.
|
|
◾ |
|
Failure
to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay
topics; or |
|
◾ |
|
Failure
to adequately respond to the company’s previous
say-on-pay |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the
frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants
(including whether independent directors participated);
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
43 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the
say-on-pay |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’
concerns; |
|
◾ |
|
Other
recent compensation actions taken by the company;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s ownership structure; and |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the
highest degree of responsiveness. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case change-in-control |
|
◾ |
|
Single-
or modified-single-trigger cash severance;
|
|
◾ |
|
Single-trigger
acceleration of unvested equity awards; |
|
◾ |
|
Full
acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in
control; |
|
◾ |
|
Acceleration
of performance awards above the target level of performance without
compelling rationale; |
|
◾ |
|
Excessive
cash severance (generally >3x base salary and bonus);
|
|
◾ |
|
Excise
tax
gross-ups triggered
and payable; |
|
◾ |
|
Excessive
golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of
transaction equity value); or |
|
◾ |
|
Recent
amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above)
or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make
packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be
in the best interests of shareholders; or |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on
shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
44 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case 17 depending
on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices,
where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice
versa, as evaluated using an “Equity Plan Scorecard” (EPSC) approach with
three pillars: |
|
◾ |
|
Plan Cost: |
|
◾ |
|
SVT
based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants,
plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and
|
|
◾ |
|
SVT
based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future
grants. |
|
◾ |
|
Plan Features:
|
|
◾ |
|
Quality
of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC);
|
|
◾ |
|
Discretionary
vesting authority; |
|
◾ |
|
Liberal
share recycling on various award types; |
|
◾ |
|
Lack
of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;
|
|
◾ |
|
Dividends
payable prior to award vesting. |
|
◾ |
|
Grant Practices:
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;
|
|
◾ |
|
Vesting
requirements in CEO’s recent equity grants
(3-year look-back);
|
|
◾ |
|
The
estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining
available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual
shares granted in the prior three years); |
|
◾ |
|
The
proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to
performance conditions; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company maintains sufficient post-exercise/vesting share-holding
requirements. |
|
◾ |
|
Awards
may vest in connection with a liberal
change-of-control |
|
◾ |
|
The
plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without
shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and
Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a
history of repricing – for
non-listed companies);
|
|
◾ |
|
The
plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant
pay-for-performance |
|
◾ |
|
The
plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or
|
|
◾ |
|
Any
other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact
on shareholder interests. |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
45 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Amend
the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of
such outstanding options or SARs; |
|
◾ |
|
Cancel
outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an
exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original
options or SARs; |
|
◾ |
|
Cancel
underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or
|
|
◾ |
|
Provide
cash buyouts of underwater options. |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
46 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Severity
of the
pay-for-performance |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the
other NEOs.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Addresses
administrative features only; or |
|
◾ |
|
Seeks
approval for Section 162(m) purposes
only ,
and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent
directors, per
ISS’
Classification of Directors . Note that if the company is presenting
the plan to shareholders for the first time for any reason (including
after the company’s initial public offering), or if the proposal is
bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will
be
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Seeks
approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering
committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per
ISS’
Classification of Directors. |
|
◾ |
|
If
the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments include a
term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, the
recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as
well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.
|
|
◾ |
|
If
the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including
after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being
requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard
evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
47 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
If
there is no request for additional shares and the amendments do not
include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award
type, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the
overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown
only for informational purposes.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Purchase
price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;
|
|
◾ |
|
Offering
period is 27 months or less; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the
outstanding shares. |
|
General Recommendation:
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Broad-based
participation; |
|
◾ |
|
Limits
on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed
as a percent of base salary; |
|
◾ |
|
Company
matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution,
which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
48 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
No
discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a
company matching contribution. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Historic
trading
patterns--the stock
price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back
“in-the-money” |
|
◾ |
|
Rationale
for the
re-pricing--was |
|
◾ |
|
Is
this a
value-for-value |
|
◾ |
|
Are
surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?;
|
|
◾ |
|
Timing--repricing should
occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock
price; |
|
◾ |
|
Option
vesting--does the
new option vest immediately or is there a
black-out period?;
|
|
◾ |
|
Term
of the
option--the term
should remain the same as that of the replaced option;
|
|
◾ |
|
Exercise
price--should be
set at fair market or a premium to market;
|
|
◾ |
|
Participants--executive officers
and directors must be excluded. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
General
Recommendation: One-time Transfers:
Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail
to submit
one-time transfers
to shareholders for approval. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
49 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Executive
officers and
non-employee directors
are excluded from participating; |
|
◾ |
|
Stock
options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount
to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a
Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; and
|
|
◾ |
|
There
is a
two-year minimum
holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.
|
|
◾ |
|
Eligibility;
|
|
◾ |
|
Vesting;
|
|
◾ |
|
Bid-price; |
|
◾ |
|
Term of
options; |
|
◾ |
|
Cost of
the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Option
repricing policy. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case non-employee director
compensation, based on the following factors: |
|
◾ |
|
If the
equity plan under which
non-employee director
grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and
|
|
◾ |
|
An
assessment of the following qualitative factors:
|
|
◾ |
|
The
relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a
similar profile; |
|
◾ |
|
The
presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
|
|
◾ |
|
Director
stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
|
|
◾ |
|
Equity
award vesting schedules; |
|
◾ |
|
The mix
of cash and equity-based compensation; |
|
◾ |
|
Meaningful
limits on director compensation; |
|
◾ |
|
The
availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case non-employee directors,
based on: |
|
◾ |
|
The
total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to
industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder
Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining
for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers
(in certain circumstances); and |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
50 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing
provision or liberal CIC vesting risk). |
|
◾ |
|
The
relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a
similar profile; |
|
◾ |
|
The
presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
|
|
◾ |
|
Director
stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
|
|
◾ |
|
Equity
award vesting schedules; |
|
◾ |
|
The mix
of cash and equity-based compensation; |
|
◾ |
|
Meaningful
limits on director compensation; |
|
◾ |
|
The
availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote against retirement plans for
non-employee directors.
Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for
non-employee directors.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place,
such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full
tenure); and |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking
disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use
of compensation consultants, such as company name, business
relationship(s), and fees paid. |
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking
additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, provided
the information requested is relevant to shareholders’ needs, would not
put the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its industry,
and is not unduly burdensome to the company. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
51 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to
adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements
and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or
awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned
salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of
unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in
lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or
equity plan proposals for which the broad-based employee population is
eligible. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
time period required to retain the shares;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership
requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by
executives; |
|
◾ |
|
Executives’
actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the
proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s
existing requirements; and |
|
◾ |
|
Problematic
pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus
long-term focus. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case non-executive employees.
The following factors will be considered: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of disclosure of its executive compensation
setting process, including how the company considers pay disparity;
|
|
◾ |
|
If any
problematic pay practices or
pay-for-performance |
|
◾ |
|
The
level of shareholder support for the company’s pay programs.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
First,
vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based
equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock,
indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly
restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a
“substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives.
Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the
criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further,
premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered
performance-based awards. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
52 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Second,
assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the
bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the
company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the
proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target
payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If
the company does not disclose the performance metric of the
performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal
regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case pay-for-superior |
|
◾ |
|
Set
compensation targets for the plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay
components at or below the peer group median;
|
|
◾ |
|
Deliver
a majority of the plan’s target long-term compensation through
performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards;
|
|
◾ |
|
Provide
the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and
non-financial performance
metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term
incentive components of the plan; |
|
◾ |
|
Establish
performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the
performance of the company’s peer companies;
|
|
◾ |
|
Limit
payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive
components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected
financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance.
|
|
◾ |
|
What
aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs
are performance driven? |
|
◾ |
|
If the
annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are
the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are
they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group?
|
|
◾ |
|
Can
shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on
the current disclosure? |
|
◾ |
|
What
type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to?
|
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for
certain principles regarding the use of prearranged trading plans
(10b5-1 plans) for
executives. These principles include: |
|
◾ |
|
Adoption,
amendment, or termination of a
10b5-1 Plan must be
disclosed within two business days in a
Form 8-K; |
|
◾ |
|
Amendment or
early termination of a
10b5-1 Plan is
allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the
board; |
|
◾ |
|
Ninety
days must elapse between adoption or amendment of a
10b5-1 Plan and
initial trading under the plan; |
|
◾ |
|
Reports
on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a
10b5-1 Plan;
|
|
◾ |
|
An
executive may not trade in company stock outside the
10b5-1 Plan;
|
|
◾ |
|
Trades
under a
10b5-1 Plan must be
handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for
the executive. |
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals seeking a policy to
prohibit any outside CEO from serving on a company’s compensation
committee, unless the company has demonstrated problematic pay practices
that raise concerns about the performance and composition of the
committee. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
53 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation:
: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
If the
company has adopted a formal recoupment policy;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
rigor of the recoupment policy focusing on how and under what
circumstances the company may recoup incentive or stock compensation;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has chronic restatement history or material financial
problems; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the
proponent; |
|
◾ |
|
Disclosure
of recoupment of incentive or stock compensation from senior executives or
lack thereof; or |
|
◾ |
|
Any
other relevant factors. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requiring that golden
parachutes or executive severance agreements be submitted for shareholder
ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval
prior to entering
into employment contracts. |
|
◾ |
|
The
triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average
annual taxable
W-2 compensation
during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control
occurs); |
|
◾ |
|
Change-in-control |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
frequency and timing of the company’s share buybacks;
|
|
◾ |
|
The use
of
per-share metrics
in incentive plans; |
|
◾ |
|
The
effect of recent buybacks on incentive metric results and payouts; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
there is any indication of metric result manipulation.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting
to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a
shareholder vote unless the company’s executive pension plans do not
contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide
plans. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
54 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to
adopt a policy of not poviding tax
gross-up payments
to executives, except in situations where
gross-ups are
provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to
management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate
tax equalization policy. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current treatment of equity upon employment termination and/or
in
change-in-control |
|
◾ |
|
Current
employment agreements, including potential poor pay practices such as
gross-ups embedded
in those agreements. |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
55 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
56 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case, |
|
◾ |
|
If
the issues presented in the proposal are more appropriately or effectively
dealt with through legislation or government regulation;
|
|
◾ |
|
If
the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner
to the issue(s) raised in the proposal; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly
prescriptive; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s approach compared with any industry standard practices for
addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation
associated with the company’s environmental or social practices;
|
|
◾ |
|
If
the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency,
whether reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to
shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources;
and |
|
◾ |
|
If
the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency,
whether implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential
information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company has already published a set of animal welfare standards and
monitors compliance; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s standards are comparable to industry peers; and
|
|
◾ |
|
There
are no recent significant fines, litigation, or controversies related to
the company’s and/or its suppliers’ treatment of animals.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
57 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company is conducting animal testing programs that are unnecessary or not
required by regulation; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company is conducting animal testing when suitable alternatives are
commonly accepted and used by industry peers; or
|
|
◾ |
|
There
are recent, significant fines or litigation related to the company’s
treatment of animals. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
potential impact of such labeling on the company’s business;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
quality of the company’s disclosure on GE product labeling, related
voluntary initiatives, and how this disclosure compares with industry peer
disclosure; and |
|
◾ |
|
Company’s
current disclosure on the feasibility of GE product labeling.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent
abuses; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the
products/practices in question; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has been subject to violations of related laws or serious
controversies; and |
|
◾ |
|
Peer
companies’ policies/practices in this area.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
58 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
potential for reputational, market, and regulatory risk exposure;
|
|
◾ |
|
Existing
disclosure of relevant policies; |
|
◾ |
|
Deviation
from established industry norms; |
|
◾ |
|
Relevant
company initiatives to provide research and/or products to disadvantaged
consumers; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the proposal focuses on specific products or geographic regions;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
potential burden and scope of the requested report;
|
|
◾ |
|
Recent
significant controversies, litigation, or fines at the company.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company already discloses similar information through existing reports
such as a supplier code of conduct and/or a sustainability report;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company has formally committed to the implementation of a toxic/hazardous
materials and/or product safety and supply chain reporting and monitoring
program based on industry norms or similar standards within a specified
time frame; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company has not been recently involved in relevant significant
controversies, fines, or litigation. |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of disclosure regarding its product safety
policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms;
|
|
◾ |
|
Current
regulations in the markets in which the company operates; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Recent
significant controversies, litigation, or fines stemming from
toxic/hazardous materials at the company. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Recent
related fines, controversies, or significant litigation;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company complies with relevant laws and regulations on the marketing
of tobacco; |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
59 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company’s advertising restrictions deviate from those of industry
peers; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company entered into the Master Settlement Agreement, which restricts
marketing of tobacco to youth; and |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
restrictions on marketing to youth extend to foreign countries.
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company complies with all laws and regulations;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
degree that voluntary restrictions beyond those mandated by law might hurt
the company’s competitiveness; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
risk of any health-related liabilities. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company already provides current, publicly-available information on
the impact that climate change may have on the company as well as
associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or
opportunities; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s level of disclosure compared to industry peers; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation
associated with the company’s climate change-related performance.
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company already discloses current, publicly-available information on the
impacts that GHG emissions may have on the company as well as associated
company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or
opportunities; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s level of disclosure is comparable to that of industry peers; and
|
|
◾ |
|
There
are no significant, controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation
associated with the company’s GHG emissions.
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company provides disclosure of year-over-year GHG emissions
performance data; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
company disclosure lags behind industry peers;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s actual GHG emissions performance;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current GHG emission policies, oversight mechanisms, and related
initiatives; and |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
60 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines,
litigation, or controversy related to GHG emissions.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company complies with applicable energy efficiency regulations and laws,
and discloses its participation in energy efficiency policies and
programs, including disclosure of benchmark data, targets, and performance
measures; or |
|
◾ |
|
The
proponent requests adoption of specific energy efficiency goals within
specific timelines. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
scope and structure of the proposal; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of disclosure on renewable energy use and GHG
emissions; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s disclosure of policies, practices, and oversight implemented to
manage GHG emissions and mitigate climate change risks.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is
reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and
business; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial
minority initiatives on the board and within the company.
|
|
◾ |
|
The
degree of existing gender and racial minority diversity on the company’s
board and among its executive officers; |
|
◾ |
|
The
level of gender and racial minority representation that exists at the
company’s industry peers; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s established process for addressing gender and racial minority
board representation; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the proposal includes an overly prescriptive request to amend nominating
committee charter language; |
|
◾ |
|
The
independence of the company’s nominating committee;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company uses an outside search firm to identify potential director
nominees; and |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding
equal employment practices. |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
61 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: EEO-1 data,
unless: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company publicly discloses equal opportunity policies and initiatives in a
comprehensive manner; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company already publicly discloses comprehensive workforce diversity data;
and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company has no recent significant
EEO-related violations
or litigation. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity
and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy on
fair and equitable compensation practices;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or
regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies
or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Local
laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of
ethnic and/or racial minorities. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of disclosure of its workplace health and safety
performance data, health and safety management policies, initiatives, and
oversight mechanisms; |
|
◾ |
|
The
nature of the company’s business, specifically regarding company and
employee exposure to health and safety risks;
|
|
◾ |
|
Recent
significant controversies, fines, or violations related to workplace
health and safety; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s workplace health and safety performance relative to industry
peers. |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s compliance with applicable regulations and guidelines;
|
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
62 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of disclosure regarding its security and safety
policies, procedures, and compliance monitoring; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
existence of recent, significant violations, fines, or controversy
regarding the safety and security of the company’s operations and/or
facilities. |
|
◾ |
|
Current
disclosure of applicable policies and risk assessment report(s) and risk
management procedures; |
|
◾ |
|
The
impact of regulatory
non-compliance, litigation,
remediation, or reputational loss that may be associated with failure to
manage the company’s operations in question, including the management of
relevant community and stakeholder relations;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
nature, purpose, and scope of the company’s operations in the specific
region(s); |
|
◾ |
|
The
degree to which company policies and procedures are consistent with
industry norms; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
scope of the resolution. |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of disclosure of relevant policies and oversight
mechanisms; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of such disclosure relative to its industry peers;
|
|
◾ |
|
Potential
relevant local, state, or national regulatory developments; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Controversies,
fines, or litigation related to the company’s hydraulic fracturing
operations. |
|
◾ |
|
Operations
in the specified regions are not permitted by current laws or regulations;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations
in these protected regions; or |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s disclosure of its operations and environmental policies in these
regions is comparable to industry peers. |
|
◾ |
|
The
nature of the company’s business; |
|
◾ |
|
The
current level of disclosure of the company’s existing related programs;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
timetable and methods of program implementation prescribed by the
proposal; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s ability to address the issues raised in the proposal; and
|
|
◾ |
|
How the
company’s recycling programs compare to similar programs of its industry
peers. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
63 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company already discloses similar information through existing reports or
policies such as an environment, health, and safety (EHS) report; a
comprehensive code of corporate conduct; and/or a diversity report; or
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting
program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar
standard within a specified time frame. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current disclosure of relevant policies, initiatives, oversight
mechanisms, and water usage metrics; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
or not the company’s existing water-related policies and practices are
consistent with relevant internationally recognized standards and
national/local regulations; |
|
◾ |
|
The
potential financial impact or risk to the company associated with
water-related concerns or issues; and |
|
◾ |
|
Recent,
significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding water
use by the company and its suppliers. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote against proposals restricting a company from
making charitable contributions. Charitable contributions are generally
useful for assisting worthwhile causes and for creating goodwill in the
community. In the absence of bad faith, self-dealing, or gross negligence,
management should determine which, and if, contributions are in the best
interests of the company. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
level of disclosure of company policies and procedures relating to data
security, privacy, freedom of speech, information access and management,
and Internet censorship; |
|
◾ |
|
Engagement
in dialogue with governments or relevant groups with respect to data
security, privacy, or the free flow of information on the Internet;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
scope of business involvement and of investment in countries whose
governments censor or monitor the Internet and other telecommunications;
|
|
◾ |
|
Applicable
market-specific laws or regulations that may be imposed on the company;
and |
|
◾ |
|
Controversies,
fines, or litigation related to data security, privacy, freedom of speech,
or Internet censorship. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
scope and prescriptive nature of the proposal;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has significant and/or persistent controversies or regulatory
violations regarding social and/or environmental issues;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has management systems and oversight mechanisms in place
regarding its social and environmental performance;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
degree to which industry peers have incorporated similar
non-financial performance
criteria in their executive compensation practices; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of disclosure regarding its environmental and
social performance. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
64 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting a report on
company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and
policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.
|
|
◾ |
|
The
degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally
recognized standards; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how;
|
|
◾ |
|
Company
participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally
recognized human rights initiatives; |
|
◾ |
|
Scope
and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of
workplace labor/human rights abuse; |
|
◾ |
|
Recent,
significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human
rights at the company or its suppliers; |
|
◾ |
|
The
scope of the request; and |
|
◾ |
|
Deviation
from industry sector peer company standards and practices.
|
|
◾ |
|
The
degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed,
including information on the implementation of these policies and any
related oversight mechanisms; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s industry and whether the company or its suppliers operate in
countries or areas where there is a history of human rights concerns;
|
|
◾ |
|
Recent
significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights
involving the company or its suppliers, and whether the company has taken
remedial steps; and |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the proposal is unduly burdensome or overly prescriptive.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements on workplace claims;
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or
regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements
on workplace claims; and |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that
could be affected by social or political disruption;
|
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
65 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Current
disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management
procedures; |
|
◾ |
|
Compliance
with U.S. sanctions and laws; |
|
◾ |
|
Consideration
of other international policies, standards, and laws; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has been recently involved in recent, significant
controversies, fines, or litigation related to its operations in
“high-risk” markets. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Controversies
surrounding operations in the relevant market(s);
|
|
◾ |
|
The
value of the requested report to shareholders;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current level of disclosure of relevant information on
outsourcing and plant closure procedures; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s existing human rights standards relative to industry peers.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to
preventing workplace sexual harassment; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or
regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or
initiatives compared to its industry peers.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote against reports on foreign military sales or
offsets. Such disclosures may involve sensitive and confidential
information. Moreover, companies must comply with government controls and
reporting on foreign military sales. |
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s current disclosure of relevant lobbying policies, and management
and board oversight; |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s disclosure regarding trade associations or other groups that it
supports, or is a member of, that engage in lobbying activities; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Recent
significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s
lobbying-related activities. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
66 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater
disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association
spending policies and activities, considering: |
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s policies, and management and board oversight related to its
direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other
groups that may be used for political purposes;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade
associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Recent
significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s
political contributions or political activities.
|
|
General
Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals asking a company to
affirm political nonpartisanship in the workplace, so long as:
|
|
◾ |
|
There
are no recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding
the company’s political contributions or trade association spending; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to
company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly
voluntary and prohibit coercion. |
I S S G
O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
67 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: Vote
case-by-case |
|
General
Recommendation: closed-end management
investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from
nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a
case-by-case opting-in to
a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a
by-law amendment
to a shareholder vote. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Past
performance as a
closed-end fund;
|
|
◾ |
|
Market
in which the fund invests; |
|
◾ |
|
Measures
taken by the board to address the discount; and
|
|
◾ |
|
Past
shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related praposals.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Past
performance relative to its peers; |
|
◾ |
|
Market
in which the fund invests; |
|
◾ |
|
Measures
taken by the board to address the issues; |
|
◾ |
|
Past
shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals;
|
|
◾ |
|
Strategy
of the incumbents versus the dissidents; |
|
◾ |
|
Independence
of directors; |
|
◾ |
|
Experience
and skills of director candidates; |
|
◾ |
|
Governance
profile of the company; |
|
◾ |
|
Evidence
of management entrenchment. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Proposed
and current fee schedules; |
|
◾ |
|
Fund
category/investment objective; |
|
◾ |
|
Performance
benchmarks; |
|
◾ |
|
Share
price performance as compared with peers; |
|
◾ |
|
Resulting
fees relative to peers; |
|
◾ |
|
Assignments
(where the advisor undergoes a change of control).
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
68 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
Stated
specific financing purpose; |
|
◾ |
|
Possible
dilution for common shares; |
|
◾ |
|
Whether
the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Potential
competitiveness; |
|
◾ |
|
Regulatory
developments; |
|
◾ |
|
Current
and potential returns; and |
|
◾ |
|
Current
and potential risk. |
|
Generally
vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not
fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with
the current SEC interpretation. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case non-fundamental restriction,
considering the following factors: |
|
◾ |
|
The
fund’s target investments; |
|
◾ |
|
The
reasons given by the fund for the change; and
|
|
◾ |
|
The
projected impact of the change on the portfolio.
|
|
General
Recommendation: non-fundamental. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Political/economic
changes in the target market; |
|
◾ |
|
Consolidation
in the target market; and |
|
◾ |
|
Current
asset composition. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case sub-classification, considering
the following factors: |
|
◾ |
|
Potential
competitiveness; |
|
◾ |
|
Current
and potential returns; |
|
◾ |
|
Risk
of concentration; |
|
◾ |
|
Consolidation
in target industry. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
◾ |
|
The
proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date no more
than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal,
as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
sale is deemed to be in the best interests of shareholders by (1) a
majority of the company’s independent directors and (2) a majority of
the company’s directors who have no financial interest in the issuance;
and |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
69 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
◾ |
|
The
company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by
either: |
|
◾ |
|
Outperforming
peers in its
8-digit GICS
group as measured by
one- and
three-year median TSRs; or |
|
◾ |
|
Providing
disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that
resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution
to existing
non-participating shareholders.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Strategies
employed to salvage the company; |
|
◾ |
|
The
fund’s past performance; |
|
◾ |
|
The
terms of the liquidation. |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
The
degree of change implied by the proposal; |
|
◾ |
|
The
efficiencies that could result; |
|
◾ |
|
The
state of incorporation; |
|
◾ |
|
Regulatory
standards and implications. |
|
◾ |
|
Removal
of shareholder approval requirement to reorganize or terminate the trust
or any of its series; |
|
◾ |
|
Removal
of shareholder approval requirement for amendments to the new declaration
of trust; |
|
◾ |
|
Removal
of shareholder approval requirement to amend the fund’s management
contract, allowing the contract to be modified by the investment manager
and the trust management, as permitted by the 1940 Act;
|
|
◾ |
|
Allow
the trustees to impose other fees in addition to sales charges on
investment in a fund, such as deferred sales charges and redemption fees
that may be imposed upon redemption of a fund’s shares;
|
|
◾ |
|
Removal
of shareholder approval requirement to engage in and terminate subadvisory
arrangements; |
|
◾ |
|
Removal
of shareholder approval requirement to change the domicile of the fund.
|
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case re-incorporations, considering
the following factors: |
|
◾ |
|
Regulations
of both states; |
|
◾ |
|
Required
fundamental policies of both states; |
|
◾ |
|
The
increased flexibility available. |
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Fees
charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
competitiveness of the fund in the industry;
|
|
◾ |
|
The
terms of the agreement. |
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
70 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Resulting
fee structure; |
|
◾ |
|
Performance
of both funds; |
|
◾ |
|
Continuity
of management personnel; |
|
◾ |
|
Changes
in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.
|
|
General
Recommendation: |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
General
Recommendation: case-by-case |
|
◾ |
|
Performance
of the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV); |
|
◾ |
|
The
fund’s history of shareholder relations; |
|
◾ |
|
The
performance of other funds under the advisor’s management.
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
71 of 72 |
|
U N I T E D S T A T E S P R O X Y V O T I N G G U I D E L I N E S |
|
|
|
|
|
I
S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M |
|
|
72 of 72 |
|
MAI-NFI-0121D |